Appointing Deputy and Pro Vice Chancellors in Pre-1992 English Universities: Managers, Management and Managerialism by Shepherd, Sue
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
Shepherd, Sue  (2015) Appointing Deputy and Pro Vice Chancellors in Pre-1992 English Universities:
Managers, Management and Managerialism.   Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) thesis, University
of Kent,.
DOI




A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PART FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF KENT FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
Appointing Deputy and 





























The roles of deputy and pro vice chancellors (DPVCs) are changing and so is the way they 
are being appointed.  This study examines (i) why many pre-1992 English universities are 
moving from an internal, fixed-term secondment model of DPVC appointment to one 
incorporating external open competition; and (ii) what the implications of change are for 
individual careers and management capacity building.  At a theoretical level, it explores the 
extent to which DPVC appointment practice is symptomatic of ideal-type managerialism 
and subjects the prevailing academic narrative - that the power of academics has declined 
in relation to that of managers - to critical examination in the light of the findings. 
The research, which uses a mixed-methods design incorporating a census, online survey 
and 73 semi-structured interviews, has generated some unexpected findings.  Notably, the 
opening up of DPVC posts to external open competition has resulted in a narrowing, rather 
than a diversification, of the gender and professional profile of successful candidates.  
Therefore, although this change to DPVC recruitment practice was motivated by a 
meritocratic  “quest for the best, ? it cannot be said to have improved management capacity 
in the sense of increasing the likelihood that the best candidates are attracted and 
appointed from the widest possible talent pool.  
On the contrary, the findings are suggestive of conservatism, homosociability and social 
closure, whereby academic managers maintain their privileged status by ring-fencing DPVC 
posts to the exclusion of other occupational groups.  DPVCs are also expanding their 
professional jurisdiction by colonisŝŶŐƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐƉĂĐĞ.  Far from 
declining, academicƐ ? power is thus being consolidated, albeit by a few elite career track 
academic managers.   
Moreover, although there is some evidence of a managerial ideology with respect to the 
DPVC appointment model, it is a context-specific  ‘academic-managerialism ? rather than a 
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This doctoral study investigates how and why the appointment of deputy and pro vice 
chancellors (hereafter abbreviated to DPVCs) is changing in pre-1992 English universities 
and examines the implications of that change for the careers of individual managers and, 
more broadly, for institutional management capacity building.  The prevailing academic 
narrative, which asserts that managerialism has pervaded universities and led to a shift in 
academic-manager power relations, is then subjected to critical analysis in the light of the 
findings. 
This introductory chapter outlines the structure of the thesis and provides essential 
background information, including definitions of key terms, before readers are presented 
with details of the research.  Section 4 explains the ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞas researcher.  
Section 5 then provides a brief overview of the research context prior to an exposition of 
the research aims, questions and parameters in Section 6.  The final section gives the 
rationale for the study and locates it within the literature. 
 
2. Thesis Structure 
The thesis consists of eight chapters.  As outlined above, this first chapter sets out the 
context for the research and the research aims and questions.  Chapter Two provides the 
conceptual and theoretical framework for the study, while Chapter Three locates it in 
empirical and historical context.  In Chapter Four, methodological and ethical issues are 
discussed and justified.  Chapter Five presents the findings in relation to the empirical 
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research questions on the drivers and outcomes of changed DPVC appointment practice.  
Further empirical evidence on the implications of change for management capacity building 
is presented in Chapter Six, which also begins the analysis of the findings.  This analysis is 
continued in Chapter Seven in ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?Ɛ theoretical research questions on 
managerialism and academic-manager power relations.  The conclusions are then given in 
Chapter Eight, together with a self-critique of the study and suggestions for further 
research.  
In terms of the approach taken to the writing of the thesis, essential quantitative data are 
summarised in tables within the main body of the text and supporting information is 
provided in the Appendices.  To aid readability, percentages given within the text are 
rounded up to the nearest whole number.  Frequent use is made of quotations from the 
literature in order to give direct voice to the authors and bring the text alive.  The relevant 
page number is given for all in-text references which include a direct quotation
1
.  A full list 
of references can be found at the end of the thesis.   
 
3. Definition of Terms 
For the purposes of this thesis the following definitions apply: 
Vice chancellor is the term used to describe the head of institution, whatever his or her 
specific job title (e.g. principal or warden). 
Deputy and pro vice chancellors (DPVCs) are the main focus of the study.  This generic 
term is used to describe those predominantly, but not exclusively, academic managers at 
the second tier of university management: that is, at the level immediately below the vice 
chancellor.  It is used to describe all managers in this group, whatever their specific job title.  
This includes deputy vice chancellors (DVCs) as well as pro vice chancellors (PVCs) even 
where, as is increasingly the case, the two co-exist with the former holding a distinctive 
role and status from the latter.  The abbreviations DVC and PVC are used whenever there is 
a need within the text to distinguish between these two sub-groups. 
                                                          
1
 The only exceptions are online articles or publications which have been accessed online and for 
which there are no page numbers.  
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Registrar is the term used to refer to the head of administration, whatever his or her 
specific job title (e.g. chief operating officer).   
Executive management team is the term employed to describe the most senior decision 
making body of the executive, as opposed to the governance, arm of the university.  This is 
the team that provides policy development and strategic management support to the vice 
chancellor.  Its core membership typically comprises the vice chancellor, DPVCs, registrar 
and director of finance.  Albeit they are on a similar level of seniority in many institutions, 
the latter two management posts are specifically excluded from the DPVC population 
except where they have been accorded a DVC or PVC title.  This reflects the different 
history and construction of these posts, which are filled by professional managers on a 
permanent contract basis.  
Third tier managers are those academic and professional services managers at the level 
below DPVCs who are not members of the executive management team.  On the academic 
side, these are usually deans.  However, in institutions where there the DPVC is also a dean, 
third tier managers are deemed to be those at the next level down the academic hierarchy: 
that is, heads of department or school.  On the administrative side, third tier managers are 
directors of professional services, such as estates, human resources or external relations, 
with a direct report to the registrar.  Figure 1 illustrates these top three tiers of 
management within a typical pre-1992 university structure. 
 





First Tier:   Vice Chancellor 
 
Second Tier:   Deputy and Pro Vice Chancellors (DPVCs) 
  Registrar and Director of Finance 
Third Tier:  Deans of Faculty (or Heads of Department or School) 
  Directors of Professional Services 
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The term DPVC appointment model is taken to comprise the following three elements:  
(i) Means of appointment, i.e. internal secondment or open competition 
(ii) Terms of appointment, i.e. tenure and contractual basis  
(iii) Role construction, i.e. portfolio and management responsibilities.  
Pre-1992 universities (or old universities) include the  ? ?ŶŐůŝƐŚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ “ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ
having the status of a university before the provisions of the Further and Higher Education 
Đƚ ? ? ? ?ĐĂŵĞŝŶƚŽĨŽƌĐĞ ?2 plus the Institute of Education (IOE) and School for Oriental and 
African Studies (SOAS).  The latter two institutions were included in the study population in 
order to ensure that all English members of the 1994 Group (a self-declared grouping of 
medium-sized research-intensive UK universities) and Russell Group (an association of 
major UK research-intensive universities) were incorporated within the analysis
3
.  A list of 
the 45 pre-1992 institutions falling within this definition is attached for reference as 
Appendix A.   
Post-1992 universities (or new universities) are those English higher education institutions 
that have been granted university status since 1992. 
Key concepts, such as managerialism and new public management (NPM), are defined in 
Chapter Two. 
 
4. Researcher Perspective 
4.1 Style and Approach 
I came to this doctoral study as a seasoned professional with extensive knowledge and 
experience of university management.  Having made the transition to higher education 
from the private sector I have worked for over fifteen years in a number of different roles 
within both pre- and post-1992 universities.  My choice of research subject is rooted in this 
professional experience, emanating from the identification of a real life work-based 
                                                          
2
 http://www.hero.ac.uk/reference_and_subject_resources/groups_and_organisations (accessed 
15/01/2009). 
3
 It was originally envisaged that comparisons between member institutions of the 1994 and Russell 
Groups might be undertaken.  However, the disbanding of the 1994 Group in 2013 means that any 
such comparisons would now have limited value.  Nevertheless, since data from the IOE and SOAS 
had already been collected, the decision was made to retain them within the definition of pre-1992 
universities and hence within the study population. 
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phenomenon: changing DPVC appointment models in pre-1992 universities.  I approached 
this issue as a reflective practitioner seeking to understand both its practical and 
theoretical significance.  These two complementary aims have informed the research 
questions and design from the outset.   
My preferred research style acknowledges the pivotal role played by the researcher in the 
research process and seeks to capitalise on what Maxwell (1996) terms experiential 
knowledge.  Accordingly, I have brought my prior knowledge and experience to the study 
and utilised it to inform the process of analysis and sense making, whilst guarding against 
forcing explanations upon the data.  I would characterise this approach as coming to the 
research with an open mind rather than an empty head (Dey 1993). 
Although my professional experience makes me an insider to the sector, I am an outsider 
with regard to my main study group, i.e. university DPVCs.  Indeed, as a higher education 
management consultant and former professional services director, it is likely that I have a 
quite different viewpoint from that of an academic manager.  This fact may be considered 
both a strength and potential weakness in relation to this study.  It is a strength in that it 
brings a new, and I would argue, welcome research perspective to an area of enquiry that 
(unsurprisingly perhaps) has hitherto been dominated by researchers from an academic 
background.  This strength would become a weakness, however, were it the case that one 
set of inherent biases and taken-for-granted assumptions were simply to be replaced by 
another. 
It is because I am aware of this danger that I have been transparent about my own 
background and perspective and demonstrated integrity throughout the course of the 
research both in terms of identifying and testing my own assumptions and biases and 
adopting a reflexive stance.  Moreover, I am committed to portraying as accurately as 
possible the worldview of my research participants, wherever possible in their own words, 
whilst ensuring that their anonymity is protected.  These concerns, which have 
underpinned my whole approach to the research design and implementation, are explored 
in more detail as part of the methodology discussion in Chapter Four. 
4.2 Voice 
I have taken the decision to make occasional use of the first person pronoun in the writing 
of this thesis.  Although I am aware that this may not be standard practice, I believe it is 
justified in the light of my particular researcher perspective, as described above.  Early 
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attempts to write certain sections of the thesis, such as the previous one, in the third 
person resulted in an awkward and stilted text.  This served to confirm my view that 
sparing and appropriate use of the first person pronoun would produce a text that is both 
more natural and more in keeping with the ethos of the research.  
5. Research Context 
This section provides a brief overview of the context within which this research takes place 
in the form of a high-level summary of recent changes within higher education and their 
impact on university management and the composition of the executive management team.  
A more detailed discussion of the historical and empirical context for the study is provided 
in Chapter Three.  
5.1 Higher Education Policy Environment 
UK higher education has been transformed over the last fifty years with major implications 
for the management of universities.  These changes include a huge expansion in student 
numbers with the move from an elite to a mass system; the end of the binary divide 
between pre-1992 universities and the former polytechnics; globalisation; intensified 
competition, both for students and resources; increased media scrutiny; the introduction of 
tuition fees; and the construction of students as consumers.  This metamorphosis has taken 
place within the context of severe funding constraints, whereby a significant decline in the 
amount of funding per student has led to pressure on institutions to increase and diversify 
their sources of income.  The global banking crisis, subsequent recession and cuts in 
government spending have further added to this financial pressure. 
During this period there has been a high level of state intervention and policy steer, 
particularly in relation to the social inclusion and enterprise agendas, and the imposition of 
an increased legislative, regulatory and accountability burden.  In the 1970s the public 
sector came under sustained government pressure for change and the resulting NPM 
reform agenda (Ferlie et al. 1996) saw it subjected to the forces of managerialism and 
neoliberalism in the quest for more efficient, cost-effective and relevant public services.  
Higher education also came under scrutiny and the commissioning of the Jarratt Report 
(CVCP 1985) was an early ŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽĞĨĨĞĐƚĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶ
the internal governance of universities in order to make them more efficient (Middlehurst 
2004).  This report, which recommended the adoption of business management structures 
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and decision-making processes, is widely seen as the turning point for the introduction of 
ƚŚĞ “ŶĞǁŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƐŝŶĐĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƉĞƌŵĞĂƚĞĚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ (Deem, 
Hillyard & Reed 2007, p. 22). 
At the same time, the move from an elite to a mass higher education system has led to a 
commodification of academic practice and conflict over the control of the curriculum and 
knowledge production  W areas in which academics have traditionally been unchallenged.  
This loss of professional autonomy is deemed to have resulted in the proletarianisation of 
academic life (Halsey 1992).  External regulation, audit and assessment have subjected 
academic work to explicit scrutiny, effectively demystifying it (Henkel 1997).  Working 
conditions have also deteriorated with the loss of tenure and the casualisation of contracts 
and there has been a steady decline in academic status relative to other occupational 
groups.  Furthermore, although traditional guild ideas of academic self-governance and 
autonomy have endured in the academic psyche, there has been a shift of power away 
ĨƌŽŵĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶance of what were once seen as their universities (Dearlove 2002).   
These changes have been unwelcome for many academics and something of a misery 
narrative has developed within the academic community (Shepherd 2014b) that rails 
against the corporatisation of universities and the rise of managerialism, and laments the 
perceived marginalisation of academics and decline in academic power in favour of that of 
managers (Vincent 2011, Currie & Vidovich 2010, Smith, P. & Hussey 2010). 
5.2 University Governance and Management 
As a result ŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĚƌŝǀĞĨŽƌĂŵŽƌĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ-like approach, the consensual 
model of university governance has given way to a corporate one, focusing on the 
governing body and its relationship to the executive (Shattock 2002).  Furthermore, the 
collegial organisational and cultural model, the collegium, has moved towards that of the 
bureaucracy and the corporation (McNay 1999).   
Meanwhile, the rapid expansion in the size of the sector and in the scale and complexity of 
its activities has meant that managerial capacity needed to be upgraded (Scott 1995).  
Accordingly, there has been a shift from administration to management in which the 
traditional civil service model of administration, characterised by neutral administrators 
working in a supportive role to the priorities of the academic community, has largely 
disappeared.  The cult of the gifted amateur has given way to an increasing 
professionalisation of the administration (Middlehurst 1993).  Generalist administrators 
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have been supplemented by specialist managers, such as those in marketing or estates 
management, often recruited from outside the sector.  The boundaries between academic 
and administrative roles and activity have arguably become less clear cut and the identities 
of administrators and managers have broadened, with implications for their future career 
development and aspirations (Whitchurch 2008b). 
The general trend towards a more managerial approach has typically taken the form of the 
consolidation of departments into schools and faculties, the devolution of budgets, the 
streamlining of committees and the emergence of a stronger executive (Middlehurst 2004).  
The  “ƐƚĞĞƌŝŶŐĐŽƌĞ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ, in the form of the executive management team, has 
also been strengthened over recent years (Clark, B. R. 2007, p. 5).  The role of the vice 
chancellor as chief executive and accounting officer has been more clearly defined, and the 
present incumbents perform a function not unlike that of their counterparts in the private 
sector (Bargh et al. 2000).  The DVC is increasingly a full-time, sometimes permanent, post 
with line management responsibility for heads of school or deans of faculty (Middlehurst 
2004).  Furthermore, the number of both DVCs and PVCs has been increasing and there is 
some evidence that they are taking on more wide-ranging portfolios outside traditional 
research and teaching and learning areas (Shepherd 2014a, Smith, D. & Adams 2008). 
Together with the registrar and director of finance, these academic managers form the 
core of the typical pre-1992 university executive management team.   
5.3 Executive Team Appointments and Profile  
The way that executive management team members are appointed has also been changing.  
There has been a shift towards a model of appointing vice chancellors for a shorter period 
of time, typically on a fixed-term basis of five years (Bargh et al. 2000).  Posts are now filled 
by competitive open recruitment and the use of executive search agencies has become 
almost universal (Shepherd 2011).  And, as the expectations and complexity of the vice 
ĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ ?Ɛ role have grown, so has the specificity and range of required attributes from 
potential candidates (Breakwell & Tytherleigh 2008a).  Despite these changes, however, 
the recruitment pattern has remained remarkably predictable.  Vice chancellors are an 
intellectual elite of predominantly white 50-something men chosen not only from within 
higher education, but usually from within the same sub-sector (Bargh et al. 2000).  It would 
appear that conservatism and the binary divide between pre- and post-1992 universities 
are both still very much in evidence in vice chancellor appointments. 
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Until recently, this divide has also continued at second tier management level.  Whilst the 
post-1992 universities externally recruit full-time and permanent DPVCs, pre-1992 
institutions have traditionally utilised an internal secondment model whereby DPVC 
appointments are made on a fixed-term, part-time basis from amongst the professoriate.  
However, the way DPVCs are appointed in pre-1992 universities has begun to change 
(Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).  The binary divide has been weakening as an increasing 
number of pre-1992 institutions supplement, or in a few cases replace, internal 
secondment with an external open competition appointment model, whereby posts are 
externally advertised and the services of an executive search agency may be utilised 
(Shepherd 2014c).  A comparison of the two models is given in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Traditional and New Variants of the DPVC Appointment Model 
 
 
Notwithstanding these recent changes to appointment practice, it appears that the 
demographic and professional profile of DPVCs has not changed significantly over the years 
(Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).  This is despite the increased complexity of the 
management task, the evolution of the role (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007) and the 
perceived emergence of a more managerial culture (Deem 2000).  Unlike in the National 
Health Service (NHS), where professional managers have been brought in at the most 
senior levels, in higher education academics have so far continued to fill the top 
management positions.    
 
Internal Secondment Model 
Appointment by invitation/selection 
Part time 
Fixed term 
Return to academic role 
 
External Open Competition Model 
External advertisement 
Executive search agencies 
Full time 
Fixed term or permanent 
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6. Research Aims and Questions 
6.1 Research Aims  
This study investigates the nature and drivers of recent change to the way DPVCs are 
appointed in pre-1992 English universities and the consequences of that change  W both 
intended and otherwise.  In addressing this issue the research has two overarching aims.  
The first is to ascertain whether this has been change for the better in terms of improving 
management capacity within the sector.  That is to say, whether it has increased the 
likelihood that the best possible candidates will be attracted and appointed from the 
widest possible pool of talent (UUK 2009). 
The second is to explore the theoretical significance of the findings for the notion of 
managerialism as ideology in a university context.  This will involve consideration of two 
main issues:  
(i) The extent to which change to the DPVC appointment model is symptomatic 
of an ideal-type managerialism (Chapter Two, 4.2); and  
(ii) The validity of the assumption that academic power is declining in inverse 
proportion to that of managers. 
In this way, it is intended to subject the prevailing academic narrative to critical 
examination in the light of the empirical findings.  This narrative holds that, as 
managerialism (loosely defined) has pervaded universities, so there has been a shift of 
power from academics to managers.  
It is recognised that these two aims are fundamentally different in nature.  This is a 
conscious decision that reflects the complementary professional and academic interests 
that prompted this enquiry (4.1) and have shaped its research design.  The first is 
concerned with informing management practice and is designed to have relevance and 
value for policy makers and higher education professionals.  The second seeks to achieve 
greater conceptual clarity and to generate theory, in the sense of meaningful explanations 
and insights from empirical data, about how the ideology of managerialism manifests itself 
in relation to changed DPVC appointment practice and what this implies for academic-
manager power relations.   
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6.2 Research Questions 
This study seeks to realise these aims by means of empirical investigation guided by the 
following central research questions.  These questions fall into two categories, reflecting 
the differing nature of the twin research aims described in the previous section.  The first 
two questions are essentially empirical in nature and the remaining three analytical and/or 
theoretical.   
Empirical Questions 
Q.1 What is the case for change to the DPVC appointment model? 
Q.2 What are the consequences of change for: 
a. The demographic and professional profile of appointed DPVCs? 
b. The careers of DPVCs appointed via external open competition? 
c. The career aspirations and progression of third tier managers? 
Analytical Questions 
Q.3 What are the implications of change for institutional management capacity building? 
Q.4 To what extent are the findings symptomatic of ideal-type managerialism? 
Q.5 What do the findings signify for academic-manager power relations? 
The choice of these research questions reflects my desire to elicit as rich and complete a 
view of the research phenomenon as possible and implies the use of multiple data sources 
and perspectives.  Accordingly, a mixed-methods research design is employed and research 
participants are drawn from all three top tiers of university management (Figure 1) to 
include both change agents (i.e. vice chancellors) and those most directly affected by the 
change (i.e. current and aspiring DPVCs).  Figure 3 illustrates the various categories of 
research participant chosen to provide a multiplicity of perspectives.  
The choice of specific methods and their use in relation to each of the above-mentioned 
research questions is discussed in Chapter Four, 4.3. 
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Figure 3: Multiple Perspectives on the Research Phenomenon 
 
 
6.3 Research Parameters 
This study centres on pre-1992 English universities.  Limiting the research geographically 
had the advantage of restricting the enquiry to those universities within a single higher 
education system, operating under the same policy and funding regime.  It also ensured 
that the fieldwork was feasible in terms of time and cost constraints.  The decision to limit 
the study population to pre-1992 universities was made on the basis that these institutions 
have ŵŽƌĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐNPM reform agenda than 
their post-1992 counterparts.  This is because their internal management and governance 
system, structure and culture have traditionally been less business-like, or managerial.  
Moreover, the pre-1992 sub-group of universities are a stable population unlike post-1992 
universities, which are growing in number year on year as more higher education 
institutions are awarded university status.   
The specific example of change examined in this study is the movement of many of these 
pre-1992 universities away from an internal secondment model of DPVC appointment to 
one incorporating external open competition, more akin to the practice of post-1992 
institutions and the private sector.  Accordingly, the initial data collection process (via a 
census and online survey), which is concerned with gaining a macro-level overview of the 
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semi-structured interview phase then focuses in on those pre-1992 institutions that have 
made changes to their DPVC appointment model.  More details on study populations and 
sampling strategy are given in Chapter Four. 
Other, sometimes difficult, decisions about research parameters had to be made.  This 
decision-making process was guided by two main considerations: a desire to maintain a 
clear and coherent research focus and to ensure the feasibility of the study within the 
timeframe.  On this basis it was decided that a detailed examination of the following would 
have to remain outside the scope of this empirical enquiry: 
x What DPVCs do and how well they perform 
x The perspective of rank-and-file university staff on changes to the DPVC 
appointment model 
x Non-NPM-related factors that have impacted upon university management, 
for example globalisation and the introduction of tuition fees 
x Wider diversity issues in higher education. 
Also beyond the scope of this study is an analysis of the difference between management 
and leadership, a topic that could easily form the subject for a thesis in its own right.  I take 
the view that these are essentially complementary activities, frequently carried out by the 
ƐĂŵĞƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĂ “ĚǇƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽŝƐŶŽƚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇŚĞůƉĨƵů
(Mintzberg 2004, p. 22).  Accordingly, unless otherwise specified, I have made a pragmatic 
decision to use the term management in this thesis in preference to that of leadership, but 
in the sense of incorporating elements of both activities.   
 
7. Rationale 
The research is both important and timely.  This section summarises why this is the case 
and indicates how the research builds upon, and addresses gaps in, existing knowledge.  
Firstly, in challenging economic times and a fast-moving and competitive higher education 
environment, the quality of university management  W especially at executive management 
team level  W has arguably never been more important.  Nevertheless, although there is an 
extensive literature in the field of higher education management within which this study is 
primarily located (Shattock 2003, Bargh et al. 2000, Watson 2000, Middlehurst 1993, Green 
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1988), the amount of published work on the university executive management team 
remains very limited and the phenomenon of the top team in practice remains relatively 
unexplored (Kennie & Woodfield 2008b). 
Secondly, as effective strategic management becomes more critical, so does the need to 
secure the best people for the most senior management jobs.  However, despite being 
identified as an important policy issue (Deem 2000), there is little documented research or 
other evidence on the recruitment and selection of executive management team members 
in the UK (Kennie & Woodfield 2008a) and it has been recognised that this is an area 
worthy of further investigation (Middlehurst 2004).  The empirical work that has been 
carried out to date has focused on the appointment of vice chancellors (Goodall 2009, 
Breakwell & Tytherleigh 2008a, Bargh et al. 2000).  There is now a need to extend this to 
DPVC level and to examine the strengths and weaknesses of current approaches, including 
the utilisation of executive search agencies (Kennie & Woodfield 2008a).     
Thirdly, DPVCs are of pivotal importance to effective university management.  They 
perform a distinctive and vital role in support of the vice chancellor, as policy developers 
and catalysts for action (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).  Moreover, they form the main 
recruitment pool from which future university leaders will be appointed.  They 
nevertheless remain an under-researched and under-theorised group that warrants further 
empirical enquiry (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).   
DPVCs have rarely been the subject of research in their own right, though they have been 
included in a few wider studies of university senior management (Middlehurst 2004, Deem 
2000).  Relatively little was known about how they are appointed or what they do until a 
recent project on the evolution of the DPVC role between 1960 and 2005 (Smith, D., Adams 
& Mount 2007).  This doctoral study builds upon and updates elements of this work in 
relation to the demographic profile, professional background and appointment of DPVCs.  
In doing so, it provides an opportunity to examine one important aspect of how pre-1992 
universities are changing their approach to management. 
Fourthly, now that it has been empirically established that a number of pre-1992 
universities are beginning to change their DPVC appointment model (Shepherd 2011), with 
potentially far-reaching and long-lasting consequences (particularly where permanent 
DPVC appointments are being made), it is timely to examine the implications of this change  
in order to inform future practice in this area.   
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Fifthly, higher education management is an issue of policy as well as practical significance.  
Successive governments have remained ambivalent at best about the quality of university 
leadership (Smith, D. & Adams 2008).  Despite the fact that universities have performed 
extraordinarily well in a number of areas including research quality, student satisfaction 
and contribution to economic growth (Watson 2002), their management and governance 
has been an enduring government concern, as evidenced, for example, by the Dearing 
Review in 1997, the Lambert Review in 2003 and the establishment of the Leadership 
Foundation for Higher Education in 2004.  University management continues to be viewed 
ĂƐƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐĂŶĚĂƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ ?ƌĞŵĂŝŶƐ(Watson 2008, p. 11). 
Finally, the standard discourse within the academic community in relation to 
managerialism and its impact on academic power warrants investigation.  A prevailing 
academic narrative can be discerned from the higher education management literature 
(Vincent 2011, Currie & Vidovich 2010, Smith, P. & Hussey 2010), specialist media such as 
Times Higher Education, and day-to-day conversations amongst university colleagues which 
holds that managerialism is all-pervasive and has resulted in the loss of academic power in 
favour of managers.  It has been acknowledged that this rhetoric needs to be subjected to 
critical examination in the light of actual behaviour and to take into account a range of 
different perspectives (Locke & Bennion 2011).  This study seeks to do just that in relation 
to one specific aspect of current management practice: the DPVC appointment model. 
In so doing, this study addresses the lack of systematic research concerning the impact of 
recent public sector reforms on the management of English universities.  Hitherto, there 
has been a tendency to regard higher education as a specific field.  However, given that its 
similarities to other professionalised public services are probably greater than the 
differences, the value of looking at it from a public management perspective and in the 
context of wider public sector reform has been recognised (Ferlie, Musselin & Andresani 
2008).  Although emanating from a desire to understand the specific phenomenon of DPVC 
appointment practice, this study also serves as a case study examining one particular 
aspect of the impact of NPM reform on organisational management and governance in a 
university context.   
At a theoretical level it further develops the work of Deem et al  (2007) on the nature of 
 “ŶĞǁŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ? in higher education and extends to higher education Exworthy and 
,ĂůĨŽƌĚ ?Ɛ(1999) analysis of how public sector reforms are impacting upon professional-
managerial dynamics.   
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It is anticipated that the research will have both scholarly merit and professional value and 
be of interest to a diverse audience of higher educational researchers, practitioners and 
policy makers.   
 
8. Summary 
I approached this study as a reflective practitioner with extensive experience of working 
within higher education, and my choice of research topic emanates from professional 
interest in an observed work-based phenomenon: that is, changing DPVC appointment 
models in pre-1992 universities.  In this thesis I explore the reasons for this change and its 
consequences, both for individual careers and for management capacity building. 
This research matters because DPVCs not only play an important management role in their 
own right, but also form the main recruitment pool from which the next generation of vice 
chancellors will be drawn.  The appointment of ƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐDPVCs therefore has a knock-on 
effect for future institutional leadership.  Furthermore, given the challenge and complexity 
of managing the modern university, it is crucial that the best people are appointed to DPVC 
posts from the widest possible talent pool.  In order to ensure this outcome, it would be of 
value to both policy makers and practitioners to have a better understanding of recent 
changes to the way DPVCs are appointed and their consequences.  A high level of interest is 
already being shown in this study by vice chancellors, the specialist higher education media 
and the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education.   
At a theoretical level, the study examines the significance of a changing DPVC appointment 
model both for managerialism as ideology in a higher education context and for the 
seemingly taken-for-granted assumption that academic power is in decline.  This is a 
debate which is heavy on rhetoric and opinion and light on empirical research and 
considered analysis.  This thesis aims to address this imbalance. 
As a first step in this process, the following chapter brings greater conceptual clarity to the 
topic by exploring the origins and definition of managerialism and related concepts, such as 
NPM and neoliberalism.  An ideal-type model of managerialism is then proposed.  The 
second half of Chapter Two outlines the prevailing academic narrative concerning the 
impact of NPM reform and managerialism on academic work, status and power. 







Central to this thesis is an examination of two commonly made assumptions: that 
managerialism (loosely defined) is all pervasive in higher education, and that it has led to a 
diminution of academic in favour of managerial power.  This chapter discusses the key 
concepts essential to an understanding of these assumptions and the ideas, theories and 
evidence that underpin them.  This discussion is based on a reading not only of the higher 
education policy and management literature, but also that drawn from the fields of 
management and public administration. 
The first half of the chapter attempts to bring greater conceptual clarity to the notion of 
managerialism in two ways.  Firstly, managerialism is considered in relation to two cognate 
concepts with which it is often confused or conflated: neoliberalism and new public 
management (NPM).  Though closely related I conceive of all three as distinct phenomena, 
with managerialism and neoliberalism comprising the twin ideological foundations of NPM.  
Secondly, an ideal-type model of managerialism is developed that sets out ƚŚĞŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ ?Ɛ 
core tenets, or claims.  These are presented in Figure 4 together with examples of 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛmain practical manifestations.   
Based on this ideal type, potential indicators of each ideological tenet are proposed in 
relation to DPVC appointment practice (Table 1).  These indicators form an essential part of 
the research design as they provide a means of linking the theoretical model to what the 
empirical findings suggest is happening in practice (Chapter Six). 
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The second half of the chapter explores the perceived impact of the NPM reform agenda, 
especially managerialism, upon higher education.  Specifically, it presents the prevailing 
academic narrative about changes to academic work and working conditions, as well as to 
academic status and power.  The effects of NPM on university governance and 
management and the composition of executive management teams are then explored in 
Chapter Three. 
 
2. New Public Management 
NPM is a contested concept with no single agreed definition.  Moreover, there is a lack of 
clear delineation between NPM and managerialism; the two terms are sometimes used 
interchangeably as alternative descriptions of the same thing, ŽƌĂƐ “ƌŝǀĂůĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?ŽĨ
public sector management reform emanating from different theoretical perspectives 
(Deem & Brehony 2005, p. 219).  As already noted, I take the view that NPM and 
managerialism should be considered as related, yet discrete, phenomena.  Managerialism 
New Public Management (NPM) 
Managerialism 
Ideology 
1. Management is important and a good thing 
2. Management is a discrete function 
3. Management is rational and value neutral 
4. Management is generic and universally 
applicable 






2. Cost control  
3. Target setting 
4. Performance 
     management 
5. Accountability 
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thus can and does exist outside of a public sector context.  The following sections explore 
and define both terms as well as that of their conceptual cousin, neoliberalism.  
NPM is a multifaceted concept with complex intellectual and political roots.  In broad terms 
it can be seen as a new paradigm that represents a distinctly different approach to the 
provision of public services (Clarke, Gerwitz & McLaughlin 2000).  More specifically, it refers 
to the sustained set of reforms of the public sector (and its underpinning doctrines) from 
the 1980s onwards that represents a shift away from the traditional model of public 
administration (Hood 1991).  These reforms have resulted in a blurring of the division 
between the public and private sectors with the former recast in the image of the business 
world (Newman 2000).   
This section examines the origins of NPM and its evolution over time, and considers the 
problems to which NPM was deemed a necessary solution.  Although the focus here is on 
the UK experience, it should be noted that NPM is not a uniquely British development and, 
indeed, it has been described as one of the most striking international trends in public 
administration (Hood 1991).  
2.1 Origins of NPM 
There is no single explanation or interpretation of why NPM caught on (Hood 1991).  
Although often associated with the politics of the New Right, it is likely that the 
introduction of NPM had its roots in socio-economic as well as purely political factors 
(Farnham & Horton 1996).  These include the rapid development of information and 
communications technology, globalisation and ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ
competitiveness   
The worldwide recession in the mid-1970s, prompted by the oil crisis following the Arab-
/ƐƌĂĞůŝǁĂƌ ?ŚŝƚƌŝƚĂŝŶ ?ƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇƐůŽǁŝŶŐĞĐŽŶŽŵǇƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇhard.  The combination of a 
challenging economic environment and rising public expenditure brought arguments about 
the appropriate scope and scale of the public sector to the fore and led to a search for new 
political and economic ideas.  The political consensus around the so-called post-war 
settlement, characterised by a mixed economy based on Keynesian economics and the 
creation of a welfare state with universal social services, began to come under increasing 
strain (Farnham & Horton 1996).   
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The then Labour government started the process of cutting public expenditure and curbing 
the money supply in monetarist fashion in order to try to reduce inflation (Farnham & 
Horton 1996).  The idea that it was the Thatcher government which brought a sudden end 
to the post-war consensus and the welfare state is thus somewhat over-simplistic (Flynn, N. 
2002) and clichéd (Rhodes 1994).  It was rather ƚŚĂƚdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĂƐŬĞĞŶĞƌ
and better placed to reduce public spending and the size of the state than had been 
previous governments (Flynn, N. 2002).  Accordingly, the drive to curb public expenditure 
ŝŶƚĞŶƐŝĨŝĞĚĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? 
This context did not make NPM reforms inevitable, however.  Pollitt, for example, is 
ƵŶĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞĚďǇǁŚĂƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐƚŚĞ “ƵŶƐƚŽƉƉĂďůĞĨŽƌĐĞƐ ?ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞƌŝƐĞŽĨEWD
(2003, pp. 35-36).  Firstly, because it fails to account for the fact that some countries facing 
the same conditions (for example, Germany and Japan) did not take an NPM route  W at 
least not until much more recently - and secondly, because it is too deterministic and 
places insufficient emphasis on human agency.  Pollitt views NPM aƐ “ĐŚŽƐĞŶ ?ďǇƉƵďůŝĐ
servants and politicians to solve ƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚƉƌŽďůĞŵƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ “ĐĂƵƐĞĚ ?(2003, pp. 36-37).   
He argues that governments and other influential organisations, such as the Organisation 
for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and the World Bank, promoted the 
easy-to-understand and fashionable ideas of NPM on the promise of financial savings and 
greater political control and contends that NPM reforms were not primarily ideological in 
basis.  In support of this latter argument, he cites the fact that social-democratic or labour 
governments, such as those in Australia and New Zealand, have been some ŽĨEWD ?ƐŵŽƐƚ
active proponents.  Others have also made the point that the development of NPM in a 
range of different political contexts suggests its rise could not be solely a function of the 
New Right (Ferlie et al. 1996). 
NPM is nevertheless closely associated with ƚŚĞEĞǁZŝŐŚƚ ?ƐƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚ in particular 
their critique of the Keynesian welfare state as: 
x Creating a culture of dependency and weakening personal responsibility 
x Supplier led, providing what professionals and bureaucrats think people want 
rather than what they actually want 
x Not subject to effective democratic control 
x Neglecting other areas of welfare, such as community or voluntary bodies 
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x Fundamentally inefficient due to its monopoly status and macroeconomic 
management  
x Weakening economic growth and private enterprise.  
(Farnham & Horton 1996) 
Based on this critique, the New Right were able to prepare the way for NPM reforms by 
telling  “ĂǀĞƌǇĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƚŽƌǇ ?ĂďŽƵƚĂůůƚŚĂƚǁĂƐǁƌŽŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁĞůĨĂƌĞƐƚĂƚĞ, including 
spiralling costs ĂŶĚ “ƐĐƌŽƵŶŐĞƌƐ ? on benefits (Clarke & Newman 1997, pp. 14-15).  In their 
view, ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞŚĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞƚŽŽďŝŐĂŶĚǁĂƐƚĞĨƵůĂŶĚǁĂƐ “ĐƌŽǁĚŝŶŐŽƵƚ ?ƚŚĞŐƌŽǁƚŚŽĨƚŚĞ
private sector (Pollitt 1990, pp. 43-44).  Accordingly, the main focus of the Thatcher 
government was to reduce the size of the public sector and, where privatisation was not 
possible (as in the case of health and education), to increase the efficiency of what pubic 
services remained (Pollitt 1990).   
The public sector was not only viewed as inefficient, but also as self-interested and 
unresponsive to the public.  Its very purpose came under attack and public spending came 
to be regarded as an unproductive cost rather than a social investment (Clarke & Newman 
1997, Ranson & Stewart 1994).  The Thatcher government described the public sector in 
 “ĂůŵŽƐƚĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇƉĞũŽƌĂƚŝǀĞƚĞƌŵƐ ?(McSweeney 1994, p. 237) and this hostility led to a 
determination to effect reform.  The private sector was held up as a model for the public 
sector to emulate.  It was argued that oŶůǇ “ďy making public sector organisations and their 
management look as much like tŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?would performance be 
improved (Ranson & Stewart 1994, p. 26).   
From a New right perspective, the traditional form of public administration, the 
bureaucracy, and the professionals who worked within it were both identified as problems 
that needed to be tackled (Flynn, N. 2002).  The Weberian impersonal, procedural and 
mechanistic bureaucratic model, though effective in conditions of relative stability, was 
deemed unsuited to the rapidly changing and unpredictable world of the 1980s (du Gay 
2000).  In contrast to the supposed fleet-footedness and efficiency of the new Asian 
 “ƚŝŐĞƌƐ ? ?ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇǁĂƐƐĞĞŶĂƐƚŚĞ “ďĂĚŽůĚĚŝŶŽƐĂƵƌ ?(Pollitt 2003, p. 33).  The 
stereotype of the bureaucracy was of a rule-bound, inflexible, costly, inward-looking and 
hierarchical organisation run by bureaucrats in their own self-interest (Flynn, N. 2002) 
rather than in the public interest (Boyne et al. 2003).  Bureaucrats were portrayed as 
 “ŚŝĚŝŶŐďĞŚŝŶĚ ‘ƌĞĚƚĂƉĞ ? ?ŽƵƚŽĨƚŽƵĐŚĂŶĚĞŵƉŝƌĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ?(Clarke & Newman 1997, p. 
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15), while adherence to procedure and acceptance of hierarchy were viewed as antithetical 
to the desired enterprise culture (du Gay 2000). 
This portrĂǇĂůŝƐĂĐĂƌŝĐĂƚƵƌĞŽĨĐŽƵƌƐĞĂŶĚ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ĞǆĂŐŐĞƌĂƚĞƐƉƵďůŝĐďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂĐǇ ?Ɛ
potential faults and fails to recognise its many virtues.  These include an emphasis on due 
process, equity of treatment, probity and accountability (Ferlie et al. 1996).  At its best 
bureaucracy offers standardised and predictable outputs based on rules and regulations, 
administered by neutral trained staff who deal with each case fairly (Clarke & Newman 
1997).  Pollitt questions the assumption that bureaucracies were not sufficiently customer 
focused (2003) and for du Gay, the representation of public bureaucracies as outmoded, 
inefficient and unresponsive failed to take account of their crucial ethical and political role 
(2000).  Nevertheless, as du Gay notes, advocates of NPM were incapable of seeing public 
bureaucracy in anything other than a negative light. 
The second perceived problem was that of professionals.  Their claim to monopoly 
provision of certain services was viewed by the New Right as a restraint on trade that had 
led to an undersupply of overly expensive services (Pollitt 1990).  Organisations regulated 
by professionals were seen as problematic since professionals were deemed to be 
fundamentally self-serving and not to be trusted to manage themselves effectively (Flynn, 
N. 2002).  Rather, they were perceived as detached from the real world and/or too trendy 
and liberal (Clarke & Newman 1997) and therefore in need of being brought under political 
control (Flynn, N. 2002).  Indeed, Pollitt (1990) ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƉĂƌƚŽĨEWD ?ƐĂƉƉĞĂůǁĂƐƚŚĞ
opportunity it provided to more closely manage the work of independent-minded 
professionals, such as doctors and academics.  The impact of NPM on the latter is the 
subject of the second half of the chapter.  
2.2 Characteristics of NPM in Practice 
NPM is a broadly based organisational phenomenon driven from the top and evident 
across a large number of public service settings over a long period of time.  Despite its scale 
and longevity, however, there is a tendency in the literature to adopt an over-coherent 
view of NPM that conflates policy and practice (Clarke, Gerwitz & McLaughlin 2000, p. 7) 
and fails to recognise how it has evolved over time.  This section provides a brief summary 
of its practical manifestations and different variants, while the following sections consider 
its ideological components. 
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The following main characteristics of NPM in practice can be identified, evidencing both its 
neoliberal and managerial roots:  
x A rational approach to management (e.g. strategic planning and objective 
setting) 
x A strengthening of the line management function (e.g. performance 
management) 
x Flat, rather than hierarchical, structures with devolved responsibilities to 
executive units 
x Adoption of human resource management (HRM) techniques to secure 
employee commitment 
x Greater flexibility of pay and conditions 
x Introduction of a more business-like and entrepreneurial culture 
x ĨŽĐƵƐŽŶǀĂůƵĞĨŽƌŵŽŶĞǇĂŶĚ ‘ĚŽŝŶŐŵŽƌĞǁŝƚŚůĞƐƐ ? 
x A shift from inputs and processes to outputs and outcomes 
x More measurement and quantification of outputs (e.g. performance indicators) 
x An emphasis on service quality and consumer orientation and choice 
x A shift of priorities from universalism to individualism 
x The introduction of market-type mechanisms and competition 
x The growth of contractual relationships (e.g. purchaser-provider) 
x A blurring of public-private sector boundaries and more scope for private 
sector provision      
(Pollitt 2003, Farnham & Horton 1996, Ferlie et al. 1996, Ranson & Stewart 1994, 
Hood 1991) 
Such a high-level summary inevitably runs the risk of over-simplification.  In reality, the 
NPM reform agenda has endured over a number of years and the ideas underpinning it 
have evolved during that time, generally in tune with developments in management theory. 
There was thus no simple shift from public administration to NPM and different variants or 
phases of NPM can be discerned.  Ferlie et al identify four distinct NPM models, or ideal 
types:  “ƚŚĞĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĚƌŝǀĞ ? ? “ĚŽǁŶƐŝǌŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? “ŝŶƐĞĂƌĐŚŽĨĞǆĐĞůůĞŶĐĞ ?
ĂŶĚ “ƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŽƌŝĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?(1996, pp. 11-15).  Though the first of these is described as 
the earliest, and the fourth as the most recent, these models are not seen as a purely 
chronological development of NPM.   
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Rhodes, meanwhile, ƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚEWD ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂů “ƚŚƌƵƐƚ ?ǁĂƐĂůůĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ “ ?Ɛ ? (economy, 
efficiency and effectiveness)  and the exercise of hierarchical control (1994, p. 144).  He 
argues that this narrow conception of management later broadened somewhat as the era 
ŽĨƚŚĞŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ƐŚĂƌƚĞƌĚĂǁŶĞĚĂŶĚĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĐĂŵĞƚŽƚŚĞĨŽƌĞ.  Ranson and 
Stewart (1994) observe two distinct phases of public service reform based on different 
strategies: corporatism and consumerism.  The former, initiated in the face of financial 
crisis by Labour and continued by the Thatcher government, was concerned primarily with 
centralising power by means of the corporate state.  This strategy was rejected in the 
ŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞƐ ? ƐĞĐŽŶĚĂŶĚƚŚŝƌĚƚĞƌŵƐĂŶĚƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚďǇŽŶĞŽĨ “ĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂƐ
ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞŵĂƌŬĞƚŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ ?(1994, p. 13). 
New Labour continued NPM reforms undĞƌƚŚĞďĂŶŶĞƌŽĨ “ŵŽĚĞƌŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?and a narrative 
of imperative: that public services had to change and innovate in order to meet the 
business and consumer needs of the modern world (Newman 2000, p. 45).  These reforms 
shifted the emphasis from short-term efficiency gains to longer-term effectiveness and 
from competition to collaboration.  Accordingly, tŚĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨ “ĚŽǁŶƐŝǌŝŶŐ ? ? “ŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?
ĂŶĚ “ĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐŽƵƚ ?ǁĂƐƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚďǇƚŚĂƚŽĨ “ďĞƐƚǀĂůƵĞ ? ? “ƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐŚŝƉƐ ?ĂŶĚ
 “ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƌĞŶĞǁĂů ?ŝŶĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚ at distance the modernisation agenda from 
Thatcherite NPM reform (Newman 2000, p. 46).  However, the degree to which New 
Labour reforms were actually different from the earlier efficiency-driven ones is debateable. 
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to undertake a critique of NPM, two points are 
worth noting.  Firstly, the main problem with NPM is seen to be its assumption that private 
sector practice is applicable to the public sector.  For many critics, NPM has adopted the 
worst features of private sector management without due regard to the fundamental 
differences between the two sectors (Ranson & Stewart 1994).  Secondly, some academic 
commentators  W particularly those from the public administration tradition, such as Hood 
and Pollitt  W appear to be ideologically opposed to NPM and slow or unwilling to concede 
that the old bureau-professionalism model was no longer optimal and that change was 
required (Hughes 2003).  In considering why NPM caught on, Hughes argues that Hood 
(1991) therefore neglects the simplest and most important explanation, which was that 
ƉƵďůŝĐĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ “ĚŝĚŶŽƚǁŽƌŬĂŶǇŵŽƌĞ ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐǁŝĚĞůǇƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐŶŽƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?
(2003, p. 50).     
 
Susan Shepherd Chapter Two: Managerialism and the Academic Narrative 
25 
 
2.3 Ideological Roots of NPM 
Although EWDŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ “ƉŽƚƉŽƵƌƌŝŽĨŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?(Pollitt 1990, p. 46), it is 
possible to identify two main ideological strands that have informed its development.  The 
first of these has been variously termed the ideology of the New Right (Clarke & Newman 
1997) ? “ŶĞǁŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐ ?(Hood 1991, p. 5), neoliberalism or marketisation.  
The second is managerialism.  dŽŐĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƐĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚ “ĂŵĂƌƌŝĂŐĞŽĨƚǁŽĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶt 
ƐƚƌĞĂŵƐŽĨŝĚĞĂƐ ?ƚŚĂƚŵĂǇŽƌŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞĨƵůůǇĐŽŵƉĂƚŝďůĞ(Hood 1991, p. 5).   
Though sometimes conflated in the literature, neoliberalism and managerialism, described 
in turn in the following sections, are not synonymous.  Whereas neoliberalism is 
individualistic, managerialism has the organisation as its basic social unit (Enteman 1993).  
Neoliberalism is primarily concerned with economics and has  “a definite political 
ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ “ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐĂƌĞƚŚĞŐƵŝĚŝŶŐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?
which holds that all problems have managerial solutions (Klikauer 2013, p. 5).  This 
fundamental difference between the two points to their different backgrounds: 
neoliberalism emanates from economics and managerialism from management theory.   
 
3. Neoliberalism 
In essence neoliberalism, or marketisation as it is often termed, is an expression of 
economic liberalism that conceives of the world as a marketplace and is concerned with 
opening up trade relations between countries on the basis of free market principles 
(Maringe 2010).  Markets are viewed as the most effective mechanism for the distribution 
of money, goods and services.  A free market economy thus facilitates economic prosperity 
whilst offering choice to consumers.  In this way neoliberalism can be seen as a form of 
economic democracy that serves the public better than politics (Farnham & Horton 1996).   
According to a neoliberal analysis, state intervention is an unnatural intrusion into the 
workings of the market, distorting it through such means as taxation, monopoly provision 
and labour market regulation (Clarke & Newman 1997).  The New Right neoliberals and 
neoconservatives believed that markets, not government plans, were the answer to a 
bloated, inefficient and unresponsive public bureaucracy.  By the early 1980s, faith in 
centralised government planning had waned and optimism about the benefits of an 
interventionist style of government had largely disappeared.  Thatcher, who was scornful of 
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Ă ?ŶĂŶŶǇ-knows-ďĞƐƚ ?ƐƚĂƚĞ(Pollitt 1990, p. 40), chose to place her faith instead in 
 “ĨƌĞĞĚŽŵĂŶĚĨƌĞĞŵĂƌŬĞƚƐ ?(Rhodes 1994, p. 140).   
EĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛclaim to legitimacy resides in the championing of the rights of the individual 
and the promotion of freedom of choice (Ranson & Stewart 1994).  Its key values are 
individualism and personal freedom, rather than collectivism (Farnham & Horton 1996).  
Neoliberalism builds on public choice theory ĂŶĚEŝƐŬĂŶĞŶ ?Ɛ seminal text Bureaucracy and 
Representative Government (1971) is regarded as particularly influential.  This argued that 
the large size of many bureaucracies, their monopoly status free from the pressures of 
competition and lack of performance indicators made them both inefficient and ineffective.  
The prescription for these public service ills was to reduce the size of the various agencies 
by breaking them up into smaller units and to improve performance by means of 
competition and the provision of publically available performance information (Boyne et al. 
2003).  Formal monitoring mechanisms were seen as necessary to ensure accountability for 
public money given that informal relations based on trust alone were no longer deemed 
adequate (Power 1994). 
Public choice theory is underpinned by a belief that people always act rationally, i.e. 
according to their own preferences, and in their own best interests (Flynn, N. 2002).  
Whether or not this is always true is open to dispute.  Furthermore, the universalistic claim 
of public choice theory  W that it is valid in all organisations and situations - has also been 
rejected as implausible (Boyne et al. 2003).  The notion of service user as consumer is not 
appropriate for some public services and a consumer focus may come at the expense of the 
interests of the wider community (Ranson & Stewart 1994).  
Equally, the concept of a market may not be applicable within the public sector.  In any 
case, many so-called markets are only provider-markets or quasi-markets: universities, for 
example, are not fully in charge of setting their own fees or student numbers (Williams, J. 
2013).  Moreover, the process of marketisation may itself change the nature of certain 
 “ŐŽŽĚƐ ?4  and reinforce the pre-existing social order and advantage (Ranson & Stewart 
1994, p. 49) as in higher education where it has arguably strengthened the existing status 
hierarchy of institutions.   
Despite these criticisms, neoliberalism is said to have become hegemonic, masquerading as 
 “ƚŚĞŽŶůǇĂĐĐĞƉƚĂďůĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?(Vincent 2011, p. 333). 
                                                          
4
 For example, if many parents choose a good small school it may grow and lose its distinct small 
school status  W the very reason they chose it in the first place (Ranson & Stewart 1994). 




4.1 Definition, Origins and Scope 
In essence, managerialism can be thought of as  “the pursuit of a particular set of 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝĚĞĂƐ ? (Flynn, N. 2002, p. 5) that represent a certain worldview, or ideology.  
Ideology is taken to mean a systematic framework of values and beliefs, developed and 
maintained by a social group, about how the world is or should be that justifies and 
legitimates a course of behaviour (Hartley 1983, cited by (Pollitt 1990).   
Managerialism is the belief system of one particular group, arguably the dominant group in 
an organisation: management (Klikauer 2013).  It is self-evidently in the interests of 
managers to promote managerialism, ǁŚŝĐŚŚĂƐĂƚŝƚƐĐŽƌĞ “ƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŝƚƐ “ƐƉĞĐŝĂůƌŝŐŚƚƐĂŶĚƉŽǁĞƌƐ ?, and to use the mantra of good 
management practice to justify their own autonomy in the same way academics may cite 
academic freedom (Pollitt 1990, p. 9).   
As an ideology, managerialism can be compared to professionalism in that both are 
ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ “ĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝŶŐǁŚĂƚĐŽƵŶƚƐĂƐǀĂůƵĂďůĞŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ?ǁŚŽŬŶŽǁƐŝƚ ?ĂŶĚ
ǁŚŽŝƐĞŵƉŽǁĞƌĞĚƚŽĂĐƚŝŶǁŚĂƚǁĂǇĂƐĂĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞ ?(Clarke, Gerwitz & McLaughlin 
2000).  Clarke et al describe the process of putting managerial ideas into practice as 
 “ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? and equate it to  “ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝǌation ? as the process of attaining 
professionalism (2000, p. 8).  This managerialisation process is undertaken by means of a 
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐŽƌ “ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĞƐ ?(Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007, p. 14).  
These may take the form of practical measures (such as target setting or performance 
management), new organisational structures (such as the creation of executive 
management teams) or propaganda and persuasion designed to effect cultural change 
(Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007, Farnham & Horton 1996).   
Its description as an ideology does not necessarily imply a close connection between the 
ideas of managerialism and that of any specific political party (Deem 2004).  The 
implementation of managerialism was not just the work of determined New Right 
advocates.  Rather, a number of diverse interests may have been involved, including those 
who felt they have no choice or who believed they may benefit.  Pollitt suggests that a 
 “ƐƵŐĂƌĞĚƉŝůů ? ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨŐƌĞater authority or financial reward, has sometimes been 
offered to elite groups in order to get otherwise unpalatable change implemented (1990, 
pp. 47-48).   
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Nevertheless, unlike in the private sector where managerialism was market driven, in the 
public sector it has been politically driven.  This places the onus on public sector managers 
ƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŽƵƚƉƵďůŝĐƉŽůŝĐǇĂƐ “ĂŐĞŶƚƐŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?(Farnham & Horton 1996, p. 45).  For 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞE,^ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐǁĞƌĞƵƐĞĚƚŽŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞ “ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚůĞǀĞƌƐ ?ƐƵĐŚ
as value for money reviews (Ferlie et al. 1996, p. 43).  From this perspective, managerialism 
can be seen as the means by which a fundamentally political project like NPM has been 
implemented (Newman 2000).  In other words, managerialism has provided an apparently 
managerial solution to what were previously conceived of as political problems (Pollitt 
1990).   
Although managerialism has been seen as a by-product of New Right ideas, its founding 
principles precede those of the New Right.  Just as neoliberalism has its roots in public 
choice theory, so managerialism emanates from FW Taylor ?Ɛ scientific school of 
management (1911).  Early examples of managerialism are therefore often described as 
neo-Taylorist (Pollitt 1990).  However, over the years its ideas have evolved in line with 
developments in management thinking, including culture, excellence and change 
management approaches (Handy 1993, Burnes 1992, Peters & Waterman 1982).   
These management ideas are said to have  “ŵƵƚĂƚĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞ
following formula: 
 “DĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚA?/ĚĞŽůŽŐǇA?ǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶA?DĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ? (Klikauer 2013, p. 3) 
In <ůŝŬĂƵĞƌ ?Ɛ view, managerialism has extended far beyond the realms of organisations into 
the economic, social, cultural and political spheres and has become so pervasive that it has 
 “ŝŶĨŝůƚƌĂƚĞĚĞǀĞƌǇĞǀĞŶƚƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨŚƵŵĂŶĞǆŝƐƚĞŶĐĞ ?(2013, p. 7).  Such is its influence that he 
finds it near impossible to think of an area of society that is not governed by it, or to 
ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŵŝŐŚƚĐĂƵƐĞŝƚƚŽĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌ ?/ŶĚĞĞĚ ?ŚĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛ
effects as akin to  “ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĞŶƐůĂǀĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĂƐƉŚǇǆŝĂƚŝŽŶ ?(2013, p. 12).  
Whilst such hyperbole appears unwarranted, Klikauer is not alone in viewing managerialism 
as an all-encompassing force.  Entemann (1993) considers it to have become the 
predominant ideology of society, following on from capitalism, socialism and Marxism, and 
democracy.  In his opinion, ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞ “ƚŚĞďĂƐŝĐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ?ŽĨĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚ
ŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐĂŶĚƐǇŵƉƚŽŵĂƚŝĐŽĨ “ĚĞĞƉƐŽĐŝĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?(1993, p. 156).  Whilst these 
two authors take a fairly extreme view of the reach of managerial ideology, there is little 
doubt that its influence has become widespread and that it has permeated the thinking of 
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many, if not most, organisations.  Its impact on higher education, as part of the wider NPM 
reform agenda, is the subject of 5.1 and Chapter Three.  
4.2 Ideal-Type Managerialism 
Based on a review of the literature, I have developed an ideal-type theoretical model of 
managerialism, consisting of six key ideological tenets or claims.  These include the five 
tenets illustrated in Figure 4 and an additional one that applies specifically to 
managerialism in the public sector, i.e. a belief in the superiority of private sector methods.   
This ideal type is purely a heuristic device or intellectual tool and, as such, does not claim to 
depict reality.  Rather, it aims to synthesise and organise abstract ideas in a coherent and 
meaningful way, and to provide a mechanism to link theory and practice through a 
comparison of the theoretical model with the empirical findings.  It is anticipated that the 
model will prove to have explanatory power not only for this thesis, but also for future 
empirical studies.  As an ideal type, it should at minimum serve as  “ĂĐůĞĂƌtarget for 
ĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐŵĂŶĚƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶ ?(Friedson 2001, p. 5).   
It is important to note that mĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛideological tenets are normative rather than 
descriptive in nature and therefore reflect the way things should be (from a managerial 
perspective) rather than the way they necessarily are.  These tenets are outlined in turn in 
this section, which is intended neither as ideological defence nor critique.  They will then be 
critically examined as part of the analysis ŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐs in Chapter Seven. 
4.2.1 Management is Important and a Good Thing 
Managerialism contends that management is both the best form of organisational 
governance (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007) and the main vehicle for organisational success.  
If only things were better managed, the argument goes, improvement would follow and 
the world would be a better place.  Objectives would be clear, staff highly motivated and 
bureaucracy and red tape would be eliminated; supporters of managerialism thus view 
management ĂƐ “ĂŶŽƉƚŝŵŝƐƚŝĐ ?ĂůŵŽƐƚĂƌŽŵĂŶƚŝĐĐƌĞĞĚ ?(Pollitt 1990, p. 1).   
Management is not only important, but also a good thing.  Beyond the realms of the 
organisation, it has the capacity to help solve a range of economic and social ills and is seen 
ĂƐ “ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂůůǇĂŶĚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůůǇŝŶĚŝƐƉĞŶƐĂďůĞƚŽƚŚĞĂĐŚievement of economic progress, 
ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌĚĞƌǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶǇŵŽĚĞƌŶƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ? ?(Deem, 
Hillyard & Reed 2007, p. 6).  Underpinning this aspect of managerialism is a belief that 
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economic growth is the main route to social prosperity (Pollitt 1990).  From this perspective, 
managerialism can be seen as a progressive social force, with more and better 
management providing the means for a struggling UK economy to become more globally 
competitive (Clarke & Newman 1997).   
4.2.2 Management is a Discrete Function 
dĂǇůŽƌ ?Ɛ(1911) scientific management, from which managerialism derives, was a means of 
reducing tasks to their component parts, measuring work processes and of controlling and 
rewarding effort.  It is an elitist view of management in that it is based on a philosophy of 
separating the conception and execution of tasks, or  ‘thinking ? from  ‘doing ? (Broadbent, 
Dietrich & Roberts 1997), with workers defined as unthinking and following orders.   
By implication, ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂƌĞ “ƚŚe manĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ? a group separate from those doing 
the work (Flynn, N. 2002, p. 4) and often remote from the day-to-day functioning of the 
organisation.  This very remoteness supports the notion of a professional management in 
possession of a generic body of knowledge sufficiently removed from the technical specifics 
that it is transferable from organisation to organisation (Enteman 1993).   
The main purpose of management is seen as undertaking the strategic decision making that 
enables an organisation to achieve its stated purpose (Ranson & Stewart 1994).  The 
discretion to plan and make strategic decisions gives management its distinctive role in 
organisations and wider society, whilst the requisite processes of analysis and strategic 
choice have  “ŝŶƚĞůůĞĐƚƵĂůŝǌĞĚĂŶĚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝǌĞĚ ?it (Enteman 1993, p. 164).   
Managers are able to justify themselves on the grounds of their superior knowledge and 
know-how, and their skills and competencies are viewed as critical to organisational 
survival and success (Farnham & Horton 1996, p. 41).  With the development of culture and 
excellence management approaches, the image of managers has been transformed from 
ƚŚĂƚŽĨ “ĚƵůůŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚŝŵĞƐĞƌǀĞƌƐ ?ƚŽ “ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂůĂŶĚŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĐŚĂŶŐĞ
ĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?(Clarke & Newman 1997, p. 35).   
4.2.3 Management is Rational and Value Neutral 
With its roots in scientific management theory, managerialism places great faith in the 
management activities of planning and objective setting as a means of improving 
performance (Farnham & Horton 1996).  The decision-making process that underpins these 
core management functions is viewed as entirely logical and rational: managers define the 
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problem, gather relevant data, develop possible solutions, evaluate them and decide on 
the best course of action.  The process is also rational in the sense that the application of 
what is regarded as superior intelligence via scientific method is inevitably deemed to lead 
to optimal decisions.  By these means, managers constantly refine and improve 
organisational performance.  
From this perspective, management practice is essentially technical and value neutral, 
offering a non-partisan framework within which decisions can be made away from the 
partisan claims of particular interest groups (Clarke & Newman 1997).  It therefore follows 
that managers are neutral professionals who can be trusted to manage in an impersonal 
way and in the organisĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ.    
4.2.4 Management is Generic and Universally Applicable 
Managerialism echoes scientific management in its espousal of the systematic nature and 
universal applicability of management.   Taylor (1911) holds that anything can and should 
be managed and that management practice in one arena is transferable to another.   
dŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŚĞŽƌǇĐŽƵůĚďĞĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚĂƐ ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨǁŚĞƌĞŝƚŝƐƉƌĂĐƚŝƐĞĚ(Kottler 1981).  It views management as a 
generic set of activities common to all organisations, with managers performing 
fundamentally the same tasks whatever sector they are in (Ranson & Stewart 1994).  For 
advocates of managerialism, there is little difference between the skills required to run an 
oil rig or a university (Klikauer 2013).  Underpinning managerialism, then, are the twin 
beliefs that organisations are more similar than different, and that the performance of any 
type of organisation can be enhanced by the application of generic management skills.  
This belief in a generic model of management that minimises the differences between the 
public and private sector has been one of the key drivers of public sector reform (Pollitt 
1990).  Accordingly, there has been considerable convergence between the management 
of the two sectors since the early 1980s, with the language and techniques of business now 
commonplace throughout the public sector (Farnham & Horton 1996).  The 1983 Griffiths 
Report which introduced general management into the NHS was one manifestation of the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨĂŝth in generic management skills applicable across a range of public and 
private sector organisations (Exworthy & Halford 1999).  
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4.2.5 Managers Must Have the Right to Manage 
The notion that managers must be granted the freedom to act, or the right to manage, is a 
key ideological demand of managerialism.  Managers must be allowed the discretion to 
undertake the management functions of planning and decision making, coordination, and 
monitoring (Enteman 1993).  This necessitates that they assume some formal authority and 
undertake specific management activities to direct the work of others.  Although they may 
lack the particular knowledge, skills and experience to perform that work themselves, they 
ĐůĂŝŵ “ĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞƚŽĐŽŵŵĂŶĚ ?ďĂƐĞĚŽŶĂĨŽƌŵŽĨŐĞŶĞƌĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĂƚŝƐƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌƚŽ
specialisation (Friedson 2001, p. 115).  
DĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵŝƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂĐĐŽŵƉĂŶŝĞĚďǇƚŚĞďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐŵƵƐƚďĞ “ŝŶĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?
and exercise their authority over the managed (Farnham & Horton 1996, p. 275).   
Accordingly, the workforce are accountable to managers, rather than the other way around 
(Smith, P. & Hussey 2010).  The assumption is that individual managers can and do make a 
real difference to organisations and impose their personalities upon them (Enteman 1993).   
4.2.6 Private Sector Methods are Superior 
Managerialism in the public sector is based on the belief that management practices in the 
private sector are inherently superior and need to be adopted if the efficiency and 
performance of public services are to be improved (Farnham & Horton 1996).  Indeed, 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŽŚĂǀĞ “ĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐŽĨŝƚƐŽǁŶŶĞĐĞƐƐŝƚǇ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶ
articulation of all that was wrong with previous public sector management in comparison 
to that of the private sector (Clarke & Newman 1997).   
The importation of private sector ideas and techniques is therefore an essential 
characteristic of managerialism in a public sector context - so much so that its use in 
support of NPM ŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂ “ĐŽǀĞƌƚĨŽƌŵŽĨƉƌŝǀĂƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?(Farnham & Horton 
1996, p. 263).   
4.3 Indicators of Managerialism 
Table 1 proposes indicators of what each of these six ideological tenets might look like in 
relation to changing DPVC appointment practice.  Although certain indicators could apply 
to more than one tenet, in order to avoid repetition they are associated with only one.  
These indicators provide a mechanism to evaluate the extent to which the ƐƚƵĚǇ ?Ɛfindings 
are symptomatic of managerialism (Q.4).   
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Table 1: Indicators of Managerialism in Relation to the DPVC Appointment Model 
Ideological Tenet of Managerialism Key Indicators for the DPVC Appointment Model 
 
1. Management is important and a 
good thing 
a. Recognition of the importance of DPVC 
posts  
b. Priority given to the appointment process in 
order to attract the best candidates 
c. A more managerial interpretation of the role 
 
2. Management is a discrete function a. DPVCs acting in a full-time management 
capacity 
b. Management skills and experience as the 
main criteria for the role 
c. Value placed on management training and 
development 
 
3. Management is rational and value 
neutral 
a. Appointment based on merit rather than 
seniority 
b. Rational and value neutral appointment 
decisions  
 
4. Management is generic and 
universally applicable 
a. Recognition of management skills and 
experience gained in any sector  
b. Appointments open to suitably qualified 
candidates from other occupational groups  
 
5. Managers must have the right to 
manage 
a. DPVC roles given appropriate authority and 
scope for managerial action 
b. Emphasis on positional, rather than expert, 
power 
 
6. Private sector methods are superior a. Adoption of private sector appointment 
practice  
b. Valuing of candidates from the private 




5. The Academic Narrative 
The remainder of this chapter highlights the way in which the transformation of higher 
education over the past few decades is perceived to have impacted academic work and the 
relative status and power of the academic profession.  Although the focus is on portraying 
the effects of managerialism, it also refers to the consequences of NPM reforms and wider 
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societal changes, such as globalisation.  This inclusive approach reflects both the difficulty 
of separating out the impact of managerialism from these other factors, and the reality that 
the term managerialism is so loosely and broadly used in the literature, often to encompass 
elements outside the ideal type presented in 4.2.  
The description of contemporary higher education given here does not purport to be a 
complete picture.  It is designed rather to reflect one perspective: the predominant view of 
the academic community as conveyed in the literature
5
 which, not surprisingly perhaps, is 
almost entirely written by academics rather than professional services managers or other 
members of the university community.  This particular view of change can be seen as an 
academic misery narrative (Shepherd 2014b) reflecting a prevailing mentality within higher 
education that is  “ƐƵƌǀŝǀĂůŝƐƚ PŽŶĞŽĨĞŶĚƵƌĂŶĐĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĞŶũŽǇŵĞŶƚ ?(McCaffery 2004). 
Firstly, the impact of managerialism on higher education in general, and on academic work 
and working conditions in particular, is described.  Section 6 then addresses the issue of 
academic status and power in relation to managers  W a topic that will be returned to in the 
analysis of the findings in Chapter Seven. 
5.1 Managerialism in Higher Education 
Although not technically part of the public sector, universities have nevertheless been 
subject to the effects of the NPM reform agenda.  Since the 1980s, the state has 
increasingly sought to steer higher education in the way that it has other publically funded 
services and, as a result, universities have been asked to increase productivity, improve 
value for money, produce graduates who meet the demands of the employment market 
and contribute to innovation and economic growth (Ferlie, Musselin & Andresani 2008).   
As governments and funding bodies have made a series of direct and indirect attempts to 
modernise universities, they ŚĂǀĞĂůƐŽďĞĐŽŵĞƐƵďũĞĐƚƚŽ “ƚŚĞďƌĂĐŝŶŐŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůǁŝŶĚƐ ?ŽĨ
managerialism (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007, p. 25).  The introduction of managerialism 
ŝŶƚŽŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ “ĂƐƵďƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĨŽƌĂƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?which are deemed incapable of governing 
themselves effectively (Trow 1994, p. 11).   
                                                          
5
 Although based on the academic literature, in my experience this is a portrayal that resonates with 
views expressed by many academics in the specialist higher education press, on social media and in 
the corridors and common rooms of universities. 
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Trow argues that the ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉƌŽŵŽƚĞƐĂ ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?ĨŽƌŵŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ĂƐŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ
ƚŚĞ ‘ƐŽĨƚ ?ĨŽƌŵĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚďǇƚŚŽƐĞƐĞŶŝŽƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂŶĚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐǁŚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ
that more effective management is necessary in order to provide low-cost, high-quality 
higher education.  Hard managerialism, on the other hand, holds that the only way to 
improve higher education is via the imposition of formal management systems, with 
outcomes assessed and institutions financially rewarded or punished according to their 
performance.  This apparent loss of faith in the ability of universities to spend public money 
efficiently has led to the imposition of ever more elaborate management and accounting 
systems (Smith, P. & Hussey 2010).   
Such has been the collective impact of NPM and managerialism that they are said to have 
 “ƐĞĞƉĞĚŝŶƚŽĞǀĞƌǇ ‘ŶŽŽŬĂŶĚĐƌĂŶŶǇ ?ŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇůŝĨĞ ?(Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007, p. 
27).    This is reflected in the way that the corporate language of targets and performance 
criteria has become commonplace (Waring 2013) and the managerial discourse of audit 
trails and mission statements has become the norm (Smith, P. & Hussey 2010).  From an 
academic perspective, this ideological encroachment is almost universally seen as a 
negative development.   
ƐŝƐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞǁŝƚŚŵŽƐƚ ‘ŝƐŵƐ ? ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵŝƐŵŽƌĞŽĨƚĞŶǀŝĞǁĞĚƉejoratively than 
favourably, and frequently used disparagingly to describe organisations that have too much 
management and/or too many managers (Klikauer 2013).  Both are believed to be true of 
higher education.  The notion that universities needed to be managed was an alien one 
until the 1980s.  However, as will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Three, managers 
and explicit management practices are now deemed to have taken over from collegial self-
managed communities of scholars and a laisser-faire organisational model (Deem 1998).  
Indeed, the overt management of universities has grown to such an extent that Deem et al 
wonder if they can  “ƐƵƌǀŝǀĞƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂďŽǀĞĂůůĞůƐĞ ?(2007, p. 66). 
In a relatively short space of time, universities are said to have replaced one approach to, 
or myth of, management with an entirely different one (Ramsden 1998).  The first views 
management as a trivial activity that any academic is capable of undertaking, but which 
wastes their time and talents.   This lax and amateur approach to university management 
has been replaced with an overly assertive style that betrays a lack of trust in people.  
Ramsden argues that neither is appropriate nor effective.   
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Though many academics view management as an irrelevant business practice that has no 
legitimate place in a university, others acknowledge that universities do function more 
effectively when actively managed and recognise that they may benefit from some support 
in this area.  Nevertheless, the imposition of marketisation and managerialism is seen as 
disproportionate and harmful.  
  “>ŝŬĞŐƌĞǇƐƋƵŝƌƌĞůƐ ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĨŽƌŐŽŽĚƌĞĂƐŽŶƐďƵƚŚĂǀĞŚĂĚƵŶĨŽƌĞƐĞĞŶ
ĂŶĚĚĂŵĂŐŝŶŐĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ? (Smith, P. & Hussey 2010, p. 19).   
Much of the perceived damage is felt to have been caused by the way in which university 
management is being enacted, i.e. against the prevailing institutional culture by  “ĂŶ
ĂŐŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĐĂĚƌĞ ?ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞĚƚŽƌƵŶŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂƐĂďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ(McCaffery 
2004, p. 3).  In this model, management becomes more important than the primary 
activities that are being managed (Smith, P. & Hussey 2010) and management experience 
and skills more important than those of the core business (Klikauer 2013). 
^ŵŝƚŚĂŶĚ,ƵƐƐĞǇůŝŬĞŶƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵŝŶŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶƚŽ “ĂĨƵŶŐĂů
ĂƚƚĂĐŬ ?(2010, p. 21) due to what they believe to be the three main tendencies of 
management: to proliferate, to become focused on their own concerns, and to change 
what they manage to suit their own purposes rather than those for which they were 
intended.  From this management perspective, successes are due to good management 
whilst failures must be the fault of workers.  This results in a modification of the 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĐŽƌĞĂĐtivities to make them more manageable and the workforce more 
accountable.  The solution is always more management, normally achieved by 
ƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ?ƚŚĞ “ŽƉƉƌĞƐƐŝǀĞďƵƌĚĞŶ ?ŽĨǁŚŝĐŚ “ďǇŝƚƐƐŚĞĞƌ
weight, distorts what it squats uƉŽŶ ?(2010, p. 27).   
Advocates of managerialism portray ŝƚĂƐ “ƌĞĂůŝƐŵĂŶĚĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞ ?ǁŚĞŶŝƚŝƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇ
ŝĚĞŽůŽŐǇ “ŵĂƐƋƵĞƌĂĚŝŶŐĂƐĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?(Vincent 2011, p. 339).  Managerialism in 
a higher education context has been described as having the following characteristics:  
x An ethos of enterprise and emphasis on income generation 
x Government policy focused on universities meeting socio-economic needs 
x More market orientation, with increased competition for resources 
x A greater separation of academic work and management activity 
x Increased control and regulation of academic work by managers 
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x A perceived shift in authority from academics to managers and consequent 
weakening of the professional status of academics. 
(Whitchurch & Gordon 2010)  
The first three of these perhaps owe more to neoliberalism, but the second three relate 
closely to the ideological tenets of managerialism described in 4.2.  They are addressed in 
more detail in the following sections.  
5.2 Academic Work 
EWDƌĞĨŽƌŵƐŚĂǀĞƚƌĂŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĚƚŚĞ “ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚĂďŝƚƵƐ ?ŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐĞƌǀŝĐĞ
professionals, including the workplace and work culture of academics (Deem, Hillyard & 
Reed 2007, p. 27).  Prior to the massification of higher education, academic labour could be 
thought of as a pre-Fordist craft activity that did not easily lend itself to routinisation or the 
possibility of external bureaucratic control.  However, in a mass system undergraduate 
teaching has been transformed from an inner-directed artisan process to an outer-directed 
and quasi-industrial operation, in a commodification of academic work  (Dearlove 2002).   
The development of the internet ŚĂƐůŽŽƐĞŶĞĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?ŵŽŶŽƉŽůǇŽǀĞƌŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ
(Yielder & Codling 2004), while the emergence of the knowledge economy has turned 
knowledge itself into a commodity and heralded an increasingly instrumental view of 
higher education as a private, rather than a public, good (Williams, J. 2013, p. 38).  This has 
resulted in an emphasis on vocationally-oriented courses and applied research, an 
expectation that academics will become more entrepreneurial, and a general narrowing of 
academic activity and autonomy (Currie & Vidovich 2010).  
ƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŚĂƐůŽŶŐďĞĞŶƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĂĐŽƌĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐǀĂůƵĞĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůƚŽĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?
professional identity and to the nature of the work that they do (Clark, B. R. 1987).  
Academics must be free to undertake independent enquiry and be prepared to think the 
unthinkable.  The very essence of research implies that academics must be self-motivated 
and free to manage themselves.  Such an approach was supported in a well-funded elite 
system but has increasingly come under attack.   
The imposition of an audit and assessment culture has placed academic work under 
scrutiny, challenging the longstanding tradition of self-regulation of academic standards 
(Henkel 1997).  Institutions are now subject to explicit external regulation, including 
institutional audit and quality assessment of both teaching and research.  External 
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assessment means that the quality of academic work can no longer be assumed, leading to 
 “ƚŚĞĚĞĂƚŚŽĨƚƌƵƐƚ ?(Smith, P. & Hussey 2010, p. 314).  Rather, it has become subject to 
explicit performance review by administrators as well as senior academics.  This process 
has been described as a form of visualisation of academic work that makes it accessible to 
others who may evaluate it from a distance without any specialist knowledge (Bleiklie, 
Hostaker & Vabo 2000).  Thus demystified, academic work can be administered like any 
other service (Henkel 1997).   
Meanwhile, an obsession with accountability and measurement has led to a distortion of 
academic activity, which is increasingly geared towards assessed outputs (Trow 1994).  A 
tendency to measure what is easy to measure rather than what really matters (Woodfield 
& Kennie 2008) has arguably resulted in  ‘countability ?, i.e. what can be counted, rather 
than genuine accountability (Currie & Vidovich 2010).  This desire to measure and quantify 
academic endeavour has seen academics become  “ƵŶŝƚƐŽĨƌĞƐŽƵƌĐĞŝŶĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐůĂďŽƵƌ
process of kŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŶĐŽŵĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?(Waring 2013, p. 405), a 
situation likened to an academic assembly line within a McUniversity (Parker & Jary 1995).   
Academic work has also been affected by an increased focus within universities on cost 
containment and wealth creation.  A good academic (and a good department) is now the 
one that brings in the most research income (Vincent 2011).  It is alleged that decisions 
about what research is to be undertaken may be taken out of academic hands, ƐŝŶĐĞ “ŽŶĐĞ
research becomes primarily a source of income, rather than a source of knowledge, it will 
ďĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂŶƚƐǁŚŽĚĞĐŝĚĞƵƉŽŶŝƚƐǀĂůƵĞ ?(Vincent 2011, p. 27) ?dŽƵƚŝůŝƐĞŽƵƌĚŝĞƵ ?Ɛ
terminology, homo academicus is being transformed into homo economicus (Carvalho & 
Santiago 2010).   
Higher education has been further commercialised by a process of marketisation, whereby 
universities are forced to compete with each other for resources and students (Williams, J. 
2013).  The conceptualisation of student as customer has transformed the academic-
student relationship into one of economic exchange (Currie & Vidovich 2010) in which 
academics become providers who must satisfy the demands of student customers.  One 
example of the extent to which a consumerist mentality has taken hold is the introduction 
of Key Information Sets (KIS), which are likened ƚŽ “ƐƵƉĞƌŵĂƌŬĞƚĨŽŽĚůĂďĞůƐ ?ĨŽƌĂƐƐŝƐƚŝŶŐ 
students to choose from the array of educational products on offer (Waring 2013, p. 398). 
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Overall, managerialism is perceived to have  “ƉŽƐĞĚĂĚŝƌĞĐƚĂŶĚĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽ
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?(Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007, p. 21) and led to a greater degree of 
cognitive control over academic work (Currie & Vidovich 2010) and consequent degrading 
of it (Kolsaker 2008).  In combination with a market ideology, it is said to transformed 
ŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽĂŶ “ŝůůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞ ?ŚƵĐŬƐƚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŵĂƌŬĞƚŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵ ?ŬŶŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞ
ŽĨĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŚĞǀĂůƵĞŽĨŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?ĂŶĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĚƌŝǀĞŶ “ĂĐŽĂĐŚĂŶĚŚŽƌƐĞƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚ
the civiůŝƐŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ?(Vincent 2011, pp. 336-339).  Vincent goes on 
ƚŽƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐƚŽĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?ƉƌŽĨŽƵŶĚƐŚĂŵĞƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶŽƚĞǀĞŶĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚƚŚŝƐ
state of affairs.  
5.3 Working Conditions 
It is not only academic autonomy that has been eroded.  A combination of more students, 
higher expectations and increased scrutiny mean that academic workloads have also 
increased and working conditions have deteriorated (Currie & Vidovich 2010).   Moreover, 
a reduction in job security with the loss of tenure and casualisation of contracts is seen as 
having brought the academic role closer to that of a salaried, even piece-work, labourer 
(Halsey 1992).   
Institutions are increasingly opting for more differentiated and performance-related 
contracts: research-only contracts for star performers, teaching-only contracts, and fixed-
term contracts.  More functional differentiation has led to more insecure and inequitable 
conditions of employment.  The growing ranks of contract staff are relatively poorly paid 
ĂŶĚŵĂŶǇĨĞĞůƚŚĞǇŽƉĞƌĂƚĞ “ĂƚƚŚĞŵĂƌŐŝŶƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ(Deem, Hillyard & Reed 
2007, p. 86).  Nevertheless, many academic staff are finding themselves having to take a 
series of such insecure temporary posts.  Deem et al argue that the development of a range 
of different contract types has considerably undermined collegiality, such as it exists.   
Although some academics have managed to retain a balanced teaching and research 
portfolio, many now focus on one activity or the other.  Others have assumed the 
emergent role of academic manager.  An institutional drive for greater efficiency means 
there is increased role differentiation and specialisation with the emergence of new fields 
of activity, such as knowledge transfer and research management.  Consequently, the 
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ “Ăůů-ƌŽƵŶĚĞƌ ?ǁŚŽ teaches, researches and undertakes 
administrative tasks is coming under threat as ƚŚĞƌŽůĞŝƐ “ƐƵďĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚĞĚŽƵƚƚŽĂŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ
army of para-ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?(Macfarlane 2011, p. 60).  dŚĞƐĞĂƌĞ “ƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ ?
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either employed to undertake a specific academic role (such as learning technologist) 
based on a more limited set of skills and responsibilities or all-rounders who effectively 
focus on just one aspect of academic work (such as research-inactive academics or 
academic managers) ?dŚŝƐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐĂŶ “ƵŶďƵŶĚůŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ
function, resulting in Ă “ŚŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŽƵƚ ?ŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐůŝĨĞ(Macfarlane 2011, p. 60).   
Taken together, these changes to academic work have been viewed as part of a broader 
trend towards the proletarianisation of intellectual labour (Dearlove 2002).  This has been 
defined as a three-fold reduction in (i) the autonomy of ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?ǁŽƌŬand the security 
of their employment, (ii) the market position of academics as a class or occupational group 
and (iii) the power and advantage in academic work (Halsey 1992).  Having addressed the 
first of these, the latter two are discussed in the following section. 
 
6. Academic Status and Power 
This section examines the academic narrative concerning the perceived loss of academic 
status and power in relation to managers resulting from managerialism and wider NPM 
reforms. 
6.1 Academic Status 
Traditionally dons were gentlemen of status, that is to say they had social and professional 
standing in relation to others.  As gentlemen they had no employer or trade union, 
received remuneration not a rate of pay, and followed a vocation rather than held a job.  
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐĞ “ƋƵĂŝŶƚĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ?have not survived into the modern age, they have 
nevertheless had a deep influence on the self-conception of many academics (Halsey 1992, 
p. 126), a group of professionals who have enjoyed a degree of personal autonomy as part 
ŽĨĂ “ƐĞůĨ-ŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐŐƵŝůĚ ?ƌĂƌĞůǇ ?ŝĨĞǀĞƌ ?ĨŽƵŶĚĂŵŽŶŐƐƚŽƚŚĞƌŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐƌŽƵƉƐ(Halsey 
& Trow 1971, p. 169).   
However, academics have gradually lost status over the years, in part due to the 
massification of higher education.  As the number of academics has increased, so their 
social scarcity and exceptional status has declined (Ramsden 1998).  At the same time, the 
proportion of non-academic staff within universities has grown and some academics feel 




ĂďƐŽƌƉƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽĂŵĂƐƐŽĨƐƚĂĨĨ ?(Smith, P. & Hussey 2010, p. 101).   
This decline in status has been keenly felt given that status is such an important concept 
within academic life, where virtually everything is graded in some way: institutions, 
department and journals.  For example, there is said to be a pecking order between 
disciplines or specialisms in which physicists are highly regarded, historians are seen as 
better than geographers, ĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝƐƚƐ “ůŽŽŬĚŽǁŶŽŶ ?ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝƐƚƐ(Becher 1989, p. 56).  
There is also a constant process of implicit and explicit ranking of individuals.  The main 
currency for the academic is not power or wealth, but reputation: to be held in high esteem 
ďǇŽŶĞ ?ƐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐĂŶĚƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞƐŽŵĞďŽĚǇŽĨĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐĨŝĞůĚ ?
Much of the driving force behind what academics do is concerned with the building of a 
professional reputation (Becher & Kogan 1992) ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞ “ƉƌĞƐƚŝŐĞĞĐŽŶŽŵǇ ?ŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĂ
(Blackmore, P. & Kandiko 2012).   Academics are also perceived to have lost public esteem 
and this too has impacted negatively on morale (Halsey 1992).   
dŚĞ “ƐƚƌŝŬŝŶŐĚĞĐůŝŶĞ ?ŝŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐƐƵĨĨĞƌĞĚďǇĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐƚĂĨĨĂƐƚŚĞ
result of managerialism can be seen as part of a wider attack on professionals (Blackmore, 
P. & Blackwell 2003, p. 19).  Within a university context, this steady loss of status and 
remuneration has occurred relative to professional services colleagues (Smith, P. & Hussey 
2010).  As professional services managers have found their expertise more in demand, this 
ŚĂƐ “ŵŽǀĞĚƚŚĞŵĂĨĞǁƌƵŶŐƐƵƉƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚƐĂůĂƌǇůĂĚĚĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞĚ “ƚŚĞ
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂƚƚŚĞƚŽƉŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ?(Fearn 2008).  
6.2 Academic-Manager Power Relations 
Traditionally, academics have been the most powerful and privileged group within the 
university community.  However, the impact of managerialism and NPM is deemed to have 
led to a fundamental change in the balance of power between academics and managers, 
mirroring that experienced in the wider public sector between professional groups and the 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐƚŽǁŚŽŵƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ “ĨŽƌŵĂůůǇĂŶĚƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞůǇĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůĞ ?(Deem, Hillyard & 
Reed 2007, p. 23).  
tŚĞƌĞĂƐŝƚƵƐĞĚƚŽďĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞƚŚĂƚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂĨĨǁĞƌĞ “ƉŽǁĞƌůĞƐƐĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂƌŝĞƐ ?
(McInnis 1998, p. 170) ǁŚŽƌĂŶĂƌŽƵŶĚĂĨƚĞƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ “ŵĂŬŝŶŐƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚĞǀĞƌǇƚŚŝŶŐ
ǁŽƌŬĞĚ ? ?ŶŽǁƚŚĞǇ “ĂƌĞůĞƐƐĞĂƐŝůǇĐŽƌƌĂůůĞĚŝŶƚŽĂƉĞŶŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞƐĞŶŝŽƌĐŽŵŵŽŶƌŽŽŵ ? 
(Smith, P. & Hussey 2010, p. 108).  This has led to a rising level of tension between two 
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groups of professionals within universities, with the old guard (academics) losing status and 
authority in favour of the new pretenders (professional services managers) who are 
 “ŵĂŬŝŶŐƐƚƌŽŶŐclaims for recognition as legitimate partners in the strategic management 
ŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?(McInnis 1998, p. 171). 
New quality assurance procedures, which mean that academic quality has to be managed, 
have  “ĐĂƚĂƉƵůƚĞĚŝŶƚŽƉƌŽŵŝŶĞŶĐĞ ?a new cadre of university managers (Salter & Tapper 
2002, p. 251).  These specialist professional services managers are assuming high-profile 
roles within the university that may impinge directly on the core activities of teaching and 
research (McInnis 1998).  As the scope of their activities has grown, so they have 
ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůǇĚŝƐƚƵƌďĞĚƚŚĞ “ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůǁŽƌŬũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ(Dobson & 
Conway 2003, p. 126).   
An increased emphasis on the institutional management of teaching in a mass system has 
also raised questions about the role of the academic community in an area where it has 
traditionally been unchallenged (Lapworth 2004).  Individual academics and departments 
have become subject to change instigated by managers purveying what academics regard 
ĂƐ “ŐĞŶĞƌŝĐĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇůŽǁůĞǀĞůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ?ĂŶĚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŚave become sites of 
ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŽǀĞƌĐŽƌĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ĐŽŶƚƌŽůŽĨƚŚĞŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞƐƉĂĐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐůŝǀĞĂŶĚǁŽƌŬ ?(Henkel 2002a, pp. 139-140).   
There has been a proliferation of service units, such as quality assurance and human 
resources.  Although the role of the professional managers who run these units is usually 
described as supporting academic activity, they may also generate policy.  The locus of 
initiative has thus shifted from academic departments to the centre (Henkel 1998) and 
academics are now likely to feel they are required to meet the needs of administrators, 
rather than the other way around (Henkel 2002a). 
This growth in the numbers of specialist professional services managers, such as those in 
planning and marketing, is said to represent  “ĂƐƵďƚůĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨ ‘ĐŽůŽŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨŚŝŐŚĞƌ
ĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďǇƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂƌĞĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞůŝƚƚůĞĂůůĞŐŝĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ
(McInnis 1998, p. 171).  Not only have these managers begun to intrude upon academic 
territory, but in carrying out their work, they are often seen as change agents for 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉŽůŝĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ŽǀĞƌƚĐŽŶǀĞǇĞƌƐŽĨĐŽƌƉŽƌate management practices into 
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?(Dobson & Conway 2003, p. 128).   
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Managers are described ĂƐ “ƋƵŝƚĞƵŶĂƉŽůŽŐĞƚŝĐŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂƌŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŽƵƐĞ
 “ƉƵƌƉŽƌƚĞĚůǇŶĞƵƚƌĂůƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?ƚŽďŽƚŚŶƵĚŐĞĂŶĚĐŽĞƌĐĞƐƚĂĨĨĂŶĚ “ƌĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ
ůŝĨĞƚŽĨŝƚĂŶŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇĚƌŝǀĞŶ ‘ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐǀŝƐŝŽŶ ? ?(Vincent 2011, pp. 335-336).  This has 
only served to annoy academics and to alienate the two occupational groups.  The  
relationship between the two is characterised by tension and sometimes antagonism, with 
each group tending to see the other as more powerful and themselves as marginalised 
(Halsey 1992).  The battle between academics and managers has been described as a 
struggle between two caricatures:  “ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƉŽƉƵůŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚ “ŶĞǁŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?each 
ďĂƐĞĚŽŶ “ƚŽǆŝĐƐƚĞƌĞŽƚǇƉĞƐ ?(Watson 2009, p. 77). 
The movement towards a more managerial approach and the imposition of an audit culture 
is ƐĂŝĚƚŽŚĂǀĞŐŝǀĞŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ “ŵŽƌĞƉŽǁĞƌƚŽƐŚĂƉĞƚŚĞůŝǀĞƐ ?ƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉƐĂŶĚƐĞůĨ-
ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?(Henkel 2002a, p. 141).  Collegiality in the sense of shared 
decision making has come under pressure as it is considered too slow and unwieldy 
(Ramsden 1998) and power has been concentrated at the centre of the institution.  The 
adoption of a more executive management style (Chapter Three) has led to the creation of 
a  “ƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞĚŽƵƚ ?ƚŽƉ-down executive management team exerting increased control over 
employees who have less autonomy over their work (Dearlove 2002, p. 262).   
Management is not only a function of the executive management team, however.  Rather, 
it is occurring at different levels of seniority, from the vice chancellor and DPVCs 
downwards.  Despite their collegial culture, universities are increasingly employing human 
resource management (HRM) tools and techniques out of a belief that performance must 
ďĞŵĂŶĂŐĞĚďǇůŝŶĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂƚĂůůůĞǀĞůƐĂŶĚ “ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŵƵƐƚŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞ
ƚƵŶĞŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůůǇĚĞĨŝŶĞĚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞĐƌŝƚĞƌŝĂ ? (Waring 2013, p. 402).  Underlying this 
approach ŝƐ “ĂŶŽǀĞƌƚĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƚŽĂƐƐĞƌƚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽǀĞƌƚŚĞǁŚŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞ
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐůĂďŽƵƌƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?(Dearlove 1998, p. 68).  This overly assertive management style, 
which betrays a fundamental lack of trust in people, is based on the myth that academics 
ĂƌĞĂůĂǌǇďƵŶĐŚǁŚŽŶĞĞĚĨŝƌŵŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ “ƚŽŐĞƚƚŚĞŵŽƵƚŽĨďĞĚĞĂƌůŝĞƌŝŶƚŚĞ
ŵŽƌŶŝŶŐ ? (Ramsden 1998, p. 4). 
As will become apparent in the following chapter, the move to a more corporate model of 
management and governance has downplayed the role of rank-and-file academics and, 
although traditional guild ideas of academic self-governance and autonomy have endured 
ŝŶƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƉƐǇĐŚĞ ?ŝŶƌĞĂůŝƚǇƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƐŚŝĨƚŽĨƉŽǁĞƌĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?
governance of what were once seen as their universities (Dearlove 2002).  This has resulted 
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ŝŶƚŚĞĚŝŵŝŶƵƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚ “ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĚŽŶĞƚŽ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶďǇ
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?(Lapworth 2004, p. 301).  To some extent, academics have been complicit in 
this by choosing to opt out of the running of their universities in order to focus on 
advancing their own careers through research: 
  “>ŝŬĞƌŝĐŚƉĞĂƐĂŶƚƐ ?ƚŚĞǇƚŝůůƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƉĂƚĐŚďƵƚĚŝƐƉůĂǇůŝƚƚůĞĚĞƐŝƌĞĨŽƌĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ
action and little interest in the larger university, to which they are limply attached, 
ĂƐƚŚĞǇŐƌƵŵďůĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŝƚŵĂŬĞƐŽŶ ‘ƚŚĞŝƌ ?ƚŝŵĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵŽĨ
pĂƌŬŝŶŐ ? ?(Dearlove 2002, p. 267) 
AĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ? disengagement from decision-making processes within their institutions has 
left them isolated and vulnerable, with managers free to make decisions without 
necessarily paying due heed to academic concerns.  The erosion of traditional academic 
power structures, such as committees, has also made it increasingly difficult for academics 
to be heard (Waring 2013) and ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĂďůǇďĞĞŶ “ĂŐƌĂĚƵĂůƐŝůĞŶĐŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞ




research concerns: the nature and extent of managerialism in higher education and the 
perceived shift in academic-manager power relations. 
The term managerialism tends to be loosely defined and conflated with that of NPM and 
neoliberalism, or marketisation.  This thesis argues that they are in fact distinct concepts, 
with managerialism and neoliberalism respectively forming the twin ideological pillars of 
NPM.  The latter, which emanates from economics and public choice theory, is concerned 
with markets and freedom of choice for consumers.  The former, which derives from 
scientific management theory, is concerned with the principles and practice of 
management.   
NPM is essentially political in nature and refers to a sustained set of reforms from the 
1980s onwards designed to transform public services in the image of the private sector.  A 
costly and monolithic welfare state, with its inflexible bureaucracy and self-interested 
professionals, was to be made more efficient, effective and responsive.  Though generally 
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associated with the ideas of the New Right and seen as instigated by the Thatcher 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?EWD ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶƐĂƌĞactually more complex than this and the reform agenda 
began before Thatcher and has continued since, albeit in somewhat different guises. 
In an attempt to bring greater conceptual clarity to the notion of managerialism, an ideal 
type has been developed that identifies its six core ideological tenets.  These are normative 
claims, rather than a description of reality, and thus open to contention.  Specific indicators 
have been derived from each of these claims in relation to the research phenomenon: 
DPVC appointment practice.  These indicators are essential to the study as they provide the 
means of linking the theoretical model and the empirical data and, hence, of examining the 
nature and extent of managerialism in practice.  In so doing, the study will help to address 
the dearth of research in this area and provide a much-needed empirical counterbalance to 
the rhetoric.  
As the NPM agenda has impacted upon higher education over the last few decades, the 
twin forces of neoliberalism and managerialism are deemed to have permeated universities.  
Together with other factors, such as the huge expansion of the sector, they have 
transformed the working lives of academics.  An academic misery narrative can be 
discerned which views these developments in an almost universally negative light.  
Academic work is said to have been commodified and devalued, while the academic-
student relationship has been turned into one of provider and consumer.  The advent of 
audit and accountability regimes has subjected both teaching and research to greater 
external scrutiny and control in what has been perceived as a direct threat to academic 
autonomy.   
The working conditions and remuneration of academics are said to have declined and there 
has been an unbundling of the traditional all-round academic role.  Many more academics 
now focus on one area of activity and are employed on insecure fixed-term contracts.  
Accordingly, academics feel they have lost power and status relative to other occupational 
groups, both inside and outside the university, leading to a loss of morale. 
At the same time, professional services managers are becoming increasingly influential 
with respect to university strategic management and the development of policy that affects 
academic work.  A new breed of specialist professional services manager, often recruited 
from outside the sector, is making claims for professional recognition.  Some have argued 
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that these managers are colonising university management.  This has become a source of 
tension, if not antagonism.   
Heavy-handed, centralised top-down management is also the subject of strident criticism.  
This illustrates the fact that the criticism of management in the academic narrative 
encompasses both that enacted by professional services and academic managers, with 
little or no clear differentiation between the two.  
As some of the quotations in this chapter testify, there is little place for subtlety or nuance 
in this occasionally hyperbolic misery narrative.  The discourse is characterised by opinion 
and conjecture and is typically the product of armchair theorising rather than empirical 
research.  There is thus an urgent need to subject this discourse to critical empirical 
examination in the way proposed by this study with respect to the specific case of changing 
DPVC appointment practice.   
The following chapter continues to set the scene for the research by exploring its historical 
and empirical context, focusing on the impact of managerialism and the wider NPM agenda 
on university governance and management.  In particular, it will trace the development of 
the executive management team and explore how the profile of its members has evolved 
over time.   
 







While Chapter Two outlines the conceptual framework for the study, this chapter provides 
historical and empirical context essential to an understanding of the findings and 
subsequent analysis.  Building upon the earlier exposition of the ideological underpinnings 
of new public management (NPM), Chapter Three examines the impact of this reform 
agenda upon university governance and management.  Against this background, it 
describes the emergence of the executive management team and reviews what is known 
about executive team members, especially DPVCs.  This approach of addressing the 
research topic from the outside in is illustrated by Figure 5.  
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The first part of the chapter provides the historical context for changing DPVC appointment 
models and identifies the key themes which underpin this research.  It begins by outlining 
how university governance arrangements have changed over time in response to 
government policy and how this has affected the internal locus of power.  It then examines 
the evolution that has taken place within universities from administration to strategic 
management and describes the resulting changes to internal management arrangements, 
including the emergence of the executive management team.  In so doing, it draws upon 
the wider management and sociology of education literatures as well as that from higher 
education policy and management.  
Having examined the transformation of university management, the second half of the 
chapter situates the study in its immediate empirical context.  Specifically, it reviews 
existing research on the socio-demographic profile of the most senior academic managers, 
i.e. vice chancellors and DPVCs, their professional background and career paths into the job.   
Empirical work on the appointment of vice chancellors and DPVCs is then summarised, 
including selection criteria and procedures.  In reviewing what is known, gaps in the 
knowledge to be addressed by this study are also identified. 
For ease of reference a timeline of key events, both external and within higher education, 
impacting upon university governance and management since the 1963 Robbins Report is 
provided in Table 2. 
 
2. University Governance 
Universities in the UK are autonomous institutions able to regulate their own affairs within 
the powers granted to them by the instrument of their incorporation: act of parliament or 
ƌŽǇĂůĐŚĂƌƚĞƌ ?dŚŝƐŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĚĞĨŝŶĞƐƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚďĂƐŝĐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐŽĨ
governance, including major committees and principal officers.  By the end of the 
nineteenth century the emerging institutions outside Oxbridge demonstrated the 
fundamental governance features that still characterise pre-1992 higher education 
institutions today.  These are the senate, the principal academic body; a large, and largely 
inert, representative body known as the court; and a smaller governing body, or council, 
with a lay majority. 
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Table 2: Timeline of Key Events Impacting University Governance and Management 
Year External Environment Higher Education 
 
1963  Robbins Report recommended the 
expansion of the sector  
1970s Oil crisis and inflation boom  
1979 ůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨDĂƌŐĂƌĞƚdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
Conservative government;  
Efficiency Unit established 
 
1981  Public Expenditure White Paper brought 
in 15% cuts to higher education funding 
1983 Griffiths Report introduced general 
management to the NHS 
Tenure abolished in pre-1992 universities 
1985  Jarratt Review of university efficiency, 
widely perceived as heralding a more 
managerial approach  
1988  Education Reform Act freed polytechnics 
from local authority control and 
established contractual basis for funding  
1989  Universities Funding Council replaced the 
University Grants Committee  
1992 Cadbury Report on corporate 
governance 
Further and Higher Education Act ended 
the binary divide by giving polytechnics 
university status  
1993  Higher Education Funding Councils for 
England, Wales and Scotland established 
1994  Committee of University Chairmen (CUC) 
published guide on university governance 
1995 Greenbury Report ŽŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐ ?
remuneration 
 
1996  Second Nolan Report into standards in 
not-for-profit institutions, including 
higher and further education institutions 
1997  Dearing Review of higher education, 
including governance arrangements 
1998 Hampel Report on corporate 
governance  
 
2003 Higgs Report on the role and 
effectiveness of non-executive 
board directors 
Lambert Review of university governance  
from a business collaboration perspective 
2004  Leadership Foundation for Higher 
Education established 
2006  £3k top-up fees introduced 
2010  Browne Review of student funding and 
finance 
2012  Introduction of £9k variable tuition fees 
payable via student loans  
 
 
Susan Shepherd                  Chapter Three: Change and Continuity in University Management 
50 
 
The precise nature of the university governance model  W and with it the relative power of 
the key internal constituencies, i.e. the governing body, the executive and the academic 
community - has evolved over time in response to the prevailing policy environment.  
Three main governance phases or models can be identified: civic, consensual and 
corporate.   
2.1 Changing Models of Governance  
Under the civic governance model of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the 
council was the dominant force in higher education governance  W its authority in large part 
resulting from the ability of lay members
6
 to raise money on behalf of their institution 
(Scott 1995).  Over time, however, as the state took over the funding of universities and 
funds became more plentiful and secure
7
, the power of the council weakened and the 
academic community became more influential.  Senates took over as policy initiating 
bodies and councils became largely reactive, rubber-stamping bodies.  The vice chancellor 
was first among equals and subject to academic constraint (Halsey & Trow 1971).  
This was the era of donnish dominion (Halsey 1992) in which academic self-management 
and collegiality were the order of the day and a consensual model of governance became 
the norm (Shattock 2002).  The consensual model was characterised by an elaborate 
committee structure, widespread consultation and high levels of academic staff 
involvement.  In their seminal work, Power and Authority in British Universities, Moodie 
and Eustace summed up the prevailing view that universities should be governed by 
academics: 
 “dŚĞƐƵƉƌĞŵĞĂuthority, providing that it is exercised in ways responsive to others, 
must therefore continue to rest with academics for no one else seems sufficiently 
ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚƚŽƌĞŐƵůĂƚĞƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐĂĨĨĂŝƌƐŽĨƐĐŚŽůĂƌƐ ? ? 
(Moodie & Eustace 1974, p. 233) 
For some academics, in hindsight at least, this represents a golden age or liberal university 
ideal: a community of scholars that organised its own affairs independent of scrutiny and to 
which other players functioned merely  “ĂƐĂƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĐĂƐƚƚŽƚŚĞĐĞntral academic 
                                                          
6
 These were usually local political and commercial elites, including the founders of the civic 
institutions, such as the Palmers in Reading and Chamberlain in Birmingham (Scott 1995). 
7
 The University Grants Committee (UGC) was established in 1919 to administer university recurrent 
grants.  By 1945, universities were almost completely dependent on state money (Tapper & Salter 
1995). 
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ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? (Salter & Tapper 2002, pp. 247-248).  This consensual governance model was 
neither particularly democratic nor accountable.  Although it was based on the concept of 
collegiality, which has at its core the principle that decisions should be arrived at by 
discussion and debate with the full participation of peers (Bryman 2007), this was never as 
widespread nor inclusive as claimed (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007).  Rather, it was an elite 
collegiality centred around a charismatic vice chancellor and the professoriate (Scott 1995), 
ǁŝƚŚ “ĂƵƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐƉŽǁĞƌĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇĞǆĞƌƚĞĚďǇƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌŝĂů ‘ďĂƌŽŶƐ ? ?(Taylor, J. 2006, p. 
252).  Around the time of the student revolts in the late 1960s, Scott (1995) discerns a 
movement towards a more democratic governance phase in which rank-and-file academics 
as well as students were given more of a voice and the hierarchical power of professors and 
other senior staff was reduced.  This movement was short lived, however. 
Within a decade, the pendulum of governance influence began to swing back towards the 
council.  The 1981 financial crisis and resulting drastic cuts to higher education funding, 
necessitating as they did difficult resourcing decisions, provided the first real challenge to 
academic self-governance (Shattock 2012).  Meanwhile, as described in the previous 
chapter, DĂƌŐĂƌĞƚdŚĂƚĐŚĞƌ ?ƐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁĂƐďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐƚŽĚĞŵĂŶĚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ
effectiveness, value for money and accountability from its public services.  Following a 
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨ ‘ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶŝĞƐ ? ŽĨƚŚĞĐŝǀŝůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞŶďǇƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇhŶŝƚ 
under the leadership of Sir Derek Rayner, Joint Managing Director of Marks and Spencer, 
the government turned its attention to higher education which had failed to convince of 
 “ŝƚƐƵŶĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚĐůĂŝŵƚŽĚŽŐŽŽĚďǇĚŽŝŶŐǁŚĂƚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽĚŽ ?(Becher & Kogan 
1992, p. 179).   
The Jarratt Review (1985), commissioned by Sir Keith Joseph, then Secretary of State for 
ĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ ?ǁĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŵĂŶŝĨĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞĨĨŽƌƚƐƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞ
the efficiency of universities by effecting changes in their institutional governance.  The 
Review was led by the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals (now Universities UK) 
under an independent chairman, Sir Alex Jarratt, Chairman of Reed International and 
Chancellor of the University of Birmingham.   
Jarratt was critical of collegial self-government and challenged the dominance of the 
senate, seeing academic participation in governance as a barrier to necessary change.  
 “dŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞĚĞĐůŝŶĞŝŶƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞĚďǇŽƵŶĐŝůƐŚĂƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚƚŚĞ
potential for Senate to resist change and to exercise a national conservatism.  
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Vice-Chancellors and university administrators have in the past been trained to 
believe that harmony between the two bodies should have a very high priority in a 
university.  It may well be, however, that a degree of tension between them is 
necessary in the circumstances now facing universities, and can be creative and 
ďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂůŝŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐƚĞƌŵ ?dŚĂƚĐĂŶŽŶůǇŚĂƉƉĞŶŝĨŽƵŶĐŝůƐĂƐƐĞƌƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?
(CVCP 1985, p. 24)  
dŚĞZĞƉŽƌƚ ?ƐĐĂůůĨŽƌĐŽƵŶĐŝůŵĞŵďĞƌƐƚŽĂƐƐĞƌƚƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇ ?ƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐ
and resource allocation was an attempt to re-balance power between council and senate
8
.  
As such, it represents an important first step in the move from a consensual to a more 
corporate style of governance.   
Within the next few years, events both inside and outside higher education turned 
governance into a hot political issue, increasing the pressure for change.  In the private 
sector a series of high-profile governance failures and sleaze allegations, notably the Robert 
Maxwell fiasco
9
, led to the commissioning of the Cadbury (1992) and Hampel (1998) 
Reports.  These were primarily concerned with safeguarding financial probity and their 
main recommendations were the separation of the managing director role from the 
chairmanship of the board, and the strengthening of the role of non-executive directors.  
The development of a common understanding of the term corporate governance is 
generally agreed to have emanated from the Cadbury Report (1992), which defines it as the 
system by which organisations are directed and controlled. 
Higher education, meanwhile, experienced its own management and governance failures, 
including at Huddersfield and Portsmouth Universities.  At Huddersfield, a staff referendum 
in June 1994 produced an overwhelming vote of no confidence in the council when staff 
and students ceased to be members, and the vice chancellor subsequently stepped down 
with what was considered an excessive severance package.  Later that year at Portsmouth 
there was another staff vote of no confidence, this time in the vice chancellor, who later 
resigned following an investigation into his expenses (Dearlove 1998). 
These incidents led to a loss of confidence by government in university governance 
arrangements and precipitated a series of initiatives.  Firstly, the Higher Education Funding 
                                                          
8
 Jarratt also made significant recommendations on university management which are discussed in 
Section 3.  
9
 DĂǆǁĞůů ?Ɛcompany was found to have drawn on employee pension funds in order to finance its 
activities. 
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Council for England investigated the severance packages.  Then the Department for 
Education requested the Committee of University Chairmen (now Committee of University 
Chairs) to consider the issues raised by the Huddersfield breakdown in governance and 
produce advice for the sector.  As a result, the Committee issued its first substantial guide 
on governance for members of higher education governing bodies, covering issues such as 
their legal responsibilities and relationship to university officers (CUC 1994).  
In addition, the Nolan Committee (1996), which had been commissioned to make 
recommendations on appropriate standards in public life, was asked to extend its remit to 
not-for-profit organisations, including higher and further education.  Nolan found no 
evidence of substantial misconduct in university governance and gave the sector a broadly 




ĐŽŶĚƵĐƚŝŶŚŝŐŚĞƌĂŶĚĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĞƌĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚ ? ? 
 (Nolan 1996, p. 23).   
Despite this, the governance of universities remained a government concern and was 
addressed again in the subsequent Dearing (NCIHE 1997) and Lambert (2003) Reviews. 
Dearing was more critical of higher education governance than Nolan (Dearlove 2002).  He 
attempted to bring pre-1992 universities into line with the post-1992 governance model in 
which the power of the academic board
11
 ŝƐůŝŵŝƚĞĚ ?ĞĂƌŝŶŐƐĂǁƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐďŽĚǇ ?Ɛ
responsibilities as extending well beyond financial oversight to cover all aspects of 
institutional performance, including academic activities (Shattock 2012).  He recommended 
ĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞĐŽƵŶĐŝůĂƐƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƐƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ-making body and spelt out 
the need for governors to steer institutions in the right strategic direction at a time of 
profound and rapid change.  Dearing further proposed a reduction in the size of governing 
bodies to a maximum of 25, age and term limits for governors, and the introduction of 
effectiveness reviews so that councils could assess their own performance (NCIHE 1997).   
Lambert was a business man with a clear preference for corporate-style governance.  He 
took the view that, although universities had already made significant improvements in this 
area, as they expanded their collaborative activity with industry they needed to renew their 
                                                          
10
 Nolan (1996) made some limited recommendations concerning the appointment of governors on 
merit, the right of students to independent appeal, the need for greater openness and the freedom 
to whistle blow. 
11
 The academic board is the most senior academic-related committee in a post-1992 university. 




(2003, p. 93).  Like Dearing before him, Lambert was prescriptive about the size of the 
governing body, setting an upper limit of 25 members, due to his belief that larger councils 
are less effective, less well attended and less conducive to constructive debate.  He further 
specified that there should be a lay majority who could bring valuable technical and 
professional expertise, the capacity for effective environmental scanning and the ability to 
act as critical friend to the university by constructively challenging the executive.  Lambert 
also recommended that councils conduct regular effectiveness reviews and adopt a Code of 
Governance.  His draft Code
12
 ĐůĂƌŝĨŝĞƐƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨĐŽƵŶĐŝůĂƐƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƐƉƌĞ-eminent 
decision-making body and assigns it responsibility for strategic and financial management 
and performance monitoring.   
The publication of the Dearing and Lambert Reports marks the high point of government 
efforts to put pressure on universities to move away from a consensual model of 
governance in favour of a corporate one focused around the formal powers of the 
governing body.  Universities have responded by developing a more systematic approach 
to governor training and governance procedures, measures which are considered to have 
 “ŐƌĞĂƚůǇŝŵƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĂůƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵǁŝƚŚǁŚŝĐŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐďŽĚŝĞƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĞŝƌ
ƚĂƐŬ ?ĂŶĚŵĂĚĞŝŵƉƌŽƉƌŝĞties less likely (Shattock 2012, p. 59).   
2.2 Limitations of the Corporate Model 
The pre-eminence of the council in determining strategy, legal compliance and the 
appropriate use of government funds is now assumed in the legal and regulatory 
framework under which pre-1992 universities operate (Lapworth 2004).  However, 
although councils may see themselves as exercising a larger role in these areas, it is 
ĚĞďĂƚĂďůĞǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐĂĐƚƵĂůůǇďĞĞŶĂ “ƌĞǀŝǀĂůŽĨůĂǇƉŽǁĞƌ ?(Scott 1995, p. 66), with 
councils asserting themselves in the way Jarratt had intended.  This may be due in part to 
the inherent limitations of the corporate governance model and question marks over its 
appropriateness in a university context.  
The recent banking crisis has illustrated the inability of some corporate boards to exercise 
adequate control over the conduct of their organisations (Brown 2011).  These failures 
ďĞƚƌĂǇĞĚďŽĂƌĚŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?ůĂĐŬŽĨĚĞƚĂŝůĞĚƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĂŶĚĂŶŝŶĂďŝůŝƚǇŽƌ
unwillingness to hold to account a headstrong chief executive (Shattock 2013).  Events such 
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 Lambert includes a draft Code of Governance intended to provide a starting point from which the 
sector could develop its own version. 
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as these have cast serious doubt on the idea that the corporate model of governance 
represents good practice or is automatically superior to traditional forms of university 
governance.  
Empirical research in the private sector suggests that non-executive directors sometimes 
lack the required resources, qualities and independence from management: 
 “ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝŶƚŚĞŽƌǇĂůůĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌƐĂƌĞĞƋƵĂů ?ŝƚĐĂŶďĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĨŽƌŶŽŶ-ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?
directors to challenge autocratic or charismatic leaders, or to insist on raising topics 
ŶŽƚŽŶƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĚĂƐĞƚďǇƚŚĞĐŚĂŝƌŵĂŶ ? ?(Sternberg 2004, p. 86) 
/ŶƚŚĞƉƵďůŝĐƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ŵĞĂŶǁŚŝůĞ ?ƐŚďƵƌŶĞƌ ?ƐƐƚƵĚŝĞƐŽĨE,^ďŽĂƌĚŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐƌĞǀĞĂůƚŚĂƚ
non-executive directors have an inbuilt disadvantage due to their lack of time and 
involvement with the institution compared with the executive.  Hence they too often play a 
purely rubber-stamping role when executives bring decisions to the board for approval.  
This leads her to conclude that the use of governing bodies in the public sector is a 
 “variable and ƵŶƉƌŽǀĞŶŵŽĚĞůŽĨĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞ ?  (Ashburner 1977, p. 281).   
In a university context, lay members of council are by definition outsiders and thus unlikely 
to be as well informed about the university as the executive.  This limits both their power 
and effectiveness as, without detailed knowledge, effective and authoritative intervention 
is not possible (Moodie & Eustace 1974).  Recent rapid changes to higher education funding 
and fees regimes and accountability frameworks mean that specialist technical knowledge 
is at a premium.  As a result, lay council members are heavily dependent upon the 
recommendations of their vice chancellors on key areas of strategy, such as the setting of 
tuition fees (Shattock 2013). 
Council members, who typically meet only four or five times a year and are isolated from 
ƚŚĞĐŽƌĞďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ? “ŚĂǀĞƚŽŽŽĨƚĞŶďĞĐŽŵĞƐŝŵƉůǇƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞ
ƉƌŽƉŽƐĂůƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĂŶĚŵƵĐŚůĞƐƐĂďůĞƚŽƉůĂǇƚŚĞƌŽůĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůĨƌŝĞŶĚ ? ?
(Shattock 2013, p. 223).  So, although there is potentially great value in having the external 
perspective which lay members bring to a council, it may perhaps be unrealistic to expect 
them to exercise proper control over university activity (Brown 2011).  This is exemplified 
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by the recent financial crisis at London Metropolitan University
13
, precipitated by years of 
inaccurate student number returns.   
Councils may also be unable to hold their executives to account effectively (Lapworth 
2004).  One example of this, which resonates with recent experience in the banking sector, 
ŝƐƚŚĞƐƉŝƌĂůůŝŶŐůĞǀĞůŽĨǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?ƐĂůĂƌŝĞƐ(Shattock 2012).  Scott has even suggested 
that some governing bodies are in the pockets of their executives (2002) and, quoted in a 
recent Times Higher Education article, blamed the recent spate of vice chancellor exits on 
ĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐĂĐƚŝŶŐ “ƚŽŽůĂƚĞĂŶĚŝŶƉĂŶŝĐ ?(Morgan 2014). 
Councils may thus be failing to assert themselves, not against the powerful senate which 
was a feature of the earlier consensual governance model, but rather against an 
increasingly powerful executive  W a phenomenon explored in the following section.  
 
3. From Administration to Management 
As governance models have changed, so has university management.  In the early days of 
ƚŚĞĐŝǀŝĐŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞŵŽĚĞů ?ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞƐŵĂůůĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐŵŝŶŝŵĂů “ǁŝƚŚ
ƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚĞƐƚŽĨƚŽƵĐŚĞƐ ? ?ďƵƚďǇƚŚĞƚŝŵĞŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵĂůŵŽĚĞůƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐĂŶĞĞĚƚo 
upgrade managerial capacity (Scott 1995, pp. 63-64).  Institutions had grown, resources 
needed to be managed and plans submitted.  Accordingly, a larger and more sophisticated 
civil service-style administration developed, comprising generalist administrators acting in a 
neutral support role to the academic community.  Two parallel, yet unequal, academic and 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞƐĞŵĞƌŐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŝŶĐŽŶƚƌŽůĂŶĚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ “ŬĞƉƚĨŝƌŵůǇ
ŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƉůĂĐĞĂƐƐĞƌǀĂŶƚƐŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ?(Dearlove 1998, p. 68).   
Over time, however, in response to a rapidly changing higher education environment, 
passive administration began to give way to active management.   
3.1 The Jarratt Effect 
The Jarratt Review (1985) is generally seen as a significant turning point in the 
managerialisation of universities.  However, the need for better management had already 
been recognised by some commentators who saw the Review as an opportunity: 
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 The University was asked to repay an unprecedented £36.5 million to the Higher Education 
Funding Council for England.  




activities within universities.  Universities will not be able to muddle through the 
1990s by continuing to regard management as some minimalist function to be left 
to administrators who are firmly subservient to their academic masters and possibly 
to a few senior academics who have run out of research steam.  Far from 
threatening the academic integrity of universities stronger management would 
ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞŝƚǁŝƚŚǀŝƚĂůƵŶĚĞƌƉŝŶŶŝŶŐ ? ?(THES 1984, p. 40) 
Jarratt found that vice chancellors had virtually no formal constitutional powers and 
instead relied on influence and persuasion.  Accordingly, managerial style and the 
interpretation of the vice chancellor role varied significantly from institution to institution.  
Jarratt judged these arrangements inadequate to the management challenge facing 
universities and proposed that councils should strengthen the role and authority of their 
vice chancellor as chief executive as well as academic leader.  His other recommendations 
on university management
14
 were to:  
x Develop institutional plans and performance indicators 
x Establish a central planning and resources committee 
x Streamline the committee structure 
x Delegate budgetary responsibilities to departments 
x Introduce staff development and appraisal mechanisms 
x Appoint, rather than elect, heads of department and assign them management 
duties and responsibilities. (CVCP 1985)  
 
Whilst, taken together these proposals represent a more business-like or corporate 
approach to higher education management than hitherto, this was no slavish imposition of 
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŽƌ “ĂŶŝŶĚƵƐƚƌŝĂůƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ? (Richmond 1986, p. 4) onto universities, as 
sometimes alleged at the time.  In fact, the majority of committee members worked in 
higher education or had direct involvement in it as university chancellors.  As a result the 
Report is broadly sympathetic to, and knowledgeable about, higher education, recognising 
its importance to the country.  It shows an awareness of the complexity and uniqueness of 
universities as organisations and the complicating factors that make them difficult to 
manage, notably disciplinary loyalties, tenure and academic self-governance.   
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 dŚĞZĞƉŽƌƚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞĂƌĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚin 2.1.  
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Furthermore, the Committee recognised the difficult economic and political situation that 
universities were in at the time and many of its recommendations were actually aimed at 
the government, Universities Funding Council and the Committee of Vice-Chancellors and 
Principals rather than the universities.  Overall, contrary to government expectation and 
immediate media reaction (Goffin 1988), the Report was not particularly critical of the way 
universities were managed and did not find significant inefficiencies.  As the Leader article 




 April remarked: 
  “ ?ŝĨƚŚĞ:ĂƌƌĂƚƚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞǁĂƐƚŽďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐĂƚĞƐƚ ?ƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐƵŶĚĞƌ
ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇŚĂǀĞƉĂƐƐĞĚĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůǇ ? ?(THES 1985)  
Although the Committee proposed improvements to management structures and 
procedures, especially strategic planning and resource management, these were to be in 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨĂƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵŝƐƐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂƐ “ƚŚĞƐĞƌǀĂŶƚ ?ŶŽƚƚŚĞ
ŵĂƐƚĞƌ ?(CVCP 1985, p. 34).  Furthermore, the Report states that change should be 
sensitive to the academic aims of a university and the need to involve academic staff.  
Nevertheless, in an unwelcome message for many academics, Jarratt was clear that the 
university as a whole should take precedence over the needs and wishes of the individual. 
 “tĞƐƚƌĞƐƐƚŚĂƚŝŶŽƵƌǀŝĞǁƵŶiversities are first and foremost corporate enterprises 
ƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƐƵďƐŝĚŝĂƌǇƵŶŝƚƐĂŶĚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂƌĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞĂŶĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůĞ ? 
(CVCP 1985, p. 22)  
Scott suggests that the importance of the Review may have been overstated since it was 
merely the aggregation of a number of detailed enquiries into different aspects of 
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ ?ĂƐƐƵĐŚ ? “ĂůŝŵŝƚĞĚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞ ?(1995, p. 65).  It is true that from 
ƚŽĚĂǇ ?ƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ:ĂƌƌĂƚƚ ?ƐƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĂƚŝŽŶƐĚŽŶŽƚƐĞĞŵƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƌĞŵĂƌkable or 
novel, itself a reflection of just how far university management has evolved during the 
intervening decades.   
Nevertheless, the Jarratt Report is generally regarded as a watershed moment in higher 
education management which ushered in a new managerial approach that is since 
perceived to have permeated universities (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007).  Henkel describes 
ƚŚĞZĞƉŽƌƚĂƐ “ĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĐĂůůĨŽƌƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐƚŽďĞŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ?(2002b, p. 30) as evidenced, for 
ĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ďǇƚŚĞůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŝƚĞŵƉůŽǇƐ PƚĞƌŵŝŶŽůŽŐǇƐƵĐŚĂƐ ‘ĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞĞŶƚĞƌƉƌŝƐĞ ? ? ‘ĐŚŝĞĨ
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 This publication is now entitled Times Higher Education. 
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ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŽƌƐ ?ŚĂĚŶŽƚďĞĞŶused previously in a higher education 
context.   
In my view the Report is highly significant, though as much for symbolic as practical 
ƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚƐƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĚŝĚƐƚŝŵƵůĂƚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů
management arrangements - not least beĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐǇĞĂƌƐ ?ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐƐĞƚƚůĞŵĞŶƚǁĂƐ
contingent on the implementation of a Programme of Action to improve management 
practices (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007) - it did not spark an overnight management 
revolution.  This was mainly because, as noted by some commentators at the time, the 
ZĞƉŽƌƚ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŚĂĚ
already changed following the expansion of the sector and the financial constraints of the 
early 1980s (THES 1985).  Hence, the universities under scrutiny easily passed the Jarratt 
test. 
dŚĞZĞƉŽƌƚ ?ƐƐǇŵďŽůŝĐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞůŝĞƐĨŝƌƐƚůǇŝŶŝƚƐĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌŐŽŽĚ
management and for those in senior academic positions, such as deans and DPVCs, to act 
as managers as well as academic leaders.  In this sense, it heavily influenced subsequent 
discourse about university management (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).  Secondly, in 
championing the need for top-down management, it challenged both the culture of 
donnish dominion and what was perceived to be an outdated and inefficient civil service 
administrative model (Smith, D. & Adams 2008).  Thirdly, the commissioning of the Report 
can be seen as evidencĞŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞŶŽƚǁĞůůŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ?
One of the committee members (Richmond 1986) spoke of an assumption at the outset of 
the Review that universities were both mismanaged and inefficient and that significant 
ƐĂǀŝŶŐƐǁŽƵůĚďĞŵĂĚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚƚƵƌŶĞĚŽƵƚŶŽƚƚŽďĞƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ?ƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ
ĚĞĨŝĐŝƚ ? (Watson 2008, p. 11) was therefore already in evidence. 
This deficit view of higher education management and leadership has been a recurring 
policy theme (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2006), with universities seen as under-managed 
ĂŶĚƌƵŶůŝŬĞŐĞŶƚůĞŵĞŶ ?ƐĐůƵďƐďǇƐĞůĨ-serving academics (Scott 2002).  Subsequent 
government reports and White Papers have carried a consistent message that universities 
need to increase efficiency, find new sources of income and improve performance 
(Middlehurst 2004).  For example, the White Paper, The Future of Higher Education, stated 
ƚŚĂƚĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƐŽŵĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞǁĞůůŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐŚĂĚďĞĞŶ “ƉƌŽƉƉĞĚƵƉƌĂƚŚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶƚƵƌŶĞĚĂƌŽƵŶĚ ?(DES 2003, p. 80).  In the same year Lambert described universities as 
ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐĂŶĚƌŝƐŬĂǀĞƌƐĞĂŶĚŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ “ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƐĞĞŵƚŽŚĂǀĞ
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enough confidence in the way that universities run themselves to give them extra funding 
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƐƚƌŝŶŐƐĂƚƚĂĐŚĞĚ ?(2003, p. 102).  The establishment of the Leadership Foundation 
for Higher Education in 2004 and various initiatives by the Higher Education Funding 
Council to promote good leadership, governance and management practice all testify to 
government determination to improve the way universities are run (Taylor, J. 2006). 
Irrespective of government pressure, however, the rapid growth in the size and complexity 
of the higher education environment over the last few decades necessitated new forms of 
governance and management (Taylor, J. 2006).  In order to survive and flourish in an 
increasingly competitive global market and during a time of severe financial constraint, 
universities felt the need to take an increasingly professional approach to management.  
This can be characterised as a historical progression from university administration to 
management, and then to a more proactive strategic management (Shattock 2000).   
 “/ŶƚŚŝƐŶĞǁ corporate culture strategic and executive management replaces 
ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚŵŽĚĞ ? ?(Scott 1995, p. 69) 
As a result, higher education management is now unrecognisable from that of forty years 
ago (Lauwerys 2002), with consequences both for managers and the managed (Taylor, J. 
2006).  Two major areas of change are the professionalisation of the administration and the 
emergence of the executive management team.  These are addressed in turn in the 
following sections.  
3.2 Professionalisation of the Administration 
The traditional civil service model of administration that had characterised the consensual 
governance phase (2.1) was one in which administrators had been expected to operate in a 
subservient role to the academic community  (Chapter Two, 6.2) and, except for the most 
ƐĞŶŝŽƌƉŽƐƚŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ? “ƚŽďĞƐĞĞŶĂŶĚŶŽƚŚĞĂƌĚĂƚĨŽƌŵĂůŵĞĞƚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ?
(Lauwerys 2002, p. 94).  From the 1980s onwards, however, this model was increasingly 
seen as inadequate. 
Jarratt found that administrators were serving their institutions well but identified further 
scope for the delegation of managerial responsibility in non-academic areas (CVCP 1985).  
One of the Committee members, the then Registrar at the University of Sussex, 
subsequently called for administrators to stop being so humble and self-effacing and step 
into the limelight and accept responsibility for institutional management (Lockwood 1986).  
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/Ŷ>ŽĐŬǁŽŽĚ ?ƐǀŝĞǁ ?ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞŽŶůǇƉĞŽƉůĞƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚƚŽŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚ:ĂƌƌĂƚƚ ?Ɛ
recommendations.  Others questioned whether universities would ever allow their 
administrators management powers similar to those being assumed by senior civil servants 
ĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĂŐĞŶĚĂ(Fielding 1986). 
However, the massive expansion in the scale and complexity of university operations since 
the 1980s made change inevitable.  There was a huge increase in student numbers and a 
consequent growth in financial turnover and the size of the physical estate.  New third-
stream and other income generation activities were taken on, whilst the manifold external 
demands of accountability and compliance necessitated the delivery of completely new 
administrative functions, including strategic planning and quality assurance.  The 
introduction of new funding and fees regimes and the construction of students as 
consumers (Williams, J. 2011), with its resultant focus on improving the student experience, 
further added to the administrative burden.   Against this background, the status quo was 
no longer good enough and more professional management was required (Taylor, J. 2006).  
This, in turn, meant that universities needed managers as well as generalist administrators. 
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ? “ŶĞǁƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ ?ĞŵĞƌŐĞĚǁŝƚŚŶĞǁĨŽƌŵƐŽĨĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ(Whitchurch 2008a, 
p. 76) as experienced and high-level specialist managers, such as those in marketing or 
estates, were recruited from outside the sector on attractive salaries (Lauwerys 2008).    
This new-look administration  W or professional services as they have increasingly come to 
be known  W are operating in a support and advisory role to the executive rather than in 
 “ĚŽĐŝůĞ ?ƐĞƌǀŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ(Scott 1995, p. 64).  As such, they have come 
to occupy the middle ground between academic managers and rank-and-file academic staff 
(Whitchurch 2008a).  This is not always a happy place to be.  If professional services 
managers provide support to departments, ƚŚĞǇŵĂǇďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ “ŐŽŝŶŐŶĂƚŝǀĞ ?ďǇƚŚŽƐĞĂƚ
ƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝĨƚŚĞǇ “ƉƵƌƐƵĞĂĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞůŝŶĞ ?ƚŚĞǇŵĂǇďĞƐĞĞŶďǇĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂƐ
prioritising managerial concerns (Whitchurch 2007, p. 56).  VŝĞǁĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?
ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƵŶǁĂŶƚĞĚďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚƐ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐ ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƚŚĞĂŐĞŶƚƐŽĨ
managerialism (Chapter Two, 6.2).  They are damned either way since both bureaucrats 
and managers tend to be resented by academics, not least because both bureaucracy and 
management have negative connotations as something one group does to another 
(Whitchurch 2008a).   
The  “managĞƌŝĂůƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶďĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽ
external pressures (Salter & Tapper 2002, p. 251) and a necessary transition from a more 
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rule-oriented to a more enterprising and service-oriented culture (Bolden, Petrov & Gosling 
2008b, Gornitzka & Larsen 2004).  However, the professionalisation of the administration 
was also driven by administrators and managers themselves (Scott 1995) and, as the 
prevailing academic narrative reveals, has not been uncontentious .  As noted in the 
previous chapter, although most academics did not want to take on an expanded 
administrative role, they did not necessarily support another group doing so, particularly 
when it entailed real influence over institutional management which, under the consensual 
governance model, had been their sole preserve (Dobson & Conway 2003, p. 126).  
Whilst some still see a clear delineation between academics and managers, characterised 
by tension and sometimes antagonism (Halsey 1992), others argue that the traditional 
binary divide between academic and administrative domains is now becoming blurred and 
Ă “ƚŚŝƌĚƐƉĂĐĞ ?ĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƐĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚǁŽŝƐĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐ(Whitchurch 2008c, p. 378).  
Whitchurch has identified new perimeter roles in this third space for both professional 
managers and academic staff, including those around widening participation, study skills 
and regional partnerships.  She argues that individuals may work back and forth across 
these boundaries, creating new functional spaces, knowledge and relationships and 
ĞŶǀŝƐĂŐĞƐĂĨƵƚƵƌĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĂŶĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĐŽĂůĞƐĐĞ “ƚŽ
create a new, generic form of third space ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ?(Whitchurch 2008c, p. 387).  This 
study examines whether any such blurring of academic-management boundaries may be 
occurring at DPVC level.  
3.3 The Rise of the Executive 
In most universities, the adoption of a more strategic approach to university management 
has resulted in a number of structural changes along the lines of those proposed by Jarratt, 
notably the streamlining of the committee system, the devolution of budgets and creation 
of fewer larger academic units, such as faculties or schools (Middlehurst 2004).  Senior 
management structures have also been reframed (Woodfield & Kennie 2007) with the 
ƌĞƉůĂĐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ “ĚŝĂƌĐŚǇ ?ŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌĂŶĚƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƌďǇĂƐŵĂůůĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚĞĂŵŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐ “ĂŬŝŶƚŽĐĂďŝŶĞƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?(Henkel 2002b, p. 32). 
The emergence of executive management teams is a relatively recent phenomenon: Jarratt 
made no reference to them in 1985, suggesting that the concept either did not exist or was 
not recognised as such at the time.  A few years later, executive teams were being created 
(Henkel 1997), though they were still comparatively new in pre-1992 universities (Scott 
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1995).  It is likely that, after the end of the binary divide, pre-1992 university vice 
chancellors were influenced by the more top-down executive model of the former 
polytechnics (Shattock 2012) ƐŝŶĐĞ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶĂĚĞĐĂĚĞ>ĂŵďĞƌƚŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚŵĂŶǇ “ǁĞůůƌƵŶ ?
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐǁĞƌĞ “ĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐƐƚƌŽŶŐĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ǁŝƚŚƐŵĂůů ?
cohesive cabinet-style management teams (2003, pp. 93-94).  Almost thirty years after 
Jarratt, all pre-1992 universities in the study population for this research have some form 
of executive management team  W a good example of the way in which the management 
approaches of pre- and post-1992 institutions have become more similar (Deem 1998). 
These teams emerged as a support mechanism for vice chancellors (Henkel 2002b).  As the 
range and complexity of university management issues grew and become too much for one 
person to deal with, so executive management teams began to take over many of the 
responsibilities previously exercised by the head of institution.  Nevertheless, vice 
chancellors remained firmly in charge and are still the biggest single influence on the 
nature and composition of the executive team (Lauwerys 2008).  Each vice chancellor 
shapes his or her own team, determining its membership and mode of operation 
(Woodfield & Kennie 2008, p. 411).  Accordingly, their size and function varies from 
institution to institution (Middlehurst 1993).   
Although the executive management team may take different forms, there is normally a 
core team consisting of the vice chancellor, DPVCs, registrar and director of finance
16
 
(Kennie & Woodfield 2008a).  Most institutions have a two-tier system whereby this core 
team is supported by a wider senior management team, typically including deans and/or 
heads of department and directors of professional services (Bolden, Petrov & Gosling 
2008a).  The name of the core team usually provides a good indicator of its status and 
ĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐĂŶ ‘ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌǇ ?ŐƌŽƵƉŽƌĂŵŽƌĞĨŽƌŵĂůůǇ
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĚ ‘ďŽĂƌĚ ? ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚĂƉƉĂƌĞŶƚŝŶĨŽƌŵĂůŝƚǇŵĂǇďĞůŝĞĂƚĞĂŵ ?ƐƚƌƵĞƐĐope and 
authority (Woodfield & Kennie 2008).  As a rule, this team is the key decision-making body 
for the institution as a whole (Bolden, Petrov & Gosling 2008a). 
The emergence of executive management teams is a manifestation of the strengthening of 
ƚŚĞĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ ?Žƌ “ƐƚĞĞƌŝŶŐĐŽƌĞ ?(Clark, B. R. 2007) ?ŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?hŶĚĞƌDŝŶƚǌďĞƌŐ ?Ɛ
(1993) conception of the university as professional bureaucracy, the executive 
management team as its strategic apex  becomes the most important part of the 
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Section 3). 
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organisation.  This suggests a movement away from the collegium organisational cultural 
model, where the operating core of academics dominate, towards a corporate model in 
which the executive is more powerful (McNay 1999).  
Further evidence of the strengthening of the steering core can be seen within the team 
itself, whose members have increasingly well-defined responsibilities (Henkel 1997).  
Firstly, as originally proposed by Jarratt, there has been an expansion of the role of vice 
chancellor as chief executive and chief accounting officer.  Pre-1992 vice chancellors have 
come to resemble more closely their counterparts in post-1992 institutions, who already 
had real executive authority (Shattock 1999).  By the time of the Lambert Report (2003) 
their role was seen as similar to that of a chief executive in the private sector.   
Secondly, a full-time and sometimes permanent DVC post has been created in some 
institutions to act as a formal deputy to the vice chancellor (Kennie & Woodfield 2008a).  
This is particularly true of those universities where the vice chancellor has a significant 
external relations or fundraising brief.  Indeed, a few institutions have recently adopted a 
president-provost model, typical of that found in the United States.  DVCs normally work 
closely with the vice chancellor in a more executive capacity, to a different brief and with a 
more obviously senior status to WsƐŝŶĂ “ƐƚƌĞƚĐŚĞĚ ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŝĞƌ(Smith, D., 
Adams & Mount 2007, p. 2)
17
.   
Thirdly, there has been a strengthening of the DPVC cohort.  Numbers have grown 
significantly over the years (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007) and there is a movement 
towards appointing full-time DPVCs with longer periods of tenure (Kennie & Woodfield 
2008a).  Increasingly, pre-1992 universities are starting to move away from the traditional 
internal fixed-term DPVC secondment model in favour of appointing some or all of their 
DPVCs via external open competition (Shepherd 2011).  DPVC portfolios are being extended 
outside of traditional teaching and research areas (Middlehurst 2004) and different 
variants of the DPVC role are beginning to emerge (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).   
The one executive team post that has arguably weakened in influence is that of the 
registrar, who traditionally sits at the head of a unitary administration.  In some cases, 
ĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƌ ?ƐƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐŚĂǀĞŶŽǁďĞĞŶƐƵďƐƵŵĞĚŝŶƚŽĂsŽƌƉƌŽǀŽƐƚ
role or split across DPVC portfolios  (Middlehurst 2013).  In at least one pre-1992 
                                                          
17
 In some cases, the authors suggest there may even be a split into two distinct management tiers 
with the DVC at the second and PVCs at the third tier (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007). 





, the post has disappeared completely.  And, although the increasingly 
influential director of finance is now routinely a member of the core executive 
management team, there is relatively little evidence of other professional services directors 
as full members (Kennie & Woodfield 2008a), though they are usually part of a wider senior 
management team.    
The rise of the executive team is not unproblematic.  Arguably, the executive are becoming 
more powerful and less effectively scrutinised, with the governing body effectively rubber-
stamping their strategic decisions (Waring 2013).  They are also less accountable to the 
wider academic community, as a result of whicŚ “ƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐǀŽŝĐĞŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞĚ
ĨƌŽŵĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝĐǇĚĞďĂƚĞ ?(Shattock 2013, p. 230).  Some academics have 
expressed concerns about the small numbers of people involved in strategic decision 
making and the legitimacy of executive teams in relation to the committee system 
(Middlehurst 1993).  The fitness for purpose of an executive, or corporate, model of 
management in a university context has also been questioned: 
 “dŚĞƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶƚƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽĞƋƵĂƚĞĐŽůůĞŐial styles of leadership and management 
with ineffectiveness and corporate styles of strong top-down decision making with 
effectiveness misunderstands the cultural attributes of the university and how to 
ŐĞƚƚŚĞďĞƐƚĨƌŽŵŝƚƐƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐ ? ?(Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007, p. 45) 
As discussed in Chapter Two, executive management teams are considered to have 
adopted an increasingly directive leadership style (Pilbeam 2009), with a new cadre of 
externally appointed DPVCs taking on the role of transmitting policy injunctions 
downwards, rather than policy recommendations upwards (Shattock 2013).  These teams 
are now performing functions traditionally undertaken within faculties and they are 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚŝŶƚŚŝƐďǇŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂŶĚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞƐƚĂĨĨǁŚŽ “ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝƐĞĂŶĚ
ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝƐĞ ?ƚŚĞƚĞĂŵ ?ƐĂĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ(Shattock 2013, p. 228).   
Accordingly, an intermediary structure has developed between the team and the wider 
academic community in the form of various academic support units, such as research and 
quality assurance offices (Henkel 2002b) and the gap is widening between members of the 
team and rank-and-ĨŝůĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?ŽƌƚŚĞ “ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚ
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ?(Winter 2009, p. 121).  
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4. Profile of Academic Managers  
This section examines the implications of this changed management landscape for those 
holding the most senior academic management roles.  Specifically, it summarises what is 
known about their socio-demographic profile and how this has changed (or not) over time.  
The review is located primarily within the higher education management literature, but 
also makes reference to the sociological literature of elites and the professions.  
Given the paucity of empirical research to date on DPVCs, much of the focus of this and the 
remaining sections in this chapter is on vice chancellors.  To a large extent vice chancellors 
are utilised as a proxy for DPVCs since the former are largely drawn from the DPVC ranks 
and their profile can therefore be assumed to reflect that of the DPVC community.  
Moreover, as will become apparent in Chapter Five, appointment practice for vice 
chancellors tends to set the pattern for what happens at DPVC level.   
4.1 Vice Chancellors 
The literature provides a virtually continuous socio-demographic profile of university vice 
chancellors since the 1930s
19
, albeit limited in scope by a reliance on publically available 
data (mainly taken from tŚŽ ?ƐtŚŽ, Times Higher Education and various higher education 
directories and handbooks) as well as the particular interest of the researchers.  Earlier 
studies are located within the literature of elites and primarily concerned with vice 
ĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ? 
Prompted by the increasingly prominent role universities were occupying in society 
ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ŽůůŝŶƐŽŶĂŶĚDŝůůĞŶ(1969) examined the 
social profile of vice chancellors, Oxbridge college principals and university chancellors 
between 1935 and 1967.  Data on club membership, honours and titles and education 
revealed that, although an Oxbridge education was still common amongst vice 
chancellors
20
, as a group they did not display anything close to the pattern of establishment 
membership exhibited by university chancellors.  Accordingly, Collinson and Millen 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ “ĂƌĞĐŽŵŝŶŐƚŽďĞƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĞĚŵŽƌĞǁŝĚĞůǇ ?(1969, p. 107). 
Szreter (1979) built upon these findings in his two studies of the 54 members of the 
Committee of Vice-Chancellors and Principals, first in the academic year 1966/7 and then a 
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 And back to the 1880s in regard to educational background (Perkin 1978-9). 
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 The authors do acknowledge, however, that their sample is skewed by the high number of heads 
of Oxbridge colleges (Collinson & Millen 1969). 
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decade later in 1976/7.  He found that the Oxbridge influence remained pronounced, 
accounting for approximately half of the sample group in both survey years.  However, less 
than a quarter of vice chancellors in 1966/7 attended public school (taken to be a marker of 
higher social class), a figure which did not alter significantly over the decade.  This is 
deemed to set vice chancellors apart from the more traditional social elites, marking them 
out rather as an intellectual meritocracy (1979).   
Overall, Szreter found little evidence of change in the socio-demographic profile of vice 
chancellors during what he described as a turbulent decade characterised by the post-
Robbins euphoria of the late 1960s and the political uncertainty and severe economic 
constraint of the early 1970s.  He summarised the findings of the second study as a case of 
 “ĂƐǇŽƵǁĞƌĞ ?(1979, p. 1), the notable exception being that the first female vice chancellor 
had been appointed by 1977.  Szreter predicted that this conservative recruitment pattern 
would continue, though admitted to uncertainty about how well served universities would 
be by this type of traditional vice chancellor. 
In the 1970s, vice chancellors were included in two further studies of elite groups by 
Wakeford and Wakeford (1974) and Perkin (1978-9).  Elites were defined by the former as 
ƚŚŽƐĞ “ŝŶĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞĞǆĞƌĐŝƐŝŶŐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĂďůĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĂŶĚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?(1974, p. 
187) and by the latter as occupyŝŶŐ “ŬĞǇƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƚƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶĂů
ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĞƐŝŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?(1978-9, p. 222) ?dŚĞƐĞƚǁŽƐƚƵĚŝĞƐĞĐŚŽ^ǌƌĞƚĞƌ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐ P
confirming on the one hand the continuing influence of an Oxbridge education and on the 
other the predominance of a state or grammar, rather than public, school route into 
university.  Like Szreter, Wakeford and Wakeford regard this as evidence that vice 
chancellors are, on the whole, a meritocratic group. 
WĞƌŬŝŶ ?ƐůĂƌŐĞ, longitudinal study of ten major elite groups between 1880 and 1978 allows 
the socio-demographic data on vice chancellors to be viewed in a broader, historical 
context.  The author concludes that the reduction over time in the proportion of vice 
chancellors from the upper classes (especially the landed class) and from major public 
ƐĐŚŽŽůƐŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂƌĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞůǇ “ƉŽŽƌ ?ŽƌŽŶůǇ “ŵŽĚĞƐƚůǇĂĨĨůƵĞŶƚ ?ŝƐ
ƐǇŵƉƚŽŵĂƚŝĐŽĨĞůŝƚĞŐƌŽƵƉƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ “ŵŝĚĚůĞƌĂŶŐĞƐŽĨƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ 
ƚŚĂƚ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ƉŽŽƌ ?ǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐŝƐŚŝŐŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĂƚŽĨŵŽƐƚŽƚŚĞƌ
elite groups, it is in line with the overall trend (1978-9, pp. 230-232).  From this perspective 
vice chancellors can be seen as more similar to, than different from, other elite groups.  
dŚŝƐŚŽůĚƐƚƌƵĞĂůƐŽŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŐĞŶĚĞƌ ?WĞƌŬŝŶ ?ƐĚĂƚĂƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚďǇ ? ? ? ?ŽŶůǇĂŚĂŶĚĨƵů
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of women had ever reached the top of any elite group, making the fact that there had only 
been two female vice chancellors since 1880 somewhat less remarkable.  
There subsequently appears to have been a lull in research interest in university leaders 
until the late 1990s when Farnham and Jones (1998) examined the biographical profile of 
vice chancellors as part of a wider comparative study of top public service managers in 
universities, the civil service and the NHS.  The start date for their study (1992 to 1997) 
coincides with the end of the binary divide at which time the former polytechnics were 
granted university status.  It is thus the first demographic profile of this extended cohort of 
vice chancellors.  This study is also noteworthy in that it forms part of a discernible trend of 
empirical research prompted by a key development in higher education policy, such as that 
of Collinson and Millen (1969) following the 1963 Robbins Report, Bargh et al (2000) after 
the 1985 Jarratt Report, and Breakwell and Tytherleigh (2008a) after the 1997 Dearing 
Report. 
This enlarged cohort of university leaders was still overwhelmingly male (96%), although 
the number of female vice chancellors had increased to six.  It was a more diverse group 
ƚŚĂŶƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇ ?ǁŝƚŚǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐŝŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ƐďŽƚŚǇŽƵŶŐĞƌĂŶĚ “ŵŽƌĞĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ
ĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůůǇƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?(1998, p. 57).   Only a third of vice chancellors in the early 
1990s went to independent schools
21
 and a third to Oxbridge, though both figures are 
ŚŝŐŚĞƌĨŽƌǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐŽĨĂŶĐŝĞŶƚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?>ŝŵŝƚĞĚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŶĂŝƌĞĚĂƚĂŽŶƉĂƌĞŶƚƐ ?
occupations also suggests that vice chancellors came from predominantly middle class 
families.  They conclude that vice chancellors remain an elite group, albeit a more 
heterogeneous one than hitherto.  Specifically, vice chancellors are considered to be part of 
ĂŶ “ŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞůŝƚĞ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?Ă “ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?ƐŽĐŝĂůĞůŝƚĞ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ǁĞůů
ƌĞǁĂƌĚĞĚĂŶĚǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚƐŽĐŝĂůƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?ĂŶĚĂ “ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĞůŝƚĞ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ
educational policy both directly and via pressure groups such as the Committee of Vice-
Chancellors and Principals (1998, p. 54). 
The next investigation of the socio-demographic characteristics of vice chancellors was 
undertaken as part of the largest study to date of the top university leadership role (Bargh 
et al. 2000) ?dŚŝƐƐĞŵŝŶĂůǁŽƌŬƚĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ ?ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ:ĂƌƌĂƚƚ ?Ɛ
recommendation to bolster the status of the vice chancellor, new forms of executive 
ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŽƵůĚĞŵĞƌŐĞďĂƐĞĚŽŶŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞ ?dŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐ ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ
                                                          
21
 dŚĞƉƌĞĐŝƐĞĚĞĨŝŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƐĐŚŽŽů ?ŝƐƵŶŬŶŽǁŶƐŽŝƚŝƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚĂƚĂ
ĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇǁŝƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶƌĂƚĞƐĨŽƌ “ƉƵďůŝĐƐĐŚŽŽů ?(Szreter 1979) Žƌ “ŵĂũŽƌƉƵďůŝĐƐĐŚŽŽů ?(Perkin 
1978-9) used in earlier studies.  
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was not in vice cŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůŽƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚďƵƚƌĂƚŚĞƌŝŶǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĚŽ
and their professional preparation for the role.  As such, their study represents a shift away 
from the investigation of vice chancellors as an elite group to a consideration of their 
characteristics from a leadership and management perspective.    
They nevertheless documented the personal profile of vice chancellors from 1960 to 1996 
(thus covering the gap in existing research from the late 1970s to 1992) and concluded that 
vice chancellors were much the same people they had always been, i.e. white males in their 
50s from an academic background.  Although an Oxbridge background (if taken to cover 
both study and employment) remained an important marker of vice chancellors, it did not 
necessarily mean they belonged to a social elite as a university education was not 
considered a significant indicator of privileged social status. 
Breakwell and Tytherleigh (2008a) picked up this theme in updating the socio-demographic 
data on vice chancellors from 1997 to 2006 and in testing the hypothesis that changes to 
higher education following the Dearing Report might have precipitated a change in the type 
of people being appointed as vice chancellors.  In broad terms, their data reinforces the 
findings of Bargh et al that vice chancellors were a predominantly white, male 50-
something cohort for whom experience of Oxbridge remained significant.  This was 
especially true for heads of pre-1992 universities.  One discernible change, however, was in 
the proportion of female vice chancellors, which had more than doubled from 6% to 15% 
since 1997, with most female vice chancellors in new universities.  The authors suggest that 
this rise in the number of female vice chancellors may be a reflection of an expanded 
supply chain given the increase in the proportion of women academics and the broadening 
ŽĨǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƐĂǁĂǇĨƌŽŵĂůĂƌŐĞůǇƐĐŝĞŶĐĞďĂƐĞ ?/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ?
they found that female vice chancellors were less likely than their male counterparts to be 
in a long-term relationship or have children, suggesting that for a woman becoming a vice 
ĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ “ŵĂǇƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĚŽŵĞƐƚŝĐƐĂĐƌŝĨŝĐĞƐ ?(Breakwell & Tytherleigh 
2008b, p. 124).  
Overall, the picture that emerges from the literature of UK vice chancellors is of a social 
group that has changed only slowly and moderately since the 1930s despite the radical 
transformation of the sector during that period.  In short, vice chancellors remain a largely 
white, male intellectual elite with an Oxbridge bias (Smith, D. et al. 1999). 
 




Although the socio-demographic profile of university vice chancellors has attracted 
significant research attention, published data on DPVCs is extremely limited.  Smith, Adams 
ĂŶĚDŽƵŶƚ ?Ɛ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝp Foundation-sponsored study (2007) is the first and, until now, the 
only attempt to provide a historical context for the role in the UK, including a statistical 
profile for the period 1960 to 2005 based on data from the Association of Commonwealth 
Universities Yearbooks in six sample years: 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005.  The 
authors found significant continuity in the profile of DPVCs
22
 over the 45-year period of 
their study. 
Over 80% of DPVCs across all sample years were professors and are therefore assumed to 
be academics.  Given what is known about the profile of vice chancellors (Breakwell & 
Tytherleigh 2008a), and the fact that most vice chancellors were previously DPVCs, it is 
perhaps not surprising that an Oxbridge influence (in terms of awarding institution for first 
and postgraduate degrees) remained significant for DPVCs in 2005.  However, it was not as 
predominant as in the 1960s at which time the sector was much smaller and hence the 
range of graduating institutions was much more limited.  Science graduates still 
outnumbered those from the arts and social sciences, though not by a large margin (Smith, 
D., Adams & Mount 2007).  The authors also noted that a small but significant proportion 
of DPVCs had achieved external recognition as elected fellows of UK learned societies and 
institutes.  In terms of gender, they found the proportion of females amongst those DPVCs 
for whom gender is known varied over the six sample years between 6% and 34%, without 
any discernible upward trend.  There is also some evidence from a slightly more recent 
study to suggest that DPVCs are getting younger (Kennie & Woodfield 2008a).  
As for DPVC numbers, Smith et al ?ƐĚĂƚĂĨŽƌĂůůh<ŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚion institutions reveals a 
seemingly dynamic growth in DPVC numbers from 21 to 348 during the 45 year-period 
from 1960.  However, these figures need to be considered in the context of the huge 
expansion of the higher education system over that time, in which the number of 
institutions increased from 46 to 118.  Rather than compare absolute numbers, therefore, 
they found it more meaningful to consider the ratio of DPVCs per higher education 
institution.  This had risen from 0.46 in 1960 to 2.95 in 2005, the equivalent of an additional 
                                                          
22
 The authors use the term PVCs in their study, but their definition also includes DVC posts and so, 
for the sake of internal consistency, the term DPVC is used here with reference to their work.  Data 
presented are the aggregate for both groups.  
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two and a half DPVC posts on average over the 45 years - a clear, but less dramatic, upward 
trend.   
The main purpose of Smith et al ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇǁĂƐƚŽƚĞƐƚƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƌĞŚĂd been an 
executivisation of the DPVC role in response to the Jarratt Review, as evidenced by an 
increase in the number of posts and a more managerial interpretation of the role.  In 
relation to the former, they found that the upward trend in DPVC numbers pre-dated 
Jarratt and was mainly driven by the huge growth in the higher education system.  They see 
the steady rise in the number of DPVCs since 1960 as an indication that universities had 
ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚƚŽĚĞǀĞůŽƉƚŚĞŝƌŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƉƌŝŽƌƚŽƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇĚƌŝǀĞĂŶĚƚŚƵƐ
conclude that rather tŚĂŶĂ “ƐƵĚĚĞŶƌƵƐŚ ?ƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐŵŽƌĞWsƐŝŶƚŚĞǁĂŬĞŽĨ
:ĂƌƌĂƚƚ ?ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐŶƵŵďĞƌƐǁĞƌĞĂƐŝŐŶŽĨĂ “ůŽŶŐĞƌƚĞƌŵŽƌƋƵŝĞƚƌĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶŝŶ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?(2007, p. 19).   
 
5. Professional Background of Academic Managers 
5.1 Vice Chancellors 
Whist many of the earlier empirical studies of vice chancellors focused on their social class 
and education, a few also examined their professional background.  The earliest available 
data, covering the period from 1935 to 1967 (Collinson & Millen 1969), shows that in 1935 
virtually all (95%) UK vice chancellors came from academia.   More specifically, nearly half 
had been vice chancellors, registrars or professors (some of whom had additionally been 
DPVCs) immediately prior to their appointment, with a further third having held other 
academic posts.  The proportion of vice chancellors from an academic background had 
fallen to 88% by 1967 due to a small number of appointments from the civil and diplomatic 
service. 
^ǌƌĞƚĞƌ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇ(1979), incorporating two data sets a decade apart, found four vice 
chancellors in 1966/7 who had been appointed from outside the academy and only three in 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ?^ǌƌĞƚĞƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƐƚ “ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƐƵƌƉƌŝ Ğ ?ŝŶŚŝƐĚĂƚĂƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞ
trend towards the appointment as vice-chancellors of non-academics has not gathered any 
ŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚ ?ƚŚĞ “ƚǇƉŝĐĂůƌŝƚŝƐŚǀŝĐĞ-chancellor is still the 
professional-as-ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?(1979, p. 5).  There was therefore an expectation that the 
post-Robbins expansion, combined with a challenging political and economic environment, 
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would lead to vice chancellor appointments from outside higher education.  Szreter 
speculates that it may have been the fear of further bureaucratisation that had deterred 
universities from appointing vice chancellors with a business or political background.  
A subsequent study of vice chancellors between 1960 and 1996 sought to identify the 
 “ĂǀĞŶƵĞƐŽĨŵŽďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƚŽƚŚĞƚŽp job and to ascertain whether these had changed over time 
(Smith, D. et al. 1999, p. 116).  The authors found that, despite post-1992 expansion, the 
typical route into the vice chancellor role remained that of the academic hierarchy.  Over 
90% of vice chancellors across their study period were previously career academics, mainly 
professors many of whom had held academic management posts from head of department 
to vice chancellor.   
Not surprisingly then, academic credentials prevailed with only 10% holding management 
qualifications.  Only one in five of all vice chancellors had undertaken paid employment in 
the private sector (although vice chancellors of post-1992 institutions were twice as likely 
as their pre-1992 counterparts to have done so) and almost one third had no experience 
outside higher education.  Accordingly, they conclude that the post of vice chancellor has 
ƌĞŵĂŝŶĞĚĂůŵŽƐƚ “ĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇƌĞƐĞƌǀĞĚĨŽƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?(Bargh et al. 2000, p. 155) and that 
there is no evidence to support their hypothesis that a more executive post-Jarratt 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƌŽůĞŚĂĚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĚŵĂũŽƌĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽ ?ƚŚĞĐĂƌĞĞƌ
preparation and professional profiles of those appointed to the top leadership post ? (2000, 
p. 56). 
ƌĞĂŬǁĞůůĂŶĚdǇƚŚĞƌůĞŝŐŚ ?ƐĨŽůůŽw-up study (2008a, 2008b) found even less evidence of 
management qualifications, with only one vice chancellor having an MBA.  The 
overwhelming majority of vice chancellors between 1997 and 2006 continued to be 
appointed from within higher education, although this figure was significantly higher in 
post-1992 than pre-1992 universities (94% versus 80%).  That means that one in five pre-
1992 universities appointed non-academics from other public or private sector 
organisations, some of whom had previously been chief executives elsewhere (2008a).  This 
figure is higher than I would have expected and it is worth noting that a more recent study 
by the same authors, albeit with a smaller sample size (147 compared to 255), found a 
somewhat lower proportion (13%) of non-academic appointments in pre-1992 universities 
(Breakwell & Tytherleigh 2010).  Nevertheless, it remains the case that pre-1992 
universities were more likely to recruit from outside academia (Breakwell & Tytherleigh 
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2008a), possibly because they felt in a stronger position to take a chance on a non-
traditional candidate.   
So, whilst there have been occasional examples of vice chancellors appointed from posts in 
the civil service or business, their numbers have not grown over time as may have been 
expected.  Moreover, there appears to have been a real reluctance to appoint non-
academic managers from within higher education to the top post.  Accordingly, no registrar 
or director of professional services who was not, or had not previously been, an academic 
has been appointed as vice chancellor (Lauwerys 2008).   
The typical route into the top job remains that of the career academic, rising through the 
academic ranks to become a professor and in many cases taking on a series of formal 
leadership positions along the way.  Breakwell and Tytherleigh found that nearly a quarter 
(23%) of vice chancellors were already in vice chancellor posts at the time of their 
appointment, compared to 10% in Bargh ĞƚĂů ?s study (2000)23.  They suggest that some 
universities view the appointment of a second-ƚŝŵĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ “ĂƐĂƐŝŐŶĂůŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌ “ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇ ?(2008a, p. 44).   
They further suggest that there has been a significant increase in the proportion of vice 
chancellors who were DPVCs prior to appointment, from 14%
24
 between 1960 and 1996 to 
45% between 1997 and 2006.  This may partly be accounted for by the increase in the 
number of DPVCs since 1960 (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).  In any case, it would 
appear that the DPVC post has become a more important recruiting ground for the top job.  
dŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐƐĞĞWsƐĂƐƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ “ƚŚĞƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƉŽŽůĨŽƌĨƵƚƵƌĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůsƐ ?ĂŶĚǀŝew 
their increasing numbers as a means of helping to solve the reported struggle to fill vice 
ĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƉŽƐƚƐĂŶĚĂƐĂŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵĨŽƌ “ǁĞĞĚŝŶŐŽƵƚ ?ƵŶƐƵŝƚĂďůĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ(Breakwell 
& Tytherleigh 2008b, p. 123).   
Although most vice chancellors lacked experience of paid employment outside of higher 
education, they had increasingly gained university-specific management experience as they 
progressed through various senior academic management roles on their route to the top.  
ƌĞĂŬǁĞůůĂŶĚdǇƚŚĞƌůĞŝŐŚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐĞƚŚŝƐĂƐĂŶ “ĂƉƉƌĞŶƚŝĐĞƐŚŝƉŵŽĚĞů ?ŽĨůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?
comprising an extended period of on-the-job training (2008b, p. 112) similar to the rising-
                                                          
23
 However, the earlier study identifies a further 17% of vice chancellors who had been head of an 
Oxbridge college or other higher education institution, so perhaps the difference is not so marked. 
24
 This figure relates to the proportion of VCs in Bargh et al ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇǁŚŽǁĞƌĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇWsƐďƵƚ
excludes the further 11% who were previously DVCs (2000, pp. 49-50). 
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through-the-ranks model found in other public or private organisations.  Therefore, 
although they acknowledge that the acquisition of managerial experience by would-be vice 
chancellors is neither intentional nor systematic, they argue that it should not be 
considered as atypical or necessarily ineffective.   
5.2 DPVCs 
Like vice chancellors, the overwhelming majority of DPVCs have traditionally been  W and 
remain  W members of the professoriate.  In their study of DPVCs between 1960 and 200525, 
Smith et al found that the typical avenue into a DPVC post was that of a successful career 
academic, as evidenced by the title of professor and by some form of management or 
leadership activity, for example, as head of department or dean (2007).  This route into the 
DPVC role had not changed during that 45-year period despite the call for universities to 
become more business-like in their style of leadership.  One major reason was that many 
DPVC posts, particularly those in pre-1992 institutions, were not open to external 
applicants (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).  The normal pattern of recruitment therefore 
remained from within the academy.  They note that, although it is not obligatory to have 
been a dean to become a DPVC, in practice and custom it helps.   
This same study found that DPVC appointees were typically high achievers within their 
discipline with some experience of leading an academic department or faculty.   
 “dŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶ ‘ďůŽŽĚĞĚ ?ŝŶǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƌŽůĞƐ W typically heads of department or 
deans of faculty  W ĂƌĞŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůůǇƚŚĞƉƌŝŵĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĨŽƌƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?(2007, p. 28) 
As is the case for vice chancellors (Breakwell & Tytherleigh 2008a) ?ƚŚĞǇǁĞƌĞƚŚƵƐ “ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ
have been adjudged as competent leaders and managers even if the frameworks on which 
ƐƵĐŚũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚƐĂƌĞŵĂĚĞĂƌĞŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽďĞůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚ ?(Smith, D., Adams & 
Mount 2007, p. 29) ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚĂ “ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞWs ?Ɛ
ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŝƐĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌĐŽŶƚŝŶƵŝŶŐŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉŽĨƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽůůĞŐĞ ? ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞ
maintenance of an academic presence for many DPVCs is merely tokenistic  (2007, p. 49).  
Interestingly for the career development of DPVCs, their data suggests that the rhetoric of 
a return to the mainstream academic community at the end of a term of office may be part 
ŽĨƚŚĞWs “ŵǇƚŚŽůŽŐǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ ?ŝŶƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?ĨĞǁƐĞƌǀŝŶŐWsƐƌĞůŝƐŚƚŚĞƉƌŽƐƉĞĐƚ(2007, 
p. 49).  For those end-of-term DPVCs who were not appointed to the top job, retirement or 
                                                          
25
 Based on 54 in-depth interviews mainly with serving DPVCs in 13 pre and post-1992 higher 
education institutions. 
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sideways movement to other senior roles were alternative options to a return to their 
department. 
Preparation for the role of DPVC was strongly experience and practice based, i.e. learning 
on the job, in a way that echoes the apprenticeship model for vice chancellors described by 
Breakwell and Tytherleigh  (2008b).  The DPVCs interviewed in the study consistently stated 
that being a dean or head of department was both a necessary requirement for the role 
and a more appropriate form of preparation than a training programme.  Interviewees 
provided numerous examples of how their academic and management experience had 
been indispensable to being a DPVC (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).  Formal leadership 
development for aspiring senior managers was rare.  The authors, however, question an 
approach that leaves new DPVC post holders feeling unclear about what to expect or how 
to get things done effectively.  ^ŽŵĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĨĞĞůŝŶŐ “ĚƌŽƉƉĞĚŝŶŝƚ ?
in the early stages of their DPVC-ship (2007, p. 4).  
Whilst Smith et al acknowledge that their findings might be considered as supporting the 
view thĂƚƚŚĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐŽĨWsƐŝƐ “ƵŶƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐ ?ĞǀĞŶĂŵĂƚĞƵƌ ?(2007, p. 
32), they point out that the absence of formalised training is not necessarily indicative of a 
lack of preparation for the job given the emphasis of serving DPVCs on the importance of 
prior academic management experience.   
However, the strength of Smith et al ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇĂƐƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚĐŽŶƚĞŵƉŽƌĂƌǇŝŶƐŝĚĞƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨ
being a DPVC also entails limitations in terms of providing a DPVC-centric worldview.   It 
could reasonably be argued that DPVCs themselves are unlikely to criticise the normal  W 
and their own - route into the job.   One former registrar has challenged the assumption 
that DPVCs from an academic background have the required management experience or 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ “ƐŽŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?
(Lauwerys 2008, p. 6).  Smith et al, however, do not overtly question the validity of the 
WsƐ ?ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞŽŶƚŚŝƐŝƐƐƵĞ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇĚŽĂĚŵŝƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇ
focuses on the leaders, rather than the led.   
A similar criticism could be levelled at recent studies of vice chancellors (Breakwell & 
Tytherleigh 2008a, 2008b, Goodall 2007, Bargh et al. 2000).  There is arguably now a need 
to ascertain the views of others within the university community, including registrars and 
professional services directors.  Equally, there is a need for a different researcher 
perspective as it is not clear that those undertaking work in this area have considered their 
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own potential for bias as academic insiders, including the danger of over-identification with 
research participants. 
 
6. Appointment of Academic Managers 
6.1 Vice Chancellors 
6.1.1 Appointment Practice 
There is little empirical evidence on the recruitment of vice chancellors (Breakwell & 
Tytherleigh 2008a).  What we do know from the sparse literature is that vice chancellor 
posts were not normally publically advertised before the 1970s.  Writing in 1969, Collinson 
and Millen noted that the recent advertisement of posts at Aston and the Open University 
 “ƐĞĞŵƚŽďĞƋƵŝƚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶĂů ?(1969, p. 108) and Wakeford and Wakeford found that vice 
chancellor posts had only just begun to be advertised (1974).   
Bargh et al noted that it was still not unusual in the 1970s for vice chancellors to be 
appointed without public advertisement (2000).  Instead, the typical recruitment process 
involved the formation of a small selection committee to solicit university opinion, seek 
and examine potential candidates and then present one or more names to senate for 
election (Collinson & Millen 1969).  Rarely were they elected by the whole collegium of 
academics (Becher & Kogan 1992).  This recruitment method is in contrast to that for 
mainstream academic posts which were almost always filled by open competition after 
national advertisement (Halsey & Trow 1971).   
Collinson and Millen (1969) found that, whereas Oxbridge vice chancellors were 
predominantly internal appointments, just over half (53%) of vice chancellors elsewhere 
were externally appointed.  The proportion of external appointments increased to around 
two thirds between 1960 and 1996, with internal promotion rather more prevalent in post-
1992 (43%) than pre-1992 (32%) universities (Bargh et al. 2000).  This same study also 
showed that the binary divide was still very much in evidence in terms of vice chancellor 
recruitment, with relatively little movement between the two sub sectors and most of that 
in one direction  W from pre to post-1992 institutions.  Only one vice chancellor during that 
period had been appointed from a post- to a pre-1992 university, although there was more 
movement in the opposite direction with one in five post-1992 vice chancellors appointed 
from an old university (2000).  The situation has not altered much since then: between 
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1997 and 2006 only two vice chancellors in pre-1992 universities were recruited from post-
1992 institutions (Breakwell & Tytherleigh 2008a).   
Exactly when the advertisement of the vice chancellor post became the norm is not clear, 
but the available evidence shows that this change in recruitment practice had taken place 
by the mid- ? ? ? ?Ɛ ?tĂƚƐŽŶ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇ(2008) on the use of executive search agencies indicates 
that 15 vice chancellor posts were advertised in the academic year 1986/87, a figure that is 
consistent with data for the years 2006 to 2011 by which time the external advertisement 
of vice chancellor posts had become standard practice (Shepherd 2011).  
tĂƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĚĂƚĂĂůƐŽƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ?ŶŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞĂĚǀĞƌƚŝƐ ĚƉŽƐƚƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚƚŚĞ
employment of an executive search agency (2008) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞŝƌƵƐĞďǇ “ŵĂŶǇ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁĂƐŶŽƚĞĚĂŶĚĂƉƉůĂƵĚĞĚďǇ>ĂŵďĞƌƚĂƐĂ “ŵŽƌĞŽƉĞŶĂŶĚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ?
ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐƚŚĂƚŚĂĚůĞĚ “ƚŽƐŽŵĞĞǆĐŝƚŝŶŐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌĂŶĚ
abroad (2003, p. 100).  By 2010, executive search agents were utilised for almost all (93%) 
vice chancellor posts in pre-1992 universities (Shepherd 2011).  Ironically their use led to 
the situation whereby, although vice chancellor posts were advertised, leading candidates 
no longer expected to respond directly but rather wait to be invited to apply (Breakwell & 
Tytherleigh 2008a).  
In this first major study of vice chancellor recruitment and selection, Breakwell and 
Tytherleigh interviewed executive search agencies who suggested that universities rarely 
ƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐŝŽŶƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐĂŶĚ “ƐĞĞŵƚŽƚŚŝŶŬŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶŝƐŝŶĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞ ?
(2008a, p. 35).  The authors take the view that recruitment of vice chancellors from inside 
higher education, but outside their own institution, may be beneficial, with universities 
 “ŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞĂĚǀĂŶtages of continuity and knowledge of the business and the culture 
without the disadvantages of losing the change-ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨĂŶĞǁĐŽŵĞƌ ?(2008b, p. 113).  
Breakwell and Tytherleigh found that responsibility for the search and selection process 
was usually delegated by the governing body to a smaller search committee, comprised 
mainly of lay governors.  Typically, the committee would recommend a candidate for 
appointment and it was rare for council to be offered a choice between candidates.  The 
composition and operation of this committee was therefore of real significance. The 
committee was generally free to decide on how to approach the recruitment process, 
including which executive search agency to engage.  The first step was normally for the 
executive search agency to establish a profile of the institution, the role and the person 
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sought and, on this basis, to draw up an advert and candidate information pack.  These 
were designed to bring some transparency to the process and to sell the job.   It was 
commonplace for executive search agencies to approach a number of potential candidates 
to encourage them to apply.  They would then normally interview a long list of 10 to 12 
candidates before putting forward a short list of three or four to the search committee for 
final selection, normally by means of panel interview.  Having made its decision, the search 
committee would seek governing body approval for its preferred candidate.   
In contrast to practice in the past, although academic opinion was normally canvassed by 
executive search agencies and there were likely to be one or more academic staff on the 
committee, it would appear that the senate typically played no formal role in the 
appointment process.  Rather, the governing body was effectively in charge.  The work of 
K ?DĞĂƌĂĂŶĚWĞƚǌĂůů(2005) suggests that in Australia the role of the chair of the governing 
body is paramount in determining the desired characteristics and in identifying potential 
candidates and deciding who should be appointed.  The dominant role of the chancellor in 
the appointment process is viewed as legitimate due to the perceived importance of the 
relationship between the chair and the vice chancellor and in recognition of the need for a 
correspondence of views between the two.  In the UK too, the chair of council plays a vital, 
if under-supported, role in vice chancellor appointments (Breakwell 2006).   
6.1.2 Selection Criteria 
Middlehurst (1993) examined adverts and other recruitment material as part of her 
investigation of documentary evidence (also including legislation, White Papers etc.) on 
ǀĂƌŝŽƵƐƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐ ?ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƌŽůĞ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚ
literature she identified the key characteristics and skills sought from prospective 
candidates for the top job.  Prominent amongst these were the ability to represent and 
promote the institution, build collaborative relationships and create and communicate a 
vision.  Financial, analytical, policy making, strategic planning, PR and negotiation skills 
were also prerequŝƐŝƚĞƐ ?ĂƌŐŚĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌĂĚǀĞƌƚƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚĞĚ
a shift in requirements from generalised academic experience to highly specific attributes, 
many of them managerial in nature such as income generation or change management.  
Notwithstanding this fact, the most essential criterion remained academic credibility, as 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞĚďǇ “ĂŶĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĂŶĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ “ĐŽŵŵĂŶĚƚŚĞ
ƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?(1993, p. 96).  
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A more recent analysis of person specifications  W the development of which helps the 
university to articulate what it wants from its vice chancellor  W ƐŚŽǁĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ
ĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?ƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚĂĚĞĞƉŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽĨ ?ĂŶĚĞŵƉĂƚŚǇĨŽƌ ?ƚŚĞŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ
sector, was still an essential requirement (Breakwell & Tytherleigh 2008a).  This is despite 
the fact that executive search agencies said they believed it was important to attract 
candidates from outside the sector and the inclusion in some adverts of phrases such as 
 “ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐŵĂǇĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĂ ?ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽƌďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?(2008a, p. 32).  In fact, 
around half of the adverts were explicit in wanting higher education experience and the 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĂƚ “ŵŽƐƚŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐĂƉƉĞĂƌĞĚƚĂŝůŽƌĞĚĨŽƌ
candidates from an academic-ƌĞůĂƚĞĚďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?(2008a, p. 32).  This casts some doubt as 
to how interested universities really are in attracting  W yet alone appointing  W vice 
chancellor candidates from outside academe.   
However, Breakwell and Tytherleigh argue that the fact so few vice chancellor 
appointments are made from outside the sector may not simply be the result of deliberate 
choice.  They suggest that the location and wording of adverts may be one factor deterring 
external applicants and the relatively low pay compared to CEO posts in the private sector 
may be another.  Executive search agencies they interviewed believed that the placement 
of uninspiring adverts in a limited range of publications deterred external applicants, who 
may not understand the role of vice chancellor.  The authors suggest that the language 
ƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŵĂǇďĞƚŽŽ “ǀĂŐƵĞ ?ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƌŽůĞƚŽĂƚƚƌĂĐƚ
applicants from outside the sector (2008b, p. 121).  
However, whilst I accept the argument that the vice chancellor position may not be well 
sold to an external audience, it could be equally be posited that, far from being too vague, 
the adverts are actually too specific about what is required  W namely an academic track 
record and/or credibility.  The primacy of this criterion would appear to act as a 
disincentive to non-academic candidates, if not effectively exclude them.  A recent 
Australian study of vice chancellor seůĞĐƚŝŽŶŝƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŚĞƌĞ ?K ?DĞĂƌĂĂŶĚWĞƚǌĂůůĨŽƵŶĚ
that once the threshold of academic credibility was established by means of a PhD and 
ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŝŶŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŽƌĂĐůŽƐĞůǇƌĞůĂƚĞĚƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ “ĚŝĚŶŽƚ
believe they necessarily reƋƵŝƌĞĚĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ?(2005, p. 30).  However, the notable decline 
they observed in non-academic vice chancellor appointments in Australia suggests that, in 
reality, career academics - not just those with academic credentials or experience - 
nevertheless prevail.  
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Finding candidates who combine both academic credibility and business acumen is 
recognised as a real challenge.  It was suggested by the executive search agencies in 
ƌĞĂŬǁĞůůĂŶĚdǇƚŚĞƌůĞŝŐŚ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐǁĂƐĂŶƵŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ
had to prioritise one over the other in their selection process.  The agencies also suggested 
the number of senior academics with high management competence was low, but 
acknowledged that universities were unlikely to find an external candidate with the 
requisite gravitas and academic track record.  The authors argue that, since the advent of 
executive management teams, vice chancellors no longer need to embody the full range of 
competencies themselves.  Nevertheless, the primacy of academic credibility clearly places 
academic candidates in a very strong position to demonstrate their suitability and likely 
acceptance by the university community.  Accordingly, Breakwell and Tytherleigh found no 
ƌĞĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞŽĨ “ĐŽůůĞŐŝĂůĐŚĂƌŝƐŵĂ ?ŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƚŚĞŝŵƉŽƌƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ
 “ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐĞ ?ĨƌŽŵŽƚŚĞƌƐĞĐƚŽƌƐ(2008b, p. 124).   
6.2 DPVCs 
6.2.1 Appointment Practice 
Smith et al (2007) identified two main models of DPVC appointment: selection by invitation 
or by means of competitive recruitment.  A third model of election by senate also existed, 
but was rare and so did not form a focus for their study.  The first of these is essentially a 
patronage model in the gift of the vice chancellor.  It is referred to as a tap-on-the-shoulder 
model since typically the vice chancellor would approach a senior academic and invite him 
or her to become a DPVC.  Appointment would result from a series of conversations rather 
than any type of formal interview.  One perceived advantage is that it facilitates selection 
of talented individuals who may not have considered putting themselves forward for the 
role.  However, this necessitates potential candidates getting themselves on the vice 
ĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ ?ƐƌĂĚĂƌ Wa task that is undoubtedly easier for academic stars or those already in 
faculty or departmental leadership positions (who would be prime candidates in any case).   
 
Such a process is considered by many interviewees automatically to introduce an element 
of gender bias given the under-representation of women amongst the professoriate.  
Another implication of the patronage model is that it is likely to produce candidates who 
owe their primary loyalty to the vice chancellor rather than the institution  W a fact 
perceived as both a potential strength and a weakness.  A number of the DPVCs 
interviewed for this study expressed surprise that such an opaque and potentially 
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discriminatory appointment practice was still in effect, even though they owed their jobs to 
it.  Nor were they always clear how they had emerged as potential candidates. 
 
The second, competitive recruitment, model involves a formal recruitment process in 
which person specifications are drawn up and posts advertised, either within the institution 
or open to both internal and external applicants.  In the latter case, executive search 
agencies are sometimes utilised.  Typically the selection process involves panel interviews 
and/or presentations.   Smith et al (2007) found that the selection by invitation method 
was used by pre-1992 universities and competitive recruitment by post-1992 institutions.  
In fact, they found no instances of the former method in the post-1992 sub-sector which 
exclusively adopted an open competition model of recruitment, even though it may have 
resulted in an internal appointment.  Amongst their site visits they did, however, find at 
least four examples of pre-1992 universities that had externally advertised a DPVC post and 
three that had engaged executive search agencies, thus demonstrating that the process of 
adopting an open competitive recruitment model at DPVC level had begun by 2005, even if 
it was still the exception.  These findings are corroborated by another small-scale study of 
ten DPVCs which found a mixture of recruitment methods, including internal selection, 
external advertisement and the use of executive search agencies (Spendlove 2007). 
 
In their research on executive management teams, Kennie and Woodfield provide a 
caricature of how top team members, including DPVCs, were traditionally appointed.  This 
highlights many of the limitations of the process. 
 
x  “&ŝƌƐƚ ?ǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚadvertise the post externally 
x Second, you may  W but more frequently do not  W interview any of the 
applicants or potential candidates 
x Third, you select the candidate on the basis of the need to have someone from 
a particular Unit (Faculty/Department/Discipline) on the team 
x Fourth, you probably expect the person selected to have a strong track record 
in some area relatively unconnected to the portfolio on which they will have to 
deliver (e.g. research) 
x Fifth, you expect the person selected to do the job on a part-time basis (say 3 
days a week) 
x Sixth, you are unlikely to provide any induction or training for the role 
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x Seventh, you are unlikely to provide the appointed person with any budgetary 
resources or a personal assistant (PA) 
x Eighth, you may often pay them ůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶŵĂŶǇŽĨǇŽƵƌ ‘ŵŝĚĚůĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? 
x Finally, you should know they will be expected to stand down from the role just 
as they become proficient (in about 2- ?ǇĞĂƌƐĨƌŽŵŶŽǁ ? ? ? 
(Kennie & Woodfield 2008a, pp. 11-12) 
 
They found that few institutions had explicit succession plans, and one of their key 
recommendations was that the issue of succession management and exit strategies should 
be addressed in a more systematic fashion, particularly where DPVC appointments were 
made on a fixed-term basis.  They also highlighted the need for further empirical work 
focusing on the recruitment and selection of executive team members (Kennie & 
Woodfield 2008a).  
The most recent study of DPVC appointments from 2006 to 2010 provides more substantial 
evidence that the binary divide in recruitment practice was beginning to be eroded as pre-
1992 universities moved away from the traditional system of fixed-term, part-time internal 
appointments to one that included full-time post-1992 style appointments made as the 
result of external open competition (Shepherd 2011).  By the end of 2010, half of the 45 
pre-1992 institutions had externally advertised at least one DPVC post, typically as part of a 
mixed appointment model.  The use of executive search agencies was also becoming more 
prevalent at DPVC level in both pre and post-1992 universities (Shepherd 2013). 
6.2.2 Selection Criteria 
Very little is known about what universities are looking for in their DPVC candidates, 
although there is a continued emphasis on academic credibility within the identity 
construction of DPVC roles (Smith, D. & Adams 2008).  Only in third-stream (i.e. concerned 
with the development of business links and the commercialisation of research) portfolios 
did Smith et al find any evidence of DPVCs from less conventional backgrounds (2007). 
In what appears to be the only empirical work in the UK focusing on DPVC selection criteria, 
Shepherd (2011) analysed the adverts for DPVC posts between 2006 and 2010.  One reason 
for the continuity in DPVC profile is immediately apparent from this analysis: in the vast 
majority of cases, the required attributes for potential post holders could only realistically 
be found in career academics.  This is because, next to leadership and management skills, 
the most commonly stated criterion was a track record of academic achievement.  All of 
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the advertisements for DVCs and all but five of the 42 for PVCs specifically required some 
combination of academic achievement, higher education experience or knowledge, and 
academic credibility.  The only exceptions to this were four PVC posts with a third-stream 
portfolio, for which candidates with entrepreneurial skills or experience were sought.  The 
third-stream DPVC portfolio thus appears to be the only one that is genuinely open to non-
academic candidates and/or those from outside the sector.  
 
7. Summary 
This chapter has sought to locate the research phenomenon in its historical and empirical 
context.  It has illustrated how university governance arrangements have changed over 
time, in three main forms and phases; civic, consensual and corporate.  Each has 
implications for the balance of power within universities between the governing body, the 
executive and the academic community, and it is important to note that academics have 
not always been in charge. 
The corporate governance model, which is the regulatory framework within which 
universities now operate, assumes the pre-eminence of the governing body in determining 
university strategy.  However, the technical and specialist nature of university management 
means that lay members of council are heavily reliant on the advice of the vice chancellor 
and other members of the executive management team.  Thus, it is questionable whether 
councils have been able to assert themselves in the way that Jarratt, Dearing and Lambert 
had envisaged.  The power of senate has, however, waned. 
It is not only the governance model that has evolved over time.  A more complex, 
competitive and challenging higher education policy environment has led to a 
transformation in university management.  This has manifested itself in changes to internal 
management arrangements, in large part along the lines recommended by Jarratt.  In 
particular, there has been a professionalisation of the administration and a strengthening 
of the executive.  Executive management teams have been created, at the heart of which 
reside a larger, and arguably more powerful, cadre of DPVCs. 
In terms of the composition of executive management teams, there has only been one 
empirical study to date on DPVCs but there is a virtually continuous socio-demographic 
profile of vice chancellors since the 1930s.  Early work was focused on their social and 
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educational background and suggests that vice chancellors were an intellectual, rather than 
a social, elite and a broadly meritocratic group.  Subsequent studies have investigated the 
extent to which key developments in higher education policy, such as the Robbins, Jarratt 
and Dearing Reports, have led to different people being appointed.  However, they have all 
concluded that the profile of vice chancellors has remained largely unchanged: they are a 
white, male intellectual elite.   
Not surprisingly given that they form the main recruitment pool from which vice 
chancellors are drawn, DPVCs share a similar profile to that of vice chancellors.  Members 
of both groups are overwhelmingly career academics and the career pathway into the roles 
has remained largely unchanged despite the transformation of the sector over the last fifty 
years.   An apprenticeship model of rising through the ranks still prevails, albeit there is an 
increasing expectation of senior-level academic management experience.   
Appointment practice has changed, however.  At vice chancellor level, external recruitment 
was introduced in the 1980s and the use of executive search agents a decade later.  By 
2010 their use was virtually universal for vice chancellor appointments.  At DPVC level, the 
traditional tap-on-the-shoulder appointment method has begun to give way to one of open 
recruitment  W initially undertaken within an institution and more recently extended to 
external candidates.   
Academic achievement and credibility are nevertheless essential prerequisites for post 
holders.   So, aůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ “ĐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞŐŝĨƚĞĚĂŵĂƚĞƵƌ ?(Middlehurst 1993) has been 
replaced within the administration by one of increasing professionalisation, with the 
recruitment of high-level specialist managers from outside the sector, it continues to be the 
norm within the ranks of senior academic managers.   
The dearth of empirical research on the profile of DPVCs means that further investigation, 
including an updating of Smith et al ?ƐĚĂƚĂ ?ŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚ ?/ŶƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌ ?ƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
nature and complexity of university management  W and, by implication, the DPVC role - is 
changing but the people who undertake it are not, warrants further scrutiny.  At the same 
time, there is a need to understand how and why DPVC appointment practice is changing 
and what the implications are both for current and aspiring DPVCs and for institutional 
management capacity building.  This study addresses these gaps in knowledge and the 
following chapter explains the methodology to be adopted for this investigation.   








just what paradigm informs and guides his or her approach. ? 
(Guba & Lincoln 2004, p. 37) 
Researchers need to be aware of, and make explicit, the philosophical orientations, or 
world view, that they bring to a study (Cresswell 2013).  This chapter explains the particular 
philosophical assumptions and methodological approach that underpin this research.  It 
then describes and provides a rationale for the use of a mixed-methods research design.  
Three methods are used: a census, online survey and semi-structured interviews.  The 
purpose and procedures for each of the three methods are given in turn, followed by a 
justification and discussion of the limitations of each.  Details of sampling strategy and 
study populations are also provided, where relevant, together with respondent profiles. 
The data analysis process, and thinking that informed it, is then outlined.  The final section 
describes the ethical issues relating to the study and the measures taken to mitigate them.  
 
2. Research Foundations 
Figure 6 is a visual representation of the foundations of the research approach, from 
philosophical assumptions through to the selection of methods.  In making the decision 
making process explicit, the aim is to demonstrate the coherence of the ƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů
logic  W and, thereby, internal validity.  
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It is acknowledged, however, that Figure 6 presents a somewhat oversimplified version of 
my methodological decision making process which was, in reality, neither purely linear nor 
sequential.  For example, I started out on my PhD journey by identifying an area of research 
interest and only then came to consider how this choice was influenced by my ontological 
and epistemological beliefs and how these, in turn, were fundamental to the shaping of my 
research questions and design.  There is thus something of a symbiotic relationship 
between the research paradigm and choice of research topic and design that perhaps is not 
adequately conveyed by Figure 6.  It is, nevertheless, an accurate depiction of the overall 
logic underpinning the research design.  
 
Figure 6: Foundations of the Research Approach 
 
Adapted from (Sarantakos 2005) 
 
3. Research Paradigm 
KŶƚŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ?ĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂŶĚŵĞƚŚŽĚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚĂƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐďĂƐŝĐ
belief system or world view (Guba & Lincoln 2004).  Taken together they may be termed a 
research, or enquiry, paradigm (Denzin & Lincoln 2008).  As Figure 6 illustrates, it is this 
paradigm  W together with the nature of the particular research problem or questions being 
addressed - that should, in turn, inform the development of the research design and the 
specific methods and procedures that translate this approach into practice (Cresswell 2013).  
Ontology: Constructivist 
Epistemology: Interpretivist 
Methodology:  Qualitative 
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This section outlines the ontological, epistemological and methodological considerations, 
or research paradigm, that guided my choice of research design and methods.   
3.1 Ontology and Epistemology 
The fundamental philosophical assumptions underpinning this research design are a 
constructivist ontology and an interpretivist epistemology.  In broad terms, ontology 
relates to the nature of reality and what can be known about it, and epistemology to the 
theory of knowledge.  More specifically, epistemology pertains to what constitutes 
acceptable knowledge in a discipline (Bryman 2008) and the relationship between the 
knower and what can be known (Guba & Lincoln 2004) ?ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĞƉŝƐƚĞŵŽůŽŐŝĐĂů
stance impacts every stage of the research process, from the choice of topic to the framing 
of interview questions (Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2006).  
An objectivist ontological stance holds that social phenomena have an objective reality, 
independent of the ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌŽƌŽƚŚĞƌƐŽĐŝĂůĂĐƚŽƌƐ ?ZĞĂůŝƚǇŝƐƚŚƵƐƐŝŶŐƵůĂƌ ? ‘ŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?
discoverable and measurable (Cresswell 2013).  Constructivism, in contrast, conceives of 
social reality as subjective, multiple and socially constructed (Cresswell 2013).  As such, 
there is no one specific version of reality that can be regarded as definitive.  Instead, reality 
is fluid and continually emerging from inĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ(Bryman 
2008).  As a researcher from a constructivist perspective, my aim is to understand how my 
research participants view and influence the world around them and the meanings they 
assign to their actions (Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2006).  I am interested in posing broad 
questions and eliciting the complexity of views, rather than distilling meanings into narrow 
categories or variables.  
In terms of epistemology, an interpretivist stance has as its fundamental tenet a rejection 
of the application of a positivist scientific method to the study of the social world (Hesse-
Biber & Leavy 2006).  The positivist epistemology associated with scientific study casts 
researchers as distant from, and independent of, what or who is being researched and thus 
able to study an object or phenomenon without influencing it or being influenced by it 
(Cresswell 2013).  An interpretative perspective, on the other hand, holds that such a 
supposedly value-free and unbiased scientific research approach is both unrealistic and 
undesirable in relation to the study of people and social phenomena.   
As a an interpretivist researcher, I see myself as interacting with my research participants 
and engaging with them in the joint creation of knowledge (Guba & Lincoln 2004).  I 
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recognise and celebrate the fact that my research is a value-laden enterprise and that my 
background, experience and assumptions have shaped not only my research interests, but 
also my interpretation of the data.  This issue is discussed in more detail in Section 8 on 
data analysis. 
3.2  Methodology  
Methodology represents the means by which these ontological and epistemological 
principles are translated into guidelines for the conduct of research (Sarantakos 2005).  Or, 
in other words, how researchers go about accessing the data they need and believe to be 
knowable (Guba & Lincoln 2004).   
Consistent with my constructivist and interpretivist philosophical principles and the nature 
of my research interests and aims, I employed a qualitative methodology.  In contrast to 
quantitative research, qualitative research is primarily concerned with meaning rather than 
measurement.  It is naturalistic and ideographic in nature as opposed to nomothetic, or 
based on universal causal laws.  This makes it an appropriate methodology for a study like 
this one which examines particular individuals or groups in a specific social context 
(Williams, M. 2002) and which seeks rich descriptions and meanings that cannot be 
experimentally examined or measured.  
The intellectual roots of qualitative ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶĐůƵĚĞtĞďĞƌ ?ƐŶŽƚŝŽŶŽĨVerstehen 
(understanding the views and perceptions of individuals as they are experienced and 
expressed in everyday life) and the phenomenological-hermeneutic tradition.  In a 
qualitative research context, phenomenology is concerned with understanding how 
individuals make sense of their world and hermeneutics with the theory and method of 
interpreting human action (Bryman 2008).  In both cases, the emphasis is on understanding 
the perspective of social actors - the primary focus of my research.  
Unlike quantitative research in the natural sciences in which hypotheses are proposed and 
then subjected to empirical testing, qualitative methodology tends to be inductive, or 
theory generating (Cresswell 2013, Denzin & Lincoln 2008), as is the case here.  Rather than 
ƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ŵǇĂŝŵǁĂƐƚŽ “ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞŽƌ inductively develop a theory or pattern of 
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐ ?(Cresswell 2013, p. 8).  One consideration in the decision to adopt this type of 
qualitative theory-generating methodology was the relative immaturity of the research 
field, with very few empirical studies to date and a lack of relevant theory.  The particular 
Susan Shepherd                                               Chapter Four: Methodology and Research Design 
89 
 
approach taken to the use of theory in this study was influenced by the thinking of Glaser 
and Strauss, the originators of grounded theory.   
Glaser and Strauss were dissatisfied with what they saw as an overemphasis on the 
prevailing hypothesis-verification scientific style of sociological research and saw grounded 
theory as a defence against this approach.  This new methodology was developed in part as 
a reaction against armchair theorising at a high level of abstraction.  Glaser and Strauss 
ǀŝĞǁ “ŐƌĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇĚĞĚƵĐĞĚĨƌŽŵa priori ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂƐƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŝǀĞĂŶĚ “ŽŶůǇ
dubiously related to the area of behaviour it purports to explaiŶ ?(1967, p. 2).  They are also 
highly critŝĐĂůŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇƚĞƌŵ “ĞǆĂŵƉůŝŶŐ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐƐĞůĞĐƚĞǆĂŵƉůĞƐƚŽ
confirm a speculative theory, thus giving the appearance of proof where none exists, and 
 “ƚĂĐŬĞĚŽŶ ?ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůƐƚƵĚŝĞƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƌǇ(1967, pp. 4-5).   
This is not to say that theory is unimportant to Glaser and Strauss, quite the reverse.  They 
want qualitative researchers to move away from being merely descriptive and 
impressionistic and become more theoretical.  The development of theory is seen as 
essential to a deeper understanding of social phenomena (Strauss 1987) and their aim is to 
ƵƚŝůŝƐĞ “ƐŽĐŝŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵƚŚĞŽƌǇdevelopment (Metraux 2004, p. 366).  
ZĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ “ŐƌĂŶĚ ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?'ůĂƐĞƌĂŶĚ^ƚƌĂƵƐƐĂĚǀŽĐĂƚĞ “ŐƌŽƵŶĚĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ
ĚĞƌŝǀĞĚĨƌŽŵĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůĚĂƚĂ ?ƚŚĂƚďŽƚŚ “ĨŝƚƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ǁŽƌŬƐ ? ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ŝƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚĂŶĚŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůƚŽ
those under study (1967, p. 3).  
And this is what I am aiming for in the theoretical developments arising from this study: 
meaningful explanations of what happens in practical situations derived from empirical 
data, albeit interpreted through the lens of my own experience and ideas.  I make no claims 
ƚŽ “ƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝǀĞ ?Žƌ “ĨŽƌŵĂů ?ƚŚĞŽƌǇ ?ƐĞĞŝŶŐŵǇƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐĂƐ “ƌŝĐŚĐŽŶceptual 
ĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨůŝǀĞĚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůǁŽƌůĚƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ “ƚŝŐŚƚůǇĨƌĂŵĞĚƚŚĞŽƌŝĞƐƚŚĂƚ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞŚǇƉŽƚŚĞƐĞƐĂŶĚŵĂŬĞĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?(Charmaz 2004, p. 517).  
Even though the study does not employ an overarching theory-testing methodology, it 
nevertheless involves an element of hypothesis testing.  At the level of research aims, one 
of the key ideas that I am seeking to test is the salience of the prevailing academic narrative 
about managerialism and academic-manager power relations with regard to the 
appointment of DPVCs.  Moreover, the research design reflects an iterative process of data 
collection and analysis in which ideas and hunches are tested throughout the course of the 
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research process.  Whilst primarily inductive in nature, the research design thus also 
incorporates some deductive strategies.  
 
4. Research Design 
In tandem with my own particular research interests, the philosophical stance and 
methodology outlined in the previous sections has guided the logic and structure of my 
research design.  The choice of research design and methods is outlined and justified in this 
section.  Details of the aims, procedure and rationale for each method are then provided in 
Sections 5, 6 and 7 respectively.  
4.1 Mixed Methods  
This study employs a mixed-methods research design.  That is to say, it utilises what are 
sometimes considered quantitative (census and online survey) as well as qualitative (semi-
structured interviews) research methods.  The research strategy of employing different 
methods to produce different types of data from different perspectives was utilised here in 
the hope of obtaining a more complete, all-round understanding of the research 
phenomenon and, hence, increasing the robustness of the findings.  The use of mixed 
methods might thus be considered as a form of data  W as well as methodological  W testing 
and triangulation (4.1.1). 
As well as enhancing the completeness and complementarity of the data, the mixed-
methods research design served a developmental purpose.  The three methods were used 
sequentially, as illustrated in Figure 7 with the analysis of each undertaken before the start 
of the next data collection phase.  This iterative approach to data collection and analysis 
allowed the emerging analysis to shape subsequent data collection and thus avoid the 
pitfall of amassing lots of unfocused data (Charmaz 2004).  
The census and online survey were designed not only to provide useful data in their own 
right, but also to inform the design of the substantive semi-structured interview phase.  For 
example, one of the aims of the online survey was to test out my initial ideas about what 
the key issues for further investigation during the interview phase might be.  In this respect, 
the first two methods may be conceived as fulfilling a preparatory and developmental role.  
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Figure 7: Sequence and Relationship of Methods 
 
 
Taken together, the quantitative data from the census and the online survey enabled the 
scoping of the macro level of the phenomenon and the qualitative (i.e. free text) data from 
the survey and the interviews were used to examine the micro level.  This capacity to 
explore both macro and micro dimensions and expand the scope of the study from the 
individual case, or cases, to the entire study population is one of the key advantages of 
employing a mixed-methods design and makes it particularly appropriate for research like 
this which explores multi-dimensional social experience (Mason 2006). 
4.1.1 Rationale 
The choice of a mixed-methods research design was essentially a pragmatic one, made on 
the basis that this was the approach best suited to meeting my research aims.  More 
specifically, my research questions required the generation of both quantitative and 
qualitative data (Table 3, 4.3).   
In my view, no one method is inherently superior to another, only more or less appropriate 
to address a particular research question or aim.  The major consideration in my choice of 
research methods was thus how well they work (Denscombe 2007).  In principle, I view 
methods as more autonomous from ontological and epistemological associations than is 
sometimes assumed and I believe that they can be used legitimately by researchers in 
different ways and for different purposes, provided that their use is consistent with the 
internal logic of the research design.  
From this perspective, both quantitative and qualitative methods can be used within any 
research paradigm proviĚĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƵƐĞŝƐĐŽŶŐƌƵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚŝĐĂů
world view (Guba & Lincoln 2004).  In this case, the research design reflects a pragmatic 
mixing of methods in support of an essentially qualitative research purpose.  This study 
could not, therefore, be described as a mixed-methods design in the way that Creswell 
1.  Census 
2.  Online Survey 
3.  Semi-structured 
Interviews 
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(2013) conceives of one, i.e. as a third, neither quantitative nor qualitative, research 
paradigm. 
A mixed-methods design provides a useful means of mutual compensation for the 
strengths and weaknesses of each method employed (Denscombe 2007).  One of its main 
applications, and claimed benefits, is methodological testing or triangulation (Bryman 
2008).  This involves the cross-checking of results from each research method on the 
premise that any biases inherent in one may be neutralised when used in conjunction with 
another (Cresswell 2013).  It stems from a belief that quantitative and qualitative methods 
each ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŝƌƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƐĂŶĚǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĂƚĐŽŵďŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ “ĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ
ƚŽŽĨĨƐĞƚƚŚĞŝƌǁĞĂŬŶĞƐƐĞƐƚŽĚƌĂǁŽŶƚŚĞƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚƐŽĨďŽƚŚ ?(Bryman 2006, p. 106). 
The use of multiple methods and data sources is not in itself intrinsically superior to single-
strategy research and this approach needs to be judged in relation to its fitness for purpose 
and consistency with the underlying research logic.  However, it does offer the potential to 
generate a richer and more comprehensive picture of the phenomenon under investigation 
(Horowitz & Gerson 2002) and the employment of multiple sources of evidence is 
particularly appropriate to this type of naturalistic, in-depth empirical enquiry that aims to 
investigate a complex phenomenon within its real-life context (Yin 2009).   
4.1.2 Limitations and Issues 
In practice a mixed-methods research design may throw up a number of challenges, 
including the requirement for the researcher to be skilful at more than one research 
method and able to deal with uncertainty and complexity.  Difficulties may arise in handling 
disparities between findings from the different methods (Denscombe 2007) and in deciding 
which form of data should take priority.  A mixed-methods strategy may tend to lead to 
outcomes that were not predictable at the outset, although quantitative and qualitative 
ŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ “ĐĂŶďĞĨƌƵŝƚĨƵůůǇĐŽŵďŝŶĞĚǁŚĞŶŽŶĞŐĞŶĞƌĂƚĞƐƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐƌĞƐƵůƚƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞ
understood bǇĞŵƉůŽǇŝŶŐƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ?(Bryman 2006, p. 10). 
I regard the potential for a mixed-methods research design to throw up unexpected and 
contradictory data as a strength, rather than a weakness, for a study such as this one which 
seeks to explore a complex social phenomenon from multiple perspectives.  As Mason 
argues, multi-dimensional lived experience requires similarly multi-dimensional 
ĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚ “ĚŽŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůůǇĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵĂůĂŶĚŶĞĂƚůǇĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚƚŽŚĂǀĞ
ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĂŶĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶ ?(2006, p. 20).  Viewed in this light, tensions 
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and contradictions in data might be considered as inevitable rather than problematic.  
Furthermore, the prioritisation of different methods and data sources is less of an issue for 
researchers like myself who do not consider any single source ŽĨĚĂƚĂĂƐƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞ
ƚƌƵƚŚ ? ? 
4.2 Flexible Design  
In keeping with its qualitative and inductive methodology, the study utilised a flexible, 
iterative research design that was able to take account of new themes and possible topics 
for enquiry that emerged as the research progressed.  A flexible design allowed me to react 
to, and take advantage of, new ideas emerging from the data and from the development of 
my own thinking. 
That is not to say, however, that I embarked on the data collection process without a clear 
sense of purpose or direction  W one of the criticisms sometimes levelled at the use of a 
flexible research strategy.  On the contrary, I developed an outline empirical plan early on 
in the research process and kept this under continual review.  One version of this plan is 
included for reference as Appendix B.  This provides an indication of the evolution of the 
research design over time.  For example, in this particular iteration of the plan it was 
envisaged that interviews with vice chancellors would be undertaken as a discrete, final 
data collection phase in order that the findings could be shared with them and their views 
ascertained
26
.  In reality, the wide geographical spread of the universities in the sample led 
to a pragmatic decision to conduct interviews with all respondents (including vice 
chancellors) in each target institution during a single visit.   
The attached plan further illustrates how I incorporated a number of fall-back or 
contingency options in my design in order to ensure that a credible research study could 
still have been undertaken within the three-year timeframe in spite of any problems that 
might have occurred with a particular method or methods.  Had my online survey or 
interview requests elicited only a very low response, for example, there were alternative 
strategies in place, such as the use of documentary analysis or expert interviews, which 
were less reliant on securing access to large numbers of research participants.  As it 
transpired, response rates were sufficiently high that I did not need to use a back-up plan.  
Nevertheless, having a contingency plan in place provided a degree of reassurance that a 
                                                          
26
 In the event, the findings to date were still discussed with vice chancellors and, in addition to the 
value this opportunity provided to ascertain their views, it is believed that the offer to share the 
findings with them contributed to the extremely high interview response rate (7.3). 
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viable research outcome was achievable whatever methodological problems might have 
been encountered. 
4.3 Choice of Methods 
The wide range of data collection tools available to qualitative researchers lends a depth to 
qualitative research (Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2006) but it also necessitates the selection of the 
most appropriate method or methods.  There were a number of factors that influenced my 
own choice of methods, including cost and time considerations as well as fit with my 
research style and experience.  Foremost amongst them, though, was research purpose: 
simply stated, different research questions require different methods to answer them.   
Table 3 shows the relationship between my research questions (Chapter One, 6.2) and 
research methods, and gives the study population for each. 
 
Table 3: Relationship between Research Questions, Methods and Study Populations 
Research Question Method Study Population 
Q.1  What is the case for change to the 




x Online survey 
x Vice chancellors  
x Registrars 
x DPVCs 
x Third tier managers 
Q.2  What are the consequences of 
change for: 
a. The demographic and professional 
profile of appointed DPVCs? 
x Census 
x Tracking of adverts 
to DPVCs 
x DPVCs in all pre-1992 
English universities 
 
b. The careers of DPVCs appointed via 





x DPVCs appointed via 
external competition 
x Executive search 
agents 
c. The career aspirations and 
progression of third tier managers? 
x Online survey 
x Semi-structured 
interviews 
x Third tier managers 
x Executive search 
agents 
Q.3 What are the implications of 
change for institutional 
management capacity building? 
x Analysis of findings x All 
Q.4 To what extent are the findings 
symptomatic of ideal-type 
managerialism? 
x Comparison of data 
against indicators 
of ideal type  
x All 
Q.5 What do the findings signify for 
academic-manager power relations? 
x Analysis of findings x All 
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Sections 5, 6 and 7 provide detailed information for each selected method in turn, including 
procedures, study population and sampling strategy, response rates and rationale.  For the 
census and online survey, sufficient detail is given on data collection procedures to permit 
their future replication.  The case of the interviews is somewhat different.  Given that these 
involved both researcher and participant in the co-construction of knowledge at a 
particular point in time, it would not be possible to precisely re-create the interview 
experience.  However, information provided on the planning and conduct of the interviews 
should enable the overall approach to be replicated.   
 
5. Census 
The initial data collection method was a census, or enumeration of an entire population 
(Bryman 2008).  This had three main aims.  Firstly, to provide a snapshot in time of the 
demographic and career profile of DPVCs in all English pre-1992 universities
27
 and thereby 
provide a current data set against which to measure change over time.  Secondly, by cross 
reference to existing advertisement monitoring data, to identify a sub-group of DPVCs 
appointed by means of external open competition and enable comparison between them 
and the remainder of the cohort.  Thirdly, to identify a representative sample for the 
interview phase of the study. 
As appropriate to its purpose as a scoping exercise, this initial data collection phase was 
descriptive rather than explanatory in nature.  Descriptive research is of particular value in 
establishing  both the fact, and the dimensions, of a given phenomenon prior to asking the 
why questions (de Vaus 2001).   
5.1 Study Population and Sampling Strategy 
Sampling was not an issue for the census since it was aimed at the entire study population 
of serving DPVCs in the 45 English pre-1992 universities.  As of August 2013, this comprised 
215 DPVCs for whom demographic data was available plus four vacant posts.  
 
                                                          
27
 This is a wholly new census to the one undertaken as a pilot study for 2011 for my unpublished 
MA dissertation. It also uses a different definition of a DVC and is therefore not directly comparable. 




Data on the demographic and career background of DPVCs was collected from institutional 
websites.  Sources included corporate management information, publication schemes, 
press releases and staff profiles.  In addition non-university online sources, such as LinkedIn, 
ǁĞƌĞƵƐĞĚĂƐŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽĂĚĚƌĞƐƐĂŶǇĚĂƚĂŐĂƉƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŝŶĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛcareer 
background.  A copy of the census data collection template is attached as Appendix C.  This 
shows the units of data that were gathered for each DPVC. 
The census was undertaken in July 2012 as the initial phase of data collection.  It was then 
repeated in August 2013 at the end of the interview phase as a way not only of updating 
the findings, but also of providing some reassurance about the reliability of the initial data.  
By comparing the two data sets I was able to check that the 2012 census data, which had 
informed the subsequent research design, did not represent an atypical snapshot in time.  
In the interests of presenting the most up-to-date picture of the DPVC cohort, it is this 
more recent 2013 census data that is reported in this thesis.  This is a good example of one 
of the challenges  W and limitations  W of this study: that is, the fact that it is examining a 
moving target with an unstable population that changes on a frequent basis. 
The 2013 census data was compared to relevant historical data from the Association of 
Commonwealth Universities (ACU) 2006 Yearbook
28
 in order to identify any change in 
profile over time.  DPVCs within the census population appointed by means of external 
open competition were then identified and their profile compared to that of those 
appointed via an internal-only recruitment process
29
. 
The identification of this first sub-group was made possible by reference to data from an 
advertisement monitoring exercise covering job advertisements for all DPVC posts in the 
two major media for higher education vacancies  W Times Higher Education30 and the 
jobs.ac.uk website.  Data from this monitoring exercise for a five-year period from January 
2006 to December 2010 were presented in the dissertation for my MA in Social Research 
Methods (Shepherd 2011), undertaken as a pilot study for this PhD.  I have continued to 
add to ƚŚŝƐĚĂƚĂƐĞƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽǁĞŝŐŚƚĨƵůůǇĞĂƌƐ ?ĚĂƚĂƵƉƚŽĞĐĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ǇĐƌŽƐƐ
referencing this data with that from the census I was able to track the DPVC advertisement 
                                                          
28
 The data within the 2006 ACU Handbook relates to the previous year: 2005. 
29
 There are five DPVCs in the cohort who are not included in either of these two groups since their 
appointment method is unclear.  This is explained further in 5.4.  
30
 Formerly the Times Higher Educational Supplement (THES) 
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to the person who got the job  W and hence identify those DPVCs appointed as the result of 
external open competition. 
5.3 Rationale 
A census was deemed the most appropriate method for obtaining a macro level overview 
of the DPVC cohort.  It offered the required breadth of coverage across the entire target 
study population, thus obviating the need for sampling.  Use of a census method permitted 
the collection of structured and consistent data to facilitate mapping across institutions and 
the generation of accurate and reliable data sets.  Moreover, a census has the additional 
advantages of replicability and non-reactivity in terms of direct researcher effect (Bryman 
2008). 
The use of a survey rather than a census was considered, but rejected for two main reasons.  
Firstly, it is highly unlikely that coverage of the whole population could have been obtained.  
Secondly, in contrast to the subsequent research methods, what was required for this 
initial descriptive data collection phase was dispassionate evidence, uncoloured by the 
perspectives of individual institutions or post holders.  This was achieved through the 
adoption of a desk-based approach that did not require the involvement of human 
participants.  
5.4 Issues and Limitations 
A census is not normally a feasible approach for large populations as it can be prohibitively 
expensive and time consuming to achieve complete coverage.  In this case, it was possible 
to estimate the DPVC population within pre-1992 institutions at the outset and make a 
judgement that it was of a manageable size
31
.  The availability of publically available online 
information meant that no data collection costs were incurred, although the process of 
gathering the data was intensive as it needed to be completed within a short space of time. 
A census method places the onus on researchers to ensure they reach the entire 
population.  In this case I am confident that I did so, at least with regard to the two thirds of 
pre-1992 institutions (30 of 45) that comprised my interview sample population.  This is 
because during the interviews I was able to confirm DPVC arrangements within these 
institutions.  When I double-checked this information against the census data, in each 
                                                          
31
 I estimated an average of five DPVCs per institution, or a total population of 225. This compares to 
the actual census population of 219.  
Susan Shepherd                                               Chapter Four: Methodology and Research Design 
98 
 
instance I found the census data to be both complete and accurate.  This is one example of 
how a mixed-methods approach provided a valuable means of data triangulation.  
Moreover, it provided reassurance that a reliance on publically available online information 
had not proved detrimental to the quality of my findings. 
During the course of mapping the census data against that from the advertisement 
monitoring exercise, I became aware of one limitation to the research design that I had not 
considered at the outset: my use of external advertisement as the sole indicator that a 
DPVC had been appointed via external open competition.  The census revealed five DPVCs, 
for whom I had no record of an external advert having being placed, who had come into 
their current post from another institution
32
.  This indicated that they were appointed by 
means of a process that was not restricted to internal candidates. 
It may be that external adverts were placed but either missed by me or not picked up as 
part of the advertisement monitoring exercise because they were not published in either 
the Times Higher Education or the jobs.ac.uk website.  However, evidence emerging from 
the interviews suggests another possible explanation: that some institutions may be 
undertaking a DPVC recruitment search without placing an external advertisement.  This in 
itself is valuable information and the identification of these five cases is an example of how 
a mixed-methods research design can highlight apparent inconsistencies in data in a 
revelatory way. 
Given that they did not meet my stated criterion of external advertisement in the Times 
Higher Education or on the jobs.ac.uk website
33
, these five posts were not included in the 
sub-group of DPVCs appointed by means of external open competition.  Nor was it 
appropriate to include them in the sub-group appointed via an internal-only process since 
the precise nature of their appointment is not known.  They were therefore excluded from 
the comparative analysis of the DPVC cohort by appointment method (Chapter Five, 4.2). 
                                                          
32
 Interestingly, three of these five posts were in one university (Aston) which was not included in my 
institutional sample group since there was no record of it having placed any external advertisements 
for DPVC posts.   
33
 It is therefore possible that my published data may slightly under-record the number of DPVCs 
appointed by means of external open competition: 71 rather than 76.   
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6. Online Survey 
An online survey of third tier university managers was undertaken with three main aims.  
The first was to elicit the views of these managers as to why change to the DPVC 
appointment model is happening and what its likely impact might be and, in so doing, to 
test my own ideas about which issues might be worth pursuing in the subsequent 
interviews.   The second was to generate data on their aspirations with regard to becoming 
a DPVC and their experience of applying for externally advertised DPVC posts.  The third 
was to find volunteers for the interview phase of the study.  
6.1 Study Population and Sampling Strategy 
The online survey was aimed at the entire population of third tier managers in English pre-
1992 universities and so there was no sampling strategy per se.  The rationale for the 
selection of third tier managers was that they should be the most senior managers below 
DPVC level, both on the academic and the professional services side of the institution.  In 
most cases, these were deans and senior directors of professional services.  However, 
where the dean was also a DPVC, the study population was taken to be the next tier down 
of academic managers: that is, heads of department or school. 
The survey was sent to all third tier managers for whom an email address could be found.  
A comprehensive trawl of university websites produced 661 results
34
.  It is not possible to 
state precisely what proportion of the entire third tier manager population this represents 
but, given the availability of information on the relevant post holders in all 45 institutions, 
it is my belief that the coverage is at least 95% on the academic manager side.  Information 
was much harder to find for professional services directors who were an invisible online 
presence in three of the institutions.  Nevertheless, overall coverage of this group is 
believed to be good.  It should be borne in mind, however, that this is not a stable 
population.  Just as with the census of DPVCs, the study population is representative only 
of a given moment in time. 
 
 
                                                          
34
 This is significantly more than my estimated population of 540, based on an average of six 
academic and six professional services directors per institution.  The number was boosted by the 
large numbers of heads of department in those institutions where the dean was also a DPVC. 




A great deal of care was invested in the design of the online survey in order to make it as 
quick and easy to complete as possible and thus maximise the response rate.  Survey length 
was kept to a minimum at only sixteen questions, and check boxes and drop down lists 
ǁĞƌĞƵƚŝůŝƐĞĚǁŚĞƌĞǀĞƌƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚŝŽŶ ?hƐĞŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽƚŽ ?ĨĂĐŝůŝƚǇŵĞĂŶƚ
that respondents only had to answer those questions directly relevant to them and, 
although the main questions were compulsory, the use of free text boxes, included to allow 
additional comments or points of clarification, was optional in most cases. 
The survey has seven pages in total, including an initial welcome page that gives an outline 
of the structure of the survey and an estimation of the time it should take to complete (ten 
minutes) followed by an Anonymity and Data Protection Statement on Page 2.  The final 
page comprises a thank you message.  The remaining four pages contain questions under 
the following headings: About You, Your Views on Changes to Appointment Practice, Your 
Career, and Invitation to Participate in Follow-up Research. Respondents were able to 
monitor their progress through the survey by an indicator on each page telling them they 
ǁĞƌĞŽŶ “WĂŐĞ ?ŽĨ ? ?ĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ ?ĐĐĞƐƐƚŽƚŚĞĂƌĐŚŝǀĞĚŽŶůŝŶĞƐƵƌǀĞǇŝƐƉĂƐƐǁŽƌĚ
protected and only available to registered survey administrators.  However, a copy of the 
questions is provided for reference in Appendix D. 
A draft version of the survey was piloted by three colleagues drawn from the target study 
population: two female professional services directors and one male head of department.  
They were first invited to read and comment on the invitation email to ensure that it was 
both comprehensible and sufficiently attractive to elicit a response.  They were then asked 
to test the online survey in my presence and to give feedback on any issues of usability as 
well as to comment on the wording of the instructions, questions and response options.  
Given the personal nature of some of the survey questions, those testing the survey were 
not asked to provide responses
35
, and hence any data from these pilots were not submitted 
or included in the findings. 
As a result of this testing process, minor changes were made to the survey instrument and 
more significant ones to the invitation email, which I believe helped to make it more 
succinct and appealing  W thus aiding the response rate.  In order both to personalise the 
invitation and to bypass gatekeepers, wherever possible this email was sent directly to an 
                                                          
35
 However, some dummy data were provided for test purposes. 
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ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĞŵĂŝůĂĚĚƌĞƐƐ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŽĂŐĞŶĞƌŝĐŽŶĞ36, or to that of a personal 
assistant.  A copy of the invitation email is attached for reference as Appendix E.   
The email contained a link to a web-based survey located on the University of Bristol online 
survey site (http://survey.bris.ac.uk).  This host site was used because it is professional, 
secure and free to ůŝĐĞŶƐĞĚƵƐĞƌƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨ<ĞŶƚ ?ƌŝƐƚŽů ?ƐŽŶůŝŶĞƐƵƌǀĞǇ
development software is easy to use and convenient for analysis.  It is also widely known 
and trusted within higher education.  My contact details were included both in the email 
and on the survey to permit respondents to ask questions or raise any concerns they might 
have.  The survey was open for a two-week period between 1 and 14 November 2012 and a 
reminder email was sent out during the second week. 
6.3 Response Rate and Respondent Profile 
An email containing a link to the online survey was sent to 661 third tier managers.  
Thirteen emails were returned undelivered and 14 return receipt messages were received 
indicating that the recipients were away for the entire survey period, for example on 
maternity or study leave.  634 emails, or 96%, or survey invitations are therefore assumed 
to have been received.  132 recipients completed the survey  W a response rate of 20%.  
There were a further 15 incomplete surveys, taking the overall response rate to 22% (147).  
For the sake of consistency, incomplete responses are excluded from the analysis. 
 
Table 4: Online Survey Response Rate and Respondent Profile 
 Study population Respondents 
 Number % Number % 
Academics 447 67.6 85 64.4 
Professional Services Managers 214 32.4 47 35.6 
Total 661 100 132 100 
Of those for whom gender is known:     
Male  465 71.5 95 72.0 
Female 185 28.5 37 28.0 
Total 650 100.0 132 100.0 
 
 
                                                          
36
 For example, pvc-research@auniversity.ac.uk. 
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The respondents are highly representative of the study population in terms of type and 
gender, as shown by Table 4.  In addition, good institutional coverage was achieved with 40 
of the 45 (89%) pre-1992 institutions comprising the study population represented.  The 
overwhelming majority of respondents are aged between 41 and 60 (89%), with the largest 
proportion aged between 51 and 60 (56%) and a further third between 41 and 50 (33%). 
The breakdown of respondents by current role is as follows: deans (23%), heads of 
department or school (36%), professional services managers (36%) and others (5%).  The 
others are academics, most of whom have just stepped down from a dean or head of 
department role.  The largest proportion of academics (44%) is from the sciences, followed 
by social sciences (28%) and humanities (13%).  Most of the remainder (15%) are from 
engineering and health.  The highest proportion of heads of department is from a science 
background (44%) and deans from a social science background (33%). 
6.4 Rationale 
A survey was considered the most effective and practical means of reaching this relatively 
large study population and gaining a macro view of the issues.  The use of interviews was 
considered, but rejected due to the small sample size and unstructured nature of the 
resulting data.  A survey method is considered less intrusive for the posing of sensitive 
questions, such as the ones in this survey relating to how successful respondents have been 
in their DPVC job applications.  It also has the advantage of minimising interviewer effects. 
The main advantages of online over postal questionnaires are lower costs and ease of 
distribution, follow up and analysis.  The University of Bristol survey platform, for example, 
ĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƐƵŵŵĂƌǇĚĂƚĂĂŶĚĂůůŽǁƐƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƚŽ ‘ĚƌŝůůĚŽǁŶ ?ŝŶƚŽ
the data using filtering and cross-tabulation tools.  An online survey has the added benefit 
of speed of response, perhaps due to the perceived urgency of email as a contact method.  
Compared to a written questionnaire, an online survey is also likely to result in fewer 
unanswered questions  W mainly due to the technical facility to require a response - and an 
increased likelihood of eliciting more detailed replies to open questions (Bryman 2008).  An 
online survey can also be completed at the respondents ?ĐŽŶǀĞŶŝĞŶĐĞ ? 
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6.5 Issues and Limitations 
Use of a survey method does not permit the posing of follow-up questions or probing.  
However, the design of this study meant that both were at least possible for the small sub-
set of survey respondents (12) participating in the subsequent semi-structured interviews. 
Lack of internet access is a major potential limitation of online compared to other survey 
methods.  It was not a factor in this study, however, the population for which was selected 
on the basis of having a valid email address.  Other disadvantages of the online survey 
method include concerns about confidentiality and anonymity and the possibility of 
multiple replies (Bryman 2008). 
A technological issue was experienced in relation to this survey which led to concerns 
amongst some recipients about the security of accessing the University of Bristol survey 
site.  Since default security settings vary between institutions, some survey recipients got 
an automated message asking if they were sure they wanted to open the link to the survey 
and informing them that this option was not recommended.  A few recipients contacted 
me to let me know this had happened and I was able to reassure them that the survey site 
was safe and secure.  However, it is impossible to know how widespread the problem was 
and how many people received the message and decided not to continue to the survey site.  
Given that institutional security settings are beyond my control, it is not believed that this 
problem could have been avoided. 
There are mixed views about whether response rates are higher or lower with an online 
survey than other survey methods, though there is some evidence in the literature that 
online surveys do tend to obtain a higher response rate (Evans & Mathur 2005).  There also 
appears to be no consensus about what constitutes a good response rate to an online 
survey.  In this case, I set myself a target response rate of 15%, based on my own previous 
experience in conducting online surveys of relatively large populations without the use of 
any incentive or sense of obligation (for example, where a survey is conducted by an 
employer).  Although I exceeded this target, the lack of published benchmarks makes it 
difficult to gauge just how good this response rate really was. 
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7. Semi-Structured Interviews   
Qualitative semi-structured interviews were employed for the substantive research phase 
in order to elicit a range of views on the various aspects of the research phenomenon, in 
particular, the nature of change to the DPVC appointment model, reasons for the change 
and consequences for the individuals and institutions concerned.  The inclusion of different 
categories of research participant, including DPVCs and those around them, was designed 
 “ƚŽĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĂŵĞƚĂŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŶǇƐƚŽƌŝĞƐŚĞĂƌĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŵĂŶǇŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƉĂƌƚŶĞƌƐ ?
(Miller & Crabtree 2004, p. 200) and thus gain a more rounded perspective on the research 
topic than has been the case with research to date.  
7.1 Study Population and Sampling Strategy 
A purposive sampling strategy was adopted for the interviews whereby participants were 
selected from the study population on the basis that they had something to contribute to 
the research topic (Denscombe 2007).  
At an institutional level, the study population comprised: 
(i) The 30
37
 English pre-1992 universities that had externally advertised at least 
one DPVC post in the period covered by the advertisement monitoring 
exercise; and 
(ii) The four executive search agents active in the higher education sector. 
 
Within these institutions, the study population included a total of 155 individuals: a mixture 
of vice chancellors, DPVCs appointed by means of external advertisement, registrars, third 
tier managers and executive search consultants with responsibility for senior university 
appointments.  A breakdown of the numbers in each participant category is given in Table 5.  
The figures in parentheses are the percentage of the respective study population. 
As Table 5 illustrates, the entire study population of vice chancellors and executive search 
agents were included in the sample.  This was to secure sufficient numbers given the 
(misguided, as it transpired) expectation of a fairly low response rate.  For the remaining 
categories of respondents, the following sampling criteria were used with the target of 
achieving two research participants  W and a minimum of one - in each institution. 
                                                          
37
 As of December 2013, the number of institutions advertising DPVC posts had increased to 33. 
Susan Shepherd                                               Chapter Four: Methodology and Research Design 
105 
 
Table 5: Overview of Interview Study Population, Sample and Participant Numbers 
 Vice 
Chancellors 


































DPVCs: a minimum of one DPVC appointed via external open competition from each of the 
27
39
 institutions which had this type of DPVC in place.  Where there was more than one 
such DPVC in an institution, the sample was selected on the basis of the following criteria, 
in priority order: 
(i) Gender: females wherever possible in order to ensure women were 
adequately represented 
(ii) Alphabetical order of surname 
(iii) If the first invited DPVC declined or did not respond, another one was invited 
according to the same criteria, and so on as required to obtain two 
participants in total per institution. 
 
Registrars: one from those institutions that: 
(i) Had no DPVC appointed via external open competition in post, or  
(ii) In which there were no third tier managers who had volunteered to be 
interviewed, or  
(iii) Where necessary to obtain two participants in total from each institution. 
 
Third tier managers: one in each category (i.e. academic and professional services manager) 
per institution, chosen from amongst those who had volunteered to be interviewed when 
they responded to the online survey.  Where there was more than one such third tier 
                                                          
38
 This figure includes two heads of governance referred by their respective registrar. 
39
 Loughborough, UEA and SOAS had no DPVCs in post at the time of the interviews who had been 
appointed by means of external open competition. 
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manager in an institution, the sample was selected on the basis of the following criteria, in 
priority order: 
(i) Gender: females wherever possible in order to ensure women were 
adequately represented 
(ii) Alphabetical order of surname 
(iii) If the first invited manager declined or did not respond, another one was 
invited according to the same criteria, and so on as required to obtain two 
participants in total per institution. 
 
Table 6 provides further detail of the type of third tier manager included at each stage of 
the process.  The figures in parentheses are the percentage of the respective study 
population.  This shows that there were more academic than professional services 
managers in the sample. 
 
Table 6: Breakdown of Third Tier Managers by Type 
























In total, 111 people across all participant categories were invited for interview, equating to 
72% of the total study population. 
7.2 Procedure 
7.2.1 Interview Approach 
dŚĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ/ƚŽŽŬƚŽƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐǁĂƐĂŬŝŶƚŽƚŚĂƚŽĨĂ “ƚƌĂǀĞůůĞƌ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂ “ŵŝŶĞƌ ?
in that it was less about unearthing some knowledge or truth through careful and 
ƉĞƌƐŝƐƚĞŶƚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐƚŚĂŶĂďŽƵƚĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽŐŝǀĞƚŚĞŝƌĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐĂŶĚ “trying to 
ƵŶĨŽůĚƚŚĞŵĞĂŶŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞƐ ?(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 1).  These two 
metaphors represent two different conceptions of interview data as either given or 
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constructed.  In the former, data collection and analysis are discrete activities whilst in the 
latter, intervieǁŝŶŐĂŶĚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐĂƌĞ “ŝŶƚĞƌƚǁŝŶĞĚƉŚĂƐĞƐŽĨŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?(2009, 
p. 49). 
/ƚŝƐĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŝƐŶŽƚĂŶŽƌŵĂůĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚůŝƚĞƌĂůůǇĂŶ “ŝŶƚĞƌ-
view, where knowledge is constructed in the inter-action between the interviewer and the 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ ?(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 20).  It is thus an ĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽƌ “ƐƚĂŐĞĚ
ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝĐĂƚŝŽŶĞǀĞŶƚ ?(Miller & Crabtree 2004, p. 194) in which the interviewer plays a key 
role.  My aim as an interviewer was to strike a balance between empathy and social 
ŶĞƵƚƌĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĐƌĞĂƚĞĂŶ “ŝŵƉĂƌƚŝĂůĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂů
ƐƉĂĐĞ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐĐŽƵůĚƐƉĞĂŬŽƉĞŶůǇ ?ĂŬŝŶƚŽƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŽƉĞŶŝŶŐƵƉto a stranger 
ŽŶĂƚƌĂŝŶĂŶĚ ?ŝŶƐŽĚŽŝŶŐ ? “ƐƚĞƉďĂĐŬĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŝƌŽƌĚŝŶĂƌǇƌŽƵƚŝŶĞƐĂŶĚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƵƉŽŶƚŚĞŝƌ
ůŝǀĞƐ ?(Horowitz & Gerson 2002, p. 210). 
Kvale ĂŶĚƌŝŶŬŵĂŶŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂƐ “ĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂƐƚĂŐĞ ?ŽŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ
feel free and safe to speak of personal issues (2009, p. 16), thus transforming a stranger 
into a confidant.  However, given the personal nature of the interview topic, it was also 
important to guard against encouraging inappropriate disclosure.  The strategies I adopted 
included maintaining a professional distance, avoiding a confiding tone and not forging 
close relations with participants (Gillham 2005). 
7.2.2 Pilot Interviews 
Two pilot interviews were undertaken, one with a male dean and the other with a female 
third tier manager, and data from both were included in the analysis.  The aim was twofold: 
to test and refine the interview process and to obtain feedback upon it.  In particular, I 
used the pilot interviews to test the feasibility of capturing the interview data by means of 
simultaneous note taking, rather than audio recording.  This experience confirmed that, 
though challenging, it was possible to take contemporaneous notes and still conduct an 
effective interview.  The issue of note taking versus audio recording is discussed in 7.2.6. 
Feedback from the pilot interviews led to the development of an interview guide to be sent 
out to participants in advance of the meeting as an aide memoire on the research topic and 
the areas to be covered in the interview.  I believe this guide served a useful purpose both 
in allowing participants to prepare for the interviews, if they so wished, and in providing 
reassurance before the interview even began that it would be conducted in a professional 
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manner.  The guide was tailored to each category of participant.  A copy of the version for 
vice chancellors is attached as Appendix F. 
7.2.3 Interview Process 
An email requesting an interview was sent individually to everyone in the sample 
population, wherever possible directly to a personal email address in order to minimise the 
impact of gatekeepers.  A sample invitation email is provided as Appendix G.  In order to 
minimise travel and accommodation costs, sample institutions were geographically 
clustered and an attempt was made to undertake interviews with all participants within 
each cluster of institutions during a single visit.  An informed consent form (Appendix H) 
was sent out a few days in advance of each interview together with the interview guide. 
/ŶĂůŵŽƐƚĂůůĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐƚŽŽŬƉůĂĐĞŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?ŵĞĂŶŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞ
setting was private and the interviews could take place uninterrupted. After a brief 
introduction ĂŶĚĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐŝŶĨŽƌŵĞĚĐŽŶƐĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐ
overarching interview structure was adopted:  
(i) Biographical questions to build rapport 
(ii) Open-ended questions designed to elicit what the participant thinks or feels 
about the topic plus prompts and follow-up questions designed to steer or 
deepen understanding 
(iii) Thanks and closing small talk.  (Miller & Crabtree 2004)  
 
At the end of the interview, participants were offered the opportunity to review an 
interview summary, a sample of which is given as Appendix I.  This has been edited in order 
to preserve the anonymity of the research participant. 
7.2.4 Respondent Validation 
The method of analysis should be taken into consideration in the design of the interview 
schedule (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009).  In the case of this study, I had decided on a 
respondent validation approach to data analysis prior to conducting the interviews and had 
already designed the interview summary template.  I introduced this element of 
respondent validation for two main reasons.  Firstly, in order to allow interview participants 
to have a say in how the data they provide is interpreted.  This has been identified as a key 
ethical issue associated with interviewing (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). 
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The interview summary represents my first attempt at capturing the salient points from the 
interview, organising these by broad themes and capturing verbatim quotations.  As such, I 
believe it provides a more meaningful mechanism than a transcript for participants to 
check my understanding not just of what was said, but of my initial interpretation of what 
was meant.  The overall aim was to ensure the integrity of my research in terms of 
accurately and fairly conveying the views and perspectives of my participants. 
The second reason is an ethical one, concerned with my commitment to preserving the 
anonymity of my participants.  Higher education is a relatively small sector and senior 
figures are well known to each other.  I therefore wanted to allow participants the chance 
to ensure they could not be personally identified through the use of specific examples or 
anecdotes and thus guard against the risk of accidental disclosure.  By including certain 
phrases or sentences within quotation marks, I was also seeking approval for these words 
to be published in unattributed form. 
The fact that the summaries were relatively short and easy to read not only meant that it 
was less of an imposition on participants to check them, but also had the added benefit of 
rendering data from over 70 interviews into a more manageable and accessible form. 
Three quarters of participants (55, or 75%) chose to review their interview summary, just 
over half (53%) of whom made minor amendments whilst the remainder (47%) were 
content for it to stand without amendment. 
7.2.5 Interviewing Elites 
Most of my participants might be considered elites in the sense that they are leaders or 
experts in their field and in positions of power (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009).  Even though I 
am both an experienced higher education manager and consultant, I am nevertheless a 
novice researcher and I was aware of the power imbalance between myself and many of 
my participants.  This is in contrast to what is the more usual differential in power relations 
in favour of the researcher (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009). 
Whilst it would be over-simplistic to suggest there is one approach that works for all elite 
interviews, arguably they do exhibit some generic traits that a researcher needs to bear in 
mind during the preparation and conduct of the interviews (Harvey 2011).  Firstly, in 
recognition that elite participants are likely to have limited time available, I arranged 
meetings well in advance and requested a one-hour diary slot with the aim of containing 
the interview within 50 minutes.  And, although my clear preference was for face-to-face 
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interviews, I was willing to accept a telephone interview as an alternative whenever the 
former was not possible.  In this way, I was able to balance what I wanted (access to 
participants) with what was feasible for them. 
Secondly, since there is some suggestion that elite interviewees tend to assess the 
interviewer and their knowledge of the subject area (Harvey 2011), I was aware of the need 
to establish my research credentials by, for example, ensuring I was familiar with the 
executive management arrangements in place at each institution.  Thirdly, elite participants 
may exhibit a tendency to control interviews and be selective about which questions they 
answer.  Accordingly, researchers may find it difficult to pose difficult questions, probe 
answers or maintain silences (Harvey 2011).  In an attempt to deal with these issues, I 
adopted strategies of asking warm-up questions at the beginning of the interview in order 
to reduce tension and build rapport, and of using my findings to date as a means of 
ĐŚĂůůĞŶŐŝŶŐƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƐŝŶĂŶƵŶƚŚƌĞĂƚĞŶŝŶŐǁĂǇ ? 
Overall, I found the biggest difficulty with elite participants was interjecting a question or 
keeping the questioning on track, i.e. covering the range of questions.  Sometimes this 
meant the conversation was taken off my intended course.  Having said that, some rich 
data emerged when I allowed my participants to focus on the aspect of the topic that was 
of most interest and relevance to them.  To a certain extent, I therefore tried to let the 
iŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĚĞǀĞůŽƉŶĂƚƵƌĂůůǇŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŽĨĨƚŽƉŝĐ ?ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇŵĞĂŶ
irrelevant.  There was a degree of structure, but not rigidly imposed.  My interview 
schedule (Appendix J) was designed both to meet my needs in answering the research 
questions and to address issues of significance to my participants (Bryman 2008).  I was 
fortunate that, given the large number of interviews, I had sufficient data overall on each 
key theme even though I was not able to cover everything with everyone. 
7.2.6 Note Taking Versus Recording 
I decided not to record the interviews and instead to rely on contemporaneous notes, 
quickly followed by the writing up of a respondent validated interview summary.  There 
were a number of important factors influencing this choice of data capture mechanism, 
both practical and ethical. 
The first was to do with the people I was interviewing.  Although scholars disagree on 
whether elite interviews should be recorded (Harvey 2011), on the basis of my previous 
experience I made a judgement that they would prefer to speak off the record and that not 
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recording the interviews would thus be more likely to lead to an open and frank 
conversation.  This was particularly the case given the nature of the subject matter under 
discussion, including private and sensitive issues about their own careers and those of close 
colleagues.  Secondly, I took the view that the interview dynamic and the creation of 
rapport might be badly affected if a participant chose to object to audio recording at the 
outset of the interview and I did not want to take this risk. 
The third major consideration informing my decision not to record was my desire for 
respondent validation of the resulting interview data, as discussed in detail in 7.2.4.  Finally, 
I am a very experienced interviewer.  As a result, I know how difficult it is to maintain active 
listening and rapport whilst making notes.  On the other hand, my experience has taught 
me that, provided I review my notes quite soon after completion of the interview, I have 
good powers of recall and am able to replay the interview experience in my mind.  This 
ĂůůŽǁƐŵĞƚŽ ‘ĨůĞƐŚŽƵƚ ?ǁŚĂƚŵĂǇďĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƐŬĞƚĐŚǇŶŽƚĞƐĂŶĚƌĞĐĂůůƚŚĞƚŽŶĞĂŶĚ
narrative thread of the original conversation  W aspects that are often lost in the notes.  
Moreover, the two pilot interviews provided renewed evidence that note taking without 
audio recording was a feasible strategy for this study. 
Although there were compelling reasons not to record the interviews, there are also 
disadvantages to such an approach.  The act of note taking may impede active listening, 
whilst a reliance on notes runs the risk of faulty or selective memory (Ruane 2005).  The 
notes  W or in this case, the interview summaries resulting from the notes - become the only 
tangible record of the meeting and there is no recording or transcript to return to for 
further analysis.  This may become an issue where a researcher wishes to re-examine the 
data from a different perspective or in relation to a theme not originally envisaged when 
the notes were made.  In order to mitigate this risk, I made sure that my interview 
summaries included all the points from my notes, even where I did not think them directly 
relevant to my research questions. 
7.2.7 Use of Quotations 
Perhaps my greatest concern about the decision not to record my interviews was the fact 
that I did not have a transcript from which I could extract extended quotations.  This was a 
potential loss on two main counts.  The first concerns the evidentiary power of extracts 
from transcribed data.  Their inclusion in the research report can be a persuasive means 
both of conveying the evidence upon which conclusions have been drawn and of allowing 
others to make judgements about the validity of those claims (Hammersley 2010).  




data, interpretation and ĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐ ?(Corden & Sainsbury 2006, p. 98).  They should not be 
used as proof, however, since they are both selected at the discretion of the researcher 
and presented out of context (Denscombe 2007). 
Secondly, extended verbatim quotations may bring the text alive and make it more 
ƌĞĂĚĂďůĞ ? “ďĂůĂŶĐĞĚ ?ĂŶĚ “ĐŽŶǀŝŶĐŝŶŐ ?(Corden & Sainsbury 2006, pp. 106-108).  More 
importantly perhaps from the perspective of my own study, their use gives research 
participants a direct voice in the research outputs, allowing them an opportunity to have 
their say.  At the same time, I was also conscious of the potential detriment to the interests 
of my research participants.  Even when anonymised, extended extracts including specific 
examples or anecdotes may run the risk of accidental disclosure of institutions or 
individuals.  This fact helped sway my decision towards note taking rather than recording.  
In broad terms, I decided that I would rather have the more frank and higher quality data I 
believed I would get by not recording, than the capacity for extended quotations that 
recording and transcription would permit me.  As it transpired, the sacrifice was not as 
great as I had imagined since I found that I was able to capture in my notes many short 
ǀĞƌďĂƚŝŵƋƵŽƚĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŝĐŚ/ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚŽŐŝǀĞǀŽŝĐĞƚŽŵǇƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐĂŶĚďƌŝŶŐ “ƚŚĞƚĂůŬƚŽ
ůŝĨĞĂŐĂŝŶ ?ŝŶŵǇƚŚĞƐŝƐ(Denscombe 2007, p. 196).    
Although standard research practice, the assumption that the use of transcribed data is 
 “ŵŽƌĞƌŝŐŽƌŽƵƐƚŚĂŶƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞƵƉŽŶfield notes, in the sense that it provides a fuller and 
ŵŽƌĞĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ǁŚĂƚŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ? ?ŝƐƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ(Hammersley 2010, p. 
554).  Just like note taking, transcription is a process of construction that involves more 
than simply writing down what was said.  Decisions have to be made, for example about 
what to include or exclude, and thus there can be no one correct transcription 
(Hammersley 2010)
40
 any more than there can be any one correct set of field notes. 
Whilst the process of transcription may bring the researcher closer to the data (May 2001), 
ŝƚŵĂǇĂůƐŽĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞƚŚĞŵĨƌŽŵŝƚŝĨƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶŝƚƐĞůĨĐŽŵĞƐƚŽďĞƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ ‘ƚŚĞ
ĚĂƚĂ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐĂƌĞĐŽƌĚŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĂƐĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶŽƌƐŽĐŝĂůĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ(Cohen, 
L., Manion & Morrison 2000).  Written transcripts should thƵƐŶŽƚďĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ “ƐĂĐƌĞĚ
ĂŶĚŝŶĨĂůůŝďůĞƚĞǆƚƐ ?(Hammersley 2010, p. 565).  Rather, they may be viewed as 
 “ŝŵƉŽǀĞƌŝƐŚĞĚ ?ĚĞĐŽŶƚĞǆƚƵĂůised renderings of live interview conveƌƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĂƚĨĂŝůƚŽ
                                                          
40
 Hammersley does, however, warn against overplaying the role of the transcriber in the 
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐĂŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĂƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ “ŵŽƌĞŽƌůĞƐƐ
adequately  ‘ǁŚĂƚŽĐĐƵƌƌĞĚ ? ?(2010, p. 558). 
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take account of the social interaction and the role of the interviewer as co-producer of the 
interview (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 178; 193). 
All things considered, I am conscious that there was no right decision about whether to 
record the interviews or not, only one that had a better fit with my own research style, 
research purpose and type of participants. 
7.3 Response Rate and Respondent Profile 
Seventy three interviews were conducted in total, which equates to 47% of the total study 
population and 66% of the sample (Table 7).  The figures in parentheses are the percentage 
of the sample.  This is an impressive strike rate of interview requests to acceptances, which 
I believe reflects the high level of interest in my research topic and its perceived 
importance by the key stakeholders in the DPVC appointment process.  Moreover, the fact 
that nearly half of the entire study population participated in the research lends weight and 
credibility to the findings. 
 
Table 7: Strike Rate of Participants as a Proportion of the Sample 
 Vice 
Chancellors 




















There was excellent coverage across the various respondent categories and sample 
institutions.  As illustrated in Table 8, women were slightly over-represented amongst DPVC 
and third tier manager interviewees compared to the study population, reflecting sampling 
criteria designed to accord them priority. 
Given the tremendous response to the interview requests, it is believed that the study 
reached the point of theoretical saturation, that is, when fresh data would no longer have 
generated new insights and further data collection would have been of little or no value. 
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Table 8: Females in the Study Population, Sample and Interview Participants 
 Vice 
Chancellors 












































Interviews were selected for this micro phase of data collection since they provide a useful 
ŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĞǆƉůŽƌŝŶŐƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ǀŝĞǁƐĂŶĚĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐĂďŽƵƚĐŽŵƉůĞǆƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶĂ
(Denscombe 2007) which would be difficult to access with any other method (Lawler 2002).  
Interviews can yield both descriptive and explanatory data (Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2006) and 
they have the potential for eliciting rich, deep and compelling information and generating 
ŶĞǁŝŶƐŝŐŚƚƐŝŶƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐƐŽƌŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐ(Denscombe 2007).  Moreover, the 
interview method is a good tool for exploring complex and subtle phenomena and provides 
ĂŐŽŽĚĨŝƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐƉŚĞŶŽŵĞŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƐŝŶĐĞŝƚŚĂƐĂƵŶŝƋƵĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌ
ĂĐĐĞƐƐŝŶŐŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞůŝǀĞĚǁŽƌůĚ(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009).  Qualitative 
interviews have thus bĞĞŶĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐƚŚĞ “ŐŽůĚƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚ ?ŽĨƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞŵĞƚŚŽĚƐ
(Silverman 2000, pp. 291-292). 
The confidentiality of a number of the topics for discussion meant that group interviews or 
focus groups would not have been practicable and it was therefore an easy decision to 
undertake them on a one-to-one basis.  Face-to-face interviews were chosen in preference 
to telephone interviews mainly because of the opportunity they present to create a sense 
of rapport.  However, as already discussed (7.2.5), telephone interviews were offered as an 
alternative where a face-to-face meeting was not possible.  The former have the advantage 
of convenience for both parties as they are easier to diarise, do not involve travel and are 
thus both more cost and time efficient.  Certainly the use of telephone interviews allowed 
me to include more research participants than would otherwise have been possible and, 
although the length of interview was generally shorter, the data was of no less value. 
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A semi-structured interview format is particularly appropriate where, as was the case here, 
there is a fairly clear research focus, informed by the findings from the census and online 
survey.  One of the particular advantages of this format over that of the structured 
interview is that it allows people to respond more on their own terms (May 2001). 
In the final analysis, the best method is the one that not only provides the best fit to the 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŝŵƐ ?ďƵƚŝƐĂůƐŽƚŚĞďĞƐƚĞǆĞĐƵƚĞĚ ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŝŶŐŝƐĂ “ĐƌĂĨƚ ? which rests upon the 
practical skills and judgement of the interviewer, is difficult to do well, and learned through 
practice (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 17).  Interviews were chosen as the primary method 
for this study in large part because of my own extensive interview experience which I 
believe added significant value to the quality of the interviews and hence of the 
subsequent analysis. 
7.5 Issues and Limitations 
Qualitative interviews tend to rest on the epistemological assumption that individuals are 
privileged data sources about the social world (Mason 2002) ?dŚŝƐƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞŽŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞƐ ?
own narratives and perspectives is also a potential weakness of interviews as a research 
instrument.  Interview data permit the researcher to hear only what interviewees say they 
do (or the reality of the world they describe) rather than what they actually do (or how 
things really are) and may also overrate the importance of individual human agency 
(Mason 2002).  This argues for the value of methodological testing and the use of other 
forms of data which are less reliant on both words and self-report.  This one-dimensional 
aspect of interviews was mitigated in this study by the use of a mixed-methods research 
design in which data from the census, for example, provide a counterbalance to the 
ƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞŝŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŝŶŐŽŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ŽǁŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐĂŶĚŽŶǁŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĞǆƉƌĞƐƐĞĚŝŶ
words (Mason 2002). 
It was initially envisaged that the main potential pitfall associated with the use of 
interviews would be obtaining access and I had contingency plans in place to reduce the 
ƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐƌĞůŝĂŶĐĞŽŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĚĂƚĂŝĨŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?ƐŝƚƚƌĂŶƐƉŝƌĞĚ ?/ŚĂĚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵ P
many more interviews than I had anticipated.  This was highly beneficial to the study, but 
did increase fieldwork costs quite significantly.  
Clark (2010) suggests a number of reasons why people may choose to engage with 
qualitative research, including a subjective interest in the research topic and an 
introspective interest in talking about themselves and explaining their own ideas and 
Susan Shepherd                                               Chapter Four: Methodology and Research Design 
116 
 
feelings to an interested third party.  I found both to be evident for this study and I suspect 
that, particularly in the case of vice chancellors, there was an added element of vested 
interest in relation to finding out what is going on elsewhere in the sector and using this to 
inform future institutional appointment practice.   
ƌŐƵĂďůǇ ? “ƚŚĞďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐŽĐĐƵƌǁŝƚŚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐǁŚŽǁĂŶƚƚŽƐŚĂƌĞƚŚĞŝƌƐƚŽƌy and 
knowledge, and, ideally, the interview situation is a rewarding experience for them in and 
ŽĨŝƚƐĞůĨ ?(Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2006, p. 124).  This raises an interesting issue: the degree to 
ǁŚŝĐŚĂƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚ ?ƐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĞŶŐĂŐŝŶŐŝŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŵƉĂĐƚƚŚĞ “ƚǇƉĞĂŶĚƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨ
the research relationshiƉ ?ĂŶĚƐƵďƐĞƋƵĞŶƚůǇĂŶǇĚĂƚĂƚŚĂƚĞŵĞƌŐĞ ?(Clark, T. 2010, p. 416).  
It is therefore important to remember that participants may have their own agenda and are 
no more likely to be neutral than the interviewer. 
Since the researcher has no way of knowing whether what their participants say is true or 
matches their actual behaviour, the validity of an interview should rest on whether the 
ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?ƐĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŝƐĂĐĐƵƌĂƚĞĂŶĚďĂůĂŶĐĞĚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŐŝǀĞƐĂ “ƚƌƵĞ ?
picture of their participants (Gillham 2005).  And even if it is not a true reflection of their 
actual views, attitudes or behaviour, interview data may still be illuminative and valuable 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). 
/ŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌŝƐĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƚŚĞ “ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚ ?(Miller & 
Crabtree 2004, p. 196).  Interview data are mediated by the interviewer as well as the 
interviewee (May 2001), each of whom has their own motivations, limitations and 
assumptions.  There is always a risk of researchers imposing their own story through 
ŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĚĂƚĂĂŶĚƚŚĞǇŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨ “ƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŚŽǁ ?
ŽĨĚĂƚĂĐŽůůĞĐƚŝŽŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ǁŚĂƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĚĂƚĂĐŽůůĞĐƚĞĚ ?
(Gunasekara 2007, p. 465).  This places the onus on researchers to be reflexive, sensitive to 
the dynamic between themselves and their participants and the way in which their 
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8. Data Analysis 
8.1 Procedure 
/ŶĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?/ĂŝŵĞĚĨŽƌĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨ “ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?
whereby I could avoid being unnecessarily constrained by preconceived theory and retain 
ƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚƐĞŶƐŝƚŝǀŝƚǇĂŶĚƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůŝŶƐŝŐŚƚ “ƚŽƐĞĞďĞŶĞĂƚŚƚŚĞŽďǀŝŽƵƐƚŽ discover the 
ŶĞǁ ?(Strauss & Corbin 1998, p. 46). 
/ƚŝƐĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚƚŚĂƚĚĂƚĂĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĂ “ƐƵďũĞĐƚŝǀĞĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ
everything new we learn is understood in terms of what we already know, and thus is 
influenced by our own prior ideas and attitudes (Gillham 2005, p. 6).  There is a danger of a 
ƉƌŽũĞĐƚŝŽŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ?ŽǁŶƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉƌĞũƵĚŝĐĞƐŵĂǇĂĨĨĞĐƚ their 
interpretation of interview responses (Sarantakos 2005).  They therefore need to do the 
best possible job in interpreting the data and confirming it by other means, taking full 
account of the context in which it was produced and the inevitable researcher effect 
(Hammersley & Atkinson 2007). 
Accordingly, a process of reflexivity was employed in which my own assumptions and 
biases  W and the extent to which they affect the research process  W were critically examined 
(Hesse-Biber & Leavy 2006) ?dŚŝƐĐŽƵůĚďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ “ƌĞĨůĞǆŝǀĞŽďũĞĐƚŝǀŝƚǇ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
researchers strive for objectivity about how their own unavoidable prejudices, or 
subjectivity, have impacted on the production of knowledge (Kvale & Brinkmann 2009, p. 
242). 
I tried to view the data as a whole first and then identify broad themes and organise into 
topics. Techniques such as asking provocative questions, looking for outliers and possible 
sources of disconfirmation were employed as part of a process of subjecting my 
interpretation of data to constant scrutiny (Miles & Huberman 1994).  I also used 
dissemination activities, such as conference presentations and blogs, as an opportunity to 
gain feedback which helped to inform my own thinking and interpretation of the data. 
8.2 Rationale 
I considered but rejected the approach to data coding and analysis proposed by grounded 
theory methodology (Strauss & Corbin 1998) as both overly prescriptive and flawed.  I 
ďĞůŝĞǀĞŝƚĨĂŝůƐƚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ ?ƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŽĨĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ
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and sense making (Denscombe 2007) ĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞŝƌ “ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůďĂŐŐĂŐĞ ?ǁŝůů
ŝŶĞǀŝƚĂďůǇŚĂǀĞŽŶǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ ‘ƐĞĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĚĂƚĂ ?ƚŚƵƐĐĂƐƚŝŶŐĚŽƵďƚŽŶƚŚĞŽǀĞƌ-simplistic 
assertion that all concepts must be empirically grounded (Robson 2002).  In my view, the 
espoused grounded theory data coding and categorisation process represents a misguided 
attempt to systematise in a pseudo-scientific way an analytic process I believe to be 
essentially intuitive. 
As Kvale and Brinkmann argue, there are no standard or fixed methods to arrive at the 
meaning of what was said in an interview and the search for data analysis techniques may 
ďĞĂŵŝƐŐƵŝĚĞĚĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĨŽƌĨŝŶĚĂ “ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĨŝǆ ?ĨŽƌǁŚĂƚŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůůǇĚŽǁŶƚŽƚŚĞ
experience and the craftsmanship of the researcher (2009, p. 192).  Ironically, It is probably 
for this latter reason that the label grounded theory is sometimes utilised by researchers 
who do not fully follow its methodology in an attempt to provide an appearance of rigour 
ŽƌƚŽŐĂŝŶƐŽŵĞƐƚĂŵƉŽĨ “ƉŽƐŝƚŝǀŝƐƚĂƉƉƌŽǀĂů ?(Charmaz 2005).  So, whilst I have been 
inspired by grounded theory to place empirical work at the heart of my study and to seek 
to generate theory  W in the form of explanation, insight, enhanced understanding and a 
meaningful guide to action (Strauss & Corbin 1998)  W I do not accept that this will be theory 
that is solely grounded in the data. 
 
9. Ethical Considerations 
dŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĞĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨ<ĞŶƚ ?Ɛ^ŽĐŝĂů^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
Ethics Advisory Group for Human Participants and was undertaken in accordance with the 
^Z ?ƐFramework for Research Ethics.  My fundamental ethical stance was not one of 
compliance, however.  Rather than rely solely on ethics codes and committees, I took 
personal responsibility for ethical issues (Gregory 2003) and for maintaining the 
transparency, impartiality and integrity of my research. 
I made strenuous efforts to maintain the implicit contract between myself as researcher 
and the research participants, that is, openness in return for anonymity.  By anonymity I 
mean that there is no link between the presentation of the data and the person who 
provided it (Ruane 2005).  Ideally, there should be reciprocity between what participants 
give and what they get from the research process (Cohen, L., Manion & Morrison 2000).  
Interviews can be a rewarding experience for those who wish to share their story (Hesse-
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Biber & Leavy 2006) or to inform research which might be of value to themselves or others.  
But researchers need to weigh the importance of the research project against its potential 
for harm. 
The main risk to participants identified in this study was that of accidental disclosure.  This 
study collected sensitive data from participants concerning, for example, their job 
applications and aspirations.  They are therefore subject to the potential for personal 
embarrassment  W and possibly more serious career implications  W if accidental disclosure of 
their identity should occur during the conduct or writing up of the research.  This is of 
particular concern for this study population since they are a small elite group, in many 
cases well known to each other. 
The following measures were taken to mitigate this risk in those phases of the study 
involving human participants: 
Online survey: Personal data provided by survey respondents has been used only for data 
management and analysis purposes.  Published findings in whatever form have been, and 
will continue to be, anonymised and no data individually or institutionally attributed.  Free 
text comments have been edited to ensure that respondents cannot be identified. 
Semi-structured interviews:  Interview summaries, using respondent codes rather than 
names, were produced based on my interview notes.  Participants were offered the 
opportunity to review the summary of their interview and to amend any content they felt 
may identify them (by, for example, reference to a specific incident or event which may be 
recognisable to colleagues).  The researcŚĞƌ ?ƐŽƌŝŐŝŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŶŽƚĞƐǁĞƌĞƚŚĞŶĚĞƐƚƌŽǇĞĚ ?
Caution was exercised in the writing up process in order to avoid inadvertent disclosure of 
ĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ƐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƐƚ ƚƵƚŝŽŶŝƐƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĂďůĞ ? 
The informed consent form (Appendix H) sets out the procedures that were followed in 
relation to the responsible handling of data, the maintenance of confidentiality and 
anonymity, and the avoidance of harm or detriment to participants.  No disclosure of 
personal information has been, or will be, made to a third party without the permission of 
the participant concerned unless required by law.  Participants are able to view personal 
data held on them upon request. 
For ethical reasons, only research participants who were not close colleagues were 
included in the study. 




This is a qualitative study which has its philosophical roots in a constructivist ontology and 
an interpretivist epistemology.  It utilises a mixed-methods design, comprising both 
 ‘ƋƵĂŶƚŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŵĞthods, in support of an essentially qualitative purpose.  
The choice of methods was based on a pragmatic assessment of how well they would work 
in answering a specific research question.  The census and online survey allowed me to 
establish the macro aspects of the phenomenon whilst the interviews provided a means of 
exploring the micro level, lived experience and perspectives of my research participants. 
Although it draws on the ideas of Glaser and Strauss (1967) in relation to sociological 
theory, the study does not employ a grounded theory methodology per se.  It is, however, 
broadly inductive and theory generating in its approach and seeks research outcomes that 
are grounded in rich, multi-dimensional empirical data, yet that also reflect my own 
experience and ideas. 
The whole study was underpinned by a commitment to accurately and fairly represent the 
perspectives and views of my research participants and to preserve their anonymity.  The 
respondent validation process was one important means of fulfilling this commitment, as 
was my reflexive approach to data analysis and interpretation.  Taken together, these 
strategies ensured that the research was conducted with integrity and mindful of the need 
to avoid harm to my research participants. 
The response rate for the interviews was extremely high and is testament to the perceived 
importance of the study within the sector.  Moreover, the fact that almost half the target 
study population participated in the interviews lends weight and credence to the findings.  
These are presented in the following chapter.







The research findings are presented in this and the following two chapters, organised 
thematically by research question.  Data in relation to the first two empirical research 
questions are given without commentary in this chapter.   These are then discussed and 
analysed in Chapters Six and Seven as part of the consideration of the final three analytical 
and theoretical research questions.   
This chapter opens by establishing the nature and extent of change to the DPVC 
appointment model, i.e. the means and terms of appointment and role construction 
(Section 2).  It then turns to presenting the evidence in answer to the empirical research 
questions.  Section 3 examines the case for change (Q.1), with an emphasis on the 
perspective of vice chancellors as the main change agents.  Section 4 outlines the profile of 
serving DPVCs and the impact of changed appointment practice upon it (Q.2a).  Sections 5 
and 6 then present the data on the consequences of change for the careers and aspirations 
of DPVCs and third tier managers respectively (Q.2 b and c).   
The overall approach taken to the writing up of interview findings is to present exemplars 
that are illustrative of the sample population.  Short verbatim quotations are used 
wherever possible in order to give a direct voice to research participants.  In general, 
quotations have been selected on the basis that they are representative of commonly held 
views.  However, they are sometimes used to illustrate exceptions to the main body of 
opinion and, where this is the case, it is indicated in the text.  
In order to prevent accidental disclosure of the identity of research participants, minimal 
attribution of quotations is given.  The following abbreviations are used to denote different 
types of participant: VC (vice chancellor); DPVC (deputy or pro vice chancellor); R (registrar); 
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Dean/HOD (dean or head of department/school); PSM (professional services manager) and 
ESA (executive search agent).  The number that follows each quotation is the assigned 
interview code for that individual.  Inclusion of these code numbers evidences the 
ƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂǁŝĚĞƌĂŶŐĞŽĨĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ‘ǀŽŝĐĞƐ ? ?
 
2. Nature and Extent of Change  
This section presents empirical evidence to support the fundamental premise of this thesis 
that the DPVC appointment model is changing in pre-1992 English universities.  Data from 
the interviews, census and updated advertisement monitoring exercise
41
 are utilised to 
illustrate the nature and extent of this change. 
2.1 Means of Appointment 
The trend towards an external open competition means of DPVC appointment in English 
pre-1992 universities (Shepherd 2011) is continuing.  Pre-1992 universities accounted for 
39% of DPVC posts advertised by all English universities
42
 between January 2006 and 
December 2013, placing 112 of the 288 advertisements.  Thirty three of 45 (73%) pre-1992 
universities externally advertised at least one DPVC post during this eight-year period, with 
an average of 3.4 posts per advertising institution.  Details of DPVC advertisements are 
attached for reference as Appendix K.  
The number of pre-1992 universities placing a DPVC advert has been growing year on year, 
with four institutions advertising a DPVC post, or posts, for the first time in 2013 (Brunel, 
LSE, Reading and SOAS).  However, only four of the 33 advertising institutions have 
adopted a model of external open competition for all their DPVC posts.  The large majority 
employ a mixed model of internal and external appointments, with the result that within 
the same executive management team there are DPVCs who have been appointed by 
different means.  This reflects that fact that vice chancellors ? decisions on appointment 
method tend to be made on a pragmatic, case-by-case basis rather than as a matter of 
policy. 
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĚŽŐŵĂƚŝƐŵ ? ?(VC 14) 
                                                          
41
 This exercise was initially undertaken for my MA dissertation (Shepherd 2011) and subsequently 
extended for this doctoral study (Chapter Four, 5.2).   
42
 This has not been a stable population over the period, but currently stands at 98 (Universities UK).  
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Only 12 pre-1992 universities (27%) utilise an internal-only appointment process for all 
DPVC posts.   
The use of executive search agencies for DPVC posts is now commonplace, though has not 
yet reached the virtually universal level (98%) for vice chancellor appointments.  Executive 
search agencies are employed in 61% of cases where a DPVC post is externally advertised 
and pre-1992 universities are just as likely as their post-1992 counterparts to use them.  
There are four big players in the DPVC executive search market
43
, who between them 
account for 84% of DPVC posts within pre-1992 universities.  Perrett Laver is the clear 
market leader and is involved in almost half (48%) of externally advertised DPVC 
appointments.  
2.2 Terms of Appointment 
In most cases being a DPVC is now a full-time job, though some retain a notional time 
allocation for research - typically one day a week.  The majority of DPVCs undertake the 
role on a fixed-term basis for between three and five years (usually renewable for a second 
term by mutual agreement) with an underlying open-ended academic contract.  This 
remains the normal basis of employment for DPVCs regardless of their means of 
appointment.  There are a few examples of DPVCs appointed to the role on an open-ended 
contract, though they remain in the minority.   
Vice chancellors expressed strong views both for and against permanent DPVC 
appointments.  The minority of vice chancellors in favour suggest that people respond 
differently to the job if it is permanent, with permanent DPVCs thought to be more willing 
to make decisions and be more accountable for them in the long term (VC 2).  Moreover, a 
permanent appointment is perceived as sending a message: 
 “zŽƵĂƌĞĐůĞĂƌůǇƐĂǇŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚŝƐŝƐĂůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?(PSM 5) 
Making the positions open ended is seen as an important signal of the increasing 
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĞũŽďƐŶŽƚƌŽůĞƐ ? P 
 “/ĨǇŽƵǁĂŶƚƚŽĚŽŝƚƉƌŽƉĞƌůǇ ?ŐŝǀĞŽƉĞŶ-ĞŶĚĞĚĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚƐ ? ?(VC 16) 
                                                          
43
 These are Perrett Laver, Heidrick & Struggles, Harvey Nash and Saxton Bampfylde.  Odgers 
Berndtson is also a major player in the wider higher education executive search market. 
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Whereas open-ended contracts signify a permanent management cadre (VC 19), fixed-term 
contracts have a symbolic importance in maintaining the notion that DPVCs are academics 
who will return to the ranks (DPVC 12).    
 “dŚĞƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞŽĨWsƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĂĨŝǆĞĚ-term role is very important and making them 
ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚǁŽƵůĚĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞƋƵŝƚĞĚƌĂŵĂƚŝĐĂůůǇ ? ? ?Z ? ? 
Most vice chancellors prefer fixed-ƚĞƌŵWsĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƐĂŝĚƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ “Ă
ŶĂƚƵƌĂůďƌĞĂŬƉŽŝŶƚ ? ?s ? ? ? ?ŽĨĨĞƌĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ “ƌĞĨƌĞƐŚƌŽůĞƐĂŶĚďƌŝŶŐŝŶŶĞǁŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚ
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ? ?s ? ? ?ĂŶĚ “ƚƌŝŐŐĞƌĂƌĞǀŝĞǁ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƵƐĞĨƵůĨŽƌďŽƚŚƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůĂŶĚƚŚĞ
institution (VC 12).  The downsides are that good DPVCs have a limited term, although one 
ŽƌƚǁŽǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌƵůĞƐĐĂŶďĞ “ĨŝĚĚůĞĚĂďŝƚ ?ŝĨŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇ ?s19).  
The DPVC term also has a bearing on the attractiveness of the job for some external 
candidates. 
 “^ŽŵĞƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞŚĂƉƉǇƚŽǁŽƌŬŽŶƐŚŽƌƚ-term contracts, but I would like more 
ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ? ?(DPVC 12) 
 “/ĨŵǇƚĞƌŵŚĂĚďĞĞŶĨŝǆĞĚƚĞƌŵ ?/ŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞŵŽǀĞĚ ? ?(DPVC 17) 
For many vice chancellors, however, the term of appointment is considered an irrelevance 
in practice since high-achieving DPVCs are likely to move on to other roles and under-
performing ones have to be dealt with regardless of whether or not they are on open-
ended or fixed-term contracts. 
 “/ ?ŵŶŽƚƚĞƌƌŝďůǇĨƵƐƐĞĚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵŽĨƚŚĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚ ?/ĨƐŽŵĞŽŶĞŝƐŶŽƚ
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞǁĂǇƐŽĨĚĞĂůŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƚŚĂƚ ? ?(VC 18) 
 “/ĨĂŶĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚǁĞƌĞƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƚŝĐǇŽƵǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚŝƚǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝt 
ǁĞƌĞĨŝǆĞĚƚĞƌŵŽƌŶŽƚ ? ?(VC 2) 
2.3 Role Construction  
There have been four main changes to the construction of the DPVC role during the eight-
year period from 2005 to 2013.  Firstly, the stretching of the second tier of management 
observed by Smith et al (2007) has become more prevalent as the number of DVCs with a 
distinct and more senior role to that of PVCs has grown.  In 2005, the executive 
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management team in most pre-1992 universities (25 of 42, or 59%
44
) comprised an 
apparently undifferentiated group of DPVCs.  By August 2013, however, the majority of 
institutions (33 of 45, or 73%) had both PVCs and one or more DVCs.  In a few cases, this 
reflects a move to a president and provost executive management model. 
Secondly, an entirely new type of DPVC has emerged: the DPVC/Dean, typically combining 
a cross-institution policy role with the executive management of a faculty.  According to the 
2006 ACU Yearbook, there were no such posts in 2005 but by 2013 there were 40 
DPVC/Deans, 18% of the entire DPVC cohort.  Twelve of the 45 pre-1992 universities have 
at least one DPVC/Dean.   Thirdly, there is evidence from both university websites and 
interview data to suggest that some DPVCs are assuming executive management 
responsibilities for professional services functions in a management model more akin to 
that found in the post-1992 sector ?dŚŝƐƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĞŵƉŝƌŝĐĂůĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨDŝĚĚůĞŚƵƌƐƚ ?Ɛ
recent observation that some DPVCs are taking over line management responsibilities from 
registrars (2013).  Fourthly, an examination of job titles reveals that the range of portfolios 
for which DPVCs now have responsibility has continued to grow well beyond the traditional 
ones of research and teaching and learning (Shepherd 2014a).  For example, in the 2013 
cohort there are DPVCs with portfolios for internationalisation, student experience, 
enterprise and engagement, development and external relations.  
Taken together these findings evidence the fact that traditional DPVCs with cross-
institutional policy responsibilities are being supplemented by new more executive variants 
of the role, often with significant budgetary and/or line management responsibilities.  
Policy and executive DPVCs often sit side by side on the same team or, in the case of 
DPVC/Deans, the two activities may be incorporated within a single post.   
The distinction between types of DPVC may extend to the means and terms of their 
appointment.  Policy DPVCs are more typically on internal secondment while executive 
DPVCs are somewhat more likely to have been appointed by means of external open 
competition.  There are also implications for salary levels given that a number of vice 
chancellors indicated the move to an external appointment model has acted as a salary 
escalator.  Those securing a DPVC role by this route may therefore be more highly 
remunerated than those on internal secondment.  It is worth noting at this point that the 
higher recruitment and salary costs incurred as a result of an external appointment process 
                                                          
44
 2005 data was only available for 42 of the 45 pre-1992 universities. 
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are seen as a disadvantage of this method compared to internal secondment.  However, for 
many vice chancellors this is a price worth paying to secure the right candidate.   
 
3. The Case for Change  
This section addresses the first research question regarding the case for change to the 
DPVC appointment model.  It summarises the main arguments advanced by interview 
participants, presented in order of perceived importance.  Taken together, these are 
indicative of a deficit case for change, typically initiated as a means of solving a perceived 
ƉƌŽďůĞŵŽƌŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƐƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ? 
3.1 Securing the Best Candidates 
The primary motivation for vice chancellors to adopt an external open competition 
appointment model for one or more of their DPVC positions is a desire to secure the best 
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĨŽƌƚŚĞũŽď ?dŚŝƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŝƐĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇŽŶĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌĂƐ “ĂƋƵĞƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞ
ďĞƐƚ ? ?s ? ? ?ĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇ ?ƚŚĞďĂƌĂƉƉĞĂƌƐƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐĞƚǀĞƌǇŚŝŐŚ ? 
 “tĞĚŽǁĂŶƚƚŚĞǀĞƌǇ ?ǀĞƌǇďĞƐƚ ? ? ?s ? ? 
 “/ĨƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽƚƚŚĞďĞƐƚŝŶƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?ƚŚĞǇǁŝůůŶŽƚŐĞƚƚŚĞũŽď ? ? ?s ? ?   
Vice chancellors point to a number of reasons why only the best candidates will do.  Firstly, 
the DPVC role has become more complex and demanding.   
 “tŚĂƚ ?ƐďĞŝŶŐĂƐŬĞĚŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐŝƐƌĂĚŝĐĂůůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞũƵƐƚŶŽƚƚŚĞ
ƐĂŵĞƌŽůĞƐ ? ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ? 
ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚĞĂŵŵĞŵďĞƌƐŶŽǁŚĂǀĞ “ƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚĂƌĞ
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ “ƚŽĚƌŝǀĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?s ? ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐŵŽƌĞŽŶĂWs ?ƐĂŐĞŶĚĂĂŶĚ “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ
ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞƚŽĚŽŵŽƌĞǁŝƚŚůĞƐƐĂŶĚƋƵŝĐŬĞƌ ?ƐŽ “ǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚƚŽƚĂŬĞƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽ ?ůůďĞ
learŶŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞũŽď ? ?s ? ? ? ?ƐƚŚĞĚĞŵĂŶĚƐŽĨƚŚĞƉŽƐƚŐƌŽǁ ?ƐŽĚŽƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨ
post holders.   
Secondly, though not all vice chancellors agree, the DPVC role is generally viewed as having 
become more important.   At any rate, the role is being taken more seriously and it is 
acknowledged that a good appointment can make a real difference for the better, and vice 
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versa (Dean/HOD 1).  Given the increased demands and expectations of the role, DPVCs are 
now seen as  “ŚŝŐŚƌŝƐŬĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ĨŽƌƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞs (Dean/HOD 2) and considered by 
ŵĂŶǇƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐĂƐ “ƚŽŽŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽůĞĂǀĞƚŽƚŚĞǀĂŐĂƌŝĞƐŽĨǁŚŽŝƐĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůůǇ ?
(Dean/HOD 1).    
 “WsŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞŶŽǁŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞĞǆƉŽƐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŵƵĐŚŚŝŐŚĞƌůĞǀĞů
of risk and so the appointment proceƐƐŚĂƐƚŽďĞĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ? ? ?Ws ? ? ? 
Thirdly, marketisation and the move from a collegial to a more corporate organisational 
ŵŽĚĞů “ǁŝƚŚƉŽǁĞƌĂƚƚŚĞƚŽƉ ? ?s ? ? ? ?ĂƌĞŚĂǀŝŶŐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞĐƌƵŝƚ
high calibre DPVCs.  For many participants the change to an external open competition 
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŵŽĚĞůĐĂŶďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ “ĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞŽĨĂǁŚŽůĞƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞƐŝŶ
, ?ŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?s ? ? ?ĂŶĚĂƐ “ĂƐǇŵƉƚŽŵŽĨƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŵƵĐŚĚĞĞƉĞƌƚŚĂƚ ?Ɛ
ŚĂƉƉĞŶŝŶŐŝŶ, ? ?s ? ? ? ?
 “hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ĂƌĞŵŽƌĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐƚ ?and  “ƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌŝƐƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŝŶŐĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŬŝŶĚ
ŽĨƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ŵŽƌĞƐƵŝƚĞĚƚŽǁŚĂƚŝƐŶĞĞĚĞĚŶŽǁ ? ? ?Ws ? ? 
In a highly competitive market, universities must be well managed  W and recruit people 
ĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ “ĐĂŶ ?ƚĂĨĨŽƌĚƚŽĨĂŝů ?ĂŶĚŶĞĞĚŐŽŽĚƉĞŽƉůĞ ?s ? ? ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐƚŚƵƐ
 “ĂŶĞǀĞƌŵŽƌĞŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚƐĞĂƌĐŚĨŽƌŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƐŬŝůůƐ ? ?s ? ? ? ? 
 “dŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐŵŽƌĞĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚƚŽƐƵĐĐĞĞĚǇŽƵŶĞĞĚǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚsƐĂŶĚ
WsƐ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
A number of vice chancellors refer to universities as ďŝŐďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ĐĂŶ ?ƚďĞƌƵŶŝŶĂŶ
ĂŵĂƚĞƵƌǁĂǇ ? ?s ? ? ? ?KŶĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐƚŚ ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƐĞĐŽŶĚŵĞŶƚWs
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŵŽĚĞůĂƐ “ĂĐŽŵŵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŽĂŵĂƚĞƵƌŝƐŵ ?ĂŶĚ “ƚŚĞĐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞĂŵĂƚĞƵƌ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂĚƚŽŐŝǀĞǁĂǇƚŽ “Ăprofessionalisation ŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?s ? ? ? ?
Meanwhile, one registrar views it as: 
 “ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůƌĞůŝĐĨƌŽŵĂƚŝŵĞǁŚĞŶƉĞŽƉůĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽĚŽƚŚĞƐĞũŽďƐĂŶĚǁŚĞŶ
management and leadership were ŶŽƚƚĂŬĞŶǀĞƌǇƐĞƌŝŽƵƐůǇ ? ? ?Z ? ? 
Many interviewees suggested that universities  “ĐĂŶŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌĂĨĨŽƌĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌ
ƚŚĂŶƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ĂŶĚŶĞĞĚƚŽůŽŽŬŽƵƚƐŝĚĞĨŽƌƚĂůĞŶƚ ?Ws ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐ
particularly the case where an institution is judged to be underperforming and/or where 
the vice chancellor has instituted a ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƚŽŝŵƉƌŽǀĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?s ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐƉůĂĐĞƐ “Ă
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞ ?ŽŶƚŚĞŝŶĐŽŵŝŶŐWs ?s ? ? ? 
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In order to appoint such high-calibre individuals, vice chancellors say they must be able to 
select from the widest possible pool of candidates and this can only be achieved by 
opening up the positions to external competition. 
 “dŚĞůŽŐŝĐǁĂƐƚŽŐĞƚƚŽƚŚĞďĞƐƚĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐƚŽŐĞƚƚŚĞďĞƐƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
 “dŚĞǁŚŽůĞƚŚƌƵƐƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƚŽĂƚƚƌĂĐƚƚŚĞďĞƐƚĐĂůŝďƌĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĨƌŽŵƚŚĞďĞƐƚƉŽŽůŽĨ
aƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚƐ ? ? ?Ws ? ? 
3.2 Plugging a Skills Gap 
The decision to externally advertise a given DPVC post is generally made in cases where the 
vice chancellor believes there to be no, or too few, suitably qualified internal candidates.   
 “dŽƚĂŬĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƌĂƚĞŝŶƚĞƌnal candidates to avoid going out to external competition 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞǁƌŽŶŐ ? ? ?W^D ? ? 
  “/ƚ ?ƐĂůůĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŵĂƚĐŚďĞƚǁĞĞŶǁŚĂƚǁĞŶĞĞĚĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ
ĂƚƚŚĂƚƉŽŝŶƚŝŶƚŝŵĞ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
For two or three vice chancellors, the size of their institutions is seen as a limiting factor. 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂďŝƚůĞƐƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽŐƌŽǁǇŽƵƌŽǁŶŝŶĂƐŵĂůůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
However, for most vice chancellors the issue is more one of quality than quantity.  For 
example, one describes his university as having  “ĂƉĂƵĐŝƚǇŽĨƚĂůĞŶƚ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚǁŝƚŚ “ŶŽƚŵƵĐŚĂƉƉĞƚŝƚĞĨŽƌďĞŝŶŐĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ŝŶǁŚĂƚŝƐĂ “ĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ-to-
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?s ? ? ? ? 
The need to address a perceived skills gap is thus a key driver of change.  
 “dŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐsƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚŚĞ ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƐŽůǀĞƚŚĞƉƌŽďůĞŵƐŚĞƌĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƉĞŽƉůĞ
ŚĞŚĂĚ ? ? ?Ws ? ? 
3.3 Testing Internal Candidates 
Even where there are strong internal candidates, many vice chancellors believe that it is 
still important to open up the posts to external competition in order to test internal staff 
ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞĨŝĞůĚ ?ŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ “ƉƵƚƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂŶĚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ
ƵƉŽŶƚŚĞƐĂŵĞďĂƐŝƐƐŽƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĐĂŶĐŽŵƉĂƌĞŽŶĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌ ? ?s ? ? ? ? 
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DĂŬŝŶŐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĐŽŵƉĞƚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ “ƚŚĞďĞƐƚĂǀĂŝůĂďůĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ? ?s ? ?ŝƐƐĞĞŶ
as a good thing not only for the institution, but also for the candidates themselves.  This is 
ďĞĐĂƵƐĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚǀŝĂĂĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝƐƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ “ƚŽǀĂůŝĚĂƚĞƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůǁŚŽ
ĐŽŵĞƐŝŶ ? ?s ? ? ? 
 “dŚĞƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶĐǇŽĨƚŚĞĞǆternal recruitment process helps internal candidates to 
ŐĞƚƚŚĞĞƐƚĞĞŵŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉĞĞƌƐ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
This view is echoed by many DPVCs appointed via an external open competition process 
ǁŚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĂƚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞũŽďŝŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇŐŝǀĞƐƚŚĞŵ “ŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ “ŵŽƌĞŽĨ
ĂŵĂŶĚĂƚĞ ? ?Ws ? ? ? 
 “KƉĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚĞŶƐƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐĂƐƉĞŽƉůĞ
ŬŶŽǁƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŶ ?ƚũƵƐƚďĞĞŶŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞŶŽĚ ? ? ?Ws ? ? ? 
Another factor in the decision to make internal candidates apply via external open 
coŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŝƐǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?ĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĂƉƉŽŝŶƚWsƐǁŚŽĂƌĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞ
that they really want the job.   
  “tĞǁĂŶƚƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽƉƵƚƚŚĞŝƌŚĞĂĚƐĂďŽǀĞƚŚĞƉĂƌĂƉĞƚ ? ?s ? ? ? ? 
3.4 ǲǳ 
Although an external open competition process does not necessarily lead to the 
appointment of someone from outside the institution, a desire to bring in an external is a 
key driver of change for many vice chancellors.   
In a competitive higher education market, experience in another institution has become 
ŵŽƌĞǀĂůƵĂďůĞĂŶĚ “ƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůǀĞƌƐƵƐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŚĂƐƐŚŝĨƚĞĚ ?
 ?s ? ? ? ?KŶĞƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚ “ƌĞůǇŝŶŐŽŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƚĂůĞŶƚŝƐĂŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ?ĂŶĚĂĚǀŝƐĞƐ
people seeking the most senior posts to leave their institution to gain experience 
ĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?Z ? ? ?ŶŽƚŚĞƌĂŐƌĞĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ƐƉĞŶĚŝŶŐƚŝŵĞŝŶŽƚŚĞƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐŝƐĂŐŽŽĚƚŚŝŶŐ ?
(R 6). 
External appointees are seen as bringing fresh ideas and perspectives from elsewhere and 
ŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐ “ƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽůŽŽŬĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶǀŝĂĂƐůŝŐŚƚůǇĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚůĞŶƐ ? ?s ? ? ?dŚĞǇ
also permit the challenge of prevailing ideas, something ĚĞĞŵĞĚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĂƐ “ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ
ŶĞĞĚƚŽƚŚŝŶŬĨŽƌǁĂƌĚƐ ?ŶŽƚďĂĐŬǁĂƌĚƐ ? ?Ws ? ? ?
 “/ǁĂŶƚWsƐǁŚŽǁŝůůĨŽƌĐĞƵƐƚŽƚŚŝŶŬƚŚƌŽƵŐŚǁŚĂƚǁĞ ?ƌĞĚŽŝŶŐ ? ? ?s ? ? 
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In some cases, it is considered necessary to make external appointments in order to bring 
ŝŶĨƌĞƐŚďůŽŽĚĂŶĚĂǀŽŝĚ “ŐŽŝŶŐƐƚĂůĞ ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚƌƵĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ
institution is seen as too introspective or where there are long-serving executive 
management team members.   
 “/ƚ ?ƐƚŽŽŝŶǁĂƌĚůŽŽŬŝŶŐƚŽŚĂǀĞƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƉŽƐƚƚŽŽůŽŶŐ ? ?Z ? ?
However, some DPVCs point to the potential dangers of exclusively appointing external 
candidates. 
 “tŚĂƚǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚŝƐĂŶĞŶƚŝƌĞ^Dd ?ƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚĞĂm] imposed as an 
ĂůŝĞŶĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ? ?Ws ? ? 
 “/ƚŝƐŐŽŽĚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂŵŝǆƚƵƌĞŽĨŶĞǁďůŽŽĚĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŐƌĂƐƐ
ƌŽŽƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ? ?Ws ? ? ? 
3.5 Driving Change 
Vice chancellors may advertise DPVC posts with the specific aim of appointing an external 
candidate when they are looking for someone to drive forward a change agenda.  In such 
cases, they are likely to judge that someone from outside the organisation may be better 
suited to the task.   
 “/ĨǇŽƵǁĂŶƚƚŽďƌĞĂŬƚŚĞŵŽƵůĚ ?ĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉĞƌƐŽŶ W however good  W would 
ƉƌŽďĂďůǇŶŽƚǁŽƌŬ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
sŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐŵĂǇƐĞĞƚŚŝŶŐƐƚŚĂƚŶĞĞĚĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐďƵƚ “ĨŝŶĚŝƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĞĨĨĞĐƚĐŚĂŶŐĞŝŶ
an established, settled envŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞĚďǇŝŶĞƌƚŝĂ ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ? 
 “zŽƵŵƵƐƚŬŶŽǁǁŚĂƚǇŽƵǁĂŶƚ ?/ĨĂďŝƚŽĨƚŚĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐĨĂŝůŝŶŐ ?ǇŽƵŵŝŐŚƚ
ŶĞĞĚŶĞǁďůŽŽĚ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
Internal candidates may be considered as having vested interests or as resistant to change. 
Moreover, where underperformance is an issue, internal candidates are sometimes viewed 
as part of the problem. 
 “dŚŽƐĞƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽǁĂŶƚƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽƚĞŶĚƚŽďĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ?s ? ? 
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3.6 Other Factors 
Whilst most vice chancellors are focused on widening the applicant pool in order to secure 
the best candidates, a few also specifically mention increased diversity as a goal.  Those 
who acknowledge that their current executive management team is not sufficiently diverse 
believe that external open coŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ “ŚĂƐĂďĞƚƚĞƌĐŚĂŶĐĞŽĨƌĞĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝŵďĂůĂŶĐĞ ?
 ?s ? ?ĂŶĚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐĐĂŶďƌŝŶŐĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ “ŝŶĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƐǁĞůůĂƐ
ƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůƉƌŽĨŝůĞ ? ?s ? ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐĂƌĞĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶƋƵĂůŝƚǇ
rather than diversity as a driver of change.   
For a few, adopting an external open competition model is simply a matter of bringing 
appointment practice for DPVCs into line with that for other university staff.  Since external 
recruitment is the norm for most other posts in the institution, one vice chancellor 
questions why it should be different at a more senior level (VC 5).  There is also a 
compliance aspect to the change, whereby a move to an external open competition model 
is viewed as a means of demonstrating to members of the governing body that the 
ĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐĂƌĞŝŶƉůĂĐĞ ?KŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚŚŝƐǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ ?Ɛ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽƵŶĚĞƌƚĂŬĞ “ĂŶŽƉĞŶĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ?ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŽƉĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂƐ
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚŝŶƉĂƌƚďǇĂĚĞƐŝƌĞ “ƚŽďĞƐĞĞŶƚŽ ďĞĚŽŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?W^D ? ? ? 
 “dŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŽƌĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŵĞƚŚŽĚŝƐĂƐŵƵĐŚŽĨĂ
political judgement as anything else  W ŝƚĐĂŶďĞƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůǇĞĂƐŝĞƌƚŽŐŽĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ? ? 
(VC 13) 
/ŶƐŽŵĞĐĂƐĞƐƚŚĞƌĞŵĂǇďĞĂŶĞůĞŵĞŶƚŽĨ “ĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐƚƌĞŶĚƐ ?ŽƌĂŶ “ŽƚŚĞƌƉůĂĐĞƐĂƌĞĚŽŝŶŐ
ŝƚƐŽŵĂǇďĞǁĞƐŚŽƵůĚĚŽŝƚ ?ƚǇƉĞŽĨŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇ ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ?KŶĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
director who came from the public sector suggests that the appointment process in higher 
education is quite naïve and that universities tend to follow the pattern of what others are 
doing (PSM 1).  Even though, perhaps unsurprisingly, vice chancellors do not mention 
following trends as a decision-making factor, over half (55%) of third tier managers 
surveyed agree with the proposition that following the example of peer institutions is a 
likely motivation for change.  
3.7 Vice Chancellors as Change Agents 
Whereas chairs of university governing bodies are responsible for the hiring and firing of 
the vice chancellor, it appears they are generally less heavily involved in DPVC 
appointments.  That is not to say that they do not take a keen interest in proceedings: a 
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member of council usually sits on the appointment panel and it has to ratify the 
appointment and salary level.  Nevertheless ?ŝƚŝƐǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐǁŚŽ “ĐĂůůƚŚĞƐŚŽƚƐ ?
(DPVC 7) in the appointment of DPVCs, in terms both of the choice of appointment method 
and of the successful candidate.   
 “EŽĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞǁŝůůďĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞs ?/ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ
changed WsĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞŝĨ/ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŝƚǁĂƐŶŽƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ? ?s ? ? 
ZŝŐŚƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŽƵƚƐĞƚŽŶĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐĂǇƐŚĞǁĂƐ “ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚƚŚĂƚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐĞŶŝŽƌ
ƚĞĂŵǁĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŵĞĂŶĚ/ǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŚĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨĐŽƵŶĐŝůƚŽĚŽŝƚ ? ?s ? ? ? ?dŚĞ
expectation ŝƐƚŚĂƚŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐďŽĚǇ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽƚŚĞƐĞŶĂƚĞ ?ǁŝůů “ŐŽĂůŽŶŐǁŝƚŚ ?
ƚŚĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ ?ƐĐŚŽŝĐĞŽĨWs ?Z ? ? ? 
 “dŚĞĐŚŝĞĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŶĞĞĚƐƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƚĞĂŵŚĞǁĂŶƚƐ ?dŚĞsĐĂŶƵůƚŝŵĂƚely do 
ǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇůŝŬĞ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
The over-riding view of vice ĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ “ŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĨŝŶĂůƐĂǇ ?ŽǀĞƌǁŚŽŝƐŝŶ
the team because it is they who are accountable for the delivery of the institutional 
strategy (VC 1).   
 “/ƚŝƐŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƌƵŶĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶďǇŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŐƌŽƵƉǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĂƚŐƌŽƵƉŝƐ
not shaped, or where people on it are not aligned to what the institution is trying to 
ĚŽ ? ? ?s ? ? 
Not surprisingly, vice chancellors are looking for people they can work with and trust. 
 “A VC understandably wants his45 ŽǁŶƚĞĂŵ ? ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? 
 “WĞƌƐŽŶĂůĐŚĞŵŝƐƚƌǇŝƐĂůƐŽŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ ? ? ?Ws ? ? 
/ƚŝƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨsƐǁŝůůďĞŬĞĞŶĞƌƚŽƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůůǇ ? ?s ? ? ?
ŝŶŽƌĚĞƌ “ƚŽƉƵƚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƐƚĂŵƉŽŶƚŚŝŶŐƐĂŶĚĂƉƉŽŝŶƚƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚĞǇƚƌƵƐƚ ? ?Ws ? ? ?
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƐĞŶƐĞŝŶǁŚŝĐŚǇŽƵĂƌĞƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĞůƐĞ ?ƐƚĞĂŵŝĨǇŽƵĂƌĞŝŶŚĞƌŝƚĞĚďǇĂ
ŶĞǁs ? ? ?Ws ? ? 
                                                          
45
 It is noticeable how often participants refer to a vice chancellor as being male, even when talking 
in generic terms rather than about a specific individual.  Perhaps this is not surprising given the 
preponderance of male vice chancellors not only amongst research participants (89.5%), but also the 
entire study population (90%). 
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Moreover, one DPVC suggested that a new vice chancellor may be more comfortable 
recruiting someone from outside who does not have an internal power base (DPVC 2).   
A tendency for incoming vice chancellors to change the incumbent executive management 
ƚĞĂŵŝƐŶŽƚĞĚďǇƐŽŵĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?KŶĞWsƐĂǇƐŚŝƐƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ “ǁĞŶƚ
ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƚĞĂŵ ?ĐŚŽŽƐŝŶŐƚŚŽƐĞƚŽŬĞĞƉĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞƚŽŐŽ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚĂŶƵŵďĞƌ
of vice chancellors describe how they have made changes to their own team, most suggest 
it is a mistake to do this straight away.  
 “/ƚǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƐĞŶƚŽƵƚƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐŵĞƐƐĂŐĞƚŽƐƚĂĨĨ ?and  “ŝŵƉůǇĂŶŝŵŵĞĚŝĂƚĞ
distrust of colleagues. You need a strong team around you but you should not rush 
ƚŽũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
 “/ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞǀĞƌǇĨŽŽůŝƐŚĨŽƌĂŶŝŶĐŽŵŝŶŐsƚŽƐǁĞĞƉĂƐŝĚĞĂŶĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐƚĞĂŵ ?ĂŶĚ
ƚŚŝƐŝƐƉƌĞƚƚǇƌĂƌĞ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
ƉƌĞŵĂƚƵƌĞƌĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐŽĨĂŶĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚĞĂŵŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐ “ĂŶĂƐƐĞƌƚŝŽŶŽĨ
ƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚƚŽďĞĂǀŽŝĚĞĚ ?(Dean/HOD 8).  One vice chancellor likens the tendency of some 
ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐƚŽŵĂŬĞĞĂƌůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌƚĞĂŵĂƐ “ĂďŝƚůŝŬĞĚŽŐƐůŝĨƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌůĞŐƐĂŶĚ
ƉŝƐƐŝŶŐƚŽŵĂƌŬŽƵƚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƚĞƌƌŝƚŽƌǇ ? ?s ? ? ? ? 
 “/ƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂŐŽŽĚŝĚĞĂĨŽƌĂŶĞǁsƚŽĐŽŵĞŝŶĂŶĚĚĞcapitate the team. Unless the 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŝƐŝŶĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?ƚŚŝƐƐĞŶĚƐŽƵƚĂůůƚŚĞǁƌŽŶŐƐŝŐŶĂůƐ ? ? ?Ws ? ? ? 
 
4. Consequences for the DPVC Profile  
This section addresses the first part of the second research question (Q.2a) concerning 
changes to the DPVC profile.   Firstly, it presents data drawn from the census on the 
demographic and professional profile of the entire 2013 DPVC cohort.  It then examines the 
impact of external open competition on the profile of those getting the jobs. 
4.1 Profile of Serving DPVCs 
The number of DPVCs has increased significantly in the eight years between 2005 and 
2013
46
. There were 219 DPVC posts in August 2013 (including four vacancies
47
) compared 
                                                          
46
 2013 data is from the census and 2005 data from the 2006 Association of Commonwealth 
Universities Yearbook. 
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to 152 in 2005 (Table 9).  This represents a 44% increase overall and an average of 5% per 
year.  This is higher than the 3.8% year-on-year increase in DPVC numbers between 2000 
and 2005 for all UK higher education institutions (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).  It also 
far outstrips the 2.6% growth in the student
48
  and 7.6% in the staff population
49
 between 
2005/6 and 2012/13, suggesting that the expansion of the sector does not by itself 
adequately account for the growth in DPVC numbers.  The ratio of DPVC posts per 
institution has risen from 3.6 to 4.9, or more than one additional post per institution.   
 
Table 9: Comparison of DPVC Numbers in 2005 and 2013 
2005 (ACU Yearbook) 2013 (Census) 
DVC PVC PVC/Dean Total DVC PVC PVC/Dean Total 
20 132 0 152 40 139 40 219 
13.2 86.8 0.0 100.0 18.3 63.5 18.3 100.0 
 
 
Over half of the additional posts are new DPVC/Deans.  In addition, seven senior 
professional services posts, such as registrar or director of finance, have been re-titled as 
DPVCs
50
 and one joint DPVC/Librarian post has been created at Leicester.  Taken together, 
these newly defined DPVC posts account for 48 of the 67 (72%) additional posts since 2005.  
The rise in DPVC numbers can thus be explained in large part by a re-categorisation of 
existing executive level posts and/or reconfiguration of the executive management team 
structure and membership.  Accordingly, there has not been the proliferation of senior 
management posts that might be assumed from the increase in numbers of those with a 
DPVC job title.  
DPVCs remain predominantly white male professors.  The 2013 cohort is overwhelmingly 
white, with a mere 4% from ethnic minorities
51
.  This is consistent with the most recent 
available data which shows that only 4.1% of UK professors (and 5.8% of academic staff
52
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
47
 Demographic data is therefore available for 215 DPVCs. 
48
 Total UK staff numbers were 355,415 in 2005/6 and 382,515 in 2012/13 (Higher Education 
Statistics Agency). 
49
 Total UK student numbers were 2,281,235 in 2005/6 and 2,340,275 in 2012/13  W a fall from a high 
of 2,2501,295 in 2010/11 (Higher Education Statistics Agency).   
50
 The institutions concerned are Birkbeck, Bradford, IOE, Kent, Liverpool and Surrey (two posts). 
51
 Based on publically available biographical and/or photographic data. 
52
 Figures for UK black and ethnic minority staff in UK higher education institutions in 2011/12.  The 
corresponding figure for professional and support staff is 7% (Equality Challenge Unit). 
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are of ethnic minority origin.  It is not possible to map change over time in the ethnicity of 
the DPVC population since historical data is not available. 
Over three quarters (76%) of serving DPVCs are male, with only 51 female DPVCs out of a 
cohort of 215.  A straightforward comparison with 2005 would be misleading given that 
gender is not specified for one in five of the DPVCs listed in the ACU Yearbook
53
.  It is 
therefore more appropriate to compare changes in the proportion of those DPVCs for 
whom gender is known: this figure rose from 21% in 2005 to 24% in 2013.  There has thus 
been a relatively small (3%) increase in the proportion of female DPVCs over the last eight 
years, equivalent to a mere 0.4% per annum.  Nevertheless, a serious gender imbalance in 
favour of men persists.  In eight pre-1992 universities the vice chancellor and all the DPVCs 
are male. 
The typical avenue of mobility into the DPVC role remains that of the career academic.  A 
large majority of DPVCs have a professorial title. At 90%, this figure has increased slightly 
from 87% in 2005 and is higher than the 80% average across all sample years of Smith et 
al ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇ ?ŝ ?Ğ ? ? ? ? ?ƚŽ ? ? ? ? ? ?ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞŝŐŚƚWsƐŶ ? ? ? ?ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƚŝƚůĞ ‘ƌ ? ?ƐŝǆŽĨǁŚŽŵ
were previously in an academic post and are assumed to be career academics.  It is perhaps 
not surprising therefore that the vast majority (94%) of DPVCs previously worked in an 
academic role (4.2).   
4.2 Impact of Changed Appointment Practice 
Seventy one, or approximately one third, of the 2013 DPVC cohort was appointed following 
external open competition
54
.  A comparison was made between the profile of these 
 ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?WsƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ ? ? ? ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ?WsƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚďǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů-only 
process (Table 10).  The appointment method for the remaining five DPVCs in the 2013 
cohort is not known and so they are omitted from the analysis.  
Table 10 shows that the adoption of an external open competition model has had virtually 
no impact on the ethnicity, but a very significant impact on the gender balance, of those 
securing the jobs.  An even higher proportion of DPVCs appointed via external open 
competition are men: 84% compared to 73% via an internal-only process.  In other words, 
only 15A?ŽĨ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?DPVCs are women compared to 27A?ŽĨ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƐ ? ?/ƚŝƐƚŚƵƐĨĞŵĂůĞ
                                                          
53
 Some entries in the ACU Yearbook have initials only. 
54
 It is important to bear in mind in interpreting these findings that this sub-group, though growing in 
size year by year, still represents a minority of serving DPVCs. 
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DPVCs appointed via an internal-only appointment process that are largely responsible for 
keeping the proportion of women in the overall 2013 DPVC cohort at 24%. 
 
Table 10: Comparison of DPVC Profile by Appointment Method 




 Number % Number % 
Male 60 84.5 101 72.7 
Female 11 15.5 38 27.3 
     
White 68 95.8 134 96.4 
Ethnic Minority 3 4.2 5 3.6 
     
Professor 67 94.4 124 89.2 
Non Professor 4 5.6 15 10.8 
     
Career Academic 67 94.4 132 95.0 
Non Academic 4 5.6 7 5.0 
 
 
In terms of professional background, Table 10 ŝůůƵƐƚƌĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?WsƐĂƌĞƐůŝŐŚƚůǇ
more likely to be professors than those appointed by means of an internal process.  
Moreover, the opening up of DPVC posts to external open competition has made no 
significant difference to the proportion of non-academic managers securing the roles.  The 
seven non-ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƐ ?ĐŽůƵŵŶĂƌĞƚŚĞƌĞ-titled professional services 
managers described in 4.1.  Of the four non-academic appointments resulting from 
external competition, two are from another university and one each from the Higher 
Education Funding Council for England and the private sector
55
.  
In fact, external open competition has led to a firming up of the academic management 
route into the role.  Table 11 shows that a higher proportion of  ‘ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?ƚŚĂŶ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂů ?
DPVCs have previously held some kind of academic manager post (89% versus 79%),  
generally at a higher level of seniority.  Indeed, DPVCs appointed by external advertisement 
                                                          
55
 In addition, there was one DPVC appointed from the public sector, but this person was a career 
academic and is therefore not included as a non-academic appointment.  This person is however 
included in Table 12 ĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐĂ ‘ŶŽŶ-ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? 
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are almost twice as likely as those appointed via an internal-only process to be, or have 
previously been, a DPVC: 39% compared to 22%.   
 
Table 11: Previous Role of DPVCs by Appointment Method 




 Number % Number % 
DPVC 28 39.4 30 21.6 
Dean 17 23.9 26 18.7 
Head of Department/School 10 14.1 35 25.2 
Other Academic Manager 8 11.4 19 13.7 
Professor 3 4.2 21 15.1 
Other 5* 7.0 8 5.7 
Total 71 100.0 139 100.0 
* Includes two from a non-academic university post and three from outside higher education 
 
 
A growing number of DPVCs are thus moving from one DPVC post to another, as 
exemplified by the DPVC research participants, a third of whom (9 of 26, or 35%) have 
previously held a DPVC post.  The broadening of the types of DPVC role (2.3) may be a 
factor here as it means there is more scope to move from a policy to executive DPVC role, 
or vice versa, and upwards from a PVC to a more senior DVC position.   
Although the opening up of DPVC posts to external competition has resulted in increased 
staff mobility, the binary divide is still very much in evidence and there is relatively little 
movement between pre- and post-1992 universities (Table 12).  Almost half (34 of 71, or 
48%) of those DPVCs appointed as a result of external open competition came into their 
post from another pre-1992 university compared to only five, or a mere 7% from a post-
1992 institution.  This finding is corroborated by DPVC interviewees who suggest that what 
little movement there is across the binary divide tends to be one way: from pre to post-
1992 institutions.   
 “dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƐƚŝůůƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨĂďŝĂƐĂŶĚĂŶĂƌƚŝĨŝĐŝĂůĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽ ? ?
(DPVC 25) 
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^ŽŵĞǀŝĞǁƚŚŝƐĂƐ “ĂĨŽƌŵŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŶŽďďĞƌǇ ?ĂŝĚĞĚĂŶĚĂďĞƚƚĞĚďǇĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞarch 
agencies and chairs of governing bodies in post- ? ? ? ?ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐǁŚŽ “ŵĂǇďĞĚĂǌǌůĞĚďǇ
ZƵƐƐĞůů'ƌŽƵƉĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ? 
 
Table 12: Previous Institution of DPVCs Appointed by External Open Competition 
Previous Institution External  Open Competition 
(n=71) 
 Number % 
Other Pre-1992 University 34 47.9 
Post-1992 University 5 7.0 
Overseas University 5 7.0 
Same University 24 33.9 
Non-University 3 4.2 
Total 71 100.0 
 
 
Only five DPVCs came from an overseas university and there is virtually no movement into 
a DPVC role from those holding non-university positions.  It is also important to note that 
the introduction of an external open competition process does not necessarily lead to an 
external appointment.  In fact, as Table 12 shows, a third (34%) of DPVCs appointed via 
external open competition are internal candidates.   
 
5. Consequences for DPVC Careers 
This section addresses part two of the second research question (Q.2b) about the careers 
of DPVCs appointed by means of external open competition.  It presents evidence from 
interviews with this newly created group of DPVCs on their route into the role, experience 
of being a DPVC and future career plans and aspirations.   
5.1 Becoming a DPVC 
5.1.1 Route into the Role 
tŝƚŚŽŶĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ?ĂWsǁŚŽĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŚŝŵƐĞůĨǀĂƌŝŽƵƐůǇĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐďĞĞŶ “ĐĂũŽůĞĚ ?ŝŶƚŽ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ “ŶŽƚƐĞĞŝŶŐŝƚĂƐŚŝƐĐĂƌĞĞƌ ? ?Ws ? ? ?ƚŚĞWsƐŝŶŵǇƐƚƵĚǇƉŽƉƵůĂƚŝŽŶ
all spoke of having made a conscious decision to become a manager.  
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 “/ǁĂƐĞŵďĂƌŬŝŶŐŽŶĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?ŽŶĞŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ? 
(DPVC 13) 
  “/ŵĂĚĞĂŶĂĐƚŝǀĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽďĞĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ W it was a turning point in 
ŵǇĐĂƌĞĞƌ ? ?(DPVC 12) 
However the timing of this decision, or the ŽǀĞƌƚĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŵĞŶƚŽĨŚĂǀŝŶŐƚĂŬĞŶ “Ă
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚƌĂĐŬ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ?ǀĂƌŝĞĚďǇŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?ĨĞǁ ŚĂĚĐůĞĂƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ
ambitions from the outset. 
 “/ǁĂƐŵŝŶĚĨƵůƚŚĂƚ/ǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽďĞĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?and to focus on  “ŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂŵŽůĞĐƵůĞ ? ?(DPVC 22) 
&ŽƌŵŽƐƚ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚ ?ƚŚĞŬĞǇĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƉŽŝŶƚŽƌ “ĨŽƌŬŝŶƚŚĞũƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?s ? ? ?ĐĂŵĞĂƚƚŚĞĞŶĚ
of their term as head of department.   
 “dŚĞďŝŐĐŚŽŝĐĞŝƐĂƚ,KůĞǀĞů ?zŽƵĐĂŶƐƚŝůůŐŽďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞƌĂŶŬƐĂĨƚĞƌƚŚŝƐĂŶĚĨŽƌ
ƐŽŵĞŝƚŝƐĂƌĞůŝĞĨƚŽŐŽďĂĐŬ ? ?(DPVC 26) 
Being a head of department was an opportunity to find out whether or not they were 
ƐƵŝƚĞĚƚŽĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?Z ? ?ĂŶĚǁĂƐƚŚƵƐ “ĂƚĞƐƚďĞĚĨŽƌĂŶĞǁĐĂƌĞĞƌƌŽƵƚĞ ?
(DPVC 17).   
Not many DPVCs started their career with becoming a DPVC in mind.  Despite generally 
coming into the job via a series of increasingly senior academic management roles, not 
ĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞƐĞĞƐƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐŵĂĚĞ “ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚĂďůĞ ? ?Ws ? ? ?Žƌ “ůŝŶĞĂƌ ? ?Ws ? ?
ĐĂƌĞĞƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?KŶĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŚŝƐĐĂƌĞĞƌĂƐ “ƐĞƌĞŶĚŝƉŝƚŽƵƐ ? ?Ws ? ?ĂŶĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĂƐ “Ă
ƐĞƌŝĞƐŽĨĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚƐĂůŽŶŐƚŚĞǁĂǇ ? ?Ws ? ? ?
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƌĞĂůŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞǁĂƐ “ĂůĂĚĚĞƌƚŽďĞĂƐĐĞŶĚĞĚ ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ?ƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ
have adopted a more planned and proactive approach to their careers.   
 “ůĂĚĚĞƌŝƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĂŶĚǇŽƵŶĞĞĚƚŽĐůŝŵďŵŽƌĞƐƚĞƉƐŶŽǁƚŽƐƵĐĐĞĞĚ ? ?(VC 13)  
KŶĞƐƉŽŬĞŽĨ “ůŽŽŬŝŶŐƵƉŽŶĞƐƚĞƉĂƚĂƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚŽƵƚŚŝƐĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?Ws ? ?ĂŶĚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ
ŽĨĂůǁĂǇƐŚĂǀŝŶŐŚĂĚ “ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚũŽďŝŶƐŝŐŚƚ ? ?Ws ? ? ? 
dŚŝƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂĐĐŽƌĚƐǁŝƚŚǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?ŽďƐĞƌǀations that academics are now paying 
ŵŽƌĞĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽ “ǁŚĂƚƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƌĞĞƌŵŝŐŚƚƚĂŬĞ ? ?s ? ?ĂŶĚĐŚŽŽƐŝŶŐ “ĂŵŽƌĞ
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ĞŶƚƌĞƉƌĞŶĞƵƌŝĂůĐĂƌĞĞƌƌŽƵƚĞ ? ?s ? ? ? ?dŚŽƐĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐǁŝƚŚĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂǀŝĐĞ
chancellor are planning their careers accordingly.   
 “ĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŶĞĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞĂƉĞƌƐŽŶĂůĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƚŽŐŽĚŽǁŶĂŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌŽƵƚĞĂŶĚ
ƚŽďƵŝůĚƵƉƚŚĞƐŬŝůůƐĂŶĚĐŽŵƉĞƚĞŶĐŝĞƐƚŽĚŽĂƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚũŽď ? ?(VC 7) 
5.1.2 Management Development 
ŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨWsƐŚĂǀĞĂƚƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŚĞ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐdŽƉDĂŶĂgement 
Programme (TMP).  Though some found it helpful from a management development 
ƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƚŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?ƐŵĂŝŶďĞŶĞĨŝƚŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŽďĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐ ?/ƚŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐĂŶ
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĨŽƌƵŵĨŽƌ “ŵĂŬŝŶŐĐŽŶŶĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĐĂŶŐĞƚǇŽƵĂũŽď ? ?Ws ? ? ?ĂŶĚĨŽƌ
 “ĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐǇŽƵƌŽǁŶĐĂƌĞĞƌ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ?dŚŝƐŝƐĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŵĂŬŝŶŐ
senior management appointments, i.e. vice chancellors and chairs of governing bodies, are 
sceptical  W Žƌ “ĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇƐŶŝĨĨǇ ? ?Ws ? ? ? W about its value.   
Taking the TMP is, however, an important means for academics to signal their interest in 
pursuing an executive management career, both to those inside and outside their 
university.   The latter is important since TMP alumni often feature on potential candidate 
databases of executive search agencies.  It is perhaps not surprising therefore that the TMP 
has become part of the career plan for academics with their sights set on the top job and 
 “ƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐŽĨĂƌŝƚĞŽĨƉĂƐƐĂŐĞƚŽďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂs ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ?
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶĂŬĞĚambition on the TMP.  There were some people with a very clear 
ĞǇĞŽŶƚŚĞŐŽĂů ? ?(Dean/HOD 8) 
dŚĞƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞŝƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ “ĂůŝƚƚůĞŚŽƚŚŽƵƐĞŽĨŐŽƐƐŝƉ ?ǁŚĞƌĞĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ “ŝƐǁĂƚĐŚŝŶŐ
ƚŚĞŵŽǀĞƐŽĨŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?Ws ? ? ?/ƚŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂƚƚƌĂĐƚƐƚŚĞĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐ ?ďƵƚŵay also help to 
shape career aspirations. 
  “ŵďŝƚŝŽŶŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞŵŽƌĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵŝƐĞĚĂŶĚŵŽƌĞŶĂŬĞĚ ? ?(DPVC 2) 
  “dŚĞdDWŚĂƐǁŽƌŬĞĚƉĞŽƉůĞƵƉŝŶƚŽĂĨƌĞŶǌǇĂďŽƵƚďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂs ? ?(DPVC 5) 
dŚĞdDWŵĂǇĂůƐŽŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐ ?ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞWsƌŽůĞ ? 
 “There is an expectation of a certain form of behaviour [in senior managers] and 
ƚŚĞdDWŚĂƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚŝƐ ? ? ?Z ? ? 
 




ĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂWsŝƐ “ŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌŽŶĞůĂƐƚƚŚƌŽǁŽĨƚŚĞĚŝĐĞďĞĨŽƌĞƌĞƚŝƌŝŶŐ ? ?s ? ? ?
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŶŽƚŝŽŶŶŽǁŽĨbeing an academic manager and different 
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞĐĂƌĞĞƌƐŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ? ? ?VC 13) 
DPVCs in my sample that ŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŽƉĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ “ĂƌĞĂ
self-ƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚŐƌŽƵƉǁŚŽǁĂŶƚƚŽƉƵƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ?dŚĞŵŽƐƚĐŽŵŵŽŶůǇ
ĐŝƚĞĚƌĞĂƐŽŶĨŽƌĚŽŝŶŐƐŽŝƐƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽǁŽƌŬĂƚĂŵŽƌĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐůĞǀĞů “ŝŶĂǁŝĚĞƌ
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇƌŽůĞ ? ?WsC 11). 
 “ƐĞĂƚĂƚƚŚĞƚŽƉƚĂďůĞǁĂƐƚŚĞŵĂŝŶĚƌĂǁ ? ?(DPVC 12) 
Taking on a DPVC role was seen as providing an opportunity to have a real impact at this 
top level. 
 “dŚĞƌĞĂůĂƉƉĞĂůǁĂƐƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽƚƵƌŶƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?(DPVC 16) 
  “/ƚ ?ƐŵǇŽŶĞĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽƉĂŝŶƚŽŶĂƌĞĂůůǇďŝŐĐĂŶǀĂƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ƚŽƌĞĂůůǇĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ? 
(DPVC 13) 
Most DPVCs were attracted by the idea of leading and managing others. 
 “/ǁĂŶƚƚŽůĞĂĚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĨƌŽŶƚ ? ?(DPVC 23) 
  “ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ/ ?ǀĞĂůǁĂǇƐďĞĞŶƐĐŽƌŶĨƵůŽĨĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?/ ?ǀĞĂůǁĂǇƐ
ǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽůĞĂĚĂŶĚŚĂĚĂŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĚƌŝǀĞ ? ?(DPVC 2) 
Power was thus an explicit or implicit motivation.  One chose a DPVC/Dean over a policy 
DPVC role because of the fact that greater budgetary and line management responsibilities 
 “ŐŝǀĞǇŽƵŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?Ws ? ? ?
 “/ůŝŬĞƚŚĞďĞŝŶŐ-in-ĐŚĂƌŐĞĂŶŐůĞ ?(DPVC 17)  
 “DĂŶǇĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐůŝŬĞƉŽǁĞƌŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽĂĚŵŝƚ ? ?(DPVC 8) 
Some were attracted by the chance to challenge themselves in a different job rather than 
 “ũƵƐƚƚŝĐŬŽǀĞƌ ?(DPVC 9) and to acquire new skills.    
 “^ŽŵĞƉĞŽƉůĞĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽŵŽǀĞŽŶ ?dŚĞǇ ?ǀĞƌĞĂĐŚĞĚƚŚĞůĞǀĞůƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚƚŽďĞ
ĂŶĚĨĞĞůƚŚĞǇĐĂŶƌĞůĂǆĂŶĚĞŶũŽǇƚŚĞũŽď ?ďƵƚ/ ?ŵŵŽƌĞŽĨĂƌŝƐŬƚĂŬĞƌ ? ?(DPVC 2)  
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 “/ƐĂǁŝƚĂƐĂďŝŐůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?(DPVC 12) 
 For a few, an academic job had lost its appeal.  One admitted that he had realised he was 
ŶĞǀĞƌ “ŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞĂEŽďĞůWƌŝǌĞǁŝŶŶĞƌ ? ?Ws ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŚŝƐĨƵƚƵƌĞůĂǇĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ? 
 “ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝƐĂďŝƚŽĨĂŐƌŝŶĚ ?dŚĞĨĞĂƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐŽĨĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝc role 
ŝƐũƵƐƚŶŽƚƚŚĞƌĞ ? ?(DPVC 22) 
There is also a financial incentive in taking on a DPVC role. 
   “^ĞŶŝŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂƌĞǁĞůůƌĞǁĂƌĚĞĚĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚƵŶĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?(DPVC 22) 
/ƚǁĂƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚĞĚƚŚĂƚƐĂůĂƌǇ “ŝƐŵŽƌĞŽĨĂŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŽƌĨŽƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐƚŚĂŶŝƐŽĨƚĞŶĂĚŵŝƚƚĞĚ ?
(DPVC 17), with the difference a higher pension can make in retirement of particular 
importance (DPVC 2).  
 “EŽŽŶĞŐŽĞƐŝŶƚŽĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĂĨŽƌŵŽŶĞǇ W ƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚĂŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŽƌ ? ?Ƶƚ/ŚĂǀĞĂ
young family and so am as motivated by money as anyone in ƚŚŝƐƐŝƚƵĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
(DPVC 24) 
5.2 Being a DPVC  
5.2.1 The Role 
tŚĂƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌĨƌŽŵWsƐ ?ŽǁŶĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐ “ƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇĂŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌŽůĞ ?
(DPVC 7).   
 “/ƚ ?ƐĂĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů ?ŵĂƌŬĞƚ-ĚƌŝǀĞŶũŽď ? ?(DPVC 17) 
  “dŚŝƐŝƐĂĨƵůů-ƚŝŵĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌŽůĞ ? ?(DPVC 21) 
Being a DPVC involves negotiation as well as strategy development and so relationship 
ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ ?Ws ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ƐŽĨƚƐŬŝůůƐŽĨŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐŝŶŐĂŶĚƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝŽŶ ?ĂƌĞƐĞĞŶĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚ
(DPVC 23).  At the same time, it is a harder edged role than was the case in the past.   
 “hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐŶĞĞĚůĞĂĚĞƌƐǁŚŽĐĂŶŵĂŬĞƚŚŝŶŐƐŚĂƉƉĞŶ ? ?(DPVC 14) 
  “zŽƵŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞĨŝƌŵĂŶĚƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞŚĂƌĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?DĂŶǇĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂƌĞ
ŶŽƚǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚĂƚƚŚŝƐ ? ? ?DPVC 23) 
The management of people and performance are critical elements of the job.   
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 “/ƚ ?ƐŵŽƌĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŶŽǁ ?zŽƵĂƌĞŽĨƚĞŶĚŽŝŶŐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŚŝŶŐƐůŝŬĞŵĂŬŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞ
ƌĞĚƵŶĚĂŶƚ ? ?(DPVC 26) 
  “/ŚĂĚƚŽĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚǁŚŽǁĂƐƵŶĚĞƌƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐĂŶĚŵĂŬĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚĞǇ
ƐŚŽƵůĚŐŽ ? ?(DPVC 16) 
The extent to which DPVCs are expected to play a managerial role depends on the 
particular perspective of the vice chancellor.  The more managerial their approach is, the 
more managerial the role construction of their DPVCs.  Most vice chancellors see their 
DPVCs as managers as well as academic leadeƌƐǁŚŽŶĞĞĚ “ďŽƚŚǀŝƐŝŽŶĂŶĚŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(VC 8).   
 “WsƐĂƌĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐĂŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌŽůĞĂŶĚďĞŝŶŐĂWsŝƐŶŽǁǀĞƌǇŵƵĐŚ
ƉĂƌƚŽĨĂƉĞƌƐŽŶ ?ƐƉĞƌƐŽŶĂ ? ?(VC 4) 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂĨĞǁĚŽŶŽƚǁĂŶƚWsƐƚŽůŝŶĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŽƌƚŽ “ŐĞƚƐƵĐŬĞĚŝŶƚŽƚŚĞŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂů ?
(VC 7).  
 “DŽƐƚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂƌĞŶŽƚǀĞƌǇŐŽŽĚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ/ŝŶĐůƵĚĞŵǇƐĞůĨŝŶƚŚĂƚ ?/ĞǆƉĞĐƚ
ƚŚĞŵƚŽďĞŝŶƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐůĞĂĚĞƌƐ ? ?(VC 14) 
ZĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞƚĂŝůŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?WsƐ ?ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŝƐĐŽŵŝŶŐƵŶĚĞƌ
increased scrutiny: DPVCs are held responsible for ensuring plans are implemented (VC 12) 
ĂŶĚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞ “ ? ? ?A?ĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďůĞŝŶƚŚĞƌŽůĞ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ? 
 “dŚĞsŝƐǀĞƌǇĐůĞĂƌĂďŽƵƚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚŚĞǁĂŶƚƐĨƌŽŵ
ǭƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ?(R 1) 
DPVCs seem to accept this as a necessary requirement of the job. 
 “/ǁŽƌŬƚŽƚĂƌŐĞƚƐĂŶĚŝĨ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵ/ǁŝůůŶĞĞĚƚŽŵŽǀĞŽŶ ? ?(DPVC 23) 
 “/ĨǇŽƵĚŽŶ ?ƚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵǁĞůů ?ŝƚŝƐƌŝŐŚƚǇŽƵƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŵŽǀĞĚŽŶ ? ?(DPVC 17) 
For their part, vice chancellors appear willing to tackle any perceived underperformance. 
 “/ǁŝůůĂƐƐĞƐƐƉĞŽƉůĞŝŶƚŚĞũŽď ?/ŝŶŚĞƌŝƚĞĚŽŶĞŽƌƚǁŽƚŝŵĞƐĞƌǀĞƌƐǁŚŽŚĂĚƚŽďĞ
ƉĂŝĚŽĨĨ ? ?(VC 1) 
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Despite performance pressure and high workloads, however, the majority of DPVCs enjoy 
ƚŚĞŝƌũŽď ?ĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐŝƚĂƐ “ĞǆĐŝƚŝŶŐ ? ?Ws ? ? ?ĂŶ “ŝŶĐƌĞĚŝďůǇǀĂůƵĂďůĞ ?ĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?Ws ? ? ?
ĂŶĚ “ǀĞƌǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ? 
5.2.2 Inherent Tensions 
Nevertheless, being a DPVC is not always straightforward or comfortable.  They often find 
themselves at the point of tension both between managerial and collegial cultures and 
between the executive management team and the wider academic community.    
 “WsƐĂƌĞǁĂůŬŝŶŐĂůŝŶĞďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞĐŽůůĞŐŝĂůĐƵůƚƵƌĂůŶŽƌŵĂŶĚǁŚĂƚ ?ƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚ
of them in making change happen.  Academics think PVCs are too corporate and 
counĐŝůƐĞĞƐƚŚĞŵĂƐƚŽŽĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞŝŶĂĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŚĞŵŝĚĚůĞ ? ? 
(VC 12) 
Unlike a head of department or dean, DPVCs do not represent a particular academic 
constituency.   Rather, they are expected to be dispassionate about their own faculty and 
ƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽ ?Ws ? ?ĂŶĚ “ƚŚŝŶŬĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĂƐǁŚŽůĞ ? ?Ws ? ? ?
 “WsŶĞĞĚƐĂĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? ?(VC 12) 
WsƐĂƌĞ “ŶŽƚŽŶĞŽĨƚŚĞƚƌŽŽƉƐĂŶǇŵŽƌĞ ?ĂŶĚŵƵƐƚďĞǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ
decisions, such as closing a failiŶŐĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?Z ? ? ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌ “ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐŚĞ
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŚĞĂƌƚůĂŶĚ ?ĂŶĚĂƌĞ “ŵŽƌĞƚŚĞs ?ƐĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞƐƚŚĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ? ?Z ? ? ?
 “ĞŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ^Dd ?senior management team] demands a different set of skills and 
you have to be more detached ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?(DPVC 26) 
dŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞsƌŽůĞŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƉŽƐƚŚŽůĚĞƌƐ “ŵƵƐƚďĞŝŶƚŽƚĂůĂůŝŐŶŵĞŶƚ
ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞs ? ?Ws ? ? ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂůůWsƐĂƌĞĞǆƉĞĐƚ ĚƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞ “ƉĂƌƚŽĨĂ
management team with responsibility for the instŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŽƚŚĞs ? ?s ? ? ? 
 “/ƚ ?ƐĂůůĂďŽƵƚƚĂŬŝŶŐĐĂďŝŶĞƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇ ? ?(DPVC 23) 
It is suggested that appointed, rather than seconded, DPVCs are more likely to have their 
primary allegiance to the vice chancellor.   
 “ǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĞƐŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŝƌůŽǇĂůƚǇƚŽƚŚĞs ? ?(DPVC 21) 
  “ƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚWsƐƐŽŽŶďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞs ?ƐĐƌĞĂƚƵƌĞƐ ? ?(DPVC 2) 
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There is another fundamental tension in the DPVC role.  Although the majority describe 
ƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞĂƐŽŶĞŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƐŽŵĞŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ “ĂƐĂŶĂĐademic 
ĨŝƌƐƚ ? ?Ws ? ? ?DĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇŝƐƐĞĞŶĂƐŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌĂďŝůŝƚǇ
to do the job effectively. 
 “/ ?ŵĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ-manager, not a manager-manager. I try to send out signals that 
/ ?ŵďŽƚŚĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĂŶĚĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ? ?(DPVC 23) 
Nevertheless, although many DPVCs were trying to maintain some research activity, most 
found this extremely difficult or even impossible given the time-consuming nature of the 
job.    
 “/ ?ŵƚŝŶŬĞƌŝŶŐǁŝƚŚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚďƵƚŝƚŝƐŵŽƌĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽĚŽĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŶĞǁ ? ?(DPVC 23) 
 “zŽƵŶĞĞĚƚŽĚŽƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĨƵůůƚŝŵĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶǇŽƵƌĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĞĚŐĞ ? ?
(DPVC 13) 
Ironically although being, or having been, an academic is still a prerequisite for becoming a 
DPVC, once in the post many find they have to sacrifice their research career.  
 “/ŬŶĞǁ/ǁĂƐůĞĂǀŝŶŐŵǇƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĐĂƌĞĞƌďĞŚŝŶĚ ?(DPVC 22) 
 “WĞŽƉůĞŐŽƚŚƌŽƵŐŚĂŵŽƵƌŶŝŶŐƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁŚĞŶŐŝǀŝŶŐƵƉƚŚĞŝƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐĂƌĞĞƌ ? ? 
(VC 12) 
Furthermore, they may encounter resistance, even hostility, from the wider academic 
community. 
 “/ĞŶũŽǇďĞŝŶŐĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ďƵƚŝƚŝƐƚƌƵĞƚŚĂƚŵĂŶǇĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĨĞĞů/ŚĂǀĞƚƵƌŶĞĚƚŽ
ƚŚĞĚĂƌŬƐŝĚĞ ?dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŚƵŐĞƌĞƐŝĚƵĂůďĞůŝĞĨƚŚĂƚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐĚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?
(DPVC 22) 
 “/ŚĂǀĞƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐŚĂĚƚŽƉƵƚŵǇŚĞĂĚŽŶƚŚĞďůŽĐŬ ?/ƚĚƌĂŝŶƐǇŽƵĂŶĚ/ might not 
ŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞŝƚŝĨ/ŬŶĞǁǁŚĂƚǁĂƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞĚ ? ?(DPVC 7) 
ǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇŵĂǇŶŽƚǁŝƐŚƚŽďĞĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚĂƐ “ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?s ? ? ? ?ĂƐĨĂƌĂƐƌĂŶŬ-
and-file academics are concerned a DPVC is likely to ďĞƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐ “a suit ?(DPVC 5) 
rather than as an academic. 
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5.3 Exit Strategies and Future Plans 
5.3.1 Exit Strategies 
Many DPVCs appointed by means of external open competition regard the exit strategy at 
the end of their term as problematic, mainly because going back to an academic role is not 
a feasible option.   
 “/ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŐŽďĂĐŬĂƐ/ŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌŚĂǀĞĂƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƉƌŽĨŝůĞĂŶĚŚĂǀĞďƵƌŶĞĚŵǇ
ďƌŝĚŐĞƐĂƐĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ? ?(DPVC 1) 
 “KŶĐĞǇŽƵŵĂŬĞƚŚĞďƌĞĂŬĨƌŽŵƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝƚ ?ƐĂůŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽŐŽďĂĐŬ W 
ǁŚĞƚŚĞƌǇŽƵƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝƚŽƌŶŽƚĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞ ? ?(DPVC 8) 
For DPVCs coming into the post from another institution, the prospect may be even less 
ƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞ “ŶŽƐĞĐƵƌĞĨŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ?ŶŽ
 “ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ ? ?Ws ? ? ?Žƌ ?ŝŶŽŶĞĐĂƐĞ ?ŶŽĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ?DPVC 
14).  There was also some suggestion that a return to research may be more difficult for 
scientists.  Interestingly, this was given as a reason why there may be more scientists in 
executive management posts.  
 “/ ?ŵĂůŵŽƐƚĂůǁĂǇƐĐŽŵƉĞƚŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŵĞĚŝĐƐŽƌƐĐŝĞŶƚŝƐƚƐĨŽƌƐĞŶŝŽƌƉŽƐƚƐ ? ?(DPVC 26) 
Even in those cases where a return to an academic role is possible, it is often viewed as an 
unattractive prospect.  
 “/ĨǇŽƵƌŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŝŶďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐĂWsǁĂƐƚŽĚŽƐŽŵĞƚŚŝŶŐĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚ ?ǁŚǇǁŽƵůĚ
you want to go bacŬ ? ?(DPVC2) 
 “/ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽŐŽďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞďĂĐŬďĞŶĐŚĞƐĂĨƚĞƌŚĂǀŝŶŐŵĂĚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ
ĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ?(DPVC 23) 
Some DPVCs would miss the challenge and excitement of a management role.   
 “'ŽŝŶŐďĂĐŬƚŽƚŚĞƌĂŶŬƐĐĂŶďĞǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ ?ĞŝŶŐĂ ƐĞŶior manager is a highly 
charged existence.  You get used to living with the pressure and, if you enjoy the 
ƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞ ?ǇŽƵŵĂǇŐĞƚďŽƌĞĚ ? ?(VC 19) 
Others realise that during their time as DPVC personal relationships with academic 
colleagues have been put under strain. 




ƉŝƐƐĞĚŽĨĨƚŽŽŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?(DPVC 26) 
 “/ĨǇŽƵĂƌĞĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌǇŽƵĂƌĞŶŽƚŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƉĞŽƉůĞƐ ?ĨƌŝĞŶĚ ? ?(DPVC 6) 
There is also the practical consideration of a substantial cut in salary. 
 “zŽƵǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽƚĂŬĞĂďŝŐƉĂǇĐƵƚƚŽďĞĂƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŽƌ ? ?(VC 1) 
  “DǇƐĂůĂƌǇǁŽƵůĚďĞŚĂůǀĞĚ ? ?(DPVC 25) 
Viewed in this light, the increasing level of financial reward for DPVCs may be one means of 
offering a degree of financial security to offset the increasing personal risk entailed in 
negotiating an exit strategy from the role.   
Vice chancellors are aware of the dangers of taking on a DPVC job. 
 “dŚŝƐŵĂǇďĞĂĚĞĂĚĞŶĚĨŽƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂŶĚŶŽƚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?(VC 3) 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐƌĞĂůůǇŶŽŐŽŝŶŐďĂĐŬĂŶĚ/ĂƐŬĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐŝĨƚŚĞǇ ?ƌĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚĨŽƌƚŚŝƐ ? ? 
(VC 18) 
Though one vice chancellor suggested that university leaders needed to talk to potential 
DPVCs about career choices and their implications, it appears this is not always happening. 
 “sƐĂƌĞŶŽƚŐŽŽĚĂƚĐĂƌĞĞƌƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƚĞĂŵ ? ?(DPVC 26) 
In fact, rather than go back to an academic role most DPVCs would prefer to move into 
another DPVC or vice chancellor position, either in their own institution or elsewhere.  
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? “ŶŽƚĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞĐĂŶĚŽƚŚŝƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ŝƚĐĂŶďĞĞǆƚƌĞŵĞůǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĨŽƌƐŽŵĞƉĞŽƉůĞĂƐ
ƚŚĞǇĐŽŵĞƚŽƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐĞĐŽŶĚƚĞƌŵ ? ?s ? ? ? ? 
 “dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƉƌŽďĂďůǇƚŚƌĞĞƚŝŵĞƐĂƐŵĂŶǇWsƐĂƐsƐƐŽŶŽƚĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞĐĂŶŐŽ
ĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƵƉƚŚĞůĂĚĚĞƌ ? ?(VC 16) 
 “DŽƐƚŚĂǀĞĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌsƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐďƵƚƚŚĞŝƌĐŚĂŶĐĞƐĂƌĞǀĞƌǇƐŵĂůů ? ?(R 6) 
Moreover, not everyone will have the necessary capabilities. 
 “^ŽŵĞWsƐǁŚŽĂƌĞĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐƚŚĞǇĐĂŶƌƵŶĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŵĂǇŶĞĞĚƚŽƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞ
that being a PVC may actually be a top-of-the-ƚƌĞĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵ ? ? 
(DPVC 26) 
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Nevertheless, there is an expectation amongst vice chancellors that good people will move 
on. 
  “dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂŵŽƌĞŵŝůŝƚĂƌǇ-ƐƚǇůĞŵĞŶƚĂůŝƚǇŶŽǁŽĨŐĞƚƵƉŽƌŐĞƚŽƵƚ ? ?(DPVC 5) 
 “dŚĞĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚĂŐood person will get a VC-ƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚŝŶĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌƐ ? ? 
(DPVC 14) 
Even DPVCs who have not yet reached the end of their second term may find themselves in 
a vulnerable position.  Firstly, there is a sense in which there is a natural lifespan to the role 
of around five years. 
 “ĨƚĞƌƚŚŝƐƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƵƐĞĚĂůůƚŚĞŝƌĞŶĞƌŐǇĂŶĚŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵĂŶĚŝƚŝƐŶŽƚŝŶƚŚĞ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƚŽĚŽĂƐĞĐŽŶĚƚĞƌŵ ? ?(VC 11) 
Not only are DPVC roles extremely challenging, but also there may be a time limit on an 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ɛcredibility in the role. 
 “WsƐĐĂŶĨĞĞůƚŚĞŝƌĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇĞďďŝŶŐĂǁĂǇĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŝƐĂĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚŽŶŚŽǁůŽŶŐ
they can be in the role. The clock is ticking for those on an academic management 
ƌŽƵƚĞ ? ?(VC 12) 
Furthermore, institutional needs and priorities may change with consequences for DPVC 
roles. 
 “dŚĞsŵŝŐŚƚǁĂŶƚƚŽƐŚĂŬĞƵƉƚŚĞƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽƐĂƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐďĞĐŽŵĞǀĂĐĂŶƚ ?
WŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽƐŚĂǀĞĂůŝĨĞĨŽƌĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƉĞƌŝŽĚƚŚĞŶĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌ ? ?(DPVC 7) 
DPVCs are particularly vulnerable when there is a new vice chancellor since it is likely that 
the incoming leader will want to make changes. 
 “ůůWsƐŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽŐŽǁŚĞŶĂŶĞǁsĐŽŵĞƐŝŶ ? ?(VC 14)   
 “tŽƌŬŝŶŐĂƚƚŚŝƐůĞǀĞůǇŽƵĂƌĞƋƵŝƚĞĞǆƉŽƐĞĚ ?tŝƚŚĂŶĞǁsĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐĐĂŶŚĂƉƉĞŶ ? ?
(DPVC 12) 
 “ŶĞǁsŵĂǇĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞĚǇŶĂŵŝĐ ?DŽƐƚĚŽŶ ?ƚŐĞƚƌŝĚŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĂƌĞ
ƉĞƌĨŽƌŵŝŶŐǁĞůů ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƐŽŵĞĚŽƚŚŝƐ ? ?(DPVC 17) 
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KǀĞƌĂůůƚŚĞŶ “ŝƚŝƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůůǇƌŝƐŬǇƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂWs ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇĨŽƌƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽĂƌĞ “ĂƚĂ
ƉƌĞĐĂƌŝŽƵƐĂŐĞ ?ďǇ the end of their second term (DPVC 7) or who have been unable to 
continue their research. 
 “/ŚĂǀĞƐĞĞŶĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐĨŽĐƵƐ ? ? ?A?ŽŶƚŚĞŝƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌŽůĞ ?/ĨƚŚĞǇĐĂŶŵŽǀĞŽŶ ?
ĨŝŶĞ ?Ƶƚ ?ŝĨŶŽƚ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŝŶĂǀĞƌǇĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?(VC 16) 
 “DŽǀĞƐŶŽǁĂƌĞĨŽƌŚŝŐŚĞƌƐƚĂŬĞƐĂŶĚǁŚĞŶǇŽƵĐŚĂnge job you are making a 
ĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŵŽǀĞƚŽŐŝǀĞƵƉĂĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ? ?(VC 18) 
5.3.2 Career Aspirations 
The DPVCs I interviewed are ambitious.  The ultimate ambition for most is to become a vice 
chancellor.    
 “dŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĂůŶĞǆƚƐƚĞƉǁŽƵůĚďĞĂƐĂs ? ?(DPVC 20) 
  “/ǁĂŶƚƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂsŶĞǆƚ ? ?(DPVC 23) 
A number of DPVCs had already applied for vice chancellor positions with varying degrees 
ŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐ ?dǁŽŚĂĚďĞĞŶŽĨĨĞƌĞĚǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌũŽďƐ PƚŚĞĨŝƌƐƚŚĂĚĚĞĐůŝŶĞĚƚǁŽ “ďĂĚs
ũŽďƐ ?ďƵƚŵŝŐŚƚĂƉƉůǇĂŐĂŝŶ “ŝĨ ĂŐŽŽĚũŽďĐŽŵĞƐĂůŽŶŐ ? ?Ws ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚŚĂĚ
already accepted a vice chancellor position by the time of the interview.   
Though there are fewer of them, female DPVCs are no less likely to aspire to the top job. 
Two of the five female DPVCs had already applied for vice chancellor posts, but had been 
unsuccessful.  Both had been told they were not yet ready but remain confident about their 
future career progression and intend to reapply. 
 “/ ?ǀĞŚĂĚĂŶŝŶƐŝŐŚƚŝŶƚŽŚŽǁĂsǁŽƌŬƐĂŶĚĨĞĞůƚŚĞƌ  ?ƐŶŽƚĂďŝƚƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŵŝƐƐŝŶŐ ?/
ǁŝůůĚĞĨŝŶŝƚĞůǇďĞĂs ? ? ?Ws ? ? ? 
 “/ǁŝůůƌƵŶĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŵǇƐĞůĨŽƌƐŽŵĞŽƚŚĞƌŬŝŶĚŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇ
ŝŶ,ŽƌŝŶƚŚĞh< ? ?(DPVC 26)  
ƚŚŝƌĚĨĞŵĂůĞWs ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇŶĞǁŝŶƉŽƐƚ ?ĂĚŵŝƚƐŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ “ĂƌŝƐŬ ?ƐŚĞĐŽƵůĚ
ŐŽĚŽǁŶƚŚĞƌŽĂĚŽĨĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐĨŽƌǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƌŽůĞƐĂŶĚƐŚĞ “ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚƌƵůĞŝƚŽƵƚ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ
she had become a DPVC without having particularly aspired to the role (DPVC 3).  
The two non-academic DPVCs are sanguine about the fact they believe they have no 
realistic prospect of becoming a vice chancellor.   
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 “ ?DǇĂŝŵŝƐƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƌŝŶĂůĂƌŐĞƉƌĞ-92. I have the leadership skills but 
ŶĞǀĞƌŝŶĂŵŽŶƚŚŽĨ^ƵŶĚĂǇƐǁŝůů/ŐĞƚƚŽďĞĂs ? ?(DPVC 25) 
One of them had been approached by an executive search agency for a vice chancellor 
ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƉĞƌƐƵĂĚĞĚƚŽĂƉƉůǇŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶŝŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ “ǁĂƐ
ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶĐĂƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞŶĞƚǁŝĚĞůǇ ? ?ďƵƚŚŝƐĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶǁĞŶƚŶŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ ? 
 “zŽƵĂƌĞŶŽƚƐĞĞŶĂƐĐƌĞĚŝďůĞŝĨǇŽƵŚĂǀĞŶŽĂĐĂĚemic background.  Generally 
ƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐǇŽƵĂƌĞũƵƐƚŶŽƚŽŶƚŚĞƌĂĚĂƌ ? ?(DPVC 15) 
Those DPVCs who do not aspire to become a vice chancellor are generally older and close 
to retirement.  
 “/ƚ ?ƐƚŽŽůĂƚĞŝŶŵǇĐĂƌĞĞƌ ? ?(DPVC 4) 
 ?dĞŶǇĞĂƌƐĂŐŽ/ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞůŝŬĞĚ ƚŽďĞĂsďƵƚŝƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞĂƚŵǇĐĂƌĞĞƌ
ƐƚĂŐĞ ? ?(DPVC 11) 
For younger DPVCs who do not wish to be a vice chancellor it is most often because the 
 “ŐůĂĚŚĂŶĚŝŶŐ ?ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞƌŽůĞĚŽŶŽƚĂƉƉĞĂů ?Ws ? ?ĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƌƚŽƚŚĞŝƌƐƉŽƵƐĞ
 “ǁŚŽŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚǁŝƐŚƚŽďĞĂĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞǁŝĨĞ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ?&ŽƵƌ WsƐĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚering the 
prospect of a non-academic role, such as higher education consultant, but only one is 
actively planning such a move (DPVC 10).  
The interviews provide further evidence of the recirculation of DPVCs identified by the 
census (4.2).  Not only have a third of the DPVCs interviewed previously been in a DPVC 
post, but also a number are contemplating a move to another DPVC post elsewhere.  This 
ŵŝŐŚƚďĞĂƐŝĚĞǁĂǇƐŵŽǀĞĚĞƐŝŐŶĞĚƚŽďƌŽĂĚĞŶƚŚĞŝƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽƌ “ĨŽƌĂĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨ
ƐĐĞŶĞƌǇ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ?ůƚĞƌŶĂƚively, it might be a strategic career move on their way to the 
top job, typically to a more senior post and/or to a bigger or better institution.    
sŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐŶŽƚĞĚƚŚĂƚ “ĂƉĂƚƚĞƌŶŽĨŝŶƚĞƌ-ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŵŽǀĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?s ? ? ?ǁĂƐ
emerging, with short-liƐƚƐĨŽƌWsũŽďƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇĐŽŵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ “ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůWsƐŵŽǀŝŶŐ
ĨƌŽŵƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽƚŽƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽ ? ?Ws ? ? ? 
 “/ ?ǀĞƐĞĞŶƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƌĞĞƌWs ? ?(VC 16)  
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6. Consequences for Third Tier Manager Careers 
This section addresses the final part of the second research question (Q.2c): the impact of 
the change to DPVC appointment practice on the career progression and aspirations of 
third tier managers, i.e. those at the next level of management down from DPVC level.  The 
experiences of both academic and professional services third tier managers are explored in 
turn utilising data drawn from the interviews and online survey.  
6.1 Deans and Heads of Department 
6.1.1 Interview Participants 
The career progression of the five deans and five heads of department interviewed has 
followed a similar pattern to that of the DPVCs.  Some were initially reluctant managers or 
ŚĂĚŵĂĚĞ “ĂŶĂĐĐŝĚĞŶƚĂůĐŚŽŝĐĞƚŽƚĂŬĞĂŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌŽƵƚĞ ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ?ǁŚŝůĞĨŽƌ
ŽƚŚĞƌƐŝƚǁĂƐ “ĂĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŝŵĞ ?ƚŽĨŽĐƵƐŽŶŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ 
research (Dean/HOD 6).  For one, this had come relatively late in his career: 
 “/ŶŵǇĞĂƌůǇ ? ?Ɛ/ƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂǁŚŽůĞŶĞǁĐĂƌĞĞƌůĂĚĚĞƌ ? ?(Dean/HOD 8) 
More typically it was being a head of department that was the turning point.  Although this 
expĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĐŽƵůĚďĞ “ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞůǇŽĨĨ-ƉƵƚƚŝŶŐ ?ĨŽƌƐŽŵĞ ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐĞŶũŽǇĞĚŝƚĂŶĚĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĞǇ
were suited to academic management (Dean/HOD 5).   
 “zŽƵƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĂƐǇŽƵŐŽĂůŽŶŐŵĂŬĞƐĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƚŽǇŽƵƌĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞŶ
ŽŶ ? ?(Dean/HOD 5) 
Only one academic manager says he started out with a senior management role in mind. 
 “/ĂůǁĂǇƐĞǆƉĞĐƚĞĚŵǇĐĂƌĞĞƌƚŽďĞŝŶŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?/ƐƚĂƌƚĞĚĨƌŽŵĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨŶŽƚ
ǁĂŶƚŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞƚĞůůŝŶŐŵĞǁŚĂƚƚŽĚŽ ? ?(Dean/HOD 10) 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŵŽƐƚĞŶũŽǇŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂŶĚ “ůŝŬĞƌƵŶŶŝŶŐƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ?
 “/ ?ŵĂƉĞƌƐŽŶŽĨƐƚƌŽŶŐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶƐĂŶĚůŝŬĞůĞĂĚŝŶŐ ? ?(Dean/HOD 10) 
On the whole, these academic third tier managers are an ambitious group and most aspire 
to climb the next rung up the academic management ladder.  Part of the appeal of the 
WsƌŽůĞŝƐƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽǁŽƌŬĂƚĂƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĐůĞǀĞůĂŶĚ “ŵĂŬĞĂŶŝŵƉĂĐƚ ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K
 ? ? ?KŶĞŝƐŵŽƚŝǀĂƚĞĚďǇƚŚĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĚŽŝŶŐ “ĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŬŝŶĚŽĨũŽď ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ?
Another mentions the big financial incentive of an executive team role (Dean/HOD 1).   
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Two say they had good research credentials, but wish to move on from a research role. 
 “/ ?ŵŶĞĂƌŝŶŐƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨŵǇĚĂǇƐďĞŝŶŐZ&-able and have no burning desire to carry 
ŽŶŵǇƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ? ?(Dean/HOD 3) 
 “/ ?ǀĞƌĞĂůŝƐĞĚĂůŝĨĞŽĨƐĐŚŽůĂƌůǇĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚĨŽƌŵĞ ? ?(Dean/HOD 6) 
Most are fairly sanguine about the fact that, in taking on a DPVC role, they would be giving 
up on their research career.  In fact, most feel they have already made this decision and are 
happy not to go back to the ranks. 
 “/ĐŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŐŽďĂĐŬƚŽĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƌŽůĞ ?/ŵĂĚĞĂĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶǁŚĞŶ/ďĞĐĂŵĞĚĞĂŶƚŽ
ĐƌŽƐƐƚŚĞZƵďŝĐŽŶĂŶĚďĞĐŽŵĞĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌĂŶĚĂůĞĂĚĞƌ ? ?(Dean/HOD 10)  
 “/ƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĂďŝƚďŽƌŝŶŐĂŶĚĂŶŶŽǇŝŶŐŚĂǀŝŶŐŽƚŚĞƌƉĞŽƉůĞŵĂŬĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶƐĨŽƌǇŽƵ ? ?
(Dean/HOD 4) 
 “'ŽŝŶŐďĂĐŬŝŶĂŵŽŶŐƐƚƉĞŽƉůĞǇŽƵǁĞƌĞŵĂŶĂŐŝŶŐǁŽƵůĚŵĞĂŶĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƉĞƌƐŽŶĂů
ĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ ? ?(Dean/HOD 5) 
Nevertheless, the primary identity of academic managers at this level remains that of an 
academic.  In response to the online survey question
56
, the overwhelming majority (82%) of 
deans and heads of department describe themselves primarily as academics.  Only nine of 
85 (11%) see themselves primarily as managers, while a further three see themselves as 
both academics and managers. 
In terms of their future career progression, the opening up of DPVC posts to external open 
competition has benefited these third tier academic managers by making jobs outside their 
own institution available.   Most are taking full advantage.  Only three of the ten of the 
interview participants are not already in the process of applying for a more senior 
management role: one because he is close to retirement and ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚĞŶũŽǇƚŚĞ “ŵĞĞƚ-
and-ŐƌĞĞƚƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐŝĚĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐĂs ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ?, the second because family 
commitments mean she is not able to relocate, and the third because he has just stepped 
down from a head of school role and is still considering his options.   
Of the remainder, five have already applied for DPVC jobs mostly in other institutions, two 
successfully.  Interestingly, both of the successful candidates are men and two of the 
unsuccessful ones are women. The sixth (a woman) has just been promoted from head of 
                                                          
56
 Response options were: academic, manager or other. 
Susan Shepherd                                         Chapter Five: Drivers and Outcomes of Change 
153 
 
department to interim head of school and would like to be a DPVC.  The final participant, 
who is dean of a large faculty and a member of the executive management team, has 
already applied for two vice chancellor positions.   
 “/ĂŵĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐĂŶĚǁŽƵůĚůŝŬĞƚŽďĞĂs ?/ ?ĚďĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽŵĂŬĞĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŝŵƐƚĞƉ
on the way to becoming a VC but one which offers me more scope than my current 
ƌŽůĞĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽƚŵĂŶǇ ? ?(Dean/HOD 10) 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ďŽƚŚŚĞĂŶĚĂĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚƚŚĂƚŝƚǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞ “ƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ?
(Dean/HOD 3) if they did not make it to the top job.   
 “dŚĞƚƌƵƚŚŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƚ ?ƐŚŝŐŚůǇĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞĂŶĚŵĂǇďĞǇŽƵƌĞĂĐŚĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůůĞǀĞů ? ?
(Dean/HOD 8) 
6.1.2 Online Survey Respondents 
The online survey provides a picture of the career aspirations of a wider population of 85 
academic third tier managers.  This data reveals that over four out of ten (compared to 
seven out of ten for the interview participants) indicate some likelihood of applying for a 
DPVC post in future, with little overall difference between the genders: 45% for men and 
43% for women (Table 13).    
 
Table 13 PdŚŝƌĚdŝĞƌĐĂĚĞŵŝĐDĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?>ŝŬĞůŝŚŽŽĚŽĨƉƉůǇŝŶŐĨŽƌĂWsWŽƐƚ 
Response Option Male (n=64) Female (n=21) 
 Number % Number % 
Very Likely 14 21.9 6 28.6 
Somewhat Likely 15 23.4 3 14.3 
Somewhat Unlikely 10 15.6 3 14.3 
Very Unlikely 20 31.2 8 38.1 
Would Rather Not Say 2 3.1 0 0 
ŽŶ ?ƚ<ŶŽǁ 3 4.7 1 4.8 
 
 
Just over half of women (52%) and just under half of men (47%) say they are unlikely to 
apply for a PVC post in future.  However, a slightly higher proportion of women (29%) than 
men (22%) say they are very likely to apply.  These findings suggest that there is no lack of 
female ambition at this level.   
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Nevertheless, a slightly higher proportion of male than female academic third tier 
managers have already submitted an application for a DPVC job (Table 14).  The gender 
difference is not marked in relation to applications within the resƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ŽǁŶ
institutions (16% versus 14%), but over double the proportion of men than women have 
applied for a DPVC post in another pre-1992 university: 22% compared to 9%.  Men are 
thus more likely to have applied for a DPVC job in another university than their own, whilst 
the reverse is true for women. 
 
Table 14 PdŚŝƌĚdŝĞƌĐĂĚĞŵŝĐDĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?WsƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĂƚĞ 




 Number % Number % 
Own University 10 15.6 3 14.3 
Other Pre-1992 University 14 21.9 2 9.5 
 
 
All thirteen ĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐŵĂĚĞĨŽƌWsƉŽƐƚƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚƐ ?ŽǁŶuniversity reached 
at least the long listing stage and five made it on to the short list.  One man and one 
woman were offered DPVC jobs.  Applications to another pre-1992 institution were 
somewhat less successful, with seven of the sixteen long listed and five short listed.  None 
resulted in a job offer.   
In terms of future career aspirations, academic third tier managers who indicate they are 
ůŝŬĞůǇƚŽĂƉƉůǇĨŽƌĂWsƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶǀŝĞǁƚŚŝƐĂƐ “ĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůĐĂƌĞĞƌƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚĂƐ
offering a new and welcome challenge.   Those not considering applying do not see the 
DPVC role as an attractive prospect, typically because they want to retain an academic 
career. 
 “,ŽƌƌŝĨŝĐũŽďƐƚŚĂƚďůŽĐŬĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ? 
 “/ƉƌĞĨĞƌƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƌŽůĞƚŽƚŚĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůƌŽůĞ ? ? 
The other main determining factor is age, with all respondents 61 and over considering 
themselves too old to take the next step up the ladder.  The vast majority (82%) of those 
indicating some likelihood of applying for a DPVC role in future were between 41 and 60 
years of age.     
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6.2 Professional Services Managers 
6.2.1 Interview Participants 
The seven professional services managers interviewed are all specialists, in human resource 
management, research services, marketing and communications, and commercial services.  
All have extensive experience working in either the public or private sector, or both.  Five 
came into their posts directly from outside higher education and two via a post in another 
university.   
>ŝŬĞĚĞĂŶƐĂŶĚŚĞĂĚƐŽĨĚĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐĂŶĚ “ĐĂƌĞĞƌĚƌŝǀĞŶ ? ?W^D ? ? ?KŶĞ
ŽĨƚŚĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐŝƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƐĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚĞĂŵŝŶ
his current role and a further three aspire to a job at this next tier of management.  
However, unlike their academic counterparts, they see little realistic prospect of 
advancement within higher education.  The overall impression is of a professional ceiling 
for non-academic managers. 
 “ƐĂƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐĚŝƌĞĐƚŽƌ ?ǁŚĂƚĐĂŶǇŽƵĚŽŶĞǆƚ ? ?(R 7) 
The only promotion opportunity available within a university for professional services 
managers is said to be that of registrar. 
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶ ?ƚƌĞĂůůǇĂƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶǁŝƚŚŝŶ,ĞǆĐĞƉƚĂƐƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƌ ? ?(PSM 4) 
However, this role holds little appeal for any of the interview participants who would prefer 
to stay within their own specialism.  Not all want to be a DPVC either.  For one manager, 
who is already on the executive team, becoming a DPVC would not be a promotion.  In fact, 
ŚĞĂƌŐƵĞƐŝƚ “ĐŽƵůĚďĞĂĚŝƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞ ?ƐŝŶĐĞŝƚŝƐĂƌŽůĞƚŚĂƚŝƐŶŽƚǁĞůůƵnderstood outside 
ƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ “ŵŝŐŚƚŶŽƚĂůůŽǁŵĞƚŽĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞŵǇƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƚĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐ ?ƚŽ
non-ŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĞŵƉůŽǇĞƌƐ ?W^D ? ? ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞŵƉůĂƚŝŶŐǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚ “ƚŽ
ƌĞĚƌĞƐƐƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨǁŽƌŬ ?ĂŶĚƌĞĚƵĐĞŚĞƌŚŽƵƌƐ ?W^D ? ? ?
For the remainder, a DPVC role within their specialist portfolio is seen as an attractive 
career option and two aspire to such a role. 
 “tŚĞƚŚĞƌƚŚŝƐŝƐƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐŽƌŶŽƚŝƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŵĂƚƚĞƌ ? ?(PSM 7) 
Others, however, have already dismissed the possibility. 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐŽƉƚŝŽŶƚŽďĞĐŽŵĞĂWs ? ?(PSM 4) 
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 “/ĂŵŶŽƚĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŽWsƌŽůĞƐĂƌĞŽƵƚ ? ?(PSM 2) 
Although they are all aware that DPVC posts are now being externally advertised, none has 
submitted an application.  One has received approaches from executive search agents 
about DPVC roles, but not pursued them.  This same manager is the only one who believes 
that the opening up of DPVC posts to external open competition has benefited him. 
 “ǆƚĞƌŶĂůƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚŝƐĂŐŽŽĚƚŚŝŶŐĨŽƌŵĞĂƐŝƚ ?ƐĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚŵy chances of getting 
a PVC job  W ƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽǁŵŽƌĞƉŽƐƚƐƚŽĐŚŽŽƐĞĨƌŽŵ ? ?(PSM 7) 
For the remainder, the change to DPVC appointment practice has been of no direct benefit. 
 “dŚĞŵŽǀĞƚŽĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂĚǀĞƌƚŝƐĞŵĞŶƚŚĂƐŶŽƚĞŶŚĂŶĐĞĚƚŚĞĐŚĂŶĐĞƐŽĨŶŽŶ-
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂWsƌŽůĞ ?/ƚ ?ƐĂĐůŽƐĞĚƐŚŽƉ ? ?(PSM 4) 
/ƚŝƐĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂ “ĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŽƌǇ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽWsƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚůŝŵŝƚƐƚŚĞ
roles to researchers or those with academic credibility (PSM 2). 
 “dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐĂƉƌĞƉŽŶĚĞƌĂŶĐĞŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂƚƚŽƉƚĞĂŵůĞǀĞů ?dŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚǀŝĞǁ
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐƉĞŽƉůĞĂƐĐƌĞĚŝďůĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĨŽƌĂWsƌŽůĞ ? ?(PSM 1) 
dŚŝƐǀŝĞǁǁĂƐďŽƌŶĞŽƵƚďǇĂƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƌ ?Z ? ?ǁŚŽŐĂǀĞƚŚĞĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨĂ “ǀĞƌǇƐƚƌŽŶŐ ?
professional services manager who had applied for a DPVC job at his own institution.  
Although this individual was taken sufficiently seriously to be given an interview, he was 
ŶŽƚĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐǁŚŽŐŽƚƚŚĞũŽď “ǁas nowhere near as 
ĐƌĞĚŝďůĞ ?ŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨƚŚĞƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐƉŽƌƚĨŽůŝŽ ?ŶŽƚŚĞƌƌĞŐŝƐƚƌĂƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐŚĂǀŝŶŐŽŶĞŽƌƚǁŽ
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐŝŶŚŝƐƚĞĂŵ “ǁŚŽĐŽƵůĚǁŽƌŬĂƚďŽĂƌĚůĞǀĞů ?ďƵƚƚŚĞǇǁŽƵůĚ
ŶŽƚďĞĂůůŽǁĞĚƚŽ ? ?Z ? ? ?
Most would consider moving to a more senior post outside higher education.  This is partly 
because they realise that their chances of promotion within the sector are very small and 
partly a positive career choice.   
 “/ĂŵŽƉĞŶƚŽŝĚĞĂƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĨƵƚƵƌĞ ?ůŝŬĞĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐƐĞĐƚŽƌƐĂŶĚĐĂn adapt my kit 
ďĂŐĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ? ?(PSM 3)   
  “>ĂĐŬŽĨŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇŝƐŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇĂƉƌŽďůĞŵĂƐ/ǁŽƵůĚƉƌŽďĂďůǇŶŽƚǁĂŶƚƚŽ
ƐƚĂǇŝŶ,ĨŽƌĞǀĞƌĂŶǇǁĂǇ ? ?(PSM 2)    
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6.2.2 Online Survey Participants 
The view that there is no point in a non-academic making an application for a DPVC post is 
shared by the overwhelming majority of the 47 professional services managers responding 
to the online survey.  There have only been two applications for a DPVC position to date, 
both made by men (Table 15).  Of these, the applicĂƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚĞŶƚ ?ƐŽǁŶ
institution was successful and the one to another institution was not. 
 





 Number % Number % 
Own University 1 3.2 0 0.0 
Other Pre-1992 University 1 3.2 0 0.0 
 
 
Not surprisingly given the perceived professional ceiling, around two thirds of professional 
services managers are unlikely to make a DPVC application in future: 68% for men and 63% 
for women (Table 16).  Moreover, the largest proportion of both men and women indicate 
that they are very unlikely to apply.   
The overwhelming reason given by professional services managers for not having made, or 
not planning to make, an application for a DPVC position is that they are not academics. 
 “Ɛ/ĂŵŶŽƚĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ/ĚŽŶ ?ƚƚŚŝŶŬ/ ?ĚŐĞƚĂůŽŽŬŝŶ ? ? 
 “/ĂŵŶŽƚĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĂŶĚ/ƚŚŝŶŬƚŚĂƚ ?ƐĂŵĂũŽƌďĂƌƌŝĞƌ ? ?
 “dŚĞƐĞƌŽůĞƐĂƌĞŝŶǀĂƌŝĂďůǇƐƚĞĞƌĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚ/ĨƵůůǇŵĂƚĐŚ
the skillset required and head hunters often ask my advice on suitable ACADEMIC 
ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ? ?
Nevertheless, some do still indicate that they are likely to apply for a DPVC role in future.  
Though numbers are small, there are a higher proportion of women than men in this group.  
Overall, however, the proportion of professional services third tier managers indicating 
that they are likely to make a DPVC job application in future is less than half of that of their 
academic counterparts: 21% compared to 45%.   
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This chapter has presented data in support of the contention that the DPVC appointment 
model is changing and in answer to the first two empirical research questions. 
These findings show that over 70% of pre-1992 English universities have externally 
advertised at least one DPVC post over the last eight years and the number of institutions 
doing so is growing year on year.  In most cases, a mixed appointment model is in 
operation with the decision on appointment method made on a case-by-case basis.  The 
use of executive search agencies is also now commonplace.   
Being a DPVC is increasingly a full-time job.  Despite the adoption of external open 
competition, most DPVCs are in post for a fixed term with a permanent underlying 
academic contract.  In practice the term of office may be a bit of an irrelevance, though a 
fixed term retains a symbolic importance in signalling that DPVCs come from  W and will 
return to  W the academic ranks.  New executive variants of the DPVC role are emerging: the 
more senior DVC, or provost; the DPVC/Dean; and DPVCs with executive management 
responsibility for one or more professional services directorates.  DPVC portfolios are also 
expanding into new functional areas. 
Vice chancellors are the primary drivers of change to an external open competition 
appointment model and they are motivated first and foremost by a desire to secure the 
best candidates for the jobs in order to improve the quality of university management.  
External competition for a DPVC post is more likely where there is an identified skills gap, a 





 Number % Number % 
Very Likely 0 0.0 2 12.5 
Somewhat Likely 7 22.6 3 18.8 
Somewhat Unlikely 7 22.6 3 18.8 
Very Unlikely 14 45.2 7 43.8 
Would Rather Not Say 1 3.2 1 6.2 
ŽŶ ?ƚ<ŶŽǁ 2 6.5 0 0.0 
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agenda.  It is seen as a useful means of testing and validating internal candidates against 
the market.  
The profile of serving DPVCs has changed little over the years: DPVCs remain 
predominantly white, male professors.  The adoption of external open competition has 
impacted the profile of successful DPVC candidates in two main ways.  Firstly, it has had an 
adverse effect on the proportion of women being appointed.  Secondly, it has led to a 
firming up of the academic management route into the role, with DPVCs appointed by 
means of external open competition nearly twice as likely as those appointed via an 
internal-only process to have already held a DPVC post.  Moreover, there has been no rise 
in the proportion of non-academic appointments either from inside or outside higher 
education.  Overall then the opening up of DPVC posts has led to a narrowing, rather than a 
diversification, in the profile of those getting DPVC jobs. 
However, although the demographic profile of DPVCs shows remarkable continuity, it 
disguises real change in the motivations and attitudes of the newly created group of DPVCs 
appointed by external open competition.  On the whole, these are highly ambitious 
individuals  W many aiming for a vice chancellor job  W who have made an active decision to 
take an academic management route and are making strategic career decisions.   
Being a DPVC is a more demanding and managerial role than hitherto and post holders are 
under increasing performance pressure.  Nevertheless, generally speaking, they are 
enjoying the role.  Although many retain an academic identity, which is seen as an 
important part of their ability to undertake the job, in practice they struggle to maintain 
their research activity.  Their primary loyalty is to the institution and the executive 
management team, particularly the vice chancellor who appointed them, rather than to 
ĂŶǇĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵĞŶĐǇĂŶĚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽďĞǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐ ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ďǇƚŚĞ
academic community. 
These factors in combination serve to make a return to the academic ranks at the end of a 
DPVC term increasingly untenable, as well as unattractive.  Exit strategies can thus be 
difficult, especially for those who are younger and/or no longer research active.  Though 
most of these DPVCs desire to climb further up the academic management ladder, this will 
not be possible for everyone.  Even mid-term, DPVCs may be vulnerable to a change of vice 
chancellor since this is liable to instigate a review of portfolios or the wider executive 
management team structure and composition.  There is then an increasing degree of 
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personal risk involved in taking on a DPVC role, albeit compensated for by a generous 
salary.  
Third tier academic managers have had much the same career route into their current role 
and tend to share the same aspirations as DPVCs.  Many aim to climb the academic 
management ladder to DPVC roles and beyond.  Indeed, a number have already submitted 
applications for a DPVC post, in some cases successfully.  There would appear to be no lack 
of ambition from female academic managers.  In fact, a higher proportion of women than 
men indicate that they are very likely to apply for a DPVC role in future.   
Professional services managers on the other hand have not benefited in the same way from 
the opening up of DPVC posts to external competition.  Even if they aspire to become a 
DPVC, they realise that the role is not currently open to non-academic candidates.  The 
overwhelming majority have therefore chosen not to apply, though one in five still says 
they are likely to submit an application in future. 
This chapter has presented findings which demonstrate the extent of the change to DPVC 
appointment model, explain the case for change and illustrate its consequences for the 
DPVC profile and the careers of current and aspiring DPVCs.  The next chapter builds upon 
these findings in addressing the practical implications of change for management capacity 
builĚŝŶŐ ?ŚĂƉƚĞƌ^ĞǀĞŶƚŚĞŶĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐƚŚĞƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĨŽƌ
managerialism as ideology and academic-manager power relations.   








research questions, this chapter addresses the first of the analytical questions on the 
practical implications of changed DPVC appointment practice for management capacity 
building (Q.3).  In so doing, it both presents new data and begins the process of analysis.  
This analysis is then continued in Chapter Seven, which answers the remaining two 
research ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐƌĞůĂƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂů concerns (Q.4 and Q.5). 
The first part of the chapter presents data on key aspects of changed DPVC appointment 
practice, including the use of executive search agencies, and considers their implications.  
In particular, the impact of change in relation to gender is discussed and a number of 
possible explanations are explored for why the adoption of external open competition has 
led to a narrowing in the profile of those getting the jobs: the framing of the posts, social 
closure, conservatism and homosociability.  The concept of meritocracy is then analysed 
and the theory advanced that it provides a means of justifying the maintenance of the 
status quo at the expense of diversity.  Finally, an assessment is made of whether or not 
the adoption of external open competition has been change for the better in terms of 
management capacity building. 
 
2. Consequences of Change 
This section analyses the main outcomes of change to DPVC appointment practice, 
including a discussion of perceived advantages and disadvantages.   
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2.1 Choice of Appointment Method 
As outlined in the previous chapter, the majority of pre-1992 universities are now utilising 
an external open competition appointment method for at least one of their DPVC posts and 
approximately one third of the 2013 cohort were appointed by these means.  This is a 
growing trend and one which looks set to continue.  It is anticipated that more DPVCs 
within more institutions will be appointed via external open competition in the coming 
years.  This is in part due to the tendency of universities to follow peer group institutions 
ǀŝĂ “ĐĂƐƵĂůďĞŶĐŚŵĂƌŬŝŶŐ ?(Tourish 2011), i.e. copying what others are doing based on the 
assumption that, since a particular practice is being widely adopted, it must work.   
More fundamentally, it reflects that fact that the case for change made by vice chancellors 
(Chapter Five, 3) is likely to become even more compelling as the demands on university 
management intensify.   Vice chancellors, often appointed on a change mandate and under 
pressure to improve university rankings, will probably be keener than ever to bring in new 
ďůŽŽĚ ?Ŷ “ĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞǀŝĞǁ ?ŽĨŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ57 holds that external appointees can more 
easily initiate and implement change than insiders (Cannella & Lubatkin 1993, p. 765) and 
so external appointments at the top are more likely where the organisation is deemed to 
be underperforming (Hambrick & Mason 1984).  External appointments may in turn lead to 
further external appointments, thus introducing a self-perpetuating aspect to change.   
Only four pre-1992 universities have adopted an external open competition model as a 
matter of policy for all their DPVC appointments, although there is some evidence to 
suggest this is becoming the default option in a few others.  Nevertheless, most vice 
chancellors do not see wholesale adoption of an external open competition model of DPVC 
recruitment as desirable.   Indeed, one goes so far as to suggest that such an approach 
ǁŽƵůĚďĞ “ǀĞƌǇĚŝƐŵŝƐƐŝǀĞŽĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?ĂŶĚ “ĂŶĂĚŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŽĨĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ? ?s ? ? ? ?
Rather it is anticipated that the current mixed appointment model, in which vice 
chancellors make pragmatic case-by-case decisions on which method to use, will continue 
to predominate.   
                                                          
57
 dŚŝƐŝƐĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶ “ŝŶĞƌƚŝĂǀŝĞǁ ? ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇůĂƌŐĞŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐĐůŝŶŐƚŽŽƵƚĚĂƚĞĚ
administrative forms and resist outsider selections even in a dynamic environment and despite poor 
performance.  This provides an interesting perspective both on why some pre-1992 universities have 
retained an internal secondment DPVC appointment model, and on why nearly all pre-1992s have 
resisted the selection of outsider appointments in the sense of those from outside higher education.  




institutional knowledge.  There is a danger in going wholeheartedly for one or other 
ŵŽĚĞů ? ?(VC 11) 
A mixĞĚŵŽĚĞůŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽŽĨĨĞƌ “ƚŚĞďĞƐƚŽĨďŽƚŚǁŽƌůĚƐ ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ?ƐŝŶĐĞ
it permits institutions to keep open the internal promotion route, without being dependent 
ƵƉŽŶŝƚ ?ǇƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐƚŚŝƐ “ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƌŽƵƚĞƚŽƚŚĞƚŽƉ ?ĂŵďŝƚŝŽƵƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐƚĂĨĨwithin an 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĐĂŶƐĞĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐ “ŶŽƚĂŐůĂƐƐĐĞŝůŝŶŐƚŚĞǇĐĂŶŶŽƚƌŝƐĞĂďŽǀĞ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ? 
2.2 Internal Staff and Succession Management 
As data from this study shows, good internal candidates can  W and in a third of cases, do - 
get externally advertised DPVC jobs.  Nevertheless, the opening up of DPVC posts to 
external competition has limited the overall chances of someone from within the 
institution securing a position.  The fact that two thirds of the jobs go to external 
ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐŝƐƵŶƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐŐŝǀĞŶƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ “ŝŶŵŽƐƚĐĂƐĞƐ ?ƚŚĞ
ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽĂƉƉŽŝŶƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĨƌŽŵŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ ? ?^ ? ? ? 
It is not normally part of an executive search aŐĞŶĐǇ ?ƐďƌŝĞĨƚŽƐĞĞŬŽƵƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ?
although if internals do apply they are said to be assessed in the same way as all other 
candidates (ESA 3).  Opinion is divided as to whether or not an internal candidate is at an 
advantage, although it appears that sometimes an institution will tell an executive search 
ĂŐĞŶĐǇ “ŝƚŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞŽŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƌƚůŝƐƚĨŽƌƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƌĞĂƐŽŶƐ ? ?^ ? ? ?
One potential downside of external open competition is that, now universities can bring in 
experienced DPVCs from elsewhere, they may not be investing sufficient effort in the 
development of internal talent or in succession management, i.e. the systematic 
identification, nurturing and development of those individuals with high potential.   
 “hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐŶĞĞĚƚŽƚĂŬĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŵĞŶƚŽƌŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? ?
(VC 18) 
In the private sector, the identification and grooming of an heir apparent is considered by 
stakeholders as a key responsibility of the chief executive (Cannella & Lubatkin 1993).  
However, in general it is felt that universities are not very good at developing people with 
the potential to be future leaders. 
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 “hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞs are astonishingly profligate and unsupportive of management talent. 
They need to be identifying people, training them, mentoring them and finding 
ĐĂƌĞĞƌĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌƚŚĞŵ ?(Dean/HOD 10) 
These findings accord with those from two recent studies.  The first found little or no 
evidence of formal succession management policies and processes for DPVC positions 
(Spendlove 2007).  The second showed that, despite recognising the importance of 
succession management, few executive management teams pay it any attention 
(Woodfield & Kennie 2007).  Accordingly, the authors conclude that a more explicit and 
systematic approach to identifying talented staff and providing them with structured 
training and development opportunities is required.   
2.3 Staff Mobility 
The introduction of an external open competition DPVC appointment model has increased 
staff mobility.  This is perceived to have both advantages and disadvantages, with the 
former outweighing the latter.   
 “/ŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚũŽďŵŽďŝůŝƚǇŝƐĂŐŽŽĚƚŚŝŶŐĨŽƌŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ? ?(DPVC 23) 
On the one hand, senior managers get the opportunity to gain experience in more than one 
institution and, on the other, institutions get the benefit of new ideas and expertise to help 
them meet future challenges.  Research in the private sector has shown that at a time of 
change longstanding service inside an organisation is unlikely to be a good thing for either 
ƉƌŽĨŝƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽƌŐƌŽǁƚŚƐŝŶĐĞ “ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐǁŚŽŚĂǀĞƐƉĞŶƚƚŚĞŝƌĞŶƚŝƌĞĐĂƌĞĞƌƐŝŶŽŶĞ
organization can bĞĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇůŝŵŝƚĞĚƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞƐ ?(Hambrick & Mason 
1984, p. 200).  If the entire team are insiders, they are likely to have a very restricted 
knowledge base to deal with radical change and therefore external appointments would 
appear to make good business sense. 
On the other hand, increased staff mobility can lead to a loss of continuity and 
 “ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞŵŽƌǇ ? ?s ? ?ĂŶĚŚĂve an initial destabilising effect.  Moreover, there 
ĂƌĞƐŽŵĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌ “ũŽďŚŽƉƉŝŶŐ ? ?s ? ? ?ǁŝƚŚWsƐĐŽŵŝŶŐŝŶĂƐ
 “ĂƐƚĞƉƉŝŶŐƐƚŽŶĞ ?ƚŽĂďĞƚƚĞƌũŽďĂŶĚ “ŶŽƚƐƚĂǇŝŶŐĂƌŽƵŶĚƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚƐŽĨǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇ
have done become apparent ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ? 
 “^ŚŽƌƚ-ƚĞƌŵƐƚĂŬĞŚŽůĚĞƌƐŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂƌĞƚŽďĞĂǀŽŝĚĞĚ ? ?(Dean/HOD 8) 
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Either way, individuals with academic management ambitions are realising the value of 
moving institution in order to gain experience and enhance their employability.   
 “/ďĞůŝĞǀĞĚŝƚǁŽƵůĚďĞƐĞŶƐŝďůĞƚŽŵŽǀĞƚŽĞǆƉĂŶĚŵǇs ? ?(DPVC 22) 
This demonstrates the growing importance of external, as opposed to internal, career 
capital (Floyd & Dimmock 2011).  The first relates to knowledge and experience 
accumulated in one ?ƐŽǁŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚƚŽƚŚĂƚŐĂŝŶĞĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞ ?dŚĞĨĂĐƚ
that the latter has become increasingly important in relation to DPVC appointments has 
implications in terms of equity.  Not all aspiring DPVCs, especially ones with family 
commitments, are able to move institutions to grow their career capital and/or gain 
promotion elsewhere.  Although this is not a new problem, it is one which is becoming 
more pertinent at DPVC level given both the increased expectation that DPVCs will have 
worked in more than one university and the reduced opportunity for promotion within 
ŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? 
2.4 Executive Search Agencies 
The involvement of executive search agencies in the appointment of senior university 
managers is a relatively new phenomenon.  However, uptake of their services during the 
last few years has been rapid and, as this study shows, they are now used for over half of 
externally advertised DPVC posts.  Nevertheless, opinion about the value search agencies 
bring to DPVC appointments is deeply divided, ranging from ringing endorsement to deep 
cynicism.  This section discusses some of the perceived pros and cons.  The issue of 
executive search agencies and gender is addressed in 3.1. 
2.4.1 Perceived Benefits 
The main reason that vice chancellors elect to use executive search agencies is because 
they can undertake a breadth of search that universities themselves have neither the time 
nor resource for. 
   “dŚĞǇĂƌĞƚŚĞŽŶůǇǁĂǇƚŽŐĞƚƚŽƚŚĞďĞƐƚĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ? ?(VC1) 
The comprehensive nature of the search has the added benefit of reassuring the governing 
ďŽĚǇ “ĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞƌŝŐŽƵƌŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ? ?s ? ? ?hƐŝŶŐĂŶĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶĐǇŝƐ
regarded as a means of demonstrating due diligence with respect to checking out the 
ďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚŽĨƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƚŚƵƐ “ŵŝƚŝŐĂƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝƐŬƐŽĨĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐĂŶ
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ƵŶŬŶŽǁŶ ? ?s ? ? ? ?DĂŶǇǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐĂůƐŽǀĂůƵĞƚŚĞŝŶĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚ ?ĚŝƐƉĂƐƐŝŽŶĂƚĞĂŶĚ
 “ŽďũĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐƚŚĞǇŐĞƚĨƌŽŵƐĞĂƌĐŚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐ ?s ? ? ? 
 “dŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŐŽŽĚũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŽĨĞĂĐŚĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ? ? 
 (VC 4) 
In essence, employing an executive search agency is seen both as a means of managing the 
risk of making a poor appointment and as a form of protection from getting the 
appointment process wrong with respect to equal opportunities. 
 “hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞĂůůƐŽǁŽƌƌŝĞĚĂďŽƵƚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞŚŽƉŝŶŐ
to outsource the issue by using head huŶƚĞƌƐ ? ?(VC 24) 
dŚŝƐƐĂŵĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌůŝŬĞŶƐƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƵƐŝŶŐĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚŽ
outsourcing their cleaning services:  
 “/ĨǇŽƵŐĞƚĐŽŵƉůĂŝŶƚƐǇŽƵĐĂŶĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞĐůĞĂŶŝŶŐĐŽŵƉĂŶǇ ?ŽƌŽŽŵƐŐĞƚĂŶǇ
cleaner?  No. You may be suspicious the cleaning company is employing illegal 
ǁŽƌŬĞƌƐĂŶĚǇŽƵĂƌĞĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝŶŐŽƵƚƚŚŝƐƌŝƐŬ ? ?(VC 24) 
Such an approach has its downsides.  ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐŚĂǀĞďĞĐŽŵĞ “ĂĐŽŵĨŽƌƚ
ďůĂŶŬĞƚ ? ?s ? ? ?ĨŽƌƐŽŵĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐǁŚŝĐŚĂƌĞƐĂŝĚƚŽďĞŚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƚŽŽŵƵĐŚĐŽŶƚƌŽů ? 
 “zŽƵĂƌĞŽƵƚƐŽƵƌĐŝŶŐƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚƚŚĞƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝď ůŝƚǇ ? ?(VC 4) 
Another major reason why universities are turning to executive search agencies is because 
they are aware they cannot rely on an advertisement alone to find the best candidates.  
With executive search agents now established in the higher education recruitment market, 
ŝƚŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞ “ĂƉŽŝŶƚŽĨƉƌŝĚĞ ? ?s ? ? ?ƚŚĂƚƐĞŶŝŽƌƉĞŽƉůĂƌĞŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽĂƉƉůǇ
for a post directly.   
 “WĞŽƉůĞĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽĂĚƐĂŶǇŵŽƌĞ W ƚŚĞǇĞǆƉĞĐƚƚŽďĞĐŽŶƚĂĐƚĞĚĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇ ? ? 
 (VC 1) 
 “/ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚĚƌĞĂŵŽĨĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐĚŝƌĞĐƚůǇĨŽƌĂƐĞŶŝŽƌƉŽƐƚ ? ?(DPVC 11) 
The use of executive search agencies thus offers universities the ability to reach candidates 
they could not access via an advertisement.   
 “'ŽŽĚƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞĂůƌĞĂĚǇŝŶƐĞĐƵƌĞƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ?WŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůWsƐĂƌĞŶŽƚůŽŽŬŝŶŐ ?ďƵƚ
waiting ? ?(PSM 3)  




ĂŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ďƵƚƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞ ? ?(VC 8)  
ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐ “ŬŶŽǁƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽĂƌĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶŵŽǀŝŶŐ ? ?s ? ?ĂŶĚĞǆĐĞů
 “ĂƚǁŝŶŬůŝŶŐƉĞŽƉůĞŽƵƚ ?ŽĨĞǆŝsting posts (VC 10).  They act as advocates for an institution 
ĂŶĚĐĂŶ “ĞŵďĂƌŬŽŶĂĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŽĨƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŽŐĞƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞƚŽĂƉƉůǇ ?s ? ? ? ?To use a 
ƐƉŽƌƚŝŶŐƚĞƌŵ ?ƚŚĞǇƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵĨŽƌƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐƚŽ ‘ƚĂƉƵƉ ?ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚĂŶĚĂƐƉŝƌŝŶŐ
DPVCs already in posts elsewhere.  It is in facilitating access to these candidates that 
executive search agencies provide most value-added to their university clients.   
The resulting recirculation of existing DPVCs, evidenced by this study, is made possible 
because there is both supply and demand in the market.  On the supply side, there are 
DPVCs interested in changing institutions either to gain external career capital via a 
sideways move or to secure a more senior role on their way to a vice-chancellorship.  A few 
DPVCs may also feel they need to move on either because they are coming to the end of 
their term or because the arrival of a new vice chancellor is imminent.  On the demand side, 
there are a number of universities wanting to hire experienced DPVCs.   
Search consultants are able to approach potential candidates and sound them out in a way 
ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŝƚƐĞůĨĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĞĂƐŝůǇĚŽ ?ƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞǇ “ĨŝůůĂůŝƚƚůĞŐĂƉ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂŶĚƚŚĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ?s ? ?ĂŶĚ “ĂĐƚĂƐĂŬŝŶĚŽĨĚĂƚŝŶŐĂŐĞŶĐǇ ? ?s7).  This can be 
ďĞŶĞĨŝĐŝĂůĨŽƌďŽƚŚƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĂůůŽǁŝŶŐĞĂĐŚĂŶ “ĂƌŵƐ-ůĞŶŐƚŚŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ?ƚŽĚŝƐĐƵƐƐƚŚĞƌŽůĞ
(DPVC 11) and ask the difficult questions they may not otherwise be able to do (DPVC 20).   
Good search consultants provide valuable feedback to caŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚĂĐƚ “ĂůŵŽƐƚĂƐĐĂƌĞĞƌ
ĂĚǀŝƐŽƌƐ ? ?s ? ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŝǀŝůĞŐĞĚ “ŝŶƚĞƌŵĞĚŝĂƌǇƌŽůĞ ? ?^ ? ?ĂůƐŽŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĞǇ
ĂƌĞĂďůĞƚŽĂƐŬƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐŽŶƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƐďĞŚĂůĨ “ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚĂƐŬ W 
ĂďŽƵƚĨĂŵŝůŝĞƐ ?ƐĐŚŽŽůƐĞƚĐ ? ? ?s ? ?ĂŶĚthis may be problematic from an equality and 
diversity perspective.   
EǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐĂĚŵŝƚƚŚĞǇĂƐŬĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĂďŽƵƚ “ƚŚĞƐŽĨƚĞƌƐƚƵĨĨ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐ
their motivations and personal circumstances with respect to moving location, though 
ŝŶƐŝƐƚ “ǁĞĚŽŶ ?ƚĂƐŬƚŚĞŵĂŶǇƚŚŝŶŐŝůůĞŐĂůŽƌĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŽƌǇ ? ?^ ? ? ?One consultant 
suggests that the information is largely volunteered by candidates because they feel it is to 
their advantage.  She gives the example of a female candidate who has been at the same 
institution for twenty years and tells the consultant that she stayed there because of her 
children.  This information is volunteered in order to demonstrate that staying in one 
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institution does not mean the candidate lacks ambition and to indicate that she is now able 
and ready to move on.  Another search consultant says that ?ŝŶŚĞƌĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? “ŵĂůĞ
candidates are just as likely as female ones to raise the issue of other things going on in 
their life  W ƚŚĞŝƌƉĂƌƚŶĞƌ ?ƐũŽď ?ĐŚŝůĚƌĞŶ ?ĂŐĞĚƉĂƌĞŶƚƐĂŶĚƐŽŽŶ ? ?^ ? ? ?dŚĞŝƐƐƵĞƐ
associated with the use of executive search agencies are thus rather more complex and 
nuanced than sometimes assumed in the literature.   
2.4.2 Perceived Disadvantages 
Although executive search agencies target a wider pool of potential applicants (typically 
120-150 initial contacts) than universities could, the outcome in terms of selection is 
nevertheless  “ŵŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚŝƐŚĂƐŚĂĚƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ “ŚŽŵŽŐĞŶŝƐŝŶŐƚŚĞƐĞŶŝŽƌ
ƚĞĂŵ ? ?s ? ? ?KŶĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚŽŶĞŝŶĞƋƵŝƚĂďůĞƐǇƐƚĞŵŽĨWsƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶ
(the tap-on-the-shoulder invitation model) may simply have given way to another, with 
ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶƚƐŶŽǁ “ŐŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞƚĂƉŽŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶsƐ ? ?s ? ? ? ? 
Previous studies on vice chancellor recruitment have concluded that executive search 
agencies are overly prescriptive in what ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞůŽŽŬŝŶŐĨŽƌĂŶĚƵƐĞƚŚŝƐĂƐĂ “ĨŝůƚĞƌƚŽ
ŵŝŶŝŵŝƐĞƚŚĞŝƌǁŽƌŬ ?(Breakwell & Tytherleigh 2008a, p. 41).  Such an approach makes it 
more difficult for non-standard candidates to succeed and is said to have led to the 
ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂ “ĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƌŽŽŵ ?ŽĨƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ ?ŵĂŝŶůǇĐŽŵƉƌŝƐŝŶŐ ? ?-
year-old men (Watson 2008, p. 10) ?/ŶtĂƚƐŽŶ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚŝƐŐƌŽƵƉŝƐďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐůĞƐƐ
diverse as younger, more interesting candidates drop out after being encouraged by 
executive search agencies to apply but not succeeding.   He suggests that individuals are 
 “ĞŝƚŚĞƌƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚůǇƐŝƚƚŝŶŐin the waiting room or constantly being begged and/or seduced 
ƚŽďĞƚŚĞƌĞ ?ďǇƐĞĂƌĐŚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽƉƵƚĂƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞƐŚŽƌƚůŝƐƚƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌ(2008, p. 10).  
/ŶŚŝƐǀŝĞǁ ?ŝƚŝƐŝŶƚŚĞĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐƚŽĨĞĞĚƚŚĞŝůůƵsion that everyone comes second so 
that they can be persuaded to put their names forward again.   
Data from this study confirm the lack of diversity in the candidate pool at DPVC level.  The 
degree to which this is solely the responsibility of executive search agencies is 
questionable, however, given that they are working to a person specification laid down by 
the university and it is the university that makes the selection decisions.  One vice 
ĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƐĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐƌĂƚŚĞƌĂƐ “ƐĞlecting agents, presenting 
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐƚŚĞǇǁĂŶƚƚŽƌĞĐĞŝǀĞ ? ?s ? ? ? 
The ĨŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĂůƐŽƌĞƐŽŶĂƚĞǁŝƚŚtĂƚƐŽŶ ?ƐƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĂůŽĨĂĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝǀĞǁĂŝƚŝŶŐƌŽŽŵŽĨ
potential candidates approached, occasionally relentlessly, by search consultants whose 
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ũŽďŝƚŝƐƚŽ “ĐŚĂƐĞĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?^ ? ? ?tŚŝůƐƚƐŽŵĞ ĨƚŚĞƐĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞ
waiting to be contacted, others are not necessarily looking to move.   In the latter case, one 
ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚĂĚŵŝƚƐ “ŝƚ ?ƐŽƵƌũŽďƚŽƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞƚŚĞŵ ? ?^ ? ? ? /ƚ comes as no surprise, 
therefore, that ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐĂƌĞĐƌŝƚŝĐŝƐĞĚĨŽƌĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂůŽƚŽĨ “ĐŚƵƌŶ ?ŝŶƚŚĞ
market (DPVC 13).  It is said that their presence  “ĐĂŶĐƌĞĂƚĞĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶŝŶĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐǁŚŽ
ŚĂĚŶŽƚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐĨŽƌĂƌŽůĞ ? ?s ? ? ? ? 
 “/ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ/ǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŽŵŽǀĞǁŚĞŶ/ǁĂƐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞĚ ? ?(VC 1) 
 “tŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŚƵŶƚĞƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ?/ǁŽƵůĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞ ƉƉůŝĞĚĨŽƌŵǇĐƵƌƌĞŶƚ
ũŽď ? ?(DPVC 6) 
The dominance of the higher education recruitment market by a small number of agencies 
is also a concern.  With just four agencies accounting for such a large share of senior 
management appointments (Shepherd 2011), it is debatable whether each search can be 
ŐĞŶƵŝŶĞůǇĨƌĞƐŚ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚĂŐĞŶƚƐŚĂǀĞĂǀĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶ “ŵŽǀŝŶŐƉůĂǇĞƌƐ
alonŐ ?(Watson 2008, p. 11).  Where one agency has multiple university clients there is also 
ƌĞĂůƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚƐŽĨŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĚĞƐƉŝƚĞĂŶ “ŽĨĨůŝŵŝƚƐ ?ƉŽůŝĐǇĨŽƌĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐůŝĞŶƚƐĂŶĚ
individual candidates (ESA 3).  One agency in particular, with a substantial market share, is 
seen to have become too influential in shaping the market and even individual careers.  
Finally, the use of executive search agencies can be off-putting for internal candidates who 
may view it as a signal that an institution wants to appoint someone from outside and that 
internal candidates are not encouraged to apply (Shine 2010).  This can result in well-
ƋƵĂůŝĨŝĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐŶŽƚĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐĨŽƌŽďǀŝŽƵƐĐĂƌĞĞƌŵŽǀĞƐ ?/ĨƐŽ ?ǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?
wish of testing internals against the market will not be realised  W or only partially so  W and 
the outcome may be a loss of morale amongst internal staff with management ambitions.  
2.4.3 No Viable Alternative 
Even though some vice chancellors and DPVCs are deeply sceptical about the value of 
executive search agencies, there is a growing sense that universities have no choice but to 
use them
58
.  Now that a DPVC recruitment market has been created, many believe that it is 
ŶŽƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽ “ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚŝƚ ? ?Ws ? ? ?ĂŶĚƐŽƵƐŝŶŐĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚ
the only viable option.   
                                                          
58
 It is worth noting here that two pre-1992 universities in the sample have decided to adopt an 
alternative approach: conducting their own internal search for a DPVC.  Although this was said to 
have required a large investment of time, in both cases it was deemed to have led to a good 
outcome. 
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 “/ĨǇŽƵŐŽĞǆƚĞƌŶĂů ?ŝƚ ?ƐĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚƚŽŝŵĂŐŝŶĞŶŽƚƵƐŝŶŐĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ƵŶůĞƐƐǇŽƵ
ŬŶĞǁǁŚŽǇŽƵǁĂŶƚĞĚ ? ?(VC 18) 
 “ŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞƚŽďĞǀĞƌǇďƌĂǀĞƚŽŵĂŬĞĂŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ
ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŵ ? ?(DPVC 6) 
Some participants described the ƵƐĞŽĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂƐ “ŽďůŝŐĂƚŽƌǇ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞ “ĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞ
ŝƐĚŽŝŶŐŝƚ ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ? 
 “WĞŽƉůĞďƵǇŝŶƚŽƵƐŝŶŐŚĞĂĚŚƵŶƚĞƌƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞĞǀĞƌǇŽŶĞĞůƐĞŝƐďƵǇŝŶŐŝŶƚŽŝƚ W ŝƚ ?ƐĂ
ďŝƚůŝŬĞƉǇƌĂŵŝĚƐĞůůŝŶŐ ? ?(VC 16) 
Not using an agency can be interpreted as signalling that an institution is either not that 
serious about a position or that it already has an internal candidate in mind (Registrar 3).   
dŚĞŽǀĞƌĂůůŝŵƉƌĞƐƐŝŽŶŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌƵƐĞŚĂƐďĞĐŽŵĞ “ƐĞůĨ-perpetuatinŐ ? ?s ? ? ?ĂŶĚ ?ĨŽƌ
some, a necessary evil. 
 “tŽƵůĚƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚďĞĂďĞƚƚĞƌƉůĂĐĞŝĨǁĞĚŝĚŶ ?ƚŚĂǀĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶƚƐ ?
WƌŽďĂďůǇǇĞƐ ?ďƵƚǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚƉƵƚƚŚĞŐĞŶŝĞďĂĐŬŝŶƚŚĞďŽƚƚůĞ ? ?(VC 6) 
 
3. Gender  
There is something of a mismatch between expectation and reality in terms of the effects 
external open competition is having on the number of female DPVCs being appointed.  A 
number of vice chancellors expected it to lead to more women being appointed and third 
tier managers were also confident about the potential benefits of change from an equality 
and diversity perspective.  The overwhelming majority (96%) surveyed agreed with the 
proposition that the adoption of external open competition for DPVC posts was likely to 
result in a diversification of the applicant pool
59
 and also lead to a fairer (70%) and more 
effective (67%) appointment process.   
Despite such optimism, WsƐƌĞŵĂŝŶ “ŽǀĞƌǁŚĞůŵŝŶŐůǇǁŚŝƚĞŵĞŶŽĨĂĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂŐĞĂŶĚĂ
ǀĞƌǇƵŶŝĨŽƌŵŐƌŽƵƉ ? ?s ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐƚŝůů “ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞĨĂĐĞƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞƚĂďůĞ ? (PSM 1).  
                                                          
59
 KŶĞĐĂǀĞĂƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŝŶƌĞƚƌŽƐƉĞĐƚ ?ƚŚĞǁŽƌĚŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞƐƵƌǀĞǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽƉƚŝŽŶĂƐĂ “ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂ “ǁŝĚĞŶŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞƉŽŽůŽĨĂƉƉůŝĐĂŶƚƐǁĂƐŶŽƚŽƉƚŝŵĂůĂƐŝƚŵĂŬĞƐŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚŝƐ
response ambiguous.  Many of the free text comments indicate that survey respondents are actually 
referring to a potential widening in the pool of appl
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In fact, the opening up the posts to external competition has had a negative impact on the 
number of female DPVCs being appointed.   This led a few participants to question whether 
ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐƚŽWsĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞĂƌĞũƵƐƚ “ǁŝŶĚŽǁĚƌĞƐƐŝŶŐ ?Žƌ “ŐŽŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞ
ŵŽƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?W^D ? ?from a gender inclusiveness perspective.   
This section considers the issue of gender, both in relation to the role of executive search 
agencies and that of the universities themselves. 
3.1 Executive Search and Gender 
Opinion is divided as to whether or not executive search agencies are a help or a hindrance 
in terms of gender inclusiveness.  A number of participants suggest that an executive 
search agency can support universities with their equal opportunities agenda and, for 
some, this is an important factor in their decision to utilise one.  
 “dŚĞǇĂƌĞŵŽƌĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨŐĞŶĚĞƌŝƐƐƵĞƐƚŚĂŶƐŽŵĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?(DPVC 6) 
 “They make it easier for women and ethnic minorities to get on the short list and 
this is one reason why ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞƋƵŝƚĞŬĞĞŶƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞŵ ? ? (DPVC 26) 
Indeed, the employment of an executive search agency may be interpreted as a sign that 
universities are taking the issue seriously (DPVC 11).  For their part, search agencies say 
they are fully committed to equality and diversity. 
 “tĞĚŽŶ ?ƚŶĞĞĚƚŽďĞŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĞĚƚŽƉƌŽĚƵĐĞĂĚŝǀĞƌƐĞůŝƐƚ ? ?(ESA 1) 
The evidence suggests that they play an important role in encouraging women to apply for 
DPVC posts (VC 14) and in reassuring them that their applications  “ǁŝůůďĞůŽŽŬĞĚĂƚ ? ?^
1).  A number of female DPVCs, and those aspiring to the role, say that they would not have 
put themselves forward without the encouragement of a search consultant. 
 “/ǁŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞŐŽƚƚŚĞũŽďǁŝƚŚŽƵƚƚŚĞŚĞĂĚŚƵŶƚĞƌĂƐ/ǁĂƐŶ ?ƚconvinced I was 
ƌĞĂĚǇĨŽƌ ?ŽƌǁŽƵůĚŐĞƚ ?ĂWsƌŽůĞ ? ?(DPVC 4) 
,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƉƌĞƐĞŶĐĞŽĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐĐĂŶǁŽƌŬĂŐĂŝŶƐƚǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝĨ
ƚŚĞǇĨŝŶĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƉƌĞƐƐƵƌĞĚƚŽĂƉƉůǇĨŽƌũŽďƐ “ƚŽŽĞĂƌůǇŝŶƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?ŽƌǁŚĞŶ “ŝƚŝƐ
not in theiƌďĞƐƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?s ? ? ?^ŽŵĞĨĞŵĂůĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐƐƉŽŬĞŽĨďĞŝŶŐďŽŵďĂƌĚĞĚ
with calls, and there was some cynicism about the motives of agencies that appear to view 
female candidates as valuable commodities to be moved around.   
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Although search consultants insist that they would only approach female candidates who 
ŵĞĞƚƚŚĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞďƌŝĞĨ ?ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĨĞĞůŝŶŐƚŚĂƚǁŽŵĞŶĂƌĞƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƵƐĞĚĂƐ “ůŽŶŐůŝƐƚ
ĨŽĚĚĞƌ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ?/ƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞŶŽƚĞĚ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐĐĂŶďĞƚƌƵĞĨŽƌŵĞŶƚŽŽƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞ
nature of thĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŵĞĂŶƐƚŚĂƚƐŽŵĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞ “ƐĞƚƵƉƚŽĨĂŝů ? ?s ? ? ? ? 
 “tŽŵĞŶĂƌĞŐĞƚƚŝŶŐŽŶƐŚŽƌƚůŝƐƚƐďĞĐĂƵƐĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞƚĞůůŝŶŐƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶƚƐ
ƚŚĞǇŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞĂǁŽŵĂŶ ?ƵƚŝŶƚŚĞĞŶĚƚŚĞǇǁŽŶ ?ƚďĞƉŝĐŬĞĚ.  There is no 
sponsorship of females right up ƚŽƚŚĞůĂƐƚƐƚĂŐĞŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐ ?.  (DPVC 26) 
Executive search agencies are actively seeking female candidates for their long lists, 
encouraged by universities keen to redress the lack of diversity in their executive 
management teams.   
 “tĞĂƌĞƵƐƵĂůůǇĂƐŬĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞǁŽŵĞŶĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐŽŶƚŚĞůŽŶŐůŝƐƚ ?(ESA 2).  
Search consultants insist that they would not put anyone onto a long list  W male or female - 
who is not up to the job.  
 “tĞĚŽŶ ?ƚǁĂŶƚƚŽƉƵƚƉĞŽƉůĞĨŽƌǁĂƌĚǁŚŽĂƌĞŶŽƚŐŽŝŶŐƚŽďĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ? ?(ESA 1) 
However, vice chancellors say that the women they see on their long lists are often not 
credible candidates.  This begs the question as to why this perception gap exists between 
search agencies and their clients and what it might tell us about the selection process and 
the criteria by which candidates are assessed  W issues that are addressed later in this 
chapter.  /ŶĂŶǇĐĂƐĞ ?ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ “ĂƌĞŶŽƚŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŝŶŐǁŽŵĞŶĨŽƌƚŚĞƐĂŬĞŽĨŝƚĂƐƚŚĂƚ ?ƐŝŶ
ŶŽďŽĚǇ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ ? ?^ ? ? ? 
 “zŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚĂƉƉŽŝŶƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŚŽŝƐŶŽƚƵƉƚŽŝƚĨŽƌĞƋƵĂůŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƐĂŬĞ ? ? 
(VC 6) 
There are also concerns about the lack of transparency of the search process.  Successful 
ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĂůǁĂǇƐĐůĞĂƌŚŽǁƚŚĞǇŐŽƚŽŶƚŽƚŚĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶƚ ?ƐŝŶŝƚŝĂůůŝƐƚĂŶĚĂƐƉŝƌŝŶŐ
DPVCs are not necessarily aware of how they might go about doing so.    
 “DĂǇďĞ/ƐŚŽƵůĚĚĞĐůĂƌĞĂŶŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŽŚĞĂĚŚƵŶƚĞƌƐďƵƚ/ ?ŵŶŽƚƐƵƌĞŚŽǁƚŽǁŽŽ
ƚŚĞŵ ? ?(DPVC 18) 
WŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐŚĂǀĞƚŽŐĞƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐ ?ƌĂĚĂƌĂŶĚƉůĂǇƚŚĞ
networking game.  This may favour male candidates, as does the fact that executive search 
agencies tend to focus their search on those in next-tier roles, such as dean or head of 
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school, and those with a national role or profile.  Agencies also rely on recommendations 
from a fairly narrow range of sources, including vice chancellors.   
 “zŽƵŶĞĞĚƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůƐƉŽŶƐŽƌƐŚŝƉĨƌŽŵƉĞŽƉůĞĂďŽǀĞƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞǇŽƵŐĞƚ
ƌĞĐŽŵŵĞŶĚĞĚ ? ?(DPVC 10) 
This is widely seen as problematic from a gender inclusiveness perspective and has been 
descrŝďĞĚĂƐ “ƌĞƉůĂĐŝŶŐŽŶĞŽůĚďŽǇƐ ?ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ? s ? ? ? ? 
 “,ĞĂĚŚƵŶƚĞƌƐĂƌĞƐƉĞĂŬŝŶŐƚŽĂŶƵŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ĞůŝƚĞŐƌŽƵƉĨŽƌ
recommendations  W ĂŶĚƉĞŽƉůĞƚĞŶĚƚŽƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ ? ?(VC 16) 
Although there are legitimate concerns about the use of executive search agencies from a 
gender perspective, the findings from this study do not support the view that executive 
search agencies are having a negative impact on the number of women being appointed.  
Of the 71 DPVCs appointed by means of external open competition, the proportion of 
women is slightly higher where an executive search agency is used than when an institution 
relies on external advertisement alone (Table 17).  
 
Table 17: Proportion of Female DPVCs Appointed With and Without Executive Search  
 Females All % 
External Advertisement plus Executive Search  8 46 17.4 
External Advertisement Alone 3 25 12.0 
Total  11 71 15.5 
 
 
It would therefore be wrong to assign sole responsibility for the gender imbalance in DPVC 
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐƚŽĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?/ŶƐƚĞĂĚ ?ĐůŽƐĞƌƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ŽǁŶ
approach to the DPVC appointment process, and the assumptions and behaviours which 
underpin it, is required.  
3.2 University Selection and Gender 
dŚĞ “ŵĂƐƐŝǀĞŐĞŶĚĞƌŝŵďĂůĂŶĐĞ ? ?s ? ?ĂƚĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚĞĂŵůĞǀĞůŝƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇ
recognised as a problem that needs to be addressed.  Some of the reasons participants 
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advance to explain why so few female DPVCs aƌĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚĂƌĞĂůĂĐŬŽĨ “ĚĞƐŝƌĞĂŶĚ
ŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ ?ŽƌĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?s ? ? ?ĂŶĚůŝŵŝƚƐŽŶŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůŵŽďŝůŝƚǇ ?ƚŚŽƵŐŚŝƚŝƐ
acknowledged this is an issue that may apply to men too).   
KƚŚĞƌƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞĚďĂƌƌŝĞƌƐĂƌĞ “ĂǀĞƌǇŵĂůĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂƚWsůĞǀĞů ? ?Ws 3), lack of career 
support and sponsorship through to the final stage of the selection process (DPVC 26), and 
 “ƚŚĞĨŽĐƵƐŽŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂƐĂĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶ ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ? 
 “/ƚ ?ƐŶŽƚĂĐƚŝǀĞĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŵŽƌĞĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨǁŚĂƚŝƐďĞŝŶŐůŽŽŬĞĚĨŽƌŝŶ
a candidate  W ůŝŬĞĂƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚƌĂĐŬƌĞĐŽƌĚ ? ?(PSM 3) 
A number of vice chancellors refer to the dearth of women in the pipeline and executive 
search agencies testify to the relative lack of women in the DPVC applicant pool.  Since 90% 
of DPVCs are drawn from the professoriate and only one in five professors is female, the 
representation of women in the candidate pool is seriously limited.  Furthermore, only 24% 
of third tier academic managers are women.  Nevertheless, the pipeline issue is not by 
itself sufficient explanation for why a mere 15% of DPVCs appointed via external open 
competition are female, a figure that drops still further at vice chancellor level.   
Given that the findings reveal no lack of ambition from women at head of department and 
dean level to attain DPVC (and, indeed, vice chancellor) positions, it would appear that 
ǁŽŵĞŶ ?ƐĂŐĞŶĐǇĂůŽŶĞĨĂŝůƐƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞĂŶĂĚĞƋƵĂƚĞĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ ?ĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ
structural factors associated with external open competition (with or without the use of 
executive search agencies) may help to explain the relative lack of female appointments.  
These are discussed in the following sections. 
 
4. Making Sense of Change 
This section analyses some of the main issues surrounding changed DPVC appointment 
practice and presents possible explanations for why the opening up of DPVC positions to 
external competition has resulted in a narrowing in the profile of those securing the jobs.    
Firstly, it explores how non-academic candidates are excluded from consideration by the 
way the posts are framed and by a process of social closure.  Secondly, it examines how 
female and other non-standard DPVC candidates are disadvantaged by a conservative and 
risk-ĂǀĞƌƐĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŽƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĂŶĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŽŶ ‘Ĩŝƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĂŵŽƵŶƚƚŽ
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homosociability.  Finally, it theorises that the culturally established ideals of meritocracy 
and excellence are prevailing over that of diversity in relation to DPVC appointments. 
 
4.1 Framing of the Post  
The framing of DPVC posts, especially in the form of the person specification, is perhaps the 
single most important factor in determining the diversity, or otherwise, of the DPVC 
applicant pool.  This section explores the essential criteria and considers their 
appropriateness in the light of the changing construction of the DPVC role and the 
management needs of the university. 
4.1.1 Person Specification 
The primary stated criterion for a DPVC job is a track record of research excellence.  
 “tĞŶĞĞĚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞǁŚŽŝƐĂĨŝƌƐƚĐůĂƐƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ? ?(VC 6) 
HowĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚĨŽƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌƐ “ǁŝƚŚĂƉĞĚŝŐƌĞĞ ? ?s ? ? ?ŵĂǇŶŽƚďĞƋƵŝƚĞǁŚĂƚ
it seems. 
 “ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞǆĐĞůůĞŶĐĞŝƐǁŚĂƚŝƐŵĂŝŶůǇƐŽƵŐŚƚ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐŝƐŽƉĞŶƚŽŝŶƚĞƌƉƌĞƚĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚ
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĚŽŶ ?ƚĂůǁĂǇƐŵĞĂŶŝƚ ? ?(VC 5) 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚ “ĂƉƌĞƐƚŝŐŝŽƵƐŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶǁŽŶ ?ƚĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞŽŶƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐ ? ?^ ? ? ?
some vice chancellors acknowledge that research excellence is an ideal  W possibly an 
increasingly unrealistic one.  Firstly, top researchers may not wish to do a job that means 
they may have to give up their research, at least for a few years.   
 “ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƐƵƉĞƌƐƚĂƌƐĂƌĞŵƵĐŚƚŽŽƐĞůĨŝƐŚƚŽĚŽŝƚ ?ďƵƚǇŽƵĚŽŶĞĞĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ
ĞƐƚĞĞŵ ? ?(VC 10) 
If, as has been argued, top scholars make the best leaders (Goodall 2009), this would be a 
source of concern.   
Secondly, academic managers are unlikely to have an active research profile  W a fact that 
goes to the heart of the inherent tension in framing the person specification for a DPVC 
post: top managers are not generally top researchers and vice versa.  A compromise 
therefore has to be made. 
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 “/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƐƚĂƌƚŝŶŐƚŽŵĂŬĞĂƚƌĂĚĞ-off between a research star and someone 
ǁŝƚŚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌŽůĞ ? ?(ESA 2) 
Executive search consultants confirm that, although according to the rhetoric a research 
track record is the most important criterion, in practice experience as an academic 
manager may take precedence.   Nevertheless, its inclusion in the person specification is 
likely to disadvantage female candidates, given the gendered nature of a research career.   
Even though the requirement for research excellence is sometimes negotiable, academic 
credibility is not.  This remains a prerequisite for a DPVC since it is believed that without it 
appointees will be unacceptable to the main internal constituencies over whom leadership 
will be exercised, i.e. rank and file academics (Bargh et al. 2000).  In this sense, the concept 
of academic credibility is not only about the individual themselves, but also about how 
ƉĞŽƉůĞƌĞƐƉŽŶĚƚŽƚŚĞŵ ?ŽŶǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂůǁŝƐĚŽŵŚĂƐŝƚƚŚĂƚ “ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽ
believe and trust someone who has a demonstrable academic track record and hence may 
ďĞŵŽƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽ ‘ĨŽůůŽǁ ?ƚŚĞŵ ?(Bolden et al. 2012, p. 8). 
 “ǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐƐŽŵĞƚŝŵĞƐƐĞĞĂƐƵŝƚǁŚĞŶƚĂůŬŝŶŐƚŽŵĞ ?ƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁ I have 
ĚŽŶĞĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐũŽď ? ?(DPVC 5) 
In reality, academic credibility is unlikely to derive solely from a current reputation as a 
cutting-edge researcher, since it is almost impossible for many DPVCs to maintain an active 
research profile (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).  In fact, they are more likely to be 
trading on past research and an already established reputation.   
 “/ƚ ?ƐŵŽƌĞĂďŽƵƚǁŚĂƚǇŽƵǁĞƌĞƚŚĂŶǁŚĂƚǇŽƵĂƌĞ ? ?(VC 12) 
 “dŚĞĐŚĂůlenge is to maintain a cloak of scholarship based on a good academic 
ƌĞĐŽƌĚ ? ?(DPVC 25) 
In order to be in possession of academic credibility, it is believed that one must be a career 
academic.  Therefore, the overwhelming view of both vice chancellors and DPVCs is that 
ƉŽƐƚŚŽůĚĞƌƐŵƵƐƚďĞ “ĨŝƌƐƚĂŶĚĨŽƌĞŵŽƐƚ ?ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐǁŝƚŚ “ĂƐŚĂƌĞĚƐĞƚŽĨǀĂůƵĞƐ ? ?s ? ? ?
/ƚŝƐĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƚŚĂƚĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐƐŚŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ? “ĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ
ĨĂŵŝůŝĂƌŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĐŽƌĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚ “ĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇŝŶŵĂŬŝŶŐĚĞcisions in an academic 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?s ? ? ? 




ǇŽƵƌƐĞůĨ ?zŽƵ ?ǀĞŐŽƚƚŽŚĂǀĞĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇ ?/ ?ǀĞĞĂƌŶĚƚŚŝƐĞǀĞŶŝĨŵǇƚŝŵĞŝƐƐƉĞŶƚŽŶ
ŽƚŚĞƌƚŚŝŶŐƐ ? ?(DPVC 23) 
 “/ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞƚŚĞũŽďǁŝƚŚŽƵƚŚĂǀŝŶŐďĞĞŶĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨ/ ?ŵŶŽƚ
ŽŶĞŶŽǁ ? ?(DPVC 18) 
In the same way that one must be an academic to have academic credibility, so it is 
assumed that one must have academic management experience to be a DPVC.  Little or no 
consideration has been given as to whether equivalent experience gained outside higher 
education might also be suitable.  This is despite recent Universities UK guidance (2009) 
which recommends that each stated attribute in a person specification should be both 
legitimate (i.e. reflecting a genuine requirement) and proportionate (i.e. not excessively 
demanding nor discriminatory) and focus on necessary skills rather than stereotypes.   
 “dŽŬĞĞƉƚŚĞƚĂůĞŶƚƉŽŽůŽƉĞŶƚŽĂƐŵĂŶǇƉĞŽƉůĞĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ?ǇŽƵƐŚŽƵůĚŬĞĞƉƚŚĞ
ĚĞƐĐƌŝƉƚŝŽŶĂƐŐĞŶĞƌĂůĂƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ ? ? (UUK 2009, p. 11) 
4.1.2 Preparation for the Role 
It is stŝůůĂƐƐƵŵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĨŽƌĂWsƉŽƐƚ “ĐĂŶďĞƚĂŬĞŶ
ĨŽƌŐƌĂŶƚĞĚĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞĐĂƌĞĞƌƉĂƚŚǁĂǇƚŽƚŚĞƚŽƉ ?ĨŽƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐƚĂĨĨ(Breakwell & 
Tytherleigh 2008a, p. 43).   However, some professional services managers challenge the 
idea that an academic career is an appropriate qualification for a DPVC role.   
 “ĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐĚŽĞƐŶŽƚƉƌĞƉĂƌĞǇŽƵƚŽďĞĂŐŽŽĚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞ ?,Žǁ
much of a PVC role actually relates to the skills of an academiĐ ?WƌŽďĂďůǇŶŽƚĂůŽƚ ? ?
(PSM 4) 
 “>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉŝƐŵƵĐŚůĞƐƐĂďŽƵƚƚĞĐŚŶŝĐĂůĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞƚŚĂŶŐĞŶĞƌŝĐƐŬŝůůƐ ? ?(Registrar 6) 
ǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂŶƚƐĂůƐŽŽďƐĞƌǀĞƚŚĂƚ “ŝƚŝƐŶŽƚĞŶŽƵŐŚŝŶŝƚƐĞůĨũƵƐƚƚŽďĞƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ
ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ?ŶŽƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚWsƐŶĞĞĚĂďƌŽĂĚĞƌƐĞƚŽĨƐŬŝůůƐƚŚĂŶƐŝŵƉůǇĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ
ones including, for example, political nous (ESA 1).  This confirms the findings from a 
number of recent empirical studies which have shown that academics do not necessarily 
have the right skill set to be effective managers and may find themselves promoted to a 
position of authority for which their expertise is inappropriately matched (Yielder & Codling 
2004).   
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Heads of department, for example, sometimes find that an academic career has not been a 
good preparation for a role as an academic manager (Johnson 2002).  Accordingly, many 
find themselves facing a steep learning curve and some struggle to cope (Floyd & Dimmock 
2011).   At DPVC level, Pilbeam found that not all academics have the communication, 
ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬŝŶŐĂŶĚƐŽĐŝĂůƐŬŝůůƐĚĞĞŵĞĚĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůĨŽƌǁŚĂƚŚĞƚĞƌŵƐƚŚĞWs ?Ɛ “ďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇ
ƐƉĂŶŶĞƌ ?ƌŽůĞ(2010, p. 771).  These are not the skills which form the basis for academic 
promotion, underlining the fundamentally different nature of academic and management 
functions.   
DPVCs in this study highlighted the clear differentiation between their academic and DPVC 
ƌŽůĞƐ ?ƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďŝŶŐƚĂŬŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌĂƐĂŶĞǁĐŚĂůůĞŶŐĞŽƌĞǀĞŶ “ĂŶĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ
ĐĂƌĞĞƌ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ?&ƵƌƚŚĞƌŵŽƌĞ ?ŵŽƐƚƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƚǁŽƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚely different 
skill sets.  This implies that an academic background may in fact be a poor preparation for a 
management role.  In reality, academic managers may lack both the skills and desire to deal 
with the inevitable organisational and personal conflict they will face.   
 “ ?ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐǁĂŶƚƚŽŐŽǀĞƌŶƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐďƵƚƚŚĞǇƌĂƌĞůǇǁĂŶƚƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞ
often poor managers when they do manage; and yet they deny rights of 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚŽŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ? (Dearlove 1998, p. 73) 
Seen from the perspective of professional services managers, academics have not 
necessarily acquired the requisite professional management skills and are often not viewed 
as credible managers.   
  “hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞƐƚŝůůƌƵŶďǇĂŵĂƚĞƵƌƐŶŽƚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ ? ?(R 6) 
DPVCs may also lack appropriate training.  There has been a false assumption in higher 
education that any intelligent person can manage and that there is therefore no need for 
training (McCaffery 2004).  However, a relative lack of formal training calls the legitimacy of 
academic managers into question as far as professional services staff are concerned (Deem, 
Hillyard & Reed 2007).    
4.1.3 Social and Cultural Capital 
In the absence of managĞŵĞŶƚĐƌĞĚĞŶƚŝĂůƐ ?ĂĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ?ƐĞůŝŐŝďŝůŝƚǇĨŽƌƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶĂƐWsŝƐ
more the product of their membership of a particular community of practice (Smith, D., 
Adams & Mount 2007).  Aspiring DPVCs are therefore heavily dependent on their social 
capital, i.e. networks and contacts accessed through membership of this group.  
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 “&ŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ-academics, whom they know may become more important than 
what ƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁ ? ? (Deem 2006, p. 220) 
Deem goes on to propose that, since they are often not trained in management and so 
have not acquired much cultural capital in management per se, academic managers may 
tend to de-emphasise training in favour of experience.  This is the case for DPVC 
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?ZĂƚŚĞƌ ?ƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĞĞŵƐƚŽďĞƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚĞǇĂůƌĞĂĚǇŚĂǀĞŵƵĐŚŽĨǁŚĂƚ
they require in terms of experience, knowledge and skills relevant to undertaking their 
management role in their ŶĞǁĐĂƌĞĞƌĨŝĞůĚ ?(Deem 2006, p. 219). 
Professional services managers, on the other hand, lack the social capital gained through 
academic networking (Spendlove 2007).  Despite the fact that some have higher degrees, 
they are also deemed to lack cultural capital relevant to higher education.  This helps to 
explain why, from an academic perspective, non-academics are not considered credible 
candidates for DPVC positions.   
4.2 Social Closure  
A sizeable minority (45%) of third tier managers surveyed envisage that a likely outcome of 
external open competition will be the attraction of more candidates from outside higher 
education and a third (33%) agree that more non-academic candidates from within the 
sector are likely to be attracted.  However, in fact, the adoption of an external open 
competition model for DPVC posts has not increased the likelihood of a non-academic 
appointment of either type.   
Most vice chancellors cannot envisage appointing a DPVC from outside higher education. 
 “,ŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŝƐŶŽƚůŝŬĞƚŚĞE,^ǁŚĞƌĞƐŽŵĞŽŶĞĐŽƵůĚďĞƐĞůůŝŶŐDĂƌƐďĂƌƐ
ƚŽĚĂǇĂŶĚƌƵŶŶŝŶŐĂŚŽƐƉŝƚĂůƚŽŵŽƌƌŽǁ ? ?(VC 4) 
 “'ŽŽĚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĨƌŽŵŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ,ĐĂŶŶŽƚŵĂŬĞƚŚĞƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?(VC 7) 
The fact that universities are not interested in appointing these candidates is confirmed by 
the executive search agents. 
 “/ŶŵǇĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞŶŽƚůŽŽŬŝŶŐĨŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞĨƌŽŵŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?
HE is inherently conservative and people are suspicious of those from outside the 
ĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ? ?(ESA 1) 
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 “ƉƌĞ-92 is very unlikely to be interested in a non-academic or someone from 
ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞ, ? ?(ESA 2) 
dŚŝƐŝƐŝŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐǁŚĞƌĞ “ƚŚĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽĨůĂǇŵĞŵďĞƌƐŽĨ
ĐŽƵŶĐŝůŝƐƐŽŵƵĐŚŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ? ?^ ? ?and non-higher education candidates tend to be 
considered, even though they do not usually end up getting the job. 
 “dŚĞƐĞŶƐĞŽĨǁĂŶƚŝŶŐĂƉƉůĞƐĂŶĚŽƌĂŶŐĞƐĂƚsůĞǀĞůŚĂƐŶŽƚŵĂĚĞŝƚĚŽǁŶƚŽƚŚĞ
ŶĞǆƚůĞǀĞů ?dŚĞĨŝƌƐƚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĐŽƵŶĐŝůƐĂƐŬŝƐ ‘ŽǁĞŶĞĞĚ a businessman or someone 
ĨƌŽŵŝŶĚƵƐƚƌǇŽƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ?(DPVC 26) 
For DPVC posts, however, not only are those from outside higher education not considered, 
nor are professional services managers already within universities.   
  “/ǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞĂƌĞĂůĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĂďŽƵƚĂƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŵĂŶĂŐĞƌĂƐWs ? ?(DPVC 4) 
Professional services managers are effectively excluded from these posts by the lack of an 
academic track record and have to move on to another sector in order to gain promotion. 
Although this is not necessarily a problem for those specialist professional services 
managers who are happy to move out of higher education, it can be more of an issue for 
the generic higher education manager, for whom such an option might is not so readily 
available (Bacon 2009).   
A few senior figures within the pre-1992 university sector are beginning to question this 
state of affairs.  One former registrar, for example, has argued that professional services 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ “ŵƵƐƚďĞĂďůĞƚŽƐĞĞƚŚĞƉŽƐƐŝďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƐĞŶŝŽƌƉŽƐƚƐŝŶ
ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?(Lauwerys 2008, p. 5).  Although very much in the minority, one or two 
academic participants agree that the exclusion of professional managers is to the detriment 
of university management. 
  “/ƚ ?ƐƌĞŐƌĞƚƚĂďůĞƚŚĂƚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐĚŽŶ ?ƚŐĞƚĂŵŝǆŽĨƚĂůĞŶƚƐ ?dŚĞƌĞ ?Ɛ no question 
that there is a vested interest in preserving the difference between academics and 
non-ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ? ?(VC 3) 
 “hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐĚŽŶ ?ƚƌĞƐƉĞĐƚƚŚĞĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞƐĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐĞƌǀŝĐĞƐ
directors.  They still have amateurs in charge.  If you wanted work done on your 
ŚŽƵƐĞ ?ǇŽƵ ?ĚŐĞƚĂďƵŝůĚĞƌ ? ?(DPVC 25) 
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Nevertheless, it remains the case that DPVCs in pre-1992 universities are almost always 
career academics.  As yet there has been no successful resolution to the problem of how to 
combine a desire for more professional management with the continued requirement for 
academic credibility (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007).  Since the former cannot easily 
displace the latter, career academics continue to dominate DPVC positions.  This is in 
ĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚƚŽƚŚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŽĨƐŽŵĞŽƚŚĞƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶƐǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨ “ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐ ?ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌprofessional reputations, rather than their 
management competence, has come under serious challenge (Laffin 1998).  The fact that 
this has not been the case in academia suggests that social closure remains strong.  This 
may in part be the result of eĂƌůǇƐŽĐŝĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞŽĨĂĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĂƌǇ “ƚƌŝďĞ ?that 
ŚĞůƉƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐƚŽ “ĚĞĨŝŶĞƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶŝĚĞŶƚŝƚŝĞƐĂŶĚĚĞĨĞŶĚƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƉĂƚĐŚĞƐŽĨ
intellectual ground by employing a variety of devices geared to the exclusion of illegal 
ŝŵŵŝŐƌĂŶƚƐ ?(Becher 1989, p. 24).  
^ŽĐŝĂůĐůŽƐƵƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ “ƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌ ?ĂŶĚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐŽĨ ?ƐŽĐŝĂůŐƌŽƵƉƐƚŽ
exclude, or usurp, other groups in a struggle for control of scarce resources, valued social 
locations, and their associated privileges ĂŶĚƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?(Flynn, R. 1999, p. 22).  It is thus an 
ĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞŽĨƉŽǁĞƌ “ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚŽŶĞŐƌŽƵƉƐĞĐƵƌĞƐŝƚƐĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐďǇĐůŽƐŝŶŐŽĨĨƚŚĞ
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŽĨĂŶŽƚŚĞƌŐƌŽƵƉďĞŶĞĂƚŚŝƚƚŚĂƚŝƚĚĞĨŝŶĞƐĂƐŝŶĨĞƌŝŽƌĂŶĚŝŶĞůŝŐŝďůĞ ?(Murphy 
1984, p. 548).  Murphy argues that, by implication, closure is a means of domination.  
Within organisations this is often achieved through the monopolisation of positions.  The 
effective exclusion by academics of other occupational groups from DPVC positions is a 
prime example of social closure.   
The issue of relative power of academics and professional services managers is returned to 
in Chapter Seven.  
4.3 Conservatism and Homosociability  
Another key factor explaining the continued lack of diversity in the profile of DPVCs is the 
conservative and risk-averse approach taken by universities to the recruitment process and 
to selection decisions.  This is tending to result in safe appointments of the same kind of 
people, in a form of homosociability, and to disadvantage non-standard candidates.  
4.3.1 A Conservative and Risk-Averse Approach 
Whilst the method of appointing DPVCs may be changing, the overall approach remains 
 “ƋƵŝƚĞĐĂƵƚŝŽƵƐ ? ?Ws ? ? ?
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 “hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐĂƌĞĞǆƚƌĞmely risk averse  W they tend to take a risk in a half-hearted 
ǁĂǇĂŶĚƐĞůĞĐƚƚŚĞƐĂŵĞƉĞƌƐŽŶĂƐĂůǁĂǇƐ ? ?(DPVC 17) 
This conservative and risk averse approach, symptomatic of a wider university culture, has 
been exacerbated by the current challenging higher education environment.   
 “,ĂƌƐŚƚŝŵĞƐŵĂǇůĞĂĚƚŽĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝƐŵ ? ?(VC 10) 
Moreover, as the stakes with respect to DPVC appointments get higher, and the perceived 
costs of a bad appointment increase, the avoidance of risk becomes even more of a 
concern.  This is especially true when executive search agencies are utilised since the 
ĞǆƉĞŶƐĞĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůƌĞƉƵƚĂƚŝŽŶĂůĨĂůůŽƵƚŽĨĂĨĂŝůĞĚĞǆĞƌĐŝƐĞǁŽƵůĚŵĂŬĞƚŚŝƐ “ĂǀĞƌǇ
ĞǆƉĞŶƐŝǀĞŵŝƐƚĂŬĞ ? ?W^D ? ? ?
KŶĞĨŽƌŵĞƌǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƐƚŚĂƚƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ƌŝƐŬ-averse attitude in part stems 
from an unhealthy focus on not being sued that ĐĂŶůĞĂĚƚŽ “ƉĂƌĂůǇƐŝƐďǇĨĞĂƌ ?ĂŶĚĂŶ
 “ĂĚŵŝƚŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ?Žƌ “ĚŽŶŽƚŚŝŶŐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ?ĐƵůƚƵƌĞǁŚŝĐŚůĞĂǀĞƐƚŚŽƐĞŵĂŬŝŶŐ
ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐĨĞĞůŝŶŐ “ƐƚƌĂŝƚũĂĐŬĞƚĞĚŝŶƚŽĨŽƌŵƵůĂŝĐƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞƐ ?(Watson 2009, p. 72).   
 “dƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐƚĞŶĚƚŽĚƌŝǀĞǇŽƵƚŽĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝƐŵ ?/ƚ ?ƐĂůůĂďŽƵƚƌŝƐŬ
mĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?(Dean/HOD 10) 
In order to limit the chances of choosing the wrong candidate, appointment panels appear 
to be using experience as the main indicator of quality.  Since no one can demonstrate 
experience better than someone who is already undertaking the role, it follows that 
existing DPVCs become the prime candidates.   
  “zŽƵŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇŚĂǀĞƚŽĚŽƚŚĞũŽďďĞĨŽƌĞǇŽƵŐĞƚŝƚ ? ?(DPVC 10) 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƉƌŝŽƌŝƚŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞŵĂŬĞƐƐĞŶƐĞŝŶƚŚĞůŝŐŚƚŽĨǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞĚ
desire for DPVCs who can hit the ground running, it is a somewhat limited and limiting 
ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĂƚĨĂŝůƐƚŽƚĂŬĞĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨĂĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ?ƐƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ?ƚĂůĞŶƚĞĚďƵƚůĞƐƐ
experienced female candidate, for example, may thus be viewed as too high risk.   
 “ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĐĂŶdidate needs to demonstrate their experience and this makes for a 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝƐŵ ? ?(ESA 2) 
Experience may also be confused with achievement.  The former is relatively easy to 
ĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨĂĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ?ƐĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŽŶŝƐŚĂƌĚĞƌƚŽĂƐƐĞƐs.  A dean who has 
been through the DPVC appointment process makes the point that, whilst there is plenty of 
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objective evidence that helps to rank candidates for academic positions (research income, 
citations, etc.), there are not many objective indicators of management and leadership 
achievement.  
 “ĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĐĂŶĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚŚŽǁŐŽŽĚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂƚ
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?,ŽǁĂƌĞƉĂŶĞůƐƚŽŬŶŽǁŚŽǁŐŽŽĚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂƐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ? ? 
 (Dean/HOD 10) 
This same participant notes the paradox that, despite their risk aversion, many universities 
have chosen to adopt an inherently riskier DPVC appointment method.  With external open 
competition, panels have to rely on CVs, interviews and references rather than first-hand 
knowledge of the candidate, as would be the case with an internal process.   
 “/ƌŽŶŝĐĂůůǇ ?ĂŶĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŵĂǇďĞƌŝƐŬŝĞƌǇĞƚůĞĂĚƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨĂƐĂĨĞƌ
ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞĂƐƚŚĞŵŽƌĞĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞĚƉĞƌƐŽŶƚĞŶĚƐƚŽǁŝŶ ? ?(Dean/HOD 10) 
The emphasis on experience serves to offset some of this risk.  However, it also means that 
only senior academic managers, ideally those already in a DPVC role, are considered as 
serious candidates.  Therefore, despite the widening of the pool of potential applicants 
resulting from the opening up of DPVC posts to external competition and the use of 
executive search agencies, the actual outcome is a narrowing of the field.   
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐh<ŐƵŝĚĞůŝŶĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŶĂƚƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐŝƐĂ “ŵĂũŽƌ 
ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĂŶƚ ?ŽĨƚŚĞĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐƉƌŽĨŝůĞŽĨƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚ ?ŚĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞďƌĞĂĚƚŚ
of talent on the executive management team (UUK 2009).  Although the guidelines strongly 
encourage the use of a range of complementary approaches to candidate evaluation, there 
is still a heavy reliance on panel interviews and presentations for DPVC appointments.  
 “Selection mechanisms are important because they determine who is excluded as 
ǁĞůůĂƐŝŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ? ? (Deem 2000, p. 16) 
Even where executive search agencies are used, the short listing and final selection 
decisions are normally undertaken by a university search committee, or appointments 
ƉĂŶĞů ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐĂŶŚĂǀĞ “ƚŝŐŚƚƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĂďŽƵƚƉŽƐƚƐ ?s ? ? ? ?
 “dŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŵĂǇŚĂǀe too much to say and they often go for the safer 
ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞ ? ?(DPVC 23) 
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This resonates with earlier research on vice chancellor recruitment (Bargh et al. 2000) that 
found search committees to be highly conservative, with a tendency to recruit people who 
matched their own values and experiences and who were seen as acceptable to the 
academic community.  Executive search agencies were also said to regard the power of 
academics in the selection process as a deterrent to appointing outsiders (Breakwell & 
Tytherleigh 2008a).   The presence of academics on appointment panels is also seen by one 
of the search consultants in this study as having a conservative effect. 
 “DĂŶǇŽĨƚŚŽƐĞŽŶĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐƉĂŶĞůĂƌĞůŝŬĞůǇƚŽŚĂǀĞĐŽŵĞ
through the traditional academic route themselves and may be more likely to 
ĨĂǀŽƵƌĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐǁŚŽŚĂǀĞĚŽŶĞƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ? ?(ESA 1) 
tŚĞƌĞĂƐĂǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌǁŚŽŝƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůůǇƐĞůĞĐƚŝŶŐĂWsŵĂǇďĞƉƌĞƉĂƌĞĚƚŽ “ďĂůĂŶĐĞ
ŽƵƚĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĂŶĚƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ? ?ĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƉĂŶĞůƐĂƌĞ “ŵƵĐŚůĞƐƐǁŝůůŝŶŐƚŽƚĂŬĞĂƌĞĂĐŚŽƌ
ŵĂŬĞĂďŽůĚĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞďŽƵŶĚƚŽƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐ ? ?s ? ? ? 
 “KŶĞŽĨƚŚĞŚĂƌĚĞƐƚĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŝƐŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƐĞĂƌĐŚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐƚŽ
see beyond paper qualifications.  The formality of the process may reinforce 
ƐƚĞƌĞŽƚǇƉĞƐ ? ? (VC 9) 
A conservative interpretation of the person specification by appointment panels thus leads 
to an even further narrowing of the pool of eligible candidates.   
4.3.2 Homosociability 
As these findings confirm ?ƌĞŐĂƌĚůĞƐƐŽĨƚŚĞƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƐǁƌŝƚƚĞŶƉƌŽĐĞĚƵƌĞ ?ǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ
 “ŶĞĂƌůǇĂůǁĂǇƐŚĂǀĞƚŚĞǁŚŝƉ-ŚĂŶĚ ?ŝŶĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŐWsƐ(Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007, 
p. 3).  The centrality of the vice chancellor to the selection process may serve to reinforce 
the tendency to appoint like-minded people. 
 “sŵĂǇďƌŝŶŐŝŶƉĞŽƉůĞǁŚŽƐŚĂƌĞŚŝƐǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚ ? ? ?s ? ? ? 
A few participants who have been through the DPVC appointment process spoke of how 
ƚŚĞǇďĞĐĂŵĞĂǁĂƌĞŽĨĂƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚĨŽƌĂĐůĞĂƌƐĞŶƐĞŽĨ “Ĩŝƚ ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞĞǆŝƐƚŝŶŐĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ
ƚĞĂŵ ?ůĞĂĚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨ “ŵŽƌĞŽĨƚŚĞƐĂŵĞ ? ?ĞĂŶ ?,K ? ? ?It has also been 
suggested that sŽŵĞǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐĂƌĞ “ŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞ comfortable with members of their 
ƚĞĂŵǁŚŽĂƌĞĚƌĂǁŶĨƌŽŵĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĂŶĨƌŽŵĂƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůďĂĐŬŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?
(Lauwerys 2008, p. 9).   
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 “dŚĞƌĞ ?ƐŶŽƚĂƌĞĐĞƉƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐƚŽĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŶŽŶ-standard candidates brought forward 
by executive search agencies.  People tend to recruit those made in their own self-
ŝŵĂŐĞ ? ?(DPVC 25) 
ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŝŶƚŽƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŝŶƵƐƚƌĂůŝĂĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĂƚĂ “ƋƵĞƐƚĨŽƌĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇĂŶĚƐĂĨĞƚǇ ? ?
symptomatic of the DPVC appointment process described in this study, resulted in the 
same kinds of people being appointed (Blackmore, J., Thomson & Barty 2006, p. 297).  
ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐůǇ ?ƚŚĞǇĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚŝƐƚǇƉĞŽĨƐĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂƐĂ “ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ŽĨ
ŚŽŵŽƐŽĐŝĂďŝůŝƚǇ ?Žƌ “ƚŚĞƚĞŶĚĞŶĐǇƚŽƐĞůĞĐƚƉĞŽƉůĞũƵƐƚůŝŬĞŽŶĞƐĞůĨ ?(2006, p. 297).  On the 
evidence of this study, DPVC appointments are symptomatic of homosociability.   
This inevitably leads to homogeneous executive management teams, a situation that is not 
optimal for any organisation, including universities.   
  “^ŽŵĞsƐůŝŬĞĂƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƚĞĂŵƚŚĂƚŝƐŶŽƚƚŽŽĐŽŵďĂƚŝǀĞ ?ďƵƚƚŚŝƐŝƐ
not a recipe for a successful institution.  The ideal is to have a team with loyalty to 
the institution but who form their oǁŶŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ? ?(VC 14) 
ŚŽŵŽŐĞŶŽƵƐƚĞĂŵƌƵŶƐƚŚĞƌŝƐŬŽĨŝŶĨĞƌŝŽƌĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐĂŶĚ “ŐƌŽƵƉƚŚŝŶŬ ?ŽƌƚŚĞ
 “ƌĞƐƚƌŝĐƚĞĚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚŽĨĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞƐ ?(Hambrick & Mason 1984, p. 202).  
As part of their development of upper echelons theory, Hambrick and Mason propose that, 
although homogenous teams may operate quickly and effectively in stable conditions, in a 
complex and turbulent environment, a heterogenic team will be more successful.   
'ŝǀĞŶƚŚĞĞƐƚĂďůŝƐŚĞĚůŝŶŬďĞƚǁĞĞŶĂŶĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƚĞĂŵ ?ƐĚĞŵŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂŶĚďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌĂů
diversity and their strategic effectiveness (Jarzabkowski & Searle 2004), there is thus a 
strong business - as well as a social justice - case for a more inclusive approach to DPVC 
appointments. 
4.4 Meritocracy 
DĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂĐǇŚĂƐďĞĞŶĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐ “ĂƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŚŝůŽƐŽƉŚǇǁŚŝĐŚŚŽůĚƐƚŚĂƚƉŽǁĞƌshould be 
ǀĞƐƚĞĚŝŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐĂůŵŽƐƚĞǆĐůƵƐŝǀĞůǇĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐƚŽŵĞƌŝƚ ? ?tŝŬŝƉĞĚŝĂ60).  The term was 
coined by Michael Young in a satirical essay that envisaged a future in which merit was 
favoured above all else (1958).  As originally conceived, the term had distinctly negative 
connotations since Young was warning against a system whereby elites used the notion of 
merit to maintain their own status, and hence social inequality (Warikoo & Fuhr 2014).   
                                                          
60
 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Meritocracy accessed 16th September 2014. 
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Over the years, meritocracy has taken on a more positive connotation.  Since its 
fundamental premise is that status is achieved rather than inherited, its proponents see it 
as a fair system that can help address social disadvantage.  For its critics, however, it is no 
more than a myth which serves to justify the status quo.  This is because it is the dominant 
group, or meritocratic class, which has a monopoly on defining what constitutes merit.   
 “DĞƌŝƚĐĂŶďĞĚĞĨŝŶĞĚĂƐǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌŝƚŝƐƚŚĂƚŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚƚŽďĞƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵů ?dŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?
ƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůĐĂŶĐůĂŝŵƚŽŚĂǀĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞ ?ŵĞƌŝƚ ? ?
(Sealy 2010, p. 185) 
In this way, merit becomes linked to the dominant group rather than open to all, allowing it 
to perpetuate its own power and privilege.  Meritocracy is thus not a neutral concept but 
rather an ideology according to the definition proposed in Chapter Two (4.1), i.e. a set of 
values and beliefs proposed by a particular group to legitimate a course of behaviour.  
Meritocracy has become so influential that it is now a fundamental assumption of western 
economies that organisations function on the basis of meritocratic principles.  It has 
ďĞĐŽŵĞƉĂƌƚŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ƉƐǇĐŚŽůŽŐŝĐĂůĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ “ƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌ
potential for career progression will be based on their ability and talent demonstrated 
ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞ ?(Sealy 2010, p. 184).  Although this meritocratic ideal may be attractive, 
research has shown that it does not lead to appointments being made on the basis of 
talent alone.   
In a meritocratic system, the selection of individuals is in theory made  “ƉƵƌĞůǇŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐ
of merit, without any reference to the social or cultural characteristics such as gender or 
the socio-ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐƐĞůĞĐƚĞĚ ?(Deem 2009, p. 4).  However, in 
practice the low representation of women at senior management level demonstrates that 
systems of merit cannot be equitable since the criteria to measure merit and the means 
used to assess it are both likely to be biased (Sealy 2010).  Nevertheless, there is a 
ƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶĐĞƚŽĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐ “ĂǀŝŽůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĂƐůĞĚƚŽƐŽĨĞǁ
women reaching the most senior positions and hence other theories are proposed, such as 
women choosing to opt out (2010, p. 187).   
^ĞĂůǇ ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƐŚŽǁƐƚŚĂƚ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚǁŽŵĞŶŵĂǇƐƚĂƌƚŽĨĨƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƌĞĞƌƐďĞůŝĞǀŝŶŐƚŚĂƚŝĨ
they behave like a man they will accordingly be promoted on merit, over time they come to 
realise that merit tends to be defined less by human capital than by the social capital 
ĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞ ?ƚŚĞŽůĚďŽǇƐ ?ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬ ?ǀĞŶƚƵĂůůǇ ?ƐŽŵĞƚŝƌĞŽĨƉůĂǇŝŶŐĂ
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game they cannot win and decide to return to their authentic selves.  In this way the opt-
out theory becomes self-fulfilling.  
In a higher education context, the notion of meritocracy is well established.  Vice 
chancellors, for example, have long been regarded as an intellectual meritocracy (Chapter 
Three, 4.1) and the same can be said of DPVCs.  Meritocracy is closely linked to another 
concept of central importance in academia, i.e. excellence, or the possession of very high-
quality characteristics in a given area of activity or field of endeavour.  In an interesting and 
pertinent analysis, Deem (2009) contrasts these two concepts with that of diversity  
Whereas in essence both excellence and meritocracy are concerned with selection and 
exclusion, diversity has inclusion as its basic premise.  There is thus a fundamental tension 
between them. 
 “dŚĞǀĞƌǇƐŽĐŝĂůĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĂůĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐƚŝĐƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞĂůůĞŐĞĚůǇŝŐŶŽƌĞĚŝŶƉƵƌƐƵŝƚŽĨ
excellence and meritocracy are central to the creation and maintenance of 
diversŝƚǇ ? ?(2009, pp. 4-5) 
Deem argues that, whilst diversity may be seen as desirable at an abstract level, 
universities have struggled to reconcile it with a culture based around excellence and 
meritocracy.  Concerns over the latter tend to take preference over those of improving 
diversity and tackling inequality  W ƉĞƌŚĂƉƐŶŽƚƐƵƌƉƌŝƐŝŶŐŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚŽƐĞĂƚƚŚĞƚŽƉĂƌĞ
highly likely to have succeeded in a meritocratic context themselves and hence may have 
ůŝƚƚůĞĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŚĞƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?(2009, p. 9).  
As a result, she concludes that excellence and meritocracy prevail over diversity in most 
aspects of academic life, with one notable exception: the appointment of senior academic 
managers.  In this case, as data in this study has confirmed, past academic reputation 
rather than management qualifications are seen as more important.  Therefore, it is not 
clear that a commitment to excellence is a driving factor: 
 “DĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂĐǇ ?ŝƚƐĞĞŵƐ ?ŚĂƐŝƚƐůŝŵŝƚƐ ? ?  (Deem 2009, p. 14) 
&ŝŶĚŝŶŐƐĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƐƚƵĚǇƌĞǀĞĂůƚŚĂƚǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞĂďŽƵƚWsĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐŝƐ
an overwhelmingly meritocratic one, with securing the best candidates as the primary 
motivation for change.  One or two vice chancellors, however, acknowledge that this 
perspective is a little simplistic. 
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 “dŚĞŝĚĞĂƚŚĂƚŝƚŝƐĂůůĂďŽƵƚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞďĞƐƚƉĞƌƐŽŶŝƐĂĐƌĂƐƐƉƌŽƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?tŚŽŝƐ 
the best?   ? All you can do is get the best person you can get at that moment with 
the best fit.  Universities have all turned down outstanding people who would not 
ďĞƌŝŐŚƚĨŽƌĂƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌƌŽůĞĂŶĚƚĞĂŵ ? ?(VC 5) 
Either way, not everyone is convinced that DPVC appointment is meritocratic, at least in 
the sense of it being equitable. 
 “dŚĞŶŽƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŽƉĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŝƐĂŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂĐǇŝƐĂŶŽŶƐĞŶƐĞĂŶĚŝƚ
ĐůĞĂƌůǇĚŽĞƐŶŽƚǁŽƌŬĨƌŽŵĂŐĞŶĚĞƌƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ? ?(VC 5) 
 “ǆƚĞƌŶĂůŽƉĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶŝƐŽŶůǇĂŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂĐǇĨŽƌƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽƉůĂǇƚŚĞŐĂŵĞǁĞůů ? ?
(DPVC 3) 
 “/ƚǁŽƵůĚŽŶůǇďĞŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐŝĨŵĞŶĂŶĚǁŽŵĞŶŚĂĚĂ ? ? P ? ?ĞƋƵĂůƐƚĂƌƚĂŶĚ
ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐŶŽƚƚŚĞĐĂƐĞ ? ?(Dean/HOD 4) 
The tension between the quest for the best candidates and the need for diversity is 
therefore recognised by a few participants.  In the main, however, this was not articulated 
and one vice chancellor confidently asserts that DPVC appointments in his institution are 
 “ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ? ĂŶĚ ?ƐŝŶĐĞ “ŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂĐǇŵĞĂŶƐĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŽĨŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?ŚĞŝƐ “ŶŽƚ
ƐƵƌĞǁŚĂƚĨĂŝƌŶĞƐƐŚĂƐŐŽƚƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚŝƚ ? ?s ? ? ?
Although the meritocratic ideal is the dominant narrative, the perpetuation of such a male-
dominated DPVC cadre in the face of the rising (albeit still seriously limited) number of 
female academics in management roles, makes this claim increasingly untenable.  It defies 
logic to believe that the skills and qualities required to be a DPVC are so disproportionately 
distributed in favour of male candidates, even though prior experience in the role 
undoubtedly still is.   
So long as academic management experience continues to be a key determinant of merit, 
women will continue to be disadvantaged, as will any less experienced candidates.  
Ironically, the outcome of the current, supposedly meritocratic, approach is that 
appointments are effectively made on the basis of seniority.  Furthermore, whilst a track 
record of research excellence and academic credibility remain prime requirements, non-
academic candidates will continue to be excluded from serious consideration.   
The criteria for merit in relation to DPVC appointments reflect the background and 
achievements of the current incumbents and the vice chancellors who select them.  For as 
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long as tŚŝƐ “ƌĞƉƌŽĚƵĐƚŝǀĞƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ƉƌĞǀĂŝůƐ(Blackmore, J., Thomson & Barty 2006, p. 
297), it is unlikely that the status quo will be disturbed, not least because it is not in the 
interests of this dominant group.   
The exclusion of non-academics is not considered problematic, but rather a necessary 
means of social closure.  In contrast, the relative dearth of female academics securing DPVC 
jobs is increasingly seen as problematic.  Interestingly, however, although it is recognised 
that women may be at a disadvantage, there is no overt acknowledgement amongst those 
who have succeeded in becoming vice chancellors and DPVCs of the nature of their own 
advantage and how this is being perpetuated.   
A recent piece of research into undergraduate admissions at Oxford undergraduates is 
pertinent here. Warikoo and Fuhr (2014) found that, whilst current students were able to 
acknowledge that others may be at a disadvantage in terms of gaining entry to the 
university, they were unable to acknowledge their own advantage in having done so.   
 “dŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚŝƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ƐƚƵĚĞŶƚƐĚŝĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƚŽĐŽŵƉƌŽŵŝƐĞƚŚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ
ŽĨƚŚĞŝƌŽǁŶƐƚĂƚƵƐĂĐŚŝĞǀĞŵĞŶƚďĂƐĞĚŽŶŵĞƌŝƚĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƚŚĞŝƌĞůŝƚĞƐƚĂƚƵƐŝƚƐĞůĨ ? ? 
 (2014, p. 713) 
 
5. Evaluating Change 
The majority (61%) of third tier managers surveyed agree with the proposition that the 
change to external open competition for DPVC posts should be a good thing overall in 
terms of future leadership
61
 capacity building.  The main reason for this is a belief that it 
will lead to a bigger pool of applicants and more competition and that this can only be 
beneficial for the quality of those securing the jobs.   
On the other hand, some feel that it may discourage universities from building capacity 
ĨƌŽŵǁŝƚŚŝŶ ?ďůŽĐŬŽĨĨŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƌŽƵƚĞƐ ?ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚ “ƉĞƌŝƉĂƚĞƚŝĐ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂŶĚĐƌĞĂƚĞ
a gulf between management and staff.  Furthermore, they are not convinced that the 
diversity and quality of applicants will necessary improve:  
 “ ?ŝĨƚŚĞĐƵůƚƵƌĞŝƐďĂƐĞĚŽŶŽŶĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĞ ‘ƐĂĨĞ ?ŽƉƚŝŽŶŝƐƚŽĂƉƉŽŝŶƚǁŚŝƚĞŵŝĚĚůĞ-
aged academics, ƚŚĞŶůŝƚƚůĞǁŝůůĐŚĂŶŐĞ ? ?
                                                          
61
 dŚĞƚĞƌŵ “ůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ “ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ǁĂƐƵƐĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƐƵƌǀĞǇƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞŽƉƚŝŽŶ ? 
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Vice chancellors and DPVCs also ƌĞŐĂƌĚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŽƉĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐ “ďŽƚŚƉƌŽƐ
ĂŶĚĐŽŶƐ ? ?Ws ? ? ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚĨŽƌŵŽƐƚƉĂƌƚƚŚĞƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƐĂƌ ƚŚŽƵŐŚƚƚŽŽƵƚǁĞŝŐŚƚŚĞ
negatives.   
 “KǀĞƌĂůůǁĞ ?ƌĞŐĂŝŶŝŶŐŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶǁĞ ?ƌĞůŽƐŝŶŐ ?(VC 17) 
The general feeling is that overall the move to external open competition for DPVC posts is 
probably change for the better, but there is also a sense of inevitability about it.   
 “dŚĞĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŽĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚŝƐŶŽƚŐŽŽĚŽƌďĂĚ ?/ƚŝƐǁŚĂƚŝƚŝƐŶŽǁ ? ?(VC 13) 
  “/ƚ ?ƐĂŶŝŶĞƐĐĂƉĂďůĞĐŚĂŶŐĞ ?ƐƐŽŽŶĂƐǇŽƵŚĂǀĞĂŵĂƌŬĞƚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽƵƐĞŝƚŽƌŝƚ
ǁŝůůůĞĂǀĞǇŽƵďĞŚŝŶĚ ? ?(DPVC 24) 
ůƚŚŽƵŐŚǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?ƉƌŝŵĂƌǇŵŽƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĂĚŽƉƚŝŶŐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůŽƉĞŶĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶ is to 
secure the best people as DPVCs, there is some scepticism as to whether it has actually led 
to the appointment of better quality candidates.   
 “dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞŶŽŵŽƌĞŐŽŽĚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌŚĂƐŚĂĚŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƐƚ ?tĞ ?ƌĞũƵƐƚ
ŵŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŵĂƌŽƵŶĚĂďŝƚŵŽƌĞ ? ?(VC 13) 
The outcome has rather been the appointment of ever more senior and experienced 
candidates, an increasing number of whom are already DPVCs.  This emphasis on prior 
experience precludes consideration of a more diverse candidate pool and thus fails to tap 
into all the available talent.   The adoption of external open competition cannot therefore 
be said to have been change for the better in the sense of having improved management 
capacity as it does not meet the following criteria of effective recruitment as defined by the 
ƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ƐŽǁn guidance: 
 “ĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚƐĞĐƵƌĞƐƚŚĞďĞƐƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞĨƌŽŵƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƐƚƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ
ƉŽŽůŽĨƚĂůĞŶƚ ?ŝŶĂŵĂŶŶĞƌƚŚĂƚŝƐďŽƚŚĨĂŝƌĂŶĚƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ? ? 
(UUK 2009, p. 2) 
Rather, it is arguably a short-term fix that does nothing to support longer-term 
management capacity building in the sector, especially where external candidates are 
brought in at the expense of internal talent development and succession management.   
 




This chapter has explored change to DPVC appointment practice and its implications for 
management capacity building. 
The trend towards an external open competition method of appointing DPVCs looks set to 
continue as universities strive to improve their performance.  This creates more DPVC job 
opportunities and has led to an increase in staff mobility, which is generally viewed as a 
good thing for both individual managers and institutions.  On the other hand, it limits 
internal promotion opportunities and may result in too little attention being paid to 
internal staff development and succession management.  Aspiring managers who are not 
geographically mobile may be disadvantaged and there is a danger of job-hopping DPVCs 
who do not stay long enough to experience the consequences of their actions.   
Executive search agencies have firmly established themselves in the higher education 
recruitment market and their use for DPVC appointments is now widespread.  They 
nevertheless divide opinion: some vice chancellors view them as invaluable, others are 
more cynical.  Even so, many feel their use is now inevitable where a university has decided 
on external open competition.   
Search agencies are able to undertake a comprehensive search, but the real value they 
ďƌŝŶŐƚŽƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĐůŝĞŶƚƐŝƐƚŚĞŝƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ƚĂƉƵƉ ?ƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇŝŶƐĞŶŝŽƌ
posts elsewhere.  In this respect, they have made themselves invaluable since their 
presence in the market means that senior people are now often unwilling to apply for jobs 
directly.  The agencies are able to identify the experienced managers universities are 
looking for and persuade them to move.  They act as an intermediary between the 
university and the candidate, which can be beneficial to both, but also raises concerns from 
ĂŶĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇĂŶĚĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?dŚĞƌĞĂƌĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌĐŽŶĐĞƌŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ?
reliance on a limited network of senior managers for candidate recommendations. 
The main charge that tends to be levelled at executive search agencies is that they 
perpetuate the status quo by imposing a narrow stereotype of what a DPVC looks like.  
However, this study has found that the use of search agencies is not having a negative 
effect on the numbers of women getting DPVC jobs, albeit that the adoption of an external 
open competition appointment method is.  I would contend that universities are as much, 
if not more, responsible for the narrowing of the profile of candidates and appointees.   
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There are a number of reasons for this, including the way DPVC posts are framed.  The 
person specification can only be met by a select group of experienced academic managers 
with a record of research achievement.  Since academic credibility remains a prerequisite, 
non-academic candidates are effectively excluded from consideration.  This amounts to a 
form of social closure.   
Moreover, female academics and other non-standard candidates are disadvantaged by a 
conservative and risk-averse approach to recruitment in which experience is used as the 
main indicator of quality.  Combined with a desire to ensure candidates fit with the existing 
team, this amounts to homosociability, which has led to the perpetuation of more of the 
same kind of people securing the jobs.   The fact that the widest possible talent pool is not 
being tapped means that the move to external open competition cannot be said to have 
been change for the better in terms of management capacity building.  
Furthermore, despite a discourse of meritocracy, the change to appointment practice has 
ŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇůĞĚĞŝƚŚĞƌƚŽƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ďĞƐƚ ?ĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐŶŽƌto the most 
equitable outcome.  It has rather served to maintain the status quo in terms of ensuring 
that the dominant academic elite continue to monopolise these senior positions.  The issue 
of power relations is analysed in more detail in the following chapter, which also examines 
the extent to which DPVC appointment practice is symptomatic of ideal-type 
managerialism.  







This chapter analyses the data presented in Chapters Five and Six in order to answer the 
final two research questions.  Firstly, the evidence of the indicators of managerialism 
outlined in Chapter Two (4.2) is examined and an assessment made of the extent to which 
DPVC appointment practice is symptomatic of ideal-type managerialism (Q.4).  In the light 
of these findings, the prevailing academic narrative (Chapter Two, 6.2) on the impact of 
managerialism in higher education is reconsidered.  The final research question on the 
significance of the findings for academic-manager power relations (Q.5) is then addressed 
and an alternative interpretation to that of a simple shift of power from academics to 
managers is ƉƌŽƉŽƐĞĚ ?dŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚŝŶŚĂƉƚĞƌŝŐŚƚ ? 
2. Managerialism and DPVC Appointments 
This section explores the significance of the findings for managerialism as ideology, both 
from an empirical and theoretical perspective.  
2.1 Indicators of Managerialism 
Table 18 provides an at-a-glance analysis of whether or not each indicator of ideal-type 
managerialism (Chapter Two, 4.2) is supported by the data.  The use of parentheses in the 
table indicates a qualified judgement made on the basis of the overall weight of evidence.   
In order to avoid unnecessary repetition of data already presented elsewhere, full details of 
the underlying evidence are provided in Appendix L rather than in the main text.  In 
essence, what this evidence shows is that the ideology of managerialism is not as all-
pervasive in respect of DPVC appointments as the wider academic narrative might suggest.   
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Furthermore, the indicators point to a context-specific, academic-managerialism, rather 
than a generic ideal type.   
 
Table 18: Summary of Evidence to Support Indicators of Ideal-Type Managerialism 
Ideological Tenet  Indicators for DPVC Appointment  Evidenced by Data? 
 
2. Management is 
important and a good 
thing 
a. Recognition of the importance of 
DPVC posts  
b. Priority given to the appointment 
process in order to attract the best 
candidates 
c. A more managerial interpretation of 










3. Management is a 
discrete function  
a. DPVCs acting in a full-time permanent 
management capacity 
b. Management skills and experience as 
the main criteria for the role 










4. Management is 
rational and value 
neutral  
a. Appointment based on merit rather 
than seniority  







5. Management is 
generic and 
universally applicable 
a. Recognition of management skills and 
experience gained in any sector  
b. Appointments open to suitably 
qualified candidates from other 








6. Managers must have 
the right to manage 
a. DPVC roles given appropriate 
authority and scope for managerial 
action 







7. Private sector 
methods are superior 
a. Adoption of private sector 
appointment practice  
b. Valuing of candidates from the private 
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2.2 Evidence of Ideal-Type Managerialism 
Based upon the evidence of managerial indicators summarised in Table 18, this section 
evaluates the degree to which the DPVC appointment model is symptomatic of each 
ideological claim of ideal-type managerialism (Chapter Two, 4.2).  Where relevant, it also 
considers the significance of the findings for the validity of these ideological claims.  
2.2.1 Management is Important and a Good Thing 
Some evidence of all three indicators can be found, making this the managerial tenet that is 
most well supported in terms of DPVC appointment practice.   
Until recently the legitimacy of management in higher education was questioned not only 
by the managed, but also by those who occupied management positions (McCaffery 2004). 
The findings from this study suggest that at the most senior level this is no longer the case.  
Vice chancellors and DPVCs appear to have fully accepted the idea that university 
management is necessary and beneficial.  Vice chancellors in particular spoke at length 
about the need for more and better management in order to deal with a challenging and 
competitive higher education environment.  This supports both manageriĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚ
management is the best means to organisational success and the academic narrative which 
holds that university senior managers have internalised managerial ideology (Vincent 2011).   
It also resonates with recent research which found that senior university managers could 
envisage no viable alternative to becoming more business-like if they were to survive 
(Waring 2013) ?/ŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŝŶtĂƌŝŶŐ ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚŚĞƐĞƐĂŵĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĚŝĚŶŽƚ
accept that their institution had become more managerial, seeing it simply as better 
managed whilst still retaining its collegial ethos  W a view also expressed by some vice 
chancellors in this study.   
ĐĐĞƉƚĂŶĐĞŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝƐĂŐŽŽĚƚŚŝŶŐŝŵƉůŝĞƐ that 
attempts to improve the quality of management are, in turn, desirable.  The aim of better 
management therefore ŚĂƐĂďƌŽĂĚĂƉƉĞĂůĂŶĚĐĂŶďĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐ “ĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞ ?Ă
grasp of hard realities, or some form of neutral rational truth about the social and 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐǁŽƌůĚ ?(Vincent 2011, p. 335).  This makes it difficult to oppose change without 
being characterised as old-ĨĂƐŚŝŽŶĞĚĂŶĚ “ŽƵƚŽĨƚŽƵĐŚǁŝƚŚƌĞĂůŝƚǇ ?(Waring 2013, p. 413).   
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2.2.2 Management is a Distinct Function 
Evidence that academic management is becoming a distinct function within universities is 
growing, especially with respect to the construction of the DPVC role.  Many DPVCs 
appointed via external open competition are not only engaged full time in management, 
but have also embarked upon an academic management career track with little or no 
intention of going back to an academic role.   
Although they may maintain an academic identity, most DPVCs are largely divorced from 
day-to-day academic work, leading to an increased separation of management and 
frontline academic activities.  They are expected to serve institutional needs and to pledge 
their primary allegiance to the executive management team - and the vice chancellor in 
particular - rather than to academic colleagues in their department or faculty.  This 
executive team has assumed responsibility for strategic thinking and planning, and the gap 
between it and the staff carrying out the work has widened.  As a consequence, 
 “ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŚĂƐĞŵĞƌŐĞĚĂƐ “ĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝǀĞƐŽĐŝĂůŐƌŽƵƉ ?ǁŝƚŚĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐ(Deem 
& Brehony 2005, p. 231).    
2.2.3 Management is Rational and Value Neutral 
The recent change in practice in relation to the appointment of DPVCs does not support the 
claim that management is rational and value neutral.  Indeed, it raises questions about the 
viability of the claim in any context.   
At the most fundamental level, there is some doubt about whether or not rational decision 
making is even possible given that rationality is influenced by institutional norms and 
values and subject to taken-for-granted assumptions and expectations (Simon 1957).  
Appointment practice, for example, tends to be embedded in the institutional fabric and 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚ ‘ƚŚĞǁĂǇƚŚŝŶŐƐĂƌĞĚŽŶĞĂƌŽƵŶĚŚĞƌĞ ? ?/ƚŵĂǇďĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚĨŽƌŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƌƐƚŽ
understand exactly what is expected since much remains tacit and it is therefore not 
surprising when the outcome is the appointment of more of the same kind of people.   
DŽƌĞďƌŽĂĚůǇ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵŝƐƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚĂƐĂƐĞƚŽĨŶĞƵƚƌĂů “ƵŶƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĞĚ
truths ?ĂŶĚŵĂĚĞƚŽĂƉƉĞĂƌ “ĂƐĐŽŵŵŽŶƐĞŶƐĞƌĞƋƵŝƌŝŶŐŶŽĨƵƌƚŚĞƌĞǆƉůĂŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?(Klikauer 
2013, pp. 3-4), the assertion that a set of management principles based on a particular 
belief system or ideology could be purely technical and value free is refuted by many 
commentators.  In the public sector, for example, politicians take a view on the best way to 
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manage based on their political beliefs, whilst managers themselves have their own 
opinions on which services should be provided (Flynn, N. 2002).   
In hŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĂŐĞŶĚĂĐŽƵĐŚĞĚŝŶƚĞƌŵƐŽĨ “ƚŚĞŶĞĞĚƚŽůŝǀĞŝŶƚŚĞƌĞĂů
ǁŽƌůĚ ?ŵĂǇďĞƵƐĞĚĂƐƐŵŽŬĞƐĐƌĞĞŶďǇǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐƚŽůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĚŝĨĨŝĐƵůƚ
organisational changes that they would like to make in any case (Deem 2004, p. 63).  A 
major study found that most senior academic managers are willing to utilise elements of 
managerialism to serve their own needs and interests, even if they do not wholeheartedly 
embrace every aspect of it (Deem & Brehony 2005).  Interestingly, this is said to be 
particularly true of those managers not intending to return to the academic ranks.   
Whatever their underpinning values, Deem and Brehony found that some senior academic 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĐŽŶǀŝŶĐĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĚŽŝŶŐŝƐĨŽƌ “ƚŚĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌŐŽŽĚ ?ǁŚŝůƐƚ
ƵƐŝŶŐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ “ƚŽlegitimate their actions and interests, which are not necessarily 
ƚŚĞƐĂŵĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĂƐƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƚŚĞŝƌƐƚĂĨĨ ? ?(2005, p. 230).  There may therefore be 
something of a discontinuity between the values and beliefs academic managers espouse 
and those they actually practice (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007).   
If management itself is not a technical and value free activity, then the claim that managers 
are merely neutral professionals also looks unconvincing.  On the contrary, the exercise of 
managerialism is inherently political with winners and losers (Flynn, N. 2002, Clarke, 
Gerwitz & McLaughlin 2000) ?ŵĂŬŝŶŐŝƚ “ĂƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĂůŝƐƐƵĞŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĂ
 “ĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĂůůǇĐŽŶƚĞƐƚĞĚƌĞŐŝŵĞ ?(Clarke & Newman 1997, p. 57).  These issues of micro-
politics and power are explored further in Section 4. 
2.2.4 Management is Generic and Universally Applicable 
The claim of managerialism that good management techniques are generic and universally 
applicable is not supported.  The notion of generic and transferable management skills 
implies both the possibility of greater mobility between sectors and an increasing role for 
general managers rather than specialist managers or professionals (Farnham & Horton 
1996).  The findings suggest that neither of these is true with regard to DPVC appointments.  
On the whole, academics do not accept that there is a generic management role in 
universities (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007), possibly because they do not want to be 
governed by a general manager (PSM 5).   
Universities are seen as special, if not unique, organisations and the notion that 
management skills and experience from other sectors (or even from within higher 
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education where non-academic managers are concerned) are relevant or transferable to 
the DPVC role is largely dismissed.  This is despite the fact that universities regularly hire 
professional services managers from outside higher education, albeit arguably on the basis 
of their specialist rather than generic management skills.  
Even though the case made for academic exceptionalism in terms of DPVC appointments is 
not entirely convincing, the findings nevertheless call into the question the validity of 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůĐůĂŝŵƚŚĂƚŵĂŶagement is both generic and universally 
applicable.  This relates to a longstanding debate in the literature about whether 
management practice really is transferable between one setting and another, and whether 
generic management skills can in fact improve the performance of any organisation.   
Kottler (1981) considers the extent to which different types of organisations in both the 
public and private sectors require different types of management and concludes that 
environmental factors may have more influence on management processes than is 
acknowledged by the generic view of management.  Accordingly, he suggests there might 
be some value in considering the public and private sectors separately.   
The view that the two sectors are more different than similar is widely held.  The not-for-
profit sector is said to face particular strategic issues which mean they should be treated as 
a distinct category of organisation (Bowman & Asch 1987).  Accordingly, the strategic 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŵŽĚĞůŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐĨŽĐƵƐĞĚŽŶĞŶŚĂŶĐŝŶŐĂĨŝƌŵ ?Ɛ
competitive edge and profitability, may not be a helpful one for the public domain (Ranson 
& Stewart 1994).  Other important differences between the two sectors include the nature 
of their ownership and stakeholders, organisational structures, values and goals.  However, 
many believe the distinctions have been blurred as a result of NPM reform, which has seen 
the language and values of private sector management becoming the norm in both 
(Farnham & Horton 1996).   
Perhaps as a result, a more recent study has found limited support for the idea that there 
are major differences between the two sectors and hence few solid empirical grounds for 
rejecting the transferability of private sector management practice to the public sector 
(Boyne 2002).  For Boyne, the problem is more that there is no established body of 
knowledge on what constitutes successful management practice in the private sector, i.e. 
which management strategies and techniques actually lead to improved performance.  In 
the absence of this, there ŚĂƐĂƌŐƵĂďůǇďĞĞŶĂŶ “ŽǀĞƌŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐƚŝĐ ?ƚƌĂŶƐĨĞƌŽĨŝĚĞĂƐĨƌŽŵ
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the private to the public sectors (Pettigrew, Ferlie & McKee 1992, p. 13) without any clear 
evidence of what works or what benefits public sector managers might derive (2.2.6).  
2.2.5 Managers Must Have the Right to Manage 
Widespread acceptance of the need for effective university management, coupled with a 
hierarchical management approach more dependent on positional power
62
, has led to an 
increasing expectation that DPVCs should have the right to manage.  Furthermore, the 
trend towards a full-time managerial conception of the DPVC role, shared experience of top 
management training, and the legitimation of academic management as a career have all 
increased the likelihood that DPVCs will be willing to assume that right.  
The first-among-equals academic leadership typical of a collegial culture has arguably been 
 “ĐŽŶƐƵŵĞĚ ?ďǇĂĐŽƌƉŽƌĂƚĞ management assumption of the right to manage based on a 
position in the management hierarchy (Yielder & Codling 2004, p. 319).  This corporate 
approach used to be more typical of post-1992 universities, but is now increasingly 
prevalent in the pre-1992 sector.  This is noteworthy for two reasons: firstly, because it is 
the newer universities which are seen as providing the management model to emulate and 
secondly, because this more managerial model is apparently being adopted in the absence 
of empirical evidence that it has actually enhanced performance in those universities 
where it has been applied.  This mirrors the transfer of private sector methods to the public 
sector without evidence of their effectiveness (2.2.4).  
The literature suggests that it is not only the most senior academic managers who have 
asserted their right to manage.  Universities are increasingůǇƵƐŝŶŐ “ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇĚƌŝǀĞŶ ?
management techniques, such as human resource management (HRM), predicated on the 
need to direct and monitor the activities and performance of workers in pursuit of a single 
common organisational purpose (Waring 2013, p. 398).  This places the onus on academic 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂƚĂůůůĞǀĞůƐƚŽďĞ “ůŝŶĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŽĂƐƐĞƌƚƚŚĞŝƌƌŝŐŚƚƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞŽƚŚĞƌ
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐǀŝĂŐŽĂůƐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂŶĚƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? “ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞĚǀŝĂƚŚĞƐŽĨƚ 
ůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?(2013, p. 402).  This allows managers to allocate responsibilities, 
set targets and identify areas of under-performance.  
Despite these pressures on managers to manage, there are nevertheless many inherent 
constraints on management in the organised anarchy of a university (Cohen, M. D. & March 
                                                          
62
 However, in the case of DPVCs, positional power is accorded on the basis of expert power.  Expert 
power thus retains a great deal of importance, not least in providing a rationale for the exclusion of 
non-academic candidates.  
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1974). Universities have been described as integrative organisations that have multiple and 
complex goals and competing priorities, making them much harder to manage than 
purposive, single-aim organisations (Temple 2008) ?dŚĞǇĂƌĞ “ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇŵĞƐƐǇƉůĂĐĞƐ ?ŝŶ
terms of how work is organised (Dearlove 1998, p. 71) and outcomes are hard to measure.  
In addition, a fragmented disciplinary culture coupled with a belief in collegiality and 
academic autonomy mean that the workforce is difficult to direct, resistant to change and 
resentful of management.  The scope for top-down management is limited in this type of 
consent-based organisation (Dearlove 2002) and therefore a sƚƌĂƚĞŐǇŽĨ “ŝƐƐƵŝŶŐ
ŝŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶĐƌĞĂƐŝŶŐůǇůŽƵĚůǇĨƌŽŵƚŚĞĐĞŶƚƌĞŵĂǇŶŽƚƉƌŽĚƵĐĞƌĞƐƵůƚƐ ?(Blackmore, P. & 
Kandiko 2012, p. 4).  
2.2.6 Private Sector Methods are Superior 
dŚĞĞǀŝĚĞŶĐĞŝŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƚŽŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵĨŽƌƚŚĞƐƵƉĞƌŝŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƉƌŝǀĂƚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ
methods is mixed.  Private sector methods, such as the use of executive search agencies, 
are increasingly being adopted for DPVC appointments  W and more widely for other senior 
university management posts.  In addition, specialist managers are being recruited from 
other sectors to run professional services functions.  However, when it comes to DPVC 
appointments, private sector experience is deemed neither relevant nor valid (2.2.4).  
 
3. Managerialism and the Academic Narrative 
This section broadens out the analysis of managerialism by relating findings from this study 
to the academic narrative presented in Chapter Two (6.2).  An alternative perspective is 
advanced that questions the doom-and-gloom scenario of this misery narrative and its 
portrayal of managerialism as all-pervasive, externally imposed and universally resisted.  
The assertion that managerialism has resulted in a loss of academic power in favour of 
managers will then be critically examined in Section 4. 
3.1 Managerialism as All-Pervasive and Externally Imposed 
dŚĞĞǆƚĞŶƚƚŽǁŚŝĐŚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐŝĚĞĂƐĂŶĚƉƌĂĐƚŝĐĞƐŚĂǀĞĨŽƵŶĚƚŚĞŝƌǁĂǇinto 
universities as part of an alleged  “ƌĞůĞŶƚůĞƐƐƌŝƐĞŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵŝŶƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇůŝĨĞ ?ŝƐ
beginning to come under question (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007, p. 7).  Firstly, 
managerialism has been significantly less radical in scope in higher education than in the 
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NHS, for example, where managers recruited from the private sector have taken on a much 
more extensive restructuring role (Clegg & McAuley 2005). 
^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ƚŚĞ “ƚŚĞƐŝƐŽĨůŽƐƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐĞƐƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞĨĂŝůƐƚŽƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ
sufficient explanation for what is actually happening on the ground (Locke & Bennion 2011, 
p. 194).  This misery narrative may rather reflect a tendency for academics to feel that, 
ƵŶůĞƐƐƚŚĞǇĂŐƌĞĞŵŽƌĂůĞŝƐĂƚƌŽĐŬďŽƚƚŽŵ ?ƚŚĞǇŵĂǇƐŽŵĞŚŽǁďĞ “ůĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐŝĚĞĚŽǁŶ ?
or making it too easy for managers (Watson 2009, p. 3).  Watson suggests that, even 
though most academics enjoy their work, they may thus feel obliged to join in the tirade 
against managerialism.   
Thirdly, the somewhat over-simplistic standard narrative that managerialism has been 
ĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůůǇŝŵƉŽƐĞĚŽŶŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶĂƐƉĂƌƚŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐEWDƌĞĨŽƌŵĂŐĞŶĚĂ
ǁĂƌƌĂŶƚƐĨƵƌƚŚĞƌƐĐƌƵƚŝŶǇ ?/ƚƐŐƌŽǁƚŚŵĂǇ ?ŝŶĨĂĐƚ ?ŽǁĞĂƐŵƵĐŚƚŽ “ƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĚǇŶĂŵŝĐƐ
of institutional development as to external pressure applied by the government or the 
ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ?(Scott 1995, p. 65).  As discussed in Chapter Three (3.2), higher education has had 
to react to the massive expansion of the sector itself and of the scope and complexity of its 
activities (McCaffery 2004).  In addition, as the findings illustrate, the adoption of a more 
business-like approach to university management has also been internally driven by vice 
chancellors and DPVCs (2.2.1).   
,ĞŶŬĞů ?ƐǁŽƌŬ(2002b) suggests that the impetus for change has not come solely from the 
executive management team.  Academic departments may themselves be adopting a more 
managerial style and structure.  Counter to traditional academic values and practice, 
Henkel found an increasing formalisation of work, greater specialisation and more quasi-
hierarchical forms of relationship within departments, leading to transparent inequalities 
and less tolerance of the unproductive.  It would therefore appear that some academics 
may not onůǇďĞ “ƌĞĂƐŽŶĂďůǇĐŽŵĨŽƌƚĂďůĞ ?ǁŽƌŬŝŶŐŝŶŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůƌĞŐŝŵĞƐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽ
 “ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚĂůŝŶƐƵƐƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƚŚĞŵ ?(Kolsaker 2008, p. 522).  
WŽůůŝƚƚ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ(1990) is instructive in this regard.  He argues that ideologies do not just 
happen, they need to be systematically articulated and reinforced.  Although there may be 
a few true believers, wholescale conversion of followers is not required, only the turning of 
a few individuals  W in this case, vice chancellors and DPVCs.  Others may adopt the rhetoric 
ŽĨĂƚůĞĂƐƚƐŽŵĞĂƐƉĞĐƚƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ĞǀĞŶŝĨƚŚĞǇĚŽŶŽƚ “ƐƵďƐĐƌŝďĞƚŽƚŚĞĨƵůů
 ‘ƉĂĐŬĂŐĞ ? ?(1990, pp. 9-10) ?DŽƌĞŽǀĞƌ ?Ă “ĚŝƐƉĞƌƐĞĚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĐŽŶƐĐŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞďǇ
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staff begin to frame their decisions and actions according to managerial considerations, 
such as budgets and performance management, may also serve to embed managerialism 
throughout an organisation (Clarke & Newman 1997, p. 77).  This may be especially the 
case where an ideology is hegemonic and no viable alternative can be envisaged.  
3.2 Academic Response to Managerialism 
The prevailing narrative suggests that managerialism is universally perceived as a bad thing.  
In fact, an increasingly segmented academic profession is unlikely to hold a common view 
of managerialism and responses will therefore vary (Locke & Bennion 2011).  These may 
range from outright rejection or denial, through suďǀĞƌƐŝŽŶ ?ƚŽƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŽŶĞ ?Ɛ
own interests (Deem & Brehony 2005).   
At one end of the spectrum, Deem et al ?ƐƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽŶƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵŝŶ
higher education found some examples of routine resistance and avoidance strategies 
(Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007).  This parallels the experience of doctors in the NHS, who 
may ƵƐĞƚŚĞŝƌ “ŵŝĐƌŽƉŽǁĞƌ ?ƚŽƌĞƐŝƐƚĐŚĂŶŐĞƐďǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƐŝůĞŶƚŶŽŶ-compliance or a 
refusal to engage (Hunter 1998, p. 18).  In academia, there has been little practical dissent 
or widespread opposition and the reaction is more likely to have been passive than active 
resistance (Locke & Bennion 2011).  Rather than mounting any serious challenge, 
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŚĂǀĞƚĞŶĚĞĚƚŽŝŶĚƵůŐĞŝŶ “ŵŝŶŽƌĂĐƚƐŽĨŐĂŵĞƉůĂǇŝŶŐĂŶĚƉĂƐƐŝǀĞĚŝƐƐĞŶƚ ?
ǁŚŝĐŚĂůůŽǁƚŚĞŵ “ƚŽĐĂƌƌǇŽŶĂƐƚŚĞǇĂůǁĂǇƐŚĂĚ ?(Waring 2013, p. 413).  Forms may be 
filled and boxes ticked simply to satisfy administrative requirements and demonstrate 
apparent compliance without any real change to core academic interests and values.   
The fact that academics have mustered so little effective resistance to such radical change 
arguably implies tacit approval (Kolsaker 2008).  As time passes, academics may become 
more attuned to managerialism or, in the case of newer staff, simply know no other way.  
Kolsaker argues that, despite worsening conditions, academics are actually more positive 
and pragmatic than much of the literature suggests.  They realise that they are no more 
badly affected than other public service professionals and, on the whole, accept 
managerialism as a means of enhancing their performance, professionalism and status.  
 “&ĂƌĨƌŽŵďĞĐŽŵŝng disenchanted by the impact of managerialism upon their daily 
life, they appear, on the whole, to be making sense of and adapting to the changing 
ĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚǁŚŝůƐƚƌĞƚĂŝŶŝŶŐĂƐƚƌŽŶŐƐĞŶƐĞŽĨŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇ ? ?(2008, pp. 522-523) 
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She therefore concludes that the academic narrative overplays the notion of managerialism 
ĂƐ “ĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌŝŶŐĨŽƌĐĞ ?ŝŶŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŽƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ(2008, p. 522).  This resonates with 
work in the NHS which found little evidence to support the imposition of managerialism 
upon doctors. 
 “dŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵƌŽůůŝŶŐŽǀĞƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐůŝŬĞƚĂŶŬƐŽĐĐƵƉǇŝŶŐĂĐĂƉŝƚĂů
ĐŝƚǇĂŶĚĐƌƵƐŚŝŶŐƌĞƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞŝƐƵŶƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝĐ ? ?(Thomas & Hewitt 2011, p. 1388) 
Back in academia Taylor (2006) found that, although some academics have been reluctant 
to surrender supremacy in the strategic management and governance of their universities, 
for most it is not a major point of contention.  Not only do they see management and 
administration as an unwelcome distraction from teaching and research, but they are also 
supportive of the more professional management that has ensued.   
Some academics may have internalised a managerialist ideology for their own career 
advancement (Locke & Bennion 2011) while, as these findings confirm, many academics in 
leadership positions have actively embraced managerialism and the career opportunities it 
affords them (Deem & Brehony 2005).  Overall, then the academic response to 
managerialism has been much more complex and varied than the prevailing academic 
narrative suggests.  Moreover, studies such as this one are evidencing the dissonance 
between the rhetoric and the reality on the ground.   
 
4. Academic-Manager Power Relations 
The remainder of this chapter addresses the final research question relating to the 
significance of the findings for academic-manager power relations (Q.5).   
This section reconsiders the assertion of the prevailing academic narrative described in 
Chapter Two (6.2) - that managerialism has led to a unilateral transfer of power from 
academics to managers - and offers a more nuanced view.  This proposes that, despite 
growing in policy influence, professional services managers still face a glass ceiling in terms 
of advancement to the most senior management posts.  On the other hand, despite losing 
influence in the management and governance of their universities, rank-and-file academics 
still retain a good degree of professional autonomy.  This analysis draws upon data from 
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this study as well as the literature on managerialism and professional-managerial dynamics 
in higher education and the NHS.  
The discussion begins with a brief definition of power in an organisational context.  
4.1 Power  
Power is a complex and contested concept and a detailed examination is beyond the scope 
of this thesis.  However, it is appropriate to set out a working definition for the purposes of 
the subsequent analysis of academic-manager power relations,   
ƚŝƚƐŵŽƐƚĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂůůĞǀĞů ?ƉŽǁĞƌĐĂŶďĞĐŽŶĐĞŝǀĞĚĂƐ “ƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽĂĐŚŝĞǀĞ
ŽƵƚĐŽŵĞƐ ?(Giddens 1984, p. 257).  In management terms this can be translated into the 
capacity to make strategic decisions or determine outcomes within an organisation based 
on differential access to information, finance or authority (Ranson & Stewart 1994).  Power 
is a major driver of organisational development and managerial change since, behind the 
scenes, competing interests and micro-politics influence day-to-day activity (Ball 1987).  In 
order to understand the mechanisms and effects of power, it is thus necessary to look 
below the apparently rational surface. 
Management systems and decisions, for example, are heavily influenced by the interests of 
the group who controls an organisation (Pettigrew 1973).  This dominant group ensures 
that organisational policies and priorities reflect its own values and objectives and will 
enter into a power struggle if necessary in order to get what it wants.  This is what Lumby 
(2013)  terms the first dimension of power, whereby one individual or group controls 
another.  The second dimension is conflict avoidance, in which contention is controlled and 
does not surface. 
 “,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƉŽǁĞƌĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌďǇďĞŝŶŐŵĂĚĞůĞƐƐǀŝƐŝďůĞ ? ? 
(Clarke & Newman 1997, p. 72) 
In fact, power may become institutionalised in the roles, rules and authority relations in an 
organisation so that its management processes become an expression of the interests of 
the dominant group.   
 “dŚĞƉŽǁĞƌĨƵůĐĂŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?ĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶŝŶŐǁŚŝĐŚ
 ‘ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ?ĞŶƚĞƌƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶĂƌĞŶĂ ? (Ranson & Stewart 1994, p. 43).   
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/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ?ƉŽǁĞƌŝƐĞŶĂĐƚĞĚ “ĐŽǀĞƌƚůǇƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?ƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĞƐĂŶĚĂŐĞŶĐǇƚŚĂƚ
shape ǁŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞƚŚŽƵŐŚƚ ?ǁŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĚŝƐĐƵƐƐĞĚĂŶĚǁŚĂƚĐĂŶďĞĚŝƐƉƵƚĞĚŽƌƌĞƐŝƐƚĞĚ ?
(Lumby 2012, p. 580).  Covert power conditions people to accept the existing order 
because they can see no alternative or do not believe it can be changed.  The failure of 
academics to mount an effective challenge against managerialism may be one such 
example.  
However, the exercise of power is arguably at its greatest and most insidious in the third 
dimension when the dominant group think and act in ways that benefit themselves or 
others without necessarily even being conscious of it.   The group remains unaware of its 
sectional claims because they are woven into the very fabric of the organisation.   
 “ ?ƚŚĞƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶƚŐƌŽƵƉŵĂǇĂƉƉĞĂƌƐŽŶŽƌŵĂů ?ƐŽĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇƚŽ
themselves and others, that both their dominance and their contestability does not 
ĞǀĞŶŽĐĐƵƌƚŽƉĞŽƉůĞ ? ?(Lumby 2013, p. 585) 
I will argue that an exercise of covert power underlies the monopolisation of DPVC posts by 
an elite group of career track academic managers who effectively keep consideration of 
non-academic candidates off the agenda.  The colonisation of the university management 
space by this elite group (Section 5) is a further exercise of power which ensures control of 
strategic decision making at the expense of both rank-and-file academics and professional 
services managers.  
4.2 Professional Services Managers and Power 
A key strand of the academic narrative describes a simple shift of power from academics to 
professional services managers.  The evidence from this study suggests that, with respect 
to DPVC appointments specifically, no such shift is occurring.  More broadly, the extent to 
which professional services managers wield power over the work of academics has 
probably been overstated.    
 
For many academics, the increased visibility of a more active and professional 
administration (Chapter Three, 3.2)  translates into power (Szekeres 2004).  Szekeres notes 
that, even though professional service sƚĂĨĨŵĂǇďĞũƵƐƚĂƐ “ĚŽǁŶƚƌŽĚĚĞŶ ?ĂƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?
ƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŶĞǀĞƌƚŚĞůĞƐƐƐĞĞŶĂƐƚŚĞ “ŝŶƐƚƌƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ŽĨĂŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůĂŐĞŶĚĂ(2004, p. 19).  As 
such, they are both an unwelcome presence from an academic perspective and perceived 
as taking over.  However, far from working against academic interests, Trow suggests that 
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academics actually owe professional services staff, especially managers, a great debt since 
ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƉƌŽǀĞĚƚŽďĞ “ƚŚĞďĞƐƚĚĞĨĞŶĐĞŽĨƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƚŚĞǁŽƌƐƚ
ĞǆĐĞƐƐĞƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ “ŝŶĂŐĂŵĞǁŚŽƐĞƌƵůĞƐĂƌĞŝŶǀĞŶƚĞĚďǇŽƚŚĞƌƐĂŶĚĂƌĞ
ĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚůǇĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐ ?(1994, p. 17).  
 
In reality, professional services managers tend to view their roles as entirely 
complementary to that of academics, with clear boundaries between them (Gornitzka & 
Larsen 2004).  They ƐĞĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐ “ĂƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĂƐǁŝĞůĚŝŶŐ
ƉŽǁĞƌŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŵ ?(Henkel 1998, p. 175).   Although managers in quality assurance, for 
example, have found their role growing as new audit regimes have given them the 
ĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇƚŽ “ŽƉĞŶƚŚĞďůĂĐŬďŽǆ ?ŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŵĂŬŝŶŐ ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞŚĂĚƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞƐ
downgraded or displaced to some extent by academics (Henkel 1997, p. 140).   
 
Moreover, despite claims of burgeoning numbers, the proportion of administrative and 
support staff has declined slightly over recent years, while that of academics has risen by 
4%, from 44% in 2003/4 to 48% in 2011/12
63
.  Academics are also more highly paid: 26% of 
academic staff earned a salary of over £50k in 2011/12 compared to only 5% of 
professional services staff.  This reflects the fact that most of the top jobs in universities are 
held by career academics.   
 
The findings from this study confirm this pattern.  Professional services managers are an 
invisible group to those making DPVC appointment decisions.  Vice chancellors do not 
consider them as suitable candidates and are not actively seeking them for DPVC posts  W as 
confirmed by executive search agencies.  For their part, professional services managers 
realise they have little or no chance of getting a DPVC job and so, even if they are 
interested, they are generally not applying.  They face a glass ceiling and cannot climb to 
the top of the university management hierarchy within pre-1992 institutions.  This is a 
source of frustration to some, compounded by widespread dissatisfaction with the 
unquestioned assumption that a research career is adequate preparation for a DPVC role.   
 
Professional services managers know that they are critical to the successful running of the 
university and resent the belittling of their role by academics who undervalue what they do.  
Perhaps the biggest source of tension between academics and professional services 
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managers comes from the lack of acknowledgement the latter feel they receive from the 
former for their increasingly specialist skills and knowledge (McInnis 1998).  Although on a 
one-to-ŽŶĞůĞǀĞůƚŚĞǇŵĂǇǁŽƌŬǀĞƌǇǁĞůůƚŽŐĞƚŚĞƌǁŝƚŚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ? “ƚŚŝƐǀĂůƵĞŝƐ
ŶŽƚŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌŝůǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚĞĚǁŚĞŶƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌĞĚĂƐĂĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚŝŶƐƚĞĂĚďĞĐŽŵĞ
management (Whitchurch 2007, p. 55).  
 
Lack of peer esteem from the institution in general and from academics in particular has 
been identified as perhaps the biggest barrier to attracting and retaining good professional 
services managers (Lauwerys 2002).  Parity of esteem with academic colleagues seems 
impossible to achieve, even where professional services managers have doctorates and 
their academic colleagues have no teaching qualification and are research inactive 
(Blackmore, P. & Blackwell 2003).  Nevertheless, professional services staff rarely get re-
ĐĂƚĞŐŽƌŝƐĞĚĂƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌƐĂƌŐƵĞŝƚƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƉŽƐƐŝďůĞĨŽƌƐƚĂĨĨ “ƚŽ
cross the divide, in ĞŝƚŚĞƌĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ǁŝƚŚŶŽĂůƚĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƐƚĂƚƵƐ ?(2003, p. 24).  
 
Lewis (2012) gives an interesting example from his own experience of how professional 
services managers are seen by academic colleagues.  He noticed that he was regarded 
differently by academic colleagues as soon as he mentioned that he was undertaking 
doctoral study.  Academics spoke of ŚŝŵĂƐ “ĂĚǀĂŶĐŝŶŐ ?ďǇ “ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝŶŐŝŶƚŽƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵǇ ?
even though he did not see entering the academy as career advancement.  In fact, for 
>ĞǁŝƐ ?ƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂƐďĞƚƚĞƌŝŶŐŚŝŵƐĞůĨǀŝĂĂWŚ “ŝŶŚĞƌĞŶƚůǇƵŶĚĞƌǀĂůƵĞĚŵǇ
identity as a professional adŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌ ?(2012, p. 13).  This example illustrates how some 
academics regard management and administration as second-class activities.   
 
Lewis examines the case for higher education administration to become a profession.  He 
ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞƐƚŚĂƚ ?ĂůƚŚŽƵŐŚŚŝŐŚĞƌĞĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐƉŽƐƐĞƐƐ “ƚŚĞŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇƚŽŽůƐƚŽ
ĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚĂŶŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇĂƐĂƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů ?ƚŚĞǇ “ůĂĐŬƚŚĞĐŽůůĞĐƚŝǀĞƐĞůĨ-ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŽĐůĂŝŵ
university administration as a profession (2012, p. 2).   It should be noted here that 
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƚŽďĞĂƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶŝƐĂůƐŽĐŽŶƚĞŶƚŝŽƵƐƐŝŶĐĞƚŚĞǇĨĂŝůƚŽŵĞĞƚƐŽŵĞŬĞǇ
criteria, for example, control over entry and continuing professional development 
requirements.  Control over professional standards and ethics also tends to be somewhat 
lax and implicit rather than codified.  An already weak claim to being a profession 
(Blackmore, P. & Blackwell 2003) may be further diluted by disciplinary and organisational 
Susan Shepherd                                                            Chapter Seven: Managerialism and Power 
208 
 
fragmentation (Henkel 1998).  Nevertheless, the popular conception is still one of an 
academic profession. 
 
This problem of achieving professional status is not unique to managers in higher education; 
it has been very difficult for managers in general.  Reed and Anthony (1992) argue that 
there are a number of factors which explain this, notably that managers are too dependent 
on their organisation for employment, status and authority and that they lack a monopoly 
over a knowledge base.  As a result, their scope for discretion is limited and their 
jurisdictional claim is weak.   
 
Managers in higher education face another major problem: only academic managers are 
deemed to have legitimacy to manage other academics.  Given the notion of professional 
autonomy, there is continued sensitivity about who should be allowed to control academic 
activities.   
 “dŚĞůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇĂƐƐŽĐŝĂƚĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞ ?ŝƐůŝŬĞůǇƚŽǀĂƌǇĂĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐ
ƚŽǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŝƚŝƐƉƌĂĐƚŝƐĞĚďǇĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŽƌƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƐƚĂĨĨ ? 
(Bolden, Petrov & Gosling 2008a, p. 38) 
What is management when undertaken by academics therefore becomes managerialism 
when undertaken by managers, as managerial activities are deemed to be those that take 
place  “ŽƵƚƐŝĚĞĂƉŽůŝĐǇĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬƚŚĂƚŚĂƐƚŚĞĂƐƐĞŶƚŽĨƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ?
(Whitchurch 2008a, p. 267).   Attempts to professionalise academic leadership through the 
introduction of non-academic senior managers, as has happened in the NHS, are therefore 
ǀŝĞǁĞĚĂƐ “ďŽƚŚƵŶĚĞƐŝƌĂďůĞĂŶĚƵŶǁŽƌŬĂďůĞ ?(2008a, p. 26). 
4.3 Academics and Autonomy 
The other side of this power relations equation is the assertion that academic power is on 
the wane.  This is considered to have two distinct aspects.  The first is what might be called 
professional power derived from membership of a professional group that affords 
ĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŽǀĞƌŽŶĞ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽŶĚŝƐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ?ŽƌƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇƚŽdetermine 
management decisions or outcomes (4.1).  The first of these is analysed in this section as it 
relates to the wider academic community and the second is discussed with respect to 
academic managers in Section 5.   
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dŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞŝƐƉƌĞĚŝĐĂƚĞĚŽŶĂƚŚĞƐŝƐŽĨ “ůŽƐƐ ?ĂůŝĞŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂŶĚƌĞƚƌĞĂƚ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ
academics are proletarianised, demoralised and disengaged from decision making (Locke & 
Bennion 2011, p. 194).  Quoted in a Times Higher Education article (Reisz 2012),  Scott calls 
ŝƚ “ĂƐƚĂŶĚĂƌĚĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞŽĨĚĞĐůŝŶĞĂŶĚĨĂůů ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇŝƐďĞŝŶŐĞƌŽĚĞĚŝŶ
ƚŚĞĨĂĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ “ŝƌƌĞƐŝƐƚŝďůĞƌŝƐĞŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?,ĞĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚĂŶĞcessary 
ĐŽƌƌĞĐƚŝǀĞŝƐƌĞƋƵŝƌĞĚŝŶƚŚĞĨŽƌŵŽĨĂŵŽƌĞŶƵĂŶĐĞĚĂĐĐŽƵŶƚŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶ
power and authority in universities.   
 
Such an account might suggest that, status and power differentials between academics and 
managers are ambiguous (Henkel 1997) and that the extent to which NPM and 
managerialism have actually reduced collegiality or shifted power relations between 
academics and managers is debatable (McInnis 1998).  Indeed, a simple dichotomy 
between academic authority and managerialism may itself be over simplistic and 
misleading (Bolden et al. 2012). 
 
Although academics are said to have lost autonomy, in fact they nevertheless retain a good 
deal of control over what they do (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007).  The state grants 
academics monopoly to provide higher education and academic freedom in return for the 
upholding values and standards; this is in large part because universities themselves enjoy 
a relatively high level of independence compared to other publically funded bodies (Ferlie, 
Musselin & Andresani 2008).  Accordingly, academics receive much less scrutiny than some 
other professional groups, including pilots and doctors.  Viewed from this perspective, 
academic autonomy may thus appear as self-ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ “ĨƌŽŵĂĨĂǀŽƵƌĞĚŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂůŐƌŽƵƉ
ƐĞĞŬŝŶŐƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚŝƚƐĞůĨĨƌŽŵƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶ ?(Ramsden 1998, p. 26).  
 
Contrary to expectation, managerialism may actually have provided a mechanism to 
preserve autonomy.  Academics recognise that managerialism helps reassure the public by 
ŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŵĞĐŚĂŶŝƐŵƐĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ “ŵĂǇŚĞůƉŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů
ƐƚĂƚƵƐĂŶĚƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŝŶƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚƵƐƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ(Kolsaker 
2008, p. 522).  Academic autonomy may even have been strengthened by formal 
mechanisms for assessing research quality such as the Research Excellence Framework 
(REF)
64
.  Not only have academics retained control but assessment panels are 
disproportionately comprised of those from pre-1992 universities and funds mainly 
                                                          
64
 Formerly the Research Assessment Exercise (RAE).  
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allocated to the most prestigious institutions.  This could be taken as evidence that the 
most powerful mechanisms of control remain in the hands of academics (Henkel 1998).  It 
is one example of how academics have found a way to sustain their dominance (Salter & 
Tapper 2002).  DPVC appointments are another.  
dŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞŝƐƚŚƵƐ “ŽǀĞƌůǇƉĞƐƐŝŵŝƐƚŝĐ ?ĂŶĚŽǀĞƌ-simplistic, underplaying the complexity 
of power relations in universities (Kolsaker 2008, p. 522).  
 
 “dŚĞůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐĂƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝǀĞƉŝĐƚƵƌĞŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŝŶƌĞƚƌĞĂƚĂŶĚ ?ĂƐƚŚĞ
body of literature grows, the language of defeat proliferates.  A casual visitor to an 
English university may be surprised, therefore, to encounter an environment where 
academics seemingly come and go as they please, have a relatively free hand in 
ĐŽƵƌƐĞĚĞƐŝŐŶ ?ĂŶĚĚŝƐĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽĚŽ ‘ƌĞĂůǁŽƌŬ ? ?ƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ĨŽƌĚĂǇƐŽŶĞŶĚ ?&ĂĐĞĚ
with this reality, we need to consider whether authority is really sapping away from 
ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ? ?(Kolsaker 2008, p. 516) 
 
5. Academic Managers and Power 
This section addresses the issue of academic managers and power.  It discusses how the 
adoption of external open competition has led to the emergence of a growing cadre of 
career track DPVCs within pre-1992 universities.  It explores how they differ from hybrid 
managers and discusses the gap that is emerging between themselves and rank-and-file 
academic staff.  It goes on to argue that career track DPVCs and other members of an elite 
group of senior academic managers are consolidating their power and status by expanding 
their management jurisdiction at the expense of other academics and professional services 
managers.  
5.1 Career Track DPVCs 
Although fixed-term, internally seconded DPVCs still account for the majority of post 
holders in pre-1992 universities, the adoption of an external open competition 
appointment model has led to an increase in the numbers of a relatively new type of DPVC: 
the full-time, career track academic manager.   
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 “ĐĂĚƌĞŽĨƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐŝƐďĞŝŶŐĐƌĞĂƚĞĚ ?dƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ?ƉƌĞ-
 ? ?ƐĚŝĚŶŽƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƐĞ ? ?(VC 13) 
Career track DPVCs are not a new phenomenon.  However, until recently they were 
predominantly found in post- ? ? ? ?ƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĞĞŵĂŶĚĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚƚŚĞ “ĐĂƌĞĞƌ
ƚƌĂĐŬ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌĂƐŽŶĞŽĨƚŚƌĞĞƚǇƉŝĐĂůƌŽƵƚĞƐŝŶƚŽĂŶĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƌŽůĞ ?ƚŚĞ
ŽƚŚĞƌƐďĞŝŶŐƚŚĞ “ƌĞůƵĐƚĂŶƚ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ŐŽŽĚĐŝƚŝǌĞŶ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ(2007, p. 35).  
Reluctant managers reject the label manager, seeing themselves rather as academic 
leaders who plan to return to an academic role.  Their motivation is likely to be to protect 
their discipline or to prevent others from taking over.  Good citizen managers are typically 
near the end of their career and have an altruistic desire to give something back to their 
university.   
Reluctant and good citizen managers only exŝƐƚ “ďĞĐĂƵƐĞƚŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚ
ĂƐƐƵŵŝŶŐƐƵĐŚĂƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŚŽƵůĚďĞĂĐĂƌĞĞƌĂƐƉŝƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?(Dearlove 2002, p. 270).  The fact 
that reluctant managers are now few and far between at DPVC level, while good citizen 
managers may also be on the decline, ŝƐŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝǀĞŽĨĂĐŚĂŶŐĞŽĨĐƵůƚƵƌĞĂƐƚŚŽƐĞ “ǁŝƚŚ
ŵŽƌĞƉƌŽŶŽƵŶĐĞĚŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĞŵĞƌŐĞ(Johnson 2002, p. 36).   
Whereas in the past, academic managers may have feigned reluctance in order to appease 
other academics who may not like ambitious would-be managers, they no longer feel the 
need to be quite so coy about their management ambitions.  In Bolden et al ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇ(2008a), 
about 90% of deans and heads of department expressed a desire to progress up the 
management ladder, either at their own or another institution.  Findings from this study 
also show that an academic management career has become more legitimate, echoing the 
situation in the NHS where senior doctor-ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂƌĞŶŽůŽŶŐĞƌƌĞŐĂƌĚĞĚĂƐ “ĨĂŝůĞĚ
ĐůŝŶŝĐŝĂŶƐ ?(Harrison 1999, p. 58) ?ĞǀĞŶƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇŵĂǇƐƚŝůůďĞƐĞĞŶĂƐ “ƚƌĂŝƚŽƌƐ ?ŽƌĂƐ
ŚĂǀŝŶŐ “ĐŽƉƉĞĚŽƵƚ ?ďǇƚŚĞŝƌĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ(Hunter 1998, p. 30).   
As the name implies, career track DPVCs have decided to made academic management 
their career.  They are full-time managers who are increasingly divorced from day-to-day 
frontline academic activity and have little or no intention of going back to an academic role.  
Their expectations of management may have been in part shaped by a shared experience 
ŽĨƚŚĞ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ&ŽƵŶĚĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐdDW ?ƐĞĞŶďǇŽŶĞƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚĂƐfacilitating the 
development of  “ĂŵĂŶĚĂƌŝŶĐůĂƐƐŽĨƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐǁŚŽďĞůŝĞǀĞƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞŝƐƚŽŵĂnage 
ŽƚŚĞƌƐ ? ?Ws ? ? ? 




managers and are aware of taking an academic management career route, moving 
ĨƌŽŵũŽďƚŽũŽďƵƉƚŚĞůĂĚĚĞƌ ? ?(ESA 1) 
These career track academic managers may have more in common with professional 
services managers than they do with other academics (Deem 2002).  They are working to a 
common purpose and a joint community of practice may be developing (Bacon 2009).  In 
ĨĂĐƚ ?ƚŚĞĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞƚǁŽŐƌŽƵƉƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐŚĂƐ “ŵŽƌĞƚŽĚŽǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
endemic, elitist ethos that prevails within manǇŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ?ƚŚĂŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŽĨŚŽǁ
universities operate (McCaffery 2004, p. 5).   
 
Career track DPVCs are no longer hybrid academic managers who perform the role on a 
part-time, fixed-term basis whilst maintaining their academic activity.  The crossover to a 
full-time academic management role has been perceived as a move away from being an all-
round academic to becoming a specialist para-professional (Macfarlane 2011).  An 
ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚĞǀŝĞǁŝƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ “ŶĞǁďƌĞĞĚŽĨĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?ŚĂǀĞďĞŶĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐĂ “ŵŽƌĞ
ƌŽƵŶĚĞĚƐĞƚŽĨƐŬŝůůƐ ?ƚŽĂĚĚƚŽƚŚŽƐĞŽĨƚĞĂĐŚŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ(Bolden, Petrov & Gosling 
2008a, p. 28) ǀŝĂƚŚĞĂĐĐƵŵƵůĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ “ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĂƐƐĞƚƐ ?(Causer & Exworthy 1999, p. 101).   
The strength of hybrid managers is that they are able to combine specialist knowledge with 
credibility with professional colleagues (Fitzgerald & Ferlie 2000).  To take an NHS example, 
hybrid clinician managers have acted as a bridge between the medical profession and 
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂŶĚŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶĂďůĞƚŽƚĂŬĞŽŶŝŶƚƌĂĐƚĂďůĞƋƵĂůŝƚǇŝƐƐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ “ĨĞǁ
ŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐŚĂǀĞĚĂƌĞĚƚŽĚĞĂůǁŝƚŚ ?(Ferlie et al. 1996, p. 186).  Moreover, these 
hybrid managers ŚĂǀĞŶŽƚďĞĐŽŵĞ “ƐƵƌƌŽŐĂƚĞŐĞŶĞƌĂůŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ďƵƚƌĞƚĂŝŶĞĚƚŚĞir 
professional values (1996, p. 190) ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? “ƚŚĞƐĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞƐĂƌĞůŽƐƚŝĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů
gives up their professional practice, because they quickly become out of date, are 
distanced from colleagues and worse, are seen, politically, to have gone over to 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?(Fitzgerald & Ferlie 2000, p. 729). 
WsƐ ?ŵŽǀĞĨƌŽŵŚǇďƌŝĚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƚŽĨƵůů-time career track academic manager may thus 
have its downsides.  Firstly, professional credibility becomes increasingly difficult to 
maintain.  Although they may still hang on to an academic identity, career track DPVCs no 
longer tend to be perceived as academics by academic colleagues outside of the executive 
management team.  Nevertheless, it is important to maintain the illusion that these are 
hybrid academic roles, undertaken by academics who will return to the ranks.  Though this 
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is more myth than reality for many DPVC posts, it is essential that the roles are only open 
to career academics if social closure is to be maintained.    
There is a real irony here, given that DPVC posts are framed on the basis firstly that 
academic credibility is essential to carry out the role effectively and secondly, that the 
academic community will only accept fellow academics in these roles.  In fact, once in post 
DPVCs tend to be viewed no differently to the registrar or any of the other management 
 ‘ƐƵŝƚƐ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵĂǇŚĞůƉƚŽĞǆƉůĂŝŶǁŚǇƚŚĞ academic narrative fails to distinguish between 
academic and professional services managers.  
^ĞĐŽŶĚůǇ ?ĚĞƐƉŝƚĞƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐůǇǁŽƌŬĞĚĂƐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?Ă “ŐƌŽǁŝŶŐ
ĐŚĂƐŵ ?ŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŽďĞĞŵĞƌŐŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶĐĂƌĞĞƌƚƌĂĐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĂĐĂĚemic 
community (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007, p. 85).  Deem (2008) gives a tangible example of 
how remote some have become.  When she and her fellow researchers were conducting 
interviews with senior academic managers, they discovered they were often quite hard to 
locate, hidden away in inaccessible suites of offices where other staff rarely ventured.   
One major difference between career track DPVCs and their academic colleagues is that 
the former owe their primary allegiance to the university as a whole, whereas for most 
academics their key loyalty is to their subject discipline.   
 “dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽŵŽƌĞƐƚƵŶŶŝŶŐĨĂĐƚĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂŶǇǁŚĞƌĞŝŶƚŚĞ
world than the simple one that academics are possessed by disciplines, fields of 
ƐƚƵĚǇ ?ĞǀĞŶĂƐƚŚĞǇĂƌĞůŽĐĂƚĞĚŝŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐ ? ?(Clark, B. R. 1987, p. 25) 
These disciplines have been conceived as the invisible colleges that bind academics 
together and in which their identities flourish (Kogan 2000).   
Arguably, their new-found detachment from their academic discipline and core academic 
activities means that taking on a career track academic management job is a move not only 
into a new working life, but also into a new community of practice (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 
2007) ?ĂƌĞĞƌƚƌĂĐŬŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐŵĂǇĨŝŶĚƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŝƌ “ůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?ĂƵthority, and self-identity 
ƉƌŽŐƌĞƐƐŝǀĞůǇĐŽŵĞƚŽƌĞƐƚŵŽƌĞŽŶƚŚĞŝƌƌŽůĞĂƐĂŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƚŚĂŶŽŶƚŚĞŝƌƐĐŚŽůĂƌůǇĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐ ?
(2007, p. 139). 
For some commentators, however, the distinction between these managers and the 
managed is somewhat over-simplistic given that more academics are participating in 
university management at all levels (Henkel 1998) and that the same individuals are 
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increasingly likely to be managers in one setting and the managed in another (Whitchurch 
& Gordon 2010).   Empirical work in the NHS has concluded that an either/or notion of 
being a professional or a manager may no longer be appropriate as professional work is 
increasingly a combination of the two activities (Causer & Exworthy 1999).   
/ŶĐŽŶƚƌĂƐƚ ?ŽƚŚĞƌƐǀŝĞǁŝƚĂƐĐƌĞĂƚŝŶŐĂŶ “ŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇƐĐŚŝƐŵ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ “ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ “ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ?ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞĨŽƌŵĞƌĂĚŽƉƚ
managerial values while the latter do not (Winter 2009, p. 121).  There is thus assumed to 
be a conflict of managerial versus professional ideologies and value systems between the 
two groups, with academic managers pitted in ideological opposition to their academic 
ĐŽůůĞĂŐƵĞƐ ?&ƌŽŵƚŚŝƐƉĞƌƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐĂƌĞďĞůŝĞǀĞĚƚŽ “ƌĞŝŶĨŽƌĐĞƚŚĞ
sense of a separation and even a polarization of academic and management activity, and 
ĂŶ ‘ŽƚŚĞƌŝŶŐ ?ŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?(Gordon & Whitchurch 2010, p. 172).   
Of course, career track academic managers may argue that they are assuming these roles in 
order to protect the interests of their profession.  Although the presence of professional 
managers may be seen to erode the notion of equality of competence that lies at the heart 
of professionalism (Causer & Exworthy 1999), keeping control of professional standards in 
their hands can be seen as a way of maintaining or even extending professional autonomy 
(Ferlie et al. 1996).  Moreover, as proponents of soft rather than hard NPM, professional 
managers may alƐŽƐĞƌǀĞ “ƚŽƉƌŽƚĞĐƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƌĂŶŬĂŶĚĨŝůĞĨƌŽŵŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůĞǆĐĞƐƐ ?
(Ferlie & Geraghty 2005, p. 438).  Ensuring that quality control of professional activity is 
exercised from within the profession may be the best defence against the imposition of 
external controls (Fitzgerald & Ferlie 2000).   
On the other hand, academics may rather see these managers ĂƐŚĂǀŝŶŐ ‘ƐŽůĚŽƵƚ ?ƚŽ
managerialism in asserting their right to manage academic colleagues.  Rowley and 
Sherman, for example, suggĞƐƚƚŚĂƚǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐĂŶĚWsƐ “ůŽŽŬĂƚƚŚĞŝƌũŽďƐĂƐ
synonymous to top level managers in large corporations and adopt a leadership style that 
ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĂƚƚǇƉĞŽĨƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?(2003, p. 1060).  They further suggest that those managers 
who plan to return to their faculty at the end of their term may adopt a different 
management style from those who either intend to retire or move elsewhere.   
DĂŶĂŐĞĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŵĂǇĨĞĞůŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂƌĞ “ƵƐing managerialism for their own purposes 
ĂŶĚĨƵƚƵƌĞĐĂƌĞĞƌƐ ?(Waring 2013, p. 129).  This claim of managerial self-interest is 
ƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇĐƌŝƚŝĐƐŽĨŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵǁŚŽĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚ “ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂtions try 
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to make the best possible arrangements for themselves (first) and their organizations 
 ?ƐĞĐŽŶĚ ? ?(Enteman 1993, p. 160).  For Enteman, it is no surprise to find that an ideology 
created by managers is also an ideology for managers.   
5.2 DPVCs Colonising the Management Space 
Differentials in power and status amongst academics are nothing new.  Whenever 
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐŽƉĞƌĂƚĞŝŶĂŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐĞƚƚŝŶŐ ?ƐƵĐŚĂƐĂƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ? “ŽĐĐƵƉĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ĐŽŶƚƌŽů ?ƌĞƋƵŝƌĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶďĞĐŽŵĞƐ “ƐƚƌĂƚŝĨŝĞĚďǇĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝǀĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĂƐ
some members become supervisors or managers (Friedson 2001, p. 84).  However, these 
differentials have become more explicit and institutionalised over recent years (Henkel 
1998) ?dŚŝƐƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶƐĂƌĞ “ŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚŝĐĂůůǇůĂǇĞƌĞĚ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ
homogeneous, with elites at both national (macro) and institutional (meso) as well as 
frontline deliverers at the micro level (Laffin 1998, p. 12).   
This hierarchy has always provided career progression opportunities for professionals 
(Pollitt 1990).  Just as professionals working withŝŶŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶƐ “ĐŽůŽŶŝƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĞŶĞǁ
ďƵƌĞĂƵĐƌĂƚŝĐƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐĂŶĚ “Ğǆtended the principle of professional exclusivity up the 
ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůŚŝĞƌĂƌĐŚǇƚŽŝŶĐůƵĚĞƚŚĞƚŽƉũŽďƐ ?(Laffin 1998, p. 4), so career track 
academic managers have done the same within new more managerial structures.  
Managerialism has thus been used by professionals themselves, both as a personal career 
strategy and as a means of improving the status and esteem of their professional group 
(Evetts 2011).  
The literature on the sociology of the professions regards organisations as ƐŝƚĞƐĨŽƌ “ŝŶƚĞƌ-
ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĐŽŵƉĞƚŝƚŝŽŶĂƐǁĞůůĂƐƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůĐŽŶƋƵĞƐƚ ?(Evetts 2011, p. 418). 
WƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐĐŽŵƉĞƚĞďǇƚĂŬŝŶŐŽǀĞƌĞĂĐŚŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐƚĂƐŬƐŽƌũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽŶĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
jurisdiction pre-ĞŵƉƚƐĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐĂŶĚƐŽŽŶĞĐĂŶŶŽƚŽĐĐƵƉǇĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ?ƐũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚ ŽŶ “ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚ
ĞŝƚŚĞƌĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŝƚǀĂĐĂŶƚŽƌĨŝŐŚƚŝŶŐĨŽƌŝƚ ?(Abbott 1988, p. 86).  The development of new 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŽƌƐŬŝůůƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆĂŵƉůĞŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ?ŵĂǇƚŚƵƐĞŝƚŚĞƌ “ĐŽŶƐŽůŝĚĂƚĞũƵƌŝƐĚŝĐƚŝŽŶĂů
hold or ŵĂǇĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚĞĞǆƉĂŶƐŝŽŶĂƚŽƚŚĞƌƐ ?ĞǆƉĞŶƐĞ ?(1988, p. 96).   
As DPVC posts become more managerial in nature and the scope of their responsibilities is 
growing, career track DPVCs are making incursions into the management jurisdiction.  
Rather than professional services managers colonising management as has been alleged, it 
is rather DPVCs who are doing so.  This may be in response to a perceived threat either 
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external (government interference) or internal (growing influence of professional services 




strong registrar or other professional services manager.  He argues that it is therefore 
ŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽĨŝŶĚƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůďĂůĂŶĐĞŝŶŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĞŶƐƵƌĞƚŚĂƚ “ƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂů
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚŐĞƚƚŽŽƐƚƌŽŶŐ ? ?Ws ? ? ?KƚŚĞƌƐƐƉŽŬĞŽĨƚŚĞŶĞĞĚĨŽƌWsƐƚŽďĞ
academics so that there will be academic ownership of university decision making (DPVC 8) 
ĂŶĚ “ĂƐŚŝĨƚďĂĐŬƚŽĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂŶĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĨƌĞĞĚŽŵ ? ?Ws ? ? ? ? 
 
This analysis also finds some support in the literature.  In their discussion of the movement 
of universities from an organisational model of bureaucracy to that of the corporation, 
Dopson and McNay argue that there has been a transfer of power from the registrar (and 
ƚŚĞĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂƐ “ƐĞŶŝŽƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐŚĂǀĞƌĞĐĂƉƚƵƌĞĚĐŽŶƚƌŽů Pŝƚ
ŝƐĨƌŽŵƚŚĞƌĂŶŬƐŽĨƚŚĞĐŽůůĞŐŝƵŵƚŚĂƚůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĞĚ ?(1996, p. 30).  
Deem et al ĨŽƵŶĚƐĞŶŝŽƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐǁĞƌĞŚĂƉƉǇƚŽƵƐĞŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ “ŝŶ
ŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶŝŶŐƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉŽǁĞƌĂŶĚĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ?(2005, p. 231) and see the emergence of 
ƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌĂƐĂŶĞǆĂŵƉůĞŽĨƚŚĞ “ďůƵƌƌŝŶŐŽĨďŽƵŶĚĂƌŝĞƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚŽƐĞǁŚŽ
ĂƌĞ ‘ũƵƐƚ ?ĂĐĂĚemics and those whose work was once the main preserve of career-managers 
ĂŶĚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŽƌƐ ?(Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007, pp. 78-79).  In other words, there has 
been an encroachment of academic managers on managerial territory.  A former registrar 
suggests that much of the tension between professional services managers and academics 
ŝƐƐĂŝĚƚŽƌĞƐƵůƚĨƌŽŵ “ƚŚĞĚĞƐŝƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐďŽĚǇ ?ĂŶĚƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƚŚĞƐĞŶŝŽƌ
academic leadership, to control the agenda and make all the key decisions and thereby to 
ůŝŵŝƚƚŚĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƉƌŽĨĞƐƐŝŽŶĂůƐĞŶŝŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐ ?(Lauwerys 2008, p. 9).  
Since professional managers are assumed to bring a managerial value system, Deem and 
colleagues have argued that it is vital to keep them out of senior management positions in 
ŽƌĚĞƌƚŽĂǀŽŝĚŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵďĞŝŶŐ “ƐƵĐĐĞƐƐĨƵůůǇŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĞĚĂŶĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐĂƵƚŽŶŽŵǇ ?ĂƐ
it is ĐƵƌƌĞŶƚůǇƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚ ?ĐƵƌƚĂŝůĞĚŝĨŶŽƚůŽƐƚ ? ?ĞĞŵĞƚĂů ? ?  ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ?ĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐĂƌĞ
ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƵƌŐĞĚƚŽďĞƚƚĞƌƉƌĞƉĂƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĨŽƌŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚŽƌƌŝƐŬ “ƚŚĞŝŵƉůŽƐŝŽŶŽĨ, ?
which would result from a possible future scenario in which only non-academic managers 
are appointed to senior management posts (2007, p. 159) ?/ŶƚŚŝƐǁĂǇ ?ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ?ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ
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at maintaining their monopoly of DPVC positions and colonising the management space 
can be seen as a means both of increasing their own status and power and of fending off 
potential incursion of that space by professional services managers.  In doing so, they are 
consolidating both their professional and managerial power. 
 
6. Summary 
This chapter has presented an analysis to address the final two research questions on 
managerialism and academic-manager power relations.   
Managerialism is not as pervasive in relation to DPVC appointments as the wider academic 
narrative might suggest.  Nevertheless, the claim that management is important and a 
good thing has been fully accepted by vice chancellors and DPVCs and the construction of 
many DPVC posts as full-time management roles also indicates an increasing recognition of 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂƐĂĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐĐůĂŝŵƐƚo be rational and 
neutral as well as generic and universally applicable are not well supported.  There is 
widespread scepticism of the transferability of management experience and skills from 
other sectors.  Rather, universities are seen as unique organisations within which only 
career academics have the legitimacy to manage other academics.  Managerialism in higher 
education is thus of a context-specific rather than a generic variety, that may be termed 
academic-managerialism.  
The doom-and-gloom scenario resulting from the impact of managerialism and NPM on 
universities portrayed in the academic narrative is questioned.  It is proposed that 
managerialism has been internally driven as well as externally imposed, and that it has not 
been universally opposed or resisted, as suggested.  Although there has been some minor 
resistance and game playing, many academics have either accepted or welcomed the 
changes, whilst a few have used managerialism for their own benefit.  
It is further argued that there has been no simple and unilateral transfer of power from 
academics to managers.  In fact, although growing in policy influence, professional services 
managers face a glass ceiling in terms of advancement and are effectively excluded from 
consideration for DPVC posts.  Contrary to the academic narrative, academics have 
managed to retain a considerable amount of professional autonomy over their work. 
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At management level, a cadre of career track DPVCs is emerging in pre-1992 universities, in 
part in response to the opening up of posts to external open competition.  These are full-
time, specialist  W rather than hybrid  W managers, with little or no intention of returning to 
the academic ranks.  As such they are increasingly divorced from frontline academic 
activities and from rank-and-file academic colleagues, who tend to view them as part of 
 “ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚ ? ?ůƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŚĞǇŵĂǇƐĞĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĂƐŵĂŶĂŐŝŶ ŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŽĨƚŚĞŝƌ
fellow academic professionals, they may be regarded as acting in a managerial capacity 
and/or in their own self-interest.   
As they assume an expanded and more managerial role, career track DPVCs are extending 
their professional jurisdiction into the management sphere of the university.  In so doing, 
they are increasing their own status and power and fending off any potential incursion by 
professional services managers.   
 







This chapter sets out the research conclusions and offers a critical reflection on the 
research process.  The latter takes the form of a self-critique of the study, including a 
consideration of the limitations of the data and possible alternative methodological 
approaches.  The final section focuses on what still remains to be done, proposing further 
avenues for empirical research emanating from this study. 
 
2. Conclusions 
In answer to each of the ƐƚƵĚǇ ?Ɛcentral research questions set out in Chapter One (6.2), 
the following conclusions are drawn.  
2.1 The Case for Change 
There is a deficit case for change whereby an external open competition DPVC 
appointment model is adopted as a response to a perceived problem.  This may be an 
internal skills gap, the need to address an inward-looking executive management team or 
to deal with institutional underperformance.  sŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?ŽǀĞƌƌŝĚŝŶŐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶŝƐƚŽ
make the best appointment possible in order to improve the quality of university 
management in what is a challenging and highly competitive environment.  This 
increasingly means bringing in a DPVC from another institution. 
Change is typically pragmatic rather than policy driven.  The majority of pre-1992 English 
universities have a mixed model of DPVC appointment, whereby vice chancellors make 
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case-by-case decisions on the appointment process, dependent on such factors as the 
depth of the internal talent pool for that particular DPVC portfolio.  Only a handful of 
universities externally advertise all their DPVC posts as a matter of policy, though there is 
evidence to suggest that external open competition is becoming the default option in a few 
others.   
Vice chancellors are the main drivers of change to DPVC appointment practice and also the 
key decision makers in terms of the selection of candidates.  Although councils have to 
formally approve DPVC appointments, in general they appear willing to accede to the 
wishes of their vice chancellor.  Indeed, some vice chancellors made it very clear from the 
outset that they expected the support of their council in this regard.   
Whilst it is understandable that vice chancellors would wish to choose their own executive 
team, the outcome has been the appointment of more of the same type of individuals.  
This runs the risk of group think and a lack of appropriate challenge, neither of which is 
conducive to the effective management of a university.  On the contrary, there is both a 
strong social justice and business case for a heterogeneous executive management team 
that reflects a diversity of backgrounds and talents.   
2.2 DPVC Profile and Careers 
DPVCs are still predominantly white male professors.  The imperviousness of the DPVC 
profile, even in the face of transformational change to university governance and 
ŵĂŶĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĂƐĂƌĞƐƵůƚŽĨƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐNPM reform agenda, confirms findings from 
earlier studies that the recruitment pattern of the most senior university managers has 
remained predictable despite significant policy change (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007, 
Bargh et al. 2000).   
However, the continuity in the demographic profile of those DPVCs appointed via external 
open competition disguises an important change in their motivations and approach.  These 
are individuals who have made a conscious decision to take a management route, enjoy 
management and are ambitious to progress to the top job.  They are typically career track 
rather than reluctant or good citizen managers (Deem, Hillyard & Reed 2007), some of 
whom will become  “ĐĂƌĞĞƌWsƐ ?making strategic career moves from one DPVC role to 
another, typically to a bigger and better institution.  
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Becoming a DPVC, though increasingly well remunerated, is a more high-risk strategy than 
hitherto, particularly for younger post holders.  This is because, if they are not at 
retirement age when their term of office expires, exit strategies can be difficult.  Going 
back to an underlying academic role, though never unproblematic, is nowadays neither a 
viable, nor a desirable, option for many DPVCs.  They are heavily reliant on the patronage 
of the vice chancellor who appointed them and their position becomes vulnerable when a 
new leader comes in who wants to create his or her own executive team. 
2.3 Management Capacity Building 
The increasing adoption of an external open competition model of DPVC appointment in 
pre-1992 universities can be seen as a logical response to the need for more and better 
management.  However, the way that the model is being implemented in practice is 
problematic and has resulted in some apparently unintended consequences  W notably the 
narrowing both of the field of preferred candidates and the professional and gender profile 
of those securing the jobs.  Opening up DPVC posts to external competition cannot 
therefore be said to have enhanced management capacity in the sense of attracting and 
appointing the best candidates from the widest possible talent pool.   
On the contrary, the way DPVCs are appointed can be seen as a means of social closure 
(2.6).  The framing of the posts effectively excludes non-academic candidates, with neither 
managers from outside higher education nor professional services managers with extensive 
experience of, and empathy with, universities considered suitable for DPVC posts.  In 
addition, a risk-averse and conservative approach to recruitment has led to an increasing 
emphasis on experience as an indicator of quality.  This precludes serious consideration of 
a more diverse candidate pool, putting non-standard candidates at a disadvantage and 
representing a form of bed-blocking for younger managers. The outcome has been the 
appointment of safer, more experienced candidates achieved via a recirculation of existing 
DPVCs as part of a self-perpetuating, predominantly male, hierarchy.   
Although sucŚĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐŵĞĞƚǀŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?Ɛƚated desire for people who can hit 
the ground running, it is not clear that the quality of candidates has actually improved.  A 
reliance on buying in experienced individuals is arguably a short-term fix to the pressing 
problem of how to improve university management.  Moreover, if external open 
competition is introduced at the expense of internal talent development and succession 
management, it militates against longer-term management capacity building in the sector.   
Susan Shepherd                                         Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Critical Reflection 
222 
 
2.4 Gender  
The adoption of an external open competition appointment model has led to fewer women 
securing DPVC jobs.  These findings challenge some commonly held assumptions about why 
there is this continuing gender imbalance at executive management level.  Firstly, it is often 
said that the dearth of women in senior positions is an issue of agency (or a lack of it), but 
the data reveal no lack of ambition amongst female deans and heads of school.  Rather, the 
evidence suggests there may be structural impediments for women associated with 
changed DPVC appointment practice, including the framing of the posts, increasing 
expectation of geographical mobility, and use of existing elite networks for candidate 
recommendations. 
Secondly, the leaky pipeline argument alone fails to explain why a mere 15% of DPVCs 
appointed via external open competition are women given that they comprise 24% of third 
tier academic managers  W the main recruitment pool.  Alternative explanations are that the 
risk-averse and conservative nature of DPVC appointment practice is resulting in 
homosociability, or the tendencǇƚŽĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŝŶŽŶĞ ?ƐŽǁŶŝŵĂŐĞ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞŽĨ
the culturally established ideals of excellence and meritocracy over that of diversity. 
Thirdly, executive search agencies are often accused of perpetuating narrow stereotypes of 
what a DPVC looks like and of having a negative impact on the diversity of appointees, but 
these findings show that the proportion of women appointed to DPVC roles is slightly 
higher when an executive search agency is used than where a university relies on external 
advertisement alone.  Whilst there are real concerns regarding the use of executive search 
agencies, the temptation to blame them for the gender imbalance in DPVC appointments 
should be avoided.  The responsibility for determining the appointment process, framing 
DPVC posts and making selection decisions rests firmly with the universities themselves.   
2.5 Managerialism 
Although higher education in general is undoubtedly experiencing a more managerial  ‘ƚƵƌŶ ?,
ideal-type managerialism is not as pervasive as the academic narrative might suggest with 
respect to DPVC appointments.  Nevertheless, there is substantial evidence of two 
ideological tenets of managerialism: that management is important and a good thing, and 
that managers should assert their right to manage.  The latter reflects an increasingly 
managerial interpretation of the DPVC role. 
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However, this is a context-specific variant of managerialism rather than the generic ideal-
type.  There is virtually no recognition of the transferability of management skills and 
experience from other sectors or the relevance or appropriateness of those offered by 
professional services managers.  The managerial ideology identified in this study is 
therefore higher education specific and could thus be conceived of as  ‘academic-
managerialism ?.  Whilst this in part reflects a belief in the uniqueness of universities as 
organisations, it also raises questions about the viability in any context of ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛ 
ideological claim that management is generic and universally applicable.   
Moreover, in terms of DPVC appointments ?ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛassertion that management is 
rational and value neutral is unfounded.  In reality, the appointment process is 
characterised by social closure and micro-politics in the form of the maintenance of self-
interest, power and status.  Given that the recruitment and selection process in other 
organisations  W and indeed any example of management decision making - is likely to be 
subject to similar influences, this casts doubt on the validity of ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?Ɛwider 
ideological claim for the rationality and neutrality of management and managers. 
2.6 Academic-Manager Power Relations 
The belief within pre-1992 English universities that DPVCs must be career academics 
remains undimmed.  This is consistent with earlier studies that have found that non-
academic managers have not been appointed despite expectations to the contrary given 
the increasingly managerial interpretation of the role (Smith, D., Adams & Mount 2007, 
Szreter 1979).  It can be seen as a continuation of the amateur-manager approach and the 
apprenticeship model of learning on the job (Breakwell & Tytherleigh 2008a).   
Whilst it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine the performance of DPVCs and make 
a judgement as to whether or not the academic managers in these roles are doing a good 
job, I believe it is appropriate to question the seemingly taken-for-granted assumption that 
DPVCs must be career academics, as clearly signalled by the person specification.  This is 
especially so given that the testimony of serving DPVCs shows that this role is very different 
from their previous academic one and requires a different skill set.   
Moreover, as the positional power of the DPVC increases, there is arguably less necessity 
for the post holder to rely on expert power and this should mean that specialist knowledge 
and academic credibility is of relatively less importance.  Nevertheless, academic credibility, 
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as opposed to personal credibility, is seen as a non-negotiable requirement and thus expert 
power retains its critical role. 
The particular way in which merit is defined, i.e. a track record of research excellence, 
academic credibility and academic management experience, can be seen as a means of 
legitimating the domination of DPVC positions by senior academic managers and 
maintaining the status quo by ensuring that more of the same type of people continue to 
get these top jobs.  Arguably, academics have always been adept at maintaining their elite 
status in the face of imposed change, such as the Research Assessment Exercise (Salter & 
Tapper 2002).  The ring-fencing of DPVC posts appears to be yet another example of this.   
The prevailing academic narrative holds that there has been a transfer of power from 
academics to managers.  In the broadest sense of the word manager, this may be true.  
However, the real shift of power has not been from academics to professional services 
managers, as often suggested, but from rank-and-file academics to an elite group of 
academic managers, including a new cadre of career track DPVCs.  At a practical level, this 
is indicative ŽĨƚŚĞƐĐŚŝƐŵƚŚĂƚŝƐĚĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞ “ĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞ
 “ŵĂŶĂŐĞĚĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ?(Winter 2009, p. 121), whilst at theoretical level, it can be conceived 
as a stratification of the academic profession (Friedson 2001). 
In an exercise of that power, this elite group of career track DPVCs are expanding their 
jurisdiction by colonising the management domain in universities.  Not only are they 
assuming line management responsibility for some professional services functions, but also 
taking control of the strategic decision-making agenda at the expense of the wider 
academic community.  Far from declining in authority, this elite group of DPVCs (and vice 
chancellors) are arguably taking full advantage of managerialism to consolidate both their 
professional and managerial power.  
        
3. Critical Reflection 
This section identifies some of the limitations of the study in terms of scope and 
methodology.   
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3.1 Limitations of the Data 
In addition to the potential weaknesses of each of the selected methods discussed in the 
chapter on methodology (Chapter Four), the following limitations of the data presented in 
this thesis are acknowledged. 
Moving target: The nature of the research design means that the findings represent a 
snapshot in time of a population of DPVCs that is neither fixed nor stable.  The study thus 
suffers from moving target syndrome, whereby the data captured are in constant flux and 
almost immediately become out of date. 
Comparator group:  The interview phase of this study is limited to pre-1992 universities 
that have changed their DPVC appointment model.  Although the decision to focus on 
those institutions which are effecting change ŝƐĂƉƉƌŽƉƌŝĂƚĞƚŽƚŚĞƐƚƵĚǇ ?ƐĂŝŵƐ ?ŝƚǁŽƵůĚ
nevertheless have been useful and illuminating to contextualise the interview findings by 
reference to experience elsewhere.  Potential comparator groups of particular value 
include those pre-1992s that have retained an internal secondment DPVC appointment 
model and post-1992 institutions that have years of experience working with an external 
open external competition appointment model. 
Balance of interview sample:  The majority of research participants are academic 
managers.  This reflects the reality that DPVCs are overwhelmingly drawn from the 
academic community.  However, in the interests both of balance and of my own stated 
desire to examine the career aspirations and opportunities of professional services 
managers, it would have been beneficial to have included more non-academic managers in 
my interview sample. 
Indicator of external open competition:  External advertisement is used as the sole 
indicator that a post holder was appointed by means of external open competition.  As 
discussed in Chapter Four (5.4) there are five cases where a DPVC was appointed from 
another institution with no record of an external advertisement having been placed.  These 
individuals were thus not included in the interview sample. 
Extended quotations:  My decision not to record and transcribe the interviews together 
with my commitment to preserving the anonymity of my research participants meant that 
the thesis does not include extended transcript extracts.  This may have impacted on the 
readability and persuasiveness of the text.  However, the process of respondent validation 
of interview summaries and the inclusion of shorter verbatim quotations allowed 
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participants the ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ŚĂǀĞƚŚĞŝƌƐĂǇ ? in the interpretation and presentation of 
the findings, whilst still guarding against the potential for accidental disclosure. 
Restrictions on what is reported: Given the word limit and the need to maintain a coherent 
research story, some of the findings and much of the reading and analysis have not been 
included within the thesis.  It thus represents only part of the overall doctoral study.  
However, recognising what needed to be excluded and how this missing material may be 
utilised in a future publications strategy was an important part of the learning process.  
Despite these acknowledged limitations, it is hoped that the data analysis presented in this 
thesis will prove of relevance and value both to higher education practitioners and policy 
makers, as well as making an original contribution to knowledge. 
3.2 Limitations of the Research Design 
Although I believe that my chosen methodology worked well in capturing the macro and 
micro aspects of, and different perspectives on, the research phenomenon, I appreciate 
that a quite different research design could also have been adopted.  I originally considered 
a case study research strategy in order to locate the empirical investigation within an 
institutional context, using interviews as the main method, supplemented by documentary 
evidence and observation of the DPVC recruitment process. 
I believe this type of in-depth, situated case study would have the potential to produce rich 
and interesting data.  However, after much consideration, I rejected this methodological 
approach as impractical for a number of reasons.  Firstly, I took the view that it would be 
too difficult to gain access to the required number and type of individuals within each case 
study institution.  Secondly, where a vice chancellor did grant permission on behalf of an 
institution, this may have entailed other senior staff being volunteered rather than 
participating freely. 
Thirdly, it would not have been possible to preserve the anonymity of interviewees from 
their colleagues within the same institution  W something that was enabled in this study 
because participants were approached individually, in most cases without the use of 
gatekeepers.  Under these circumstances, it is likely they may have been unwilling to speak 
openly about each other and their institutional circumstances.  Fourthly, such a close focus 
on specific institutions, whilst valuable in its own right, runs the risk of accidental disclosure 
in the writing up process and resultant harm to the research participants.  As noted 
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elsewhere, this is a relatively small community where senior managers are well known to 
each other. 
Finally, even if the timing had made it possible, it would have been difficult to secure 
agreement to observe the DPVC recruitment process given the number of stakeholders and 
ethical issues to consider, not least the effect that the observation itself may have had on 
the process.  Overall, then, I felt that a case study methodology would not have been 
feasible for this doctoral study.  However, it may be an option worth considering for future 
research. 
There is a second issue in relation to the overall research approach that needs to be 
acknowledged.  If I had embarked on the study with the aim of examining the effects of 
managerialism in pre-1992 institutions, I would not necessarily have chosen DPVC 
appointment as my empirical focus.  However, this was not my initial motivation for 
undertaking this research.  As noted in the introduction, I approached it rather from a 
reflective practitioner perspective with a particular interest in DPVC appointments and a 
desire not only to explore what was happening empirically, but also to understand its 
theoretical context and implications.   
The research strategy was therefore an appropriate one in meeting the aims of this 
particular study and, in fact, the phenomenon of changing DPVC appointment models also 
serves as a useful case study of the effects of managerialism.  Moreover, it provides a 
framework, in the form of an ideal-type model, by which the impact of managerialism can 
be explored in relation to other areas of practice inside or outside a university context. 
 
4. Avenues for Further Research 
Like all research projects, this doctoral research is limited in its scope and therefore does 
not explore all the relevant issues.  A number of gaps in understanding remain and, 
inevitably, this study leaves many questions unanswered.  Building upon these findings, the 
following options are suggested as avenues worthy of further empirical investigation. 
x Extending the research to those pre-1992s that have retained an internal-only 
DPVC appointment model to understand their perspective on the pros and cons of 
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the traditional appointment model, how they view change and the likelihood they 
will also adopt an external open competition model. 
 
x Extending the research to post-1992 universities to understand more about the 
DPVC appointment model towards which their pre-1992 counterparts appear to be 
moving and its perceived advantages and disadvantages in practice. 
 
x Extending the research to include chairs of council to understand the precise 
nature of their involvement in the recruitment of executive management team 
members and the degree of influence they have over selection decisions. 
 
x Extending the research to vice chancellor level to understand how appointment 
practice for vice chancellors compares to that for DPVC appointments and the 
extent to which the greater involvement of the governing body impacts on the 
process and its outcomes. 
 
x Extending the research to include the perceptions of rank-and-file academic staff 
on DPVC appointments and to understand the extent to which changes to practice 
may be contributing to the widening of the gap between academic staff and 
executive management team members. 
 
x Extending the research by undertaking a more in-depth study of the use of 
executive search agents in higher education  W an area increasingly seen as 
problematic.  Though it is recognised it would be challenging to design such a 
project and secure the participation of the various stakeholders, it would be 
extremely valuable to understand the extent to which perceptions of executive 
search agencies expressed in this study reflect actual practice, including how 
influential they are in the decision making process. 
 
x Extending the research into the international arena to understand how the 
appointment and profile of university leaders in England compares to that 
elsewhere and ascertain what might be learned from their experience. 
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x Repeating some or all of the study at a later date in order to monitor change over 
time, for example in DPVC profile and the number of institutions externally 
advertising DPVC posts, and test the reliability of these findings. 
 
x Undertaking a critique of the study by using an alternative methodological 
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Appendix B:  Sample Empirical Research Plan 
 
Outline Proposal for Empirical Work: Version 4 
7 March 2012   
 
Core research question: 
Why are pre-1992 universities changing the way they appoint PVCs and are the changes 
helping or hindering leadership capacity building? 
 
A) Proposed Research Strategy 
Specific empirical questions and associated research methods are indicated below 
Preliminary   
P) What is the extent and pattern of external advertisement of PVC posts in pre-1992 
universities since 2006? 
P) What do the adverts tell us about the perceived requirements of the role and 
candidate? 
Method: Desk research.  Update advert monitoring exercise (MA dissertation) with 2011 
data 
Scope:  All advertised EMT posts in English HEIs, 1 Jan 2006 to 31 Dec 2011 (THES, 
jobs.ac.uk) 




1) What is the demographic and career profile of serving PVCs and how does this 
compare to that in 2006? 
2) What impact, if any, has the external advertisement of posts had on the demographic 
and career profile of serving PVCs?  
Method: Desk research.  
(a) Census of PVCs using publically available information, (esp. university websites, 
publication schemes, statutes and ordinances) and compare to ACU Yearbook data and 
prior empirical work 
 (b) Track adverts to specific post holders and compare their profile to remainder of 
population 
Scope: Entire population of DVC/PVCs in 45 pre-1992 universities (estimate 4 per HEI, so 
180) 
 Timeframe: Summer 2012 
 
  




Phase Two  
3) What impact are changes to the DVC/PVC appointment process having on the career 
development and aspirations of next-tier managers? 
Method: Online survey using University of Bristol software.  Direct email invitation to 
participate. All respondents asked if they would be prepared to be interviewed for Phase 
Four 
Scope:  Deans/Heads of School and Professional Heads of Service in all 45 pre-1992 
universities 
(estimate 12 per HEI, so 540 possible respondents) 
Timeframe: Autumn 2012 
 
Phase Three 
4) What do next-ƚŝĞƌŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐƉĞƌĐĞŝǀĞƚŽďĞƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨĐŚĂŶŐĞƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?Ɛ
PVC appointment practice at an individual and institutional level? 
Method: Semi-structured interviews. Summarised and respondent validated 
Sample: Purposeful sample of Deans/Heads of School and Professional Heads of Service in 
those pre-1992 universities that have changed their DVC/PVC appointment process 
(estimated population of 12 post holders in each of 26 institutions, so 312).  Aim for 10% of 
population, or 30 interviews 
Timeframe: Spring/Summer 2013 
 
Phase Four 
5) What do VCs believe to be the main drivers, benefits and outcomes of change to the 
DVC/PVC appointment process at an individual and institutional level? 
Method: Semi-structured interviews. Summarised and respondent validated?? 
 Sample: VCs from those 26 pre-1992 institutions identified in Phase One as having changed 
their DVC/PVC appointment process.  Estimate 40-60% coverage (10-16 interviews) 
Timeframe: Summer/Autumn 2013 
 
Perceived advantages over earlier iterations: 
Mixed method approach with a quantitative element 
Variety of data sources 
^ŽŵĞƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂů ‘ƌĞĚƵŶĚĂŶĐǇ ?ďƵŝůƚŝŶ 
Less reliant on access to elite interviewees 
Avoids the need for gatekeepers 
Contingency plans in place 
Movement from macro to micro level 
Viewpoints of different stakeholders on the phenomenon 
Can present findings in a way that does not jeopardise individual or institutional 
confidentiality 
Respondent validation of interview data 
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B) Fall-Back Positions: 
Contingency Plan One 
If there is insufficient response to Phase Two, extend it to VCs from all pre-1992 
institutions. This would allow comparison of changed and non-changed PVC appointment 
models.   
 
OR 
Contingency Plan Two 
If there is insufficient response to Phase Two and Three, conduct expert interviews with 
ESAs, HEFCE, UUK, Equality Challenge Unit etc. 
 
OR 
Contingency Plan Three 
If there is insufficient response to Phase Two and Three, undertake documentary analysis 
to understand government perception of HE management and leadership deficit
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Appendix C : Sample Census Data Collection Template  
 
Post PVC PVC PVC 
Portfolio/Area Research and Enterprise Learning and Teaching Engagement 
Professor? Y Y Y 
Gender M M M 
Ethnicity  W W W 
Name John Hay Glen Burgess Ian Pashby  
Email Pvc-re Pvc-lt Pvc-eng 
Month of appt. April Feb Jan 
Year of appt. 2012 2010 2013 
Previous role 
 
Dean, Health and Medical 
Sciences 
HOD, History and Deputy 
Dean for Research 
Provost and CEO 
Institution 
 
Surrey Hull Nottingham  
Malaysia campus 
LM responsibilities? Y Y Y 
Full time? Y Y Y 
Fixed term? No No No 
Advertised? Nov 2011 Nov 2009 May 2012 
ESA Heidrick Veredus Saxton Bampfylde 
Previous   John Leach 
Now   PVC Sheffield Hallam 
 
Institution: Hull        Data accessed: 16 August 2013 
Email suffix:@hull.ac.uk         Telephone: 01482-346311 
Vice-Chancellor: Professor Calie Pistorius (Sept 2009) Formerly VC at Pretorius 
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Appendix D:  Online Survey Questions 
Anonymity and Data Protection Statement 
All data collected in this survey will be held securely in the UK and fairly and lawfully 
processed for the specific purposes for which it was collected.  Personal data is requested 
for data management and analysis purposes only. 
Research findings published in any form will be anonymised and no data you provide will 
be personally or institutionally attributed.  Free text comments will be edited, as required, 
to ensure that respondents cannot be identified.  
Section One: About You 
1. Your current role: 
x Dean or Head of Faculty/Division 
x Head of School or Department  
x Director or Head of a Professional Services Division/Department 
x Other (please specify) 
2. Your institution (select from drop down list) 
3. Your gender: 
x Male 
x Female 
4. Your age: 
x 40 or under 
x 41 to 45 
x 46 to 50 
x 51 to 60 
x 61 and over 
5. You would describe yourself as primarily: 
x An academic 
x A manager 
x Other (please specify) 
If an academic, your academic discipline sits within: 
x Humanities 
x Sciences (including ICT) 
x Social Sciences 
x Other (please specify) 
 
Section Two: Your Views on Changes to Appointment Practice 
6. Has your own institution externally advertised any PVC posts?  
x Yes 
x No  
x ŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ 
  
Susan Shepherd                                                                                                                Appendices 
236 
 
7. Please indicate on the grid below the level of your agreement, or otherwise, with 
the following propositions (Options: Strongly agree; somewhat agree; somewhat 
ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ?ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ?ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ? 
 
The change from an internal secondment model of DPVC appointment to one of 
external advertisement is likely to be motivated by a desire to: 
 
a. Increase the effectiveness of the appointment process 
b. Comply with equal opportunities good practice 
c. Follow the example of other peer group institutions 
d. Diversify the applicant pool 
e. Improve the quality of institutional management 
f. ĚŽƉƚĂŵŽƌĞ ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂů ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ 
 
8. Please note below any other likely motivations for change not included in the 
previous question 
 
9. Please indicate on the grid below the level of your agreement, or otherwise, with 
the following propositions (Options: Strongly agree; somewhat agree; somewhat 
ĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ?ƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇĚŝƐĂŐƌĞĞ ?ĚŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ ? 
 
The change from an internal secondment model of DPVC appointment to one of 
external advertisement is likely to result in: 
a. A more effective appointment process 
b. A fairer appointment process (in terms of equal opportunities) 
c. The attraction of a more diverse pool of applicants 
d. The appointment of more candidates from outside HE 
e. The appointment of more non-academic candidates from within HE (e.g. 
directors of professional services) 
f. No significant change to the profile of successful candidates 
g. An improvement in the quality of institutional management 
h. /ŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĚ ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞƌŝĂůŝƐŵ ?ǁŝƚŚŝŶĂŶŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ 
 
10. Please note below any other likely outcomes of change not included in the previous 
question 
 
11. Overall, do you believe the adoption of an external advertisement model of DPVC 
appointment will enhance future leadership capacity building in the sector? 
x Yes 
x No 
x Not sure 
x ŽŶ ?ƚŬŶŽǁ 
11a. Please give reasons for your answer 
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Section Three: Your Career 
 
12. Have you ever applied for an advertised DPVC post in your own university? 
x Yes 
x No 
12a.If yes, what was the outcome of your application? 
x Application did not reach long listing stage 
x Long listed 
x Short listed 
x Offered post and accepted 
x Offered post but declined 
x Would rather not say 
x Other (please specify) 
 




13a.If yes, what was the outcome of your application? 
x Application did not reach long listing stage 
x Long listed 
x Short listed 
x Offered post and accepted 
x Offered post but declined 
x Would rather not say 
x Other (please specify) 
 
14. How likely are you to apply for an advertised DPVC post in a pre-1992 university 
(including your own) in future? 
x Very likely 
x Somewhat likely 
x Somewhat unlikely 
x Very unlikely 
x Would rather not say 
x Not sure 
14a. Please give reasons for your answer 
 
15. What do you consider to be the main obstacle, if any, to your becoming a DPVC in a 
pre-1992 university? 
 
Section Four: An Invitation to Participate in Further Research 
16. Would you be willing to be interviewed in order to discuss these issues in more 
detail?  
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Appendix E:  Invitation Email for Online Survey 
 
Subject: Your Views Sought on University Leadership  
Dear Colleague, 
I would like to invite you to participate in ESRC-funded doctoral research into the 
appointment of Deputy and Pro Vice-chancellors (DPVCs) in pre-1992 English universities.  
This study aims to produce outcomes of practical relevance and value for future HE 
leadership development.  
Given that DPVCs perform a distinctive and important role within a universŝƚǇ ?ƐƐĞŶŝŽƌ
management team, it is essential that the best people are appointed.  My research has 
shown that many pre-1992 universities are moving away from the traditional, fixed-term 
internal secondment model of DPVC appointment to one of open competition by external 
advertisement, often utilising the services of executive search agencies.   
As a senior HE professional, any such change to DPVC appointment practice is likely to 
affect you directly.  You probably work closely with DPVCs and, moreover, research shows 
ƚŚĂƚǇŽƵĂƌĞĂŵĞŵďĞƌŽĨƚŚĞŵĂŝŶ ‘ƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚƉŽŽů ?ĨŽƌĨƵƚƵƌĞWsĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐ ?zŽƵƌ
views are therefore particularly important in informing this research. 
Accordingly, I would be very grateful if you could spare ten minutes of your time to 
complete a short online survey.  This can be accessed by clicking on the link below. Since 
the survey is located on a secure University of Bristol website, please select Yes if your 
browser asks for confirmation of whether you wish to continue.  
https://www.survey.kent.ac.uk/dpvc-appointment 
The survey will be available for a two-week period between 1 and 15 November.  It has 
been designed to be as quick and easy to complete as possible.   However, should you have 
any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at this email address. 
I thank you in advance for your participation. 
Kind regards, 
Sue Shepherd 
PhD Student, School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research 
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Appendix F:  Interview Guide for Vice Chancellors 
 
Appointing Deputy and Pro Vice Chancellors in Pre-1992 Universities 
 
Research Overview 
Many pre-1992 universities are moving away from the traditional fixed-term, internal 
secondment model of appointment for Deputy and Pro Vice Chancellors (DPVCs) to one of 
open competition by means of external advertisement, often utilising the services of an 
executive search agency.  The empirical element of my PhD is concerned with investigating 
why this change to DPVC appointment practice is happening and what the consequences 
are both for the managers concerned and for their institutions. More broadly, I am 
interested in whether this has been change for the better in terms of improving 
management capacity within the sector. 
Interview Topics 
This will be a semi-structured interview and the intention is to allow plenty of flexibility to 
focus on those areas of greatest relevance and mutual interest and to explore other issues 
as they arise.  Nevertheless, the broad areas I would like to cover are: 
 
Current DPVC appointment practice and roles in your institution 
Drivers and motivations for changing DPVC appointment practice 
Your experience of the DPVC recruitment process  
The utilisation of ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐ ? “ŚĞĂĚŚƵŶƚĞƌƐ ? ?
The development of the person specification and experience sought from DPVC candidates 
Benefits and disadvantages of change 
The legacy of change for future Vice Chancellors 
Your views on whether, overall, this has been change for the better in terms of improved 
management capacity 




PhD Student, School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research  
University of Kent 
 
Susan Shepherd                                                                                                                Appendices 
240 
 
Appendix G:  Invitation Email for Vice Chancellor Interviews  
 
Subject: Invitation to Participate 
Dear XX 
I am writing to invite you to participate in an ESRC-funded doctoral research study into 
changing appointment practice for Deputy and Pro Vice Chancellors (DPVCs).   
As you will be aware, many pre-1992 universities are moving away from the traditional 
fixed-term, internal secondment model of DPVC appointment to one of open competition 
by means of external advertisement, often utilising the services of an executive search 
agency.  The empirical element of my PhD is concerned with investigating why this change 
to DPVC appointment practice is happening and what the consequences are both for the 
managers concerned and for their institutions.  More broadly, I am interested in whether 
this has been change for the better in terms of improving management capacity within the 
sector. 
My evidence suggests that your university has externally advertised at least one DPVC post 
over recent years and I would like to seek your views as Vice Chancellor on the factors that 
prompted this change to appointment practice and what the anticipated and actual 
outcomes have been.  In addition to hearing about your own experience of the DPVC 
appointment process, I would also like to seek your views on the wider significance of 
change for university management.  For my part, I would be happy to share with you my 
research findings to date, including the impact of changed appointment practice on the 
profile of current post holders and on the career aspirations of potential and aspiring 
DPVCs.  Your feedback on these initial findings would be most welcome.  
Please be reassured that your anonymity will be respected and no comments you make will 
be individually or institutionally attributed.  An informed consent form will be send to all 
participants explaining procedures for the responsible handling of data and for preserving 
confidentiality and anonymity.  
With the above in mind, I would be very grateful if you could spare me an hour of your time 
to discuss these issues.  I am planning to conduct interviews in XX on XX.  If you would be 
willing to be interviewed, perhaps you could kindly let me know your availability on this 
date or, alternatively, put me in touch with your PA to arrange a convenient appointment.  
Thank you in advance for your consideration. 
Kind regards, 
Sue Shepherd 
PhD student, School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research 
University of Kent  
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Appendix H:  Consent Form to Participate in Research 
Appointing Deputy and Pro Vice Chancellors in Pre-1992 Universities 
 
You are invited to participate in a research study conducted by Sue Shepherd, who is a 
doctoral student from the School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social Research (SSPSSR) at 
the University of Kent.  Professor Sarah Vickerstaff is her primary research supervisor.  Ms 
Shepherd is conducting this investigation for her doctorate, which is funded by the 
Economic and Social Research Council.    
You have been invited to participate in this study because you are a senior HE professional 
in an English university.  Your participation is entirely voluntary.  Please read the 
information below and feel free to ask any questions you may have before deciding 
whether or not to participate.  
1. PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
This study examines the drivers of recent change to the way Deputy and Pro Vice 
Chancellors (DPVCs) are being appointed in pre-1992 English universities and its 
consequences, both intended and otherwise.  It aims to ascertain whether this has been 
change for the better in terms of improving management capacity within the sector and to 
explore the theoretical significance of change for the notion of managerialism in a 
university context.  In so doing, the study seeks both to inform management practice and 
to make an original contribution to knowledge through the generation of theory in a 
hitherto under-researched and under-theorised area of enquiry. 
 
2. PROCEDURES 
If you volunteer to take part in this study, we will ask you to participate in a semi-
structured interview lasting no more than one hour. 
 
3. PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL 
 If you volunteer to be in this study, you may withdraw at any time without consequences 
of any kind. You may also refuse to answer any questions you do not want to answer.  
 
4. POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO SUBJECTS AND/OR TO SOCIETY 
It is not anticipated that you will benefit directly from participation in this study.  However, 
by furthering understanding of the implications of recent changes to the appointment of 
senior managers, it is hoped that opportunities to improve current management practice 
within universities may be identified. 
 
5. POTENTIAL HARM OR DETRIMENT 
We do not anticipate that your participation in this research will result in any harm or 
detriment.  The researcher is, however, mindful of the potential risk to participants of any 
unintended public disclosure of their identity in relation to the research findings.  In order 
ƚŽŵŝƚŝŐĂƚĞƚŚŝƐƌŝƐŬ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂŶƚƐǁŝůůďĞŐŝǀĞŶƚŚĞŽƉƚŝŽŶŽĨƌĞǀŝĞǁŝŶŐƚŚĞƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ
interview summary and making any amendments necessary in order to ensure that they 
cannot be personally identified from this information.  Additionally, every effort will be 
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made not to breach the anonymity of research participants in any form of publication of 
the research findings.  No comments will be individually or institutionally attributed. 
 
6. RESPONSIBLE HANDLING OF DATA   
The researcher will comply with all legal requirements in relation to the secure storage and 
use of personal data as set down by the Data Protection Act (1998).  Any personal data 
relating to you that is obtained in connection with this study will be disclosed to third 
parties only with your permission or as required by law.   
 
7. CONFIDENTIALITY AND ANONYMITY 
The confidentiality of personal data will be maintained throughout the research process by 
means of a coding system.  We will not use your name in any of the information we get 
from this study or in any of the research reports.  When the study is finished, we will 
destroy the list that shows which code number goes with your name.   Information that can 
identify you individually will not be released to anyone outside the study.  Ms. Shepherd 
will, however, use the non-attributed information collected in her thesis and other 
publications.   
 
8. RESEARCH APPROVAL AND CODE OF PRACTICE 
This study received ĂƉƉƌŽǀĂůĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨ<ĞŶƚ ?Ɛ^ŽĐŝĂů^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƚŚŝĐƐ
Advisory Group for Human Participants on 11 June 2012.  It will be conducted according to 
ƚŚĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚ^ŽĐŝĂůZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚŽƵŶĐŝů ?^Z ? ?ƐFramework for Research Ethics (2010). 
 
9. IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS 
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact: 
 
Ms Sue Shepherd      Professor Sarah Vickerstaff 
Principal Investigator     Professor of Work and 
Employment and  
SSPSSR       Head of SSPSSR 
University of Kent     University of Kent 
Canterbury      Canterbury  
Kent  CT2 7NF      Kent  CT2 7NF 
ss780@kent.ac.uk      s.a.vickerstaff@kent.ac.uk 
 
 








Signed    Date 
Susan Shepherd                                                                                                                Appendices 
243 
 
Appendix I:  Sample Interview Summary 
 
Interviewee Number:  A.11 
Post:  VC 
Gender:  Male 
Respondent Validated:  Yes 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
-Management Arrangements 
x This section is omitted in order to preserve the anonymity of the institution/interviewee 
 
Appointment Practice 
x These executive posts are appointed by open external competition, as are those of 
professional services directors 
x HHs are not necessarily used for the external recruitment process 
x For example, HHs are not being used for the currently advertised DVC post 
x PVCs are internally appointed 
x ^ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůWsƐ “ŝƐĂŶŽƉĞŶƉƌŽĐĞƐƐďƵƚƚŚĞǇĚŽůĞƚŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐǁŚŽǁŽƵůĚ
ďĞŽŶƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ŚŝƚůŝƐƚ ?ŬŶŽǁƚŚĞǇĂƌĞŝŶǀŝƚĞĚƚŽĂƉƉůǇ ? 
x /ŶƚŚĞŵŽƐƚƌĞĐĞŶƚWsĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚ “ƚŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞƚŚƌĞĞŽƌĨŽƵƌƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚĞǇŵĂĚe sure 
ŬŶĞǁƚŚĞƉŽƐƚǁĂƐǀĂĐĂŶƚ ? 
x The most recent PVC appointment process was: 
x This section is omitted in order to preserve the anonymity of the 
institution/interviewee 
x dŚĞƌĞǁĞƌĞ “ĂĐŽƵƉůĞŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞƚŚĂƚƉƵƚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĨŽƌǁŚŽŵŝƚŵŝŐŚƚŚĂǀĞ
been a bit too soon and they were dissuaded from applying and there was one who 
ĚŝĚŶ ?ƚĂƉƉůǇƚŚĂƚǁĞǁŽƵůĚŚĂǀĞůŝŬĞĚƚŽĂƉƉůǇ ?
x  “dŚĞƉƌŽĐĞƐƐǁĂƐƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵƚŚĞsŝŶƚŚĞŵĂŬŝŶŐŽĨƚŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶ ? 
x  “dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂƚĂĐŝƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚƚŚĞsŚĂĚĂƉŽǁĞƌŽĨǀĞƚŽ ? 
x  “Ɛŝƚ ŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚ ?ŝƚǁĂƐĂƵŶĂŶŝŵŽƵƐĐŚŽŝĐĞ ?
x  “dŚĞŵŽƐƚŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚĐƌŝƚĞƌŝŽŶǁĂƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞƉĞƌƐŽŶŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞƚŚĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨƚŚĞs ? 
x  “dŚĞWsĐŽŶƚƌĂĐƚŝƐ ‘ĨŽƌƵƉƚŽĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌƐ ?ŽƌĨŽƌĂƐůŽŶŐĂƐƚŚĞǇŚŽůĚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞŽĨ
ƚŚĞs ? ?
x When he was appointed to the job ŚĞǁĂƐ “ĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚƚŚĂƚŐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƌŝŐŚƚƐĞŶŝŽƌƚĞĂŵ
ǁĂƐǀĞƌǇŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶƚƚŽŚŝŵĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŚĞǁĂŶƚĞĚƚŚĞƐƵƉƉŽƌƚŽĨŽƵŶĐŝůƚŽĚŽŝƚ ?  
x This section is omitted in order to preserve the anonymity of the institution/interviewee 
x   “dŚĞĐŚŝĞĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŶĞĞĚƐƚŽŚĂǀĞƚŚĞƚĞĂŵŚĞǁĂŶƚƐ ? 
x  “dŚĞsĐĂŶƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĚŽǁŚĂƚƚŚĞǇůŝŬĞ ? 
 
HHs 
x Have a contractual arrangement with a HH who they will use as their preferred 
company 
x They undergo a tender process every few years 
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x They have a very good relationship with this HH which has been involved in the 
recruitment of virtually the whole senior team and they know each other well 
x dŚĞĚĞĐŝƐŝŽŶŽŶǁŚĞƚŚĞƌŽƌŶŽƚƚŽƵƐĞƚŚĞ,,ƐĨŽƌĂƉŽƐƚŝƐďĂƐĞĚ “ŽŶĂũƵĚŐĞŵĞŶƚ
about the post and the nature of the ŵĂƌŬĞƚ ? 
x /ŶƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŽĨƚŚĞsƉŽƐƚ ?ďĞůŝĞǀĞƐŝƚŝƐ “ĂƐƵĨĨŝĐŝĞŶƚůǇĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝǀĞƉŽƐƚ ? 
x  “ŶǇŽŶĞůŽŽŬŝŶŐǁŝůůƐĞĞƚŚĞĂĚǀĞƌƚ ?ƐŽǁŚǇƵƐĞ,,Ɛ ? ? 
x ůƐŽ “ǁĂŶƚƚŽŵŽǀĞƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇƋƵŝĐŬůǇĂŶĚǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚĚŽƚŚŝƐǁŝƚŚ,,Ɛ ? 
x ĂŶƐĂǀĞŵŽŶĞǇ “ĂƐ,,ƐĂƌĞŶŽƚĐŚĞĂƉ ? 
x ůƐŽ “ƚŚĞǇŚĂǀĞŐŽŽĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŽĂƌĞĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚŽĨŐĞƚƚŝŶŐĂĨŝĞůĚ ? 
x Have found that HHs have not always generated a good field, for example with 
professional services posts 
x Have an agreement with the HH that they will not poach staff from any other of their HE 
clients 
x They will not approach people in these institutions, but it is OK if the individual 
approaches them 
x This restricts the field somewhat 
x &ĞĞůƐ “ƚŚĞƌĞŝƐĂŐĞŶĞƌĂůWZŝƐƐƵĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞƵƐĞŽĨ,,Ɛ ? 
x  “,ĞĂǀǇǁĞŝŐŚƚŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐƵƐĞƚŚĞŵƚŽƐĂǇ ‘ǁĞĂƌĞĂƐĞƌŝŽƵƐƉůĂǇĞƌ ? ?
x /ĨŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶƐĚŽŶ ?ƚƵƐĞƚŚĞŵ ? “ŝƚŵĂǇŐŝǀĞŽĨĨĂƐŝŐŶĂůƚŚĂƚƚŚĞǇĂƌĞĂďŝƚƐƚƌĂƉƉĞĚĨŽƌ
ĐĂƐŚ ? 
x There is now a question as to whether good candidates will apply if there is an advert 
alone without the use of HHs 
x dŚĞŝƌƵƐĞŝƐƚŚƵƐ “ĂďŝƚƐĞůĨ-ƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂƚŝŶŐ ? 
x The use of HHs may not be helping in relation to diversity 
x dŚĞĨĂĐƚƚŚĂƚǇŽƵŚĂǀĞƚŽŐĞƚŽŶĂ,,Ɛ ?ƌĂĚĂƌŵŝŐŚƚŵĂŬĞ “ƚŚĞƉƌŽĨŝůĞŽĨĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐ
ŶĂƌƌŽǁĞƌ ? 
x  “/ƚŵĂǇďĞƚŚĂƚ,,ƐĂƌĞŐŝǀŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƚĂƉŽŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƵůĚĞƌ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶsƐ ? 
x  “,,ƐĐĂŶĞŵďĂƌŬŽŶĂĐĂŵƉĂŝŐŶŽĨƉĞƌƐƵĂƐŝŽŶƚŽŐĞƚƐŽŵĞŽŶĞ ? 
x  “,,ƐĐĂŶĐƌĞĂƚĞĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶŝŶĐĂŶĚŝĚĂƚĞƐǁŚŽŚĂĚŶŽƚƚŚŽƵŐŚƚŽĨĂƉƉůǇŝŶŐĨŽƌĂƌŽůĞ ? 
x  “ůůƐĞŶŝŽƌƉĞŽƉůĞĂƌĞďŽŵďĂƌĚĞĚďǇĐĂůůƐĨƌŽŵ,,Ɛ W rarely go two weeks without 
getting a call -but it is important not tŽďĞĨůĂƚƚĞƌĞĚďǇŝƚ ? 
x  “,,ƐƉůĂǇĂƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞĨŝƌŵŝŶŐƵƉŽĨĐĂƌĞĞƌƌŽƵƚĞƐ ? 
 
Person sought 
x What is sought depends a bit on the particular PVC portfolio 
x zŽƵŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞĂƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚƌĞĐŽƌĚƚŽďĞWs ?ZĞƐĞĂƌĐŚ ?ĂŶĚ “ĂůĞĂĚŝŶŐĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐ ?ƚŽďĞ
PVC (Education), though not necessarily a research record 
x  “WsŵƵƐƚŚĂǀĞĐƌĞĚŝďŝůŝƚǇǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŝƌĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƉĞĞƌƐ ? 
x  “tŽƵůĚŐĞŶĞƌĂůůǇĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƉƉŽŝŶƚĞĞƐƚŽďĞĂĐĂĚĞŵŝĐƐ ? 
x A PVC (External Relations) may be someone from outside the sector 
 
Role 
x Traditional PVCs are full-time posts, bought out at 0.7fte with 0.3fte in the department 
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x  “dŚĞƌĞŝƐŶŽƐƉĞĐŝĂůĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĞǇǁŝůůďĞZ&-able  W some are but it depends on the 
ŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ? 
x Very hard for a PVC to go back to an academic career, especially those in science and 
medicine 
x  “ǆŝƚƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐĨŽƌs ?WsƐĂƌĞŵŽƌĞŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƚŚĂŶƚŚĞǇƵƐĞĚƚŽďĞ ? 




x  “ĨƚĞƌƚhis they have used all their energy and momentum and it is not in the 
ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĨŽƌƚŚĞŵƚŽĚŽĂƐĞĐŽŶĚƚĞƌŵ ? 
x ĨŝǆĞĚƚĞƌŵƉŽƐƚƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐ “ĂŶĂƚƵƌĂůďƌĞĂŬƉŽŝŶƚ ? 
 
Motivations for changing PVC appointment practice 
x  “dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂďŝƚůĞƐƐĐŚĂŶĐĞƚŽŐƌŽǁǇŽƵƌŽǁŶŝŶĂƐŵĂůůŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ? 
x  “/ƚŝƐƐƚƌŽŶŐůǇŝŶƚŚĞŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƚŽŚĂǀĞĂŵŝǆĞĚŵŽĚĞůŽĨƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚǁŚĞƌĞ
ǇŽƵĐĂŶŬĞĞƉŽƉĞŶƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůƉƌŽŵŽƚŝŽŶƌŽƵƚĞ ?ďƵƚŶŽƚďĞĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶƚƵƉŽŶŝƚ ? 
x  “ŵŝǆĞĚŵŽĚĞůĂůůŽǁƐǇŽƵƚŽĚƌĂǁŽŶĞǆƉĞƌƚŝƐĞĨƌŽŵ outside and retain institutional 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? 
x Relying solely on the internal pool limits your options in terms of diversity and external 
ƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚĐĂŶŚĞůƉŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶƚŚĞĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨƚŚĞƚĞĂŵ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƐŝƐŶŽƚ “ŚƵŐĞůǇĚŝǀĞƌƐĞ ?Ăƚ
present) 
x  “dŚĞƌĞŝƐĂĚĂŶŐĞƌŝŶŐŽŝŶŐǁŚŽůĞŚĞĂƌƚĞĚůǇĨŽƌŽŶĞŽƌŽƚŚĞƌŵŽĚĞů ? 
x ,Ğ “ǁŽƵůĚďĞŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽǁŚŽůůǇĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚĂŶĚĞǀĞŶŵŽƌĞŽƉƉŽƐĞĚƚŽ
ǁŚŽůůǇŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐ ? 
x /ŶƚĞƌŶĂůŽŶůǇĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƐ “ǁŽƵůĚďĞĐŚĂŶŶĞůůŝŶŐĂŵĂƚĞƵƌŝƐŵ ? 
x Universities are so competitive now and  “ŶĞĞĚƚŚĞďĞƐƚƉĞŽƉůĞ ? 
x  “dŚĞĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨƚƌĂǀĞůŝƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůƌĞĐƌƵŝƚŵĞŶƚ ? 
x ĞůŝĞǀĞƐ “ƚŚĞŶĞǆƚŐĞŶĞƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨsƐǁŝůůďĞŬĞĞŶĞƌƚŽƌĞĐƌƵŝƚĞǆƚĞƌŶĂůůǇ ? 
 
Other 
x dŚĞƌĞŵĂǇďĞ “ĂŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚŝĐĂůƉĂƚƚĞƌŶƚŽĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚůĂƌŐĞŵĞƚƌŽƉŽůŝƚĂŶƵŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚŝĞƐ
may find it easier to have a more diverse senior team 
x There are more senior staff who commute long distances due to the housing market, 
finances, schools etc. 
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Appendix J:  Interview Schedule for Vice Chancellors 
 
PVC Recruitment Practice 
x How do you currently recruit your PVCs? 
x Does the same method apply to all PVC posts and, if not, what is the rationale for 
this? 
x What is the case for external recruitment? What is the problem that needed to be 
fixed? 
x Do you think change is a recognition of the increasing importance of the PVC role? 
x Are you as VC the key driver of change?  Do you envisage making further change? 
x What might the legacy be for the next VC? 
x Do VCs have a vested interest in making external appointments/bringing in own 
people? 
 
Role and Appointment Basis 
x Are PVC posts made on a fixed term or open ended basis and what is the rationale 
for this? 
x What is the typical exit strategy for PVCs? 
x ŽǇŽƵĞǆƉĞĐƚǇŽƵƌWsƐƚŽĂĐƚĂƐŵĂŶĂŐĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŽ ‘ŵĂŶĂŐĞ ? ? 
x Is the PVC role primarily an academic or a management one? 




x What are the key requirements you are looking for in a PVC? 
x How important are management training and experience? 
x How open are you to considering candidates from the private sector or with private 
sector experience, including non-academic candidates from within the university?  
x What was the candidate mix (internal/external; male/female; academic/non-
academic) for your recent PVC appointments? 
x Is there an element of professional closure in the framing of the PVC role and, if so, 
is this problematic? 
 
Head Hunters 
x What is the rationale for using/not using HHs? 
x What are the pros and cons of using HHs? 
x Is there any sense iŶǁŚŝĐŚƚŚĞƐĞĐƚŽƌŚĂƐƌĞƉůĂĐĞĚŽŶĞŽůĚďŽǇƐ ?ŶĞƚǁŽƌŬǁŝƚŚ
another? 
 
Motivations versus Outcomes 
x Why do you think the sector as a whole is moving to external recruitment? 
x tŽƵůĚǇŽƵĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞƚŚĞĂƉƉŽŝŶƚŵĞŶƚƉƌŽĐĞƐƐĂƐ “ĞŶƚŝƌĞůǇŵĞƌŝƚŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ ? ? 
x Do you believe a more diverse pool of applicants is being attracted? 
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x Are there any particular barriers to women getting a PVC role and what steps are 
you taking to address the gender imbalance? 
x What have been the benefits of change?  
x Do you think the quality of people appointed has improved? 
x Are there any negative or unintended consequences? 
x Has anything important been lost in the move away from the internal secondment 
model? 
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Appendix K: DPVC Advertisements for Pre-1992 English Universities (2006  ? 2013) 
University Post Closing Date Executive Search 
DVC    
Queen Mary Vice-Principal 02/06/2006  
Birmingham Vice-Principal 13/06/2007 Saxton Bampfylde  
Bristol Deputy Vice-chancellor 22/10/2007  
Keele Deputy Vice-chancellor 06/12/2007 Perrett Laver  
Bradford DVC (Academic) 21/11/2008  
Surrey DVC (Research and Innovation) 21/03/2008 Perrett Laver  
Surrey DVC (Academic Development) 21/03/2008 Perrett Laver  
Surrey Senior Deputy Vice-chancellor 01/03/2009 Perrett Laver  
Surrey Deputy Vice-chancellor (Academic 
Development) 
01/07/2009 Perrett Laver  
Bradford DVC (Academic) 03/06/2011  
Imperial Provost 28/05/2012 Perrett Laver  
Lancaster Deputy Vice-Chancellor 22/06/2012  
Bristol Deputy Vice-Chancellor 03/11/2013  
Brunel Vice-Principal (Education and International) 13/05/2013 Saxton Bampfylde  
Brunel Vice-Principal (Academic) 23/.9/2013 Saxton Bampfylde  
Keele Deputy Vice-Chancellor and Provost 29/08/2013  
LSE Deputy Director and Provost 06/05/2013 Perrett Laver  
Salford Deputy Vice-Chancellor 02/07/2013  
Surrey Vice-President and DVC (Research and 
Innovation) 
11/04/2013 Perrett Laver  
Warwick Provost 26/07/2013  
    
PVC    
Durham PVC (Student Experience) 24/04/2006 Norman Broadbent 
Kent PVC (Research) 28/04/2006  
Loughborough PVC (Enterprise) 30/07/2006  
OU PVC (Curriculum and Awards) 13/10/2006 Heidrick & Struggles 
OU PVC (Learning and Teaching) 13/10/2006 Heidrick & Struggles 
Oxford PVC (Research, Academic Services & 
University Collections) 
27/02/2006  
Oxford PVC (Planning and Resources) 06/10/2006  
Sussex PVC (Enterprise) 23/02/2006 Perrett Laver  
Sussex PVC (Research) 23/02/2006 Perrett Laver  
Sussex PVC (Teaching and Learning) 23/02/2006 Perrett Laver  
Kent PVC (Medway) 18/01/2007  
Kent PVC (External) 18/01/2007  
Newcastle PVC and Head of Humanities and Social 
Sciences 
10/10/2007 Tribal Resourcing 
Durham PVC (Research) 21/02/2008 Perrett Laver  
Durham PVC (Learning and Teaching) 14/02/2008  
KCL Vice Principal (Research & Innovation) 28/03/2008 Heidrick & Struggles 
Leicester PVC (Resources) 01/07/2008 Harvey Nash 
Leicester PVC and Head of College of Arts, 
Humanities and Law 
01/07/2008 Harvey Nash 
Leicester PVC and Head of College of Social Sciences 
 
01/07/2008 Harvey Nash 
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Leicester PVC and Head of College of Science and 
Engineering 
01/07/2008 Harvey Nash 
Loughborough PVC (Enterprise) 20/10/2008  
Newcastle PVC (Research and Innovation) 11/02/2008 Tribal Resourcing 
Newcastle PVC (Engagement) 11/02/2008 Tribal Resourcing 
Sheffield PVC (Research and Innovation) 18/01/2008  
Sheffield PVC (Learning and Teaching) 18/01/2008  
Sheffield PVC (External Affairs) 18/01/2008  
Sheffield PVC and Head of Arts 18/01/2008  
Sheffield PVC and Head of Engineering 18/01/2008  
Sheffield PVC and Head of Medicine 18/01/2008  
Sheffield PVC and Head of Pure Science 18/01/2008  
Sheffield PVC and Head of Social Science 18/01/2008  
Bath PVC (Learning & Teaching) 02/09/2009  
Durham PVC (Science) 27/03/2009  
Hull PVC (Learning & Teaching) 20/11/2009 Veredus 
Hull PVC (Engagement)  20/11/2009 Veredus 
Leicester PVC (Research and Enterprise) 05/10/2009 Harvey Nash 
Liverpool Executive PVC (Health & Life Sciences) 17/08/2009  
Liverpool Executive PVC (Human & Social Sciences) 17/08/2009  
Liverpool PVC for Internationalisation 17/08/2009  
Sussex PVC (International) 07/05/2009 Perrett Laver  
Sussex PVC (Teaching and Learning) 19/11/2009 Perrett Laver  
UCL Vice-Provost (Operations) 15/04/2009 Perrett Laver  
Birmingham PVC (Education) 22/09/2010 Perrett Laver  
Birmingham PVC (Research and Knowledge Transfer) 22/09/2010 Perrett Laver  
Lancaster PVC (International) 23/07/2010  
Liverpool PVC (Student Experience) 12/03/2010  
Manchester Vice-President and Dean of the Faculty of 
Humanities 
06/01/2010 Perrett Laver  
Manchester Vice-President and Dean of the Faculty of 
Medical and Human Sciences 
04/11/2010 Saxton Bampfylde  
Newcastle PVC (Learning, Teaching and Student 
Experience) 
01/10/2010  
Oxford PVC (Development and External Affairs) 01/03/2010  
Queen Mary Vice-Principal and Executive Dean (Science 
and Engineering) 
24/03/2010 Perrett Laver  
Queen Mary Vice-Principal and Executive Dean (Warden 
of Barts and The London School of Medicine 
and Dentistry) 
28/10/2010 Perrett Laver  
Salford PVC (Academic) 25/02/2010 Heidrick & Struggles 
Sheffield PVC (Arts and Humanities) 03/05/2010  
Sheffield PVC (External Affairs) 03/05/2010  
Birmingham PVC and Head of the College of Engineering 
and Physical Sciences 
01/04/2011 Perrett Laver 
City PVC (Research and Enterprise) 12/05/2011 Perrett Laver 
Hull PVC (Research and Enterprise) 04/11/2011 Heidrick & Struggles 
Imperial Pro Rector (Research) 11/04/2011 Perrett Laver 
Newcastle PVC (Faculty of Science, Agriculture and 
Engineering) 
13/06/2011 Saxton Bampfylde 
OU PVC (Research) 16/03/2011 Perrett Laver 
RHUL Vice-Principal (Research and Enterprise) 18/04/2011 Perrett Laver 
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Salford PVC (Research & Innovation) & Dean 
(Science & Technology) 
02/11/2011 Saxton Bampfylde 
UCL Vice-Provost (Education) 29/07/2011 Odgers Berndtson 
Bath PVC (Internationalisation) 01/01/2012  
Birmingham Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Head of College of 
Medical and Dental Sciences 
11/10/2012 Perrett Laver 
Durham PVC (Education) 30/03/2012  
UEA Pro Vice-Chancellor (Academic) 01/10/2012 Perrett Laver 
Hull PVC (Engagement) 18/05/2012 Saxton Bampfylde 
Imperial Pro Rector (Education) 18/04/2012 Perrett Laver 
IOE Pro-Director (Strategy and Organisation) 
and Secretary 
23/03/2012  
KCL Vice-Principal (Arts and Sciences) 26/07/2012 Heidrick & Struggles 
KCL Vice-Principal (Education) 11/10/2012 Heidrick & Struggles 
OU PVC (Academic) 29/02/2012 Perrett Laver 
OU Pro-Vice-Chancellor (Learning and 
Teaching) 
20/12/2012 Perrett Laver 
Salford Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Dean of Health and 
Social Care) 
04/10/2012 Heidrick & Struggles 
Sheffield PVC (Social Sciences) 05/01/2012  
Sheffield PVC (Arts and Humanities)   
Surrey PVC (International Relations) 17/04/2012 Perrett Laver 
Sussex PVC (Research) 22/05/2012 Heidrick & Struggles 
Warwick Pro-Vice-Chancellor 18/07/2012  
Warwick Joint PVC (Monash-Warwick Alliance) 08/06/2012 Perrett Laver 
Kent PVC (Research & Innovation) 07/10/2013 Odgers Berndtson 
Kent PVC (Teaching & Learning) 28/10/2013 Odgers Berndtson 
IOE Pro-Director (Teaching, Quality and 
Learning Innovation) 
22/08/2013  
Leicester Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Head of College 
(Arts, Humanities and Law) 
01/03/2013 Harvey Nash 
Leicester Pro-Vice-Chancellor and Head of College 
(Social Sciences) 
01/03/2013 Harvey Nash 
Queen Mary VP (International) 04/12/2013 Perrett Laver 
Reading PVC (Global Engagement) 14/10/2013 Odgers Berndtson 
Reading PVC (Academic Planning & Resource) 14/10/2013 Odgers Berndtson 
SOAS Pro-Director (Research & Enterprise) 28/02/2013  
UCL VP (International) 16/12/2013 Heidrick & Struggles 
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Appendix L: Evidence to Support Indicators of Ideal-Type Managerialism 
 
1. Management is Important and a Good Thing 
Indicator 1a: Recognition of the importance of DPVC posts  
Vice chancellors recognise the importance of the DPVC role and believe it is essential to get 
the right people into these posts.  These are increasingly seen as high-risk appointments 
that can make a real difference, for better or worse, to the quality of university 
management.  Accordingly there is an emphasis on securing the best candidates. 
Indicator 1b: Priority given to the appointment process in order to attract the best 
candidates 
A high priority is accorded to the DPVC appointment process, as demonstrated by the time 
and cost investment universities have made in adopting external open competition and 
utilising the services of executive search agencies.  Even where the decision is taken to 
make an internal DPVC appointment, a formal open competition process, rather than the 
traditional tap-on-the-shoulder model, is now standard practice. 
Indicator 1c: A more managerial interpretation of the DPVC role 
sŝĐĞĐŚĂŶĐĞůůŽƌƐ ?ĞǆƉĞĐƚĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƉŽƐƚŚŽůĚĞƌƐĂŶĚWsƐ ?ŽǁŶŶĂƌƌĂƚŝǀĞƐďŽƚŚƚĞƐƚŝĨǇƚŽ
the emergence of a more managerial interpretation of the DPVC role.  More executive 
variants of DPVC are emerging with line management and budgetary, as well as policy, 
responsibilities and there is a high expectation of performance from post holders.  For most 
DPVCs appointed by means of external open competition, a part-time, add-on DPVC role 
has been transformed into a full-time management job.  Indeed, it was the prospect of 
effecting change and leading and managing others that attracted many of them to the role.    
On the other hand, some vice chancellors hold a more traditional view of the DPVC role as 
one of policy development and academic leadership.  Universities  W and their vice 
chancellors  W might best be conceived as located somewhere along a continuum from 
highly collegial to highly managerial.  Their position on this continuum is a key determinant 
of how managerial the DPVC role is likely to be.  Furthermore, even within the same 
university there may be traditional policy DPVCs as well as those with a more executive-
style brief.   
 
2. Management is a Discrete Function 
Indicator 2a: DPVCs acting in a full-time permanent management capacity 
In purely contractual terms, being a DPVC is not a full-time and permanent management 
job since the norm remains a fixed-term DPVC appointment with an underlying open-
ended academic contract.  In practice, however, for most DPVCs appointed via external 
open competition it is less a part-time, fixed-term role than a full-time management job 
undertaken as part of an ongoing academic management career.   
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Although some DPVCs retain a notional time allocation for research, in reality most find it 
difficult to maintain their research activity.  Furthermore, few DPVCs wish to return to an 
academic role at the end of their term and, for the most part, recognise they have left their 
teaching and research careers behind them.   
Indicator 2b: Management skills and experience as the main criteria for the role 
The main stated criterion for most DPVC roles, almost regardless of the specific portfolio, is 
a track record of research excellence.  This reflects the fact that academic experience and 
credibility are still seen as prerequisites for the DPVC job.  In reality, however, management 
experience has become increasingly important  W albeit the expectation is that this must 
have been gained within a higher education context.  The ideal DPVC candidate would be 
able to offer experience as both stellar researcher and academic manager, but in most 
cases a balance has to be struck between the two.  The longer a DPVC has been on an 
academic management track, the less likely it is that they will be at the forefront of 
research in their area.  
Indicator 2c: Value placed on management training and development 
On-the-job training via a series of academic management roles is more highly valued than 
management training credentials and remains the normal preparation for a DPVC role.  
Nevertheless, more DPVCs (and those who aspire to the role) do now undertake some kind 
of formal management training programme, such as that provided by the Leadership 
Foundation.  This is despite the fact that some vice chancellors and other senior decision 
makers are sceptical of its value.  Such as it is, management training is higher education 
specific rather than generic. 
 
3. Management is Rational and Value Neutral 
Indicator 3a: Appointment based on merit rather than seniority 
Although most vice chancellors assert that DPVC appointments are based on merit, the 
emphasis on academic management experience means that in practice the jobs tend to go 
to the most senior academic managers, a substantial number of whom are already in DPVC 
jobs elsewhere.   These may also be the best candidates, though the evidence suggests 
they are not drawn from the widest possible talent pool.  An apparently meritocratic 
approach is not necessarily leading to an optimal or fair outcome.  
Indicator 3b: Rational and value neutral appointment decisions 
Though the appointment process itself was not observed and it is therefore not possible to 
draw a definitive conclusion, the outcomes of external open competition for DPVC posts in 
terms of gender and professional balance are not indicative of rational and value neutral 
selection decisions.  On the contrary, DPVC appointment practice appears to reflect a 
combination of conservatism, homosociability and social closure.  The recirculation of 
existing DPVCs, for example, suggests a degree of self-interest and reinforcement of the 
status quo.   
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4. Management is Generic and Universally Applicable 
Indicator 4a: Recognition of management skills and experience gained in any sector 
Management skills and experience gained outside higher education are neither sought nor 
recognised in DPVC candidates.  The only exception is in respect of DPVCs with a third 
stream portfolio where the value of industry experience is acknowledged  W even though 
the vast majority of successful candidates are nevertheless career academics.  Only a 
handful of DPVCs in any portfolio have been appointed from outside higher education.  
The move to external open competition for DPVC posts has, however, resulted in greater 
opportunities for current and aspiring DPVCs to move from one university to another, 
showing that management skills are increasingly seen as generic and transferable within 
higher education  W primarily within the pre-1992 sub-sector.  
Indicator 4b: Appointments open to suitably qualified candidates from other occupational 
groups 
DPVC posts are framed in such a way that they are effectively closed to non-academic 
candidates, whether from inside or outside higher education.  Universities are seen as 
unique organisations in which academics alone are considered to have the credibility and 
legitimacy to manage other academics.  Not even those professional services managers 
who meet many of the key requirements for the role, such as specialist higher education 
knowledge and an empathy with the academic mission, are deemed viable DPVC 
candidates (except for a very small number of registrar-type DPVC posts).   
 
5. Managers Must Have the Right to Manage 
Indicator 5a: DPVC roles given appropriate authority and scope for managerial action 
DPVCs appointed via external open competition are increasingly acting in a managerial 
capacity and regard themselves as managers.  Many posts are designed with strategic and 
line management, as well as policy development, responsibilities.  Moreover, managing 
change and tŚĞƉĞƌĨŽƌŵĂŶĐĞŽĨƐƚĂĨĨĂƌĞŬĞǇĞůĞŵĞŶƚƐŽĨƚŚĞWs ?ƐũŽď ?/ŶƚŚŝƐƐĞŶƐĞ ?ƚŚĞ
roles are constructed on the basis that DPVCs will assert their right to manage.  For their 
part, DPVCs seem to accept and embrace this aspect of their role and are willing to assert 
their managerial authority.  On the other hand, as already noted, not all DPVC posts are 
managerial in nature and the scope for hierarchical line management is limited in a 
university context. 
Indicator 5b: Emphasis on positional, rather than expert, power 
Executive DPVC posts arguably have more positional power than that of traditional policy 
DPVCs.   Nevertheless, expert power derived from credibility as a researcher (or in some 
cases, teaching) is still regarded as a prerequisite for the role, since management 
legitimated by positional power alone is deemed inappropriate and ineffective in a 
university culture.  In other words, DPVCs may be accorded some positional power, but 
qualify for the role on the basis of their expert power.  Expert power thus retains a great 
Susan Shepherd                                                                                                                Appendices 
254 
 
deal of importance, not least in providing a rationale for the exclusion of non-academic 
candidates.  
 
6. Private Sector Methods are Superior 
Indicator 6a: Adoption of private sector appointment practice  
Pre-1992 universities are increasingly adopting DPVC appointment practice that might be 
considered typical of the private sector, i.e. external advertisement and executive search.  
However, implementation is suboptimal.  For example, universities are failing to use 
executive search agencies to maximum effect.  For their part, search agents suggest that 
higher education lags well behind practice in other sectors with regard to equality and 
diversity.   
Indicator 6b: Valuing of candidates from the private sector or with private sector 
experience 
Candidates from the private sector are not considered suitable for DPVC posts (with the 
possible exception of those with a third stream portfolio) and there is no evidence that 
private sector experience is valued in DPVC candidates.  In fact, there is widespread 
scepticism amongst vice chancellors and DPVCs about the transferability of management 
skills from other sectors. This is despite the fact that many managers have been recruited 
from the private sector to lead professional services functions.   
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